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This dissertation examines the origin, purpose, and function of the Athenian 
ephebeia during the Lycurgan period (334/3-322/1 B.C.). The ephebeia, a compulsory 
two-year long state-funded and organized program of military service for eighteen and 
nineteen year old citizens called ephebes, did not exist as a formal institution prior to 
334/3 B.C., the date of the earliest known ephebic inscriptions. Instead, the demos 
probably created the ephebeia after Alexander’s destruction of Thebes in September 335 
B.C. because they needed a standing army to defend Attica against Boeotian raiders. The 
ephebeia, then, was not a Lycurgan reform of a long-standing institution but founded de 
novo for a specific military purpose.  
This explains many hitherto misunderstood aspects of the ephebeia’s 
organization, officials, and military activities. Having entrusted the defense of Athens to 
the youngest and most immature citizens with no combat experience, the demos turned 
them into a capable fighting force by subjecting them to unusually strict discipline and by 
establishing a program of military training under specialized instructors. The demos also 
encouraged reluctant ephebes to serve by appealing to their love of honor (philotimia) 
and rewarded them with many honors at the end of their garrison duty.  
 
 vii 
In addition to its military activities, the ephebeia played an important role in the 
civic and moral paideia of the ephebes because they were unable to gain the educational 
benefits from Athens’ democratic institutions. The ephebeia, by instilling moderation, 
piety, and patriotic fervor in the ephebes, sought to make them virtuous citizens both 
dedicated to preserving the democracy and deeply motivated to freeing Athens from 
Macedonian domination. This devotion to the state explains why the institution was 
abolished by the pro-Macedonian oligarchy (321/0-319/8 B.C.) established after Athens’ 
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This study examines the Athenian ephebeia, a two-year long state-funded 
program of garrison duty, military training, and civic education, for eighteen and nineteen 
year old citizens called ephebes. It argues against the prevailing view that the ephebeia as 
described in the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia and attested in the corpus of ephebic 
inscriptions was “but a temporary phase in an institution which had ancient antecedents 
and one which later, beginning with the oligarchic revolution of 322/1, underwent many 
further changes.”1 My aim is not only to show that the ephebeia should be seen as a 
creation of the Lycurgan period and to explain what circumstances prompted the 
Athenians to establish this peculiar and enigmatic institution four years after the battle of 
Chaeronea, but also to reconstruct the purpose and function of the ephebeia from its 
inception to its probable abolition in the aftermath of the Lamian war (334/3-322/1).2 By 
placing the ephebeia in its proper historical, military, and socio-economic context, I also 
hope to improve our understanding of Lycurgan Athens and shed additional light on how 
the Athenians sought to survive under Macedonian domination and aimed to regain their 
former leading position in the Greek world. 
The first two chapters attempt to resolve the long-standing scholarly controversy 
concerning the date of the ephebeia’s origin. In the first chapter I examine and reject the 
various arguments advanced by scholars that are claimed to prove a pre-Lycurgan 
ephebeia. Having shown that citizens did not receive military training at public expense 
before the 330’s, I then discuss Aeschines’ peripoleia, probably the most important piece 
of evidence cited by the advocates for an early ephebeia. My analysis suggests that this 
passage, despite the similarity in terminology (i.e. sunephebos and peripolos) to that used 
to describe the ephebeia in the Athenaion Politeia, should not be taken as evidence that 
the youngest citizens had to perform two years of compulsory garrison duty c. 372. I 
argue that Aeschines’ military service was no different from the the youngest citizens in 
                                                
1 Mitchel 1964, 344, n. 34. 
2 All dates are B.C. unless otherwise stated.  
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the fifth century and that fourth-century ephebes before the creation of the ephebeia 
functioned as a homeguard in times of war and were ineligible for strateia (overseas 
campaigns) except under exceptional circumstances. 
With the epigraphic evidence suggesting a date of 335/4 for the inception of the 
ephebeia, chapter two investigates why it began to function in the following year. 
Contrary to scholarly opinion, the institution, I contend, was not created for the purpose 
of training citizens to be better warriors with the goal of strengthening the Athenian army 
that had been decisively defeated at Chaeronea in 338. Nor should we see the ephebeia as 
an inevitable consequence of the Lycurgan program’s aim to revitalize Athens in 
response to the city’s subordination to Macedon, as scholars have supposed, but rather as 
an extraordinary solution to a border crisis after Alexander’s destruction of Thebes in 
September 335. In an atmosphere of great anxiety and fear the Athenians, bereft of their 
most important ally and facing increased border tension and hostility with Alexander’s 
Boeotian allies, were compelled by their insecurity and weakness to raise a standing army 
to protect Attica. Having no other viable alternative the demos, I propose, used ephebes 
and modified their traditional duties to fulfill this immediate need. This resulted in the 
establishment of a new institution – the ephebeia – perhaps through Epicrates’ legislation 
“concerning the ephebes” (Harp. s.v. Ἐπικράτης) in late 335/4. 
 The third chapter explores how the demos sought to turn a given helikia of youths 
inexperienced in the art of war into a standing army capable of defending the chora 
effectively against Boeotian raiders. I argue that while they sought to mobilize the 
ephebes of every census class for garrison duty, some were at first unwilling to serve 
because they felt that it was detrimental to their personal interests. The demos encouraged 
these reluctant individuals to participate, I suggest, by ensuring that all would have an 
opportunity to satisfy their desire for distinction (philotimia) during their stint of service. 
I also contend that the characterization of youths as susceptible to unruly violence 
accounts for the prominence of discipline (eutaxia) and obedience (peitharchia) in the 
ephebeia, to the extent that the sophronistes was exceptionally granted the power to 
thrash those ephebes who acted in a disorderly manner. Alongside maximizing 
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recruitment and ensuring good discipline, the demos hired specialized instructors to teach 
the ephebes physical training and rudimentary skills in hoplite and non-hoplite arms. This 
training, I maintain, was primarily intended to give the ephebes the necessary skills to 
deal with Boeotian raiders.  
The concluding chapter examines the role the ephebeia played in the ephebes’ 
civic and moral education during the Lycurgan period. We will see that this paideia 
consisted of instruction in sophrosyne under the supervision of the sophronistes, a tour of 
the city’s sanctuaries, and involvement in various cults and festivals. I further suggest 
that the demos incorporated these features into the ephebeia because the ephebes could 
not have gained the educational benefits of participating in the city’s democratic 
institutions until they had completed their stint of military service. By cultivating 
patriotism, self-control, and piety in the youngest citizens, the ephebeia, I propose, sought 
to make them decent, law-abiding citizens who were devoted to the preservation of the 
constitution and willing to fight vigorously and die willingly for their patris against 
Macedon, should the Athenians have an opportunity to rebel. This unyielding loyalty to 
the democracy may help to explain why the pro-Macedonian oligarchy under Phocion 
and Demades (321/0-319/8) probably abolished the ephebeia after Athens’ defeat in the 
Lamian War in 322. 
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Chapter One: An Ephebeia before Chaeronea? 
 
The communis opinio is that the ephebeia antedated the Lycurgan period, contrary 
to the view of Wilamowitz and his supporters, who maintain that it was created de novo 
in the mid 330’s.1 Scholars have deployed an array of arguments to show that the 
ephebeia must have existed as a formal institution from the second quarter of the fourth-
century onwards and perhaps as early as the sixth-century.2 As Lofberg aptly puts it, “we 
must admit that long before that date [i.e. 335] there existed, if not the ephebeia as we 
now know it, at least the germ from which grew the institution so completely described 
by Aristotle.”3 I contend, however, that Wilamowitz’s position is consistent with the 
literary and epigraphic evidence. While his opponents are right to argue that the ephebeia 
had antecedents, they have confused them with the existence of the institution itself.4 
This has occurred because scholars have to some extent misunderstood the nature of 
Athenian military practices in the Classical period. The following discussion has two 
objectives. The first is to show that there was no pre-Lycurgan ephebeia, while the 
second is to examine the antecedents of the institution so as to determine the role the 
youngest citizens played within the Athenian military system prior to its creation, what 
                                                
1 A good summary of the debate up to 1950 can be found in Reinmuth 1952, 34-5; Nilsson 1955, 17-20. 
For a more recent bibliography, see Burckhardt 1996, 26-33.  
2 Reinmuth 1952; 1971; Pélékidis 1962; Gauthier 1976; Vidal-Naquet 1986a; Winkler 1990. 
3 Lofberg 1925, 335. Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 106, was skeptical whether anything definite could be said about 
the institution at the different stages of its development on account of the paucity of information. Pélékidis 
1962, 9, however, argues that the ephebeia before Chaeronea was identical in every respect to the Lycurgan 
institution (contra Ober 1985a, 90-6; Christ 2001, 416-7). See also Reinmuth’s 1966, 793-9, esp. 794, 
review of Pélékidis 1962, in which he rejects his position. Most scholars have followed Reinmuth 1952 & 
1971, who argues that the ephebeia in the early fourth century was a military institution, whose sole 
concern was military training (e.g. Mitchel 1964, 344, n. 34; Roscam 1969, 206; Gauthier 1976, 193-4; 
Faraguna 1992, 276; Hunter 1994, 152).  
4 When Reinmuth published his article “The Genesis of the Athenian Ephebia” in 1952, he observed that 
“the dictum of Wilamowitz that the ephebia began to function in 335/4 on the basis of a law passed the year 
before, has had the effect of diverting later studies on the subject from an examination of the antecedents of 
the institution and of confining discussion of its beginnings largely to arguments about the date of its 
origin” (34; cf. 39). Part of the reason why Reinmuth’s article proved so influential (and hence gained 
supporters for a pre-Lycurgan ephebeia) was that he exploited a major problem with the approach of 
Wilamowitz’s supporters: i.e. their denial that the ephebeia had any antecedents. This entailed rejecting or 
explaining away any similarity in terminology or in prior military practices approximating those of the 
ephebeia as the Athenaion Politeia describes it (e.g. Wilamowitz 1893, 191-4; Bryant 1907, 73-88; Brenot 
1920; Forbes 1929, 109-126). 
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duties they were required to perform, and under what circumstances they undertook their 
military service.5  
 
1.1: Explicit Evidence for the Ephebeia  
  Chapter forty-two of the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia is our main literary 
evidence for the ephebeia.6 I quote it in full:7 
 
(1) And the present state of the constitution has this following form. Those 
born to citizens on both sides share in the constitution, and they are 
registered among the demesmen when they are eighteen years old. And 
when they are enrolled, the demesmen, under oath, vote concerning them, 
first whether they seem to have attained the age according to the law, and 
if they do not seem so, they return again to the boys, and secondly whether 
he is free and born [legitimately] in accordance with the laws. Then, if 
they vote that he is not free, he appeals to the law court, and the 
demesmen choose five men from their number as prosecutors, and if he 
seems to be enrolled illegally, the city sells him: and if he wins his case, 
the demesmen must enroll him. (2) And after this the council examines 
those registered, and if anyone seems to be younger than eighteen years 
old, it fines the demesmen who enrolled him. And when the ephebes have 
been examined, their fathers, gathered together tribe by tribe, choose 
under oath three of their tribesmen who are more than forty years old, 
whom they consider to be the best and the most suitable to take care of the 
ephebes, and from them the people elects one of each tribe as 
sophronistes, and elects a kosmetes from the other Athenians to be over 
them all. (3) These officials, having gathered the ephebes together, first 
take a circuit of the temples, then march to Piraeus, and some garrison 
Munychia and others Acte. And the people also elects two physical 
trainers and instructors for them, who teach the ephebes to fight with 
hoplite weapons, to fire the bow, to cast the javelin, and to discharge the 
catapult. And it also grants to the sophronistai a drachma per head for 
                                                
5 The recent work of Marcellus 1994, 24-49, places more emphasis on the antecedents than has been the 
case in previous studies, but his explanation of the terminology (i.e. ephebos and peripolos) fails to 
appreciate the complexity of Athenian military practices. 
6 Cf. Rhodes 1981, 61, 63: “No one would now deny that A.P. is the πολιτεία Ἀθηναῖων from the 
collection of πολιτεῖαι attributed in the ancient world to Aristotle, that it was written in the 330’s and 
320’s when Aristotle was in Athens, and that it is a product of the Aristotelian school … On the evidence 
we have, Aristotle could have written this work himself, but I do not believe he did. That does not diminish 
the interest and importance of A.P.” Day and Chambers 1962, 1-4, however, argue that Aristotle is the 
author. For a detailed commentary on chapter 42, see Rhodes 1981, 493-510. 
7 All translations from the Greek and Latin are my own unless otherwise stated. 
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sustenance, and four obols per head to the ephebes: and each sophronistes, 
taking the pay for his own tribesmen, purchases the provisions for all in 
common (for they mess together by tribes), and takes care of all other 
things. (4) And the ephebes spend their first year in this manner: and in the 
following year, when the assembly is held in the theatre [where] the 
ephebes demonstrate their parade ground drill to the people and receive a 
shield and spear from the city, they patrol the countryside and pass their 
time in the guard-posts. (5) And they garrison for two years, wearing a 
chlamys, and they are exempt from all taxes; and they can neither be sued 
nor initiate a law suit, so that there may be no excuse for absence, except 
concerning an estate, an heiress, and if anyone may have inherited a 
priesthood. And when two years have passed, they are now with the others 
(i.e. they have attained full citizenship rights).8 
 
This chapter comes at the beginning of the treatise’s second half (42-69), in which 
the author analyzes the constitution as it appeared in his own time (42.1: Ἔχει δ’ ἡ νῦν 
κατάστασις τῆς πολιτείας). Having discussed the requirements for citizenship and the 
dokimasia of the new citizens (42.1-2), the author then outlines the function and 
organization of the ephebeia (42.2-5), describing a centrally organized and funded 
                                                
8 (1.) Ἔχει δ’ ἡ νῦν κατάστασις τῆς πολιτείας τόνδε τὸν τρόπον. μετέχουσιν μὲν τῆς πολιτείας οἱ 
ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γεγονότες ἀστῶν, ἐγγράφονται δ’ εἰς τοὺς δημότας ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτη γεγονότες. 
ὅταν δ’ ἐγγράφωνται, διαψηφίζονται περὶ αὐτῶν ὀμόσαντες οἱ δημόται, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δοκοῦσι 
γεγονέναι τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου, κἂν μὴ δόξωσι, ἀπέρχονται πάλιν εἰς παῖδας, δεύτερον 
δ’ εἰ ἐλεύθερός ἐστι καὶ γέγονε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. ἔπειτ’ ἂν μὲν ἀποψηφίσωνται μὴ εἶναι 
ἐλεύθερον, ὁ μὲν ἐφίησιν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, οἱ δὲ δημόται κατηγόρους αἱροῦνται πέντε [ἄν]δρας 
ἐξ αὑτῶν, κἂν μὲν μὴ δόξῃ δικαίως ἐγγράφεσθαι, πωλεῖ τοῦτον ἡ πόλις· ἐὰν δὲ νικήσῃ, τοῖς 
[δ]ημόταις ἐπάναγκες ἐγγράφειν. (2.) μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δ[οκ]ιμάζει τοὺς ἐγγραφέντας ἡ βουλή, κἄν 
τις δόξ[ῃ] νεώτερος ὀκτωκαίδεκ’ ἐτῶν εἶναι, ζημιοῖ τ[ο]ὺς δημότας τοὺς ἐγγράψαντας. ἐπὰν δὲ 
δοκιμασθῶσιν οἱ ἔφηβοι, συλλεγέντες οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν [κ]ατὰ φυλάς, ὀμόσαντες αἱροῦνται 
τρεῖς ἐκ τῶν φυλετῶν τῶν ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἔτη γεγονότων, οὓς ἂν ἡγῶνται βελτίστους 
εἶναι καὶ ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν ἐφήβων, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ὁ δῆμος ἕνα τῆς φυλῆς 
ἑκάστης χειροτονεῖ σωφρονιστήν, καὶ κοσμητὴν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ πάντας. 
(3.) συλλαβόντες δ’ οὗτοι τοὺς ἐφήβους, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ἱερὰ περιῆλθον, εἶτ’ εἰς Πειραιέα 
πορεύονται, καὶ φρουροῦσιν οἱ μὲν τὴν Μουνιχίαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν Ἀκτήν. χειροτ[ο]νεῖ δὲ καὶ 
παιδοτρίβας αὐτοῖς δύο καὶ διδασκάλους, οἵτινες ὁπλομαχεῖν καὶ τοξεύειν καὶ ἀκοντίζειν καὶ 
καταπάλτην ἀφιέναι διδάσκουσιν. δίδωσι δὲ καὶ εἰς τροφ[ὴν] τοῖς μὲν σωφρονισταῖς δραχμὴν αʹ 
ἑκάστῳ, τοῖς δ’ ἐφήβοις τέτταρας ὀβολοὺς ἑκάστῳ· τὰ δὲ τῶν φυλετῶν τῶν αὑτοῦ λαμβάνων ὁ 
σωφρονιστὴς ἕκαστος ἀγοράζει τὰ ἐπιτήδεια πᾶσιν εἰς τὸ κοινόν (συσσιτοῦσι γὰρ κατὰ φυλάς), 
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖται πάντων. (4.) καὶ τὸν μὲν πρῶτον ἐνιαυτὸν οὕτως διάγουσι· τὸν δ’ 
ὕστερον ἐκκλησίας ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ γενομένης, ἀποδειξάμενοι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ περὶ τὰς τάξεις, καὶ 
λαβόντες ἀσπίδα καὶ δόρυ παρὰ τῆς πόλεως, περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν καὶ διατρίβουσιν ἐν τοῖς 
φυλακτηρίοις. (5.) φρουροῦσι δὲ τὰ δύο ἔτη χλαμύδας ἔχοντες, καὶ ἀτελεῖς εἰσι πάντων· καὶ δίκην 
οὔτε διδόασιν οὔτε λαμβάνουσιν, ἵνα μὴ πρό[φ]ασις ᾖ τ[ο]ῦ ἀπιέναι, πλὴν περὶ κλήρου καὶ 
ἐπικλή[ρου], κἄν τ[ι]νι κατὰ τὸ γένος ἱερωσύνη γένηται. διε[ξ]ελθόντων δὲ τῶν δυεῖν ἐτῶν, ἤδη 
μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἰσίν.  
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military institution, in which elected officials – the kosmetes and the tribal sophronistai – 
supervise the epheboi and coordinate their activities. The demos also elects specialized 
military instructors – the paidotribai and didaskaloi – to train the epheboi in the art of 
war. These epheboi were eighteen and nineteen year old Athenian citizen males who 
were obliged to perform a two year long military service, which consisted of garrison 
duty in the Athens-Piraeus enceinte and the border fortresses. They have a distinct status, 
separate from the rest of the citizen body in a physical and a civic sense, and are required 
to complete the ephebeia in order to attain their full franchise. The initial publication of 
the Athenaion Politeia is conventionally dated to the late 330’s, with revisions in the text 
made during the first half of the 320’s to keep it up to date.9 Since the chapter contains no 
perceptible later revisions, the author’s description of the ephebeia probably also dates c. 
330.10  
 Contemporary with the Athenaion Politeia are the earliest of the corpus of 
ephebic inscriptions erected in honor of those ephebes who have completed their term of 
military service. Currently this corpus consists of twenty-eight inscriptions, which are 
either securely dated to or are thought to belong to the years 333/2-323/2.11 Though 
ephebic inscriptions continue for nearly six hundred years from 333/2, with the last extant 
example dated just after the Herulean invasion of Greece in 267/8 A.D.,12 the ephebic 
                                                
9 See Rhodes 1981, 51-58, esp. 56. Day and Chambers 1962, 196-7, lower the date of composition to 327-
324. 
10 The Athenaion Politeia says that the ephebes in their second year of service displayed their skill to the 
demos by undertaking “tactical maneuvers (τὰ περὶ τὰς τάξεις)” before the Assembly in the theatre 
(42.4). While scholars have taken ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ to mean the orchestra of the theatre of Dionysus, Dillery 
1982, 462-6 has convincingly argued that the writer is instead referring to the theatre-shaped end of the 
Panathenaic Stadium (cf. Humphreys 1985, 227, n. 32; contra Faraguna 1992, 279, n. 111). Since the 
stadium was completed in the summer of 330 shortly before the Greater Panathenaea (Will 1983, 87-8; 
Hintzen-Bohlen 1997, 38-9), the ephebes probably first staged their military reviews in it in 330/29 or 
perhaps the previous year. Provided that the Athenaion Politeia wrote this as part of his original 
composition rather than as a revision, the author is probably describing the ephebeia as it was c. 330. 
Rhodes 1981, 51-2, 495, holds that the chapter was written after the mid 330’s. This terminus post quem is 
not based on the content of the chapter, but from the epigraphic evidence (pp. 8-11). 
11 I have compiled a register of twenty-eight Lycurgan ephebic inscriptions in the Appendix (pp. 186-226). 
The members of the corpus are arranged in chronological order and are abbreviated E1-E28, dating from 
the enrollment years of 334/3 to 323/2. The register includes the text of each inscription, a discussion of 
alternative readings and dates if controversial, and problems with interpretation.   
12 See Kennell 2006, 15-30, for a register of all extant Athenian ephebic inscriptions from the Lycurgan 
period to the Herulean invasion. 
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corpus in the Lycurgan period forms a homogenous group on account of its distinctive 
format. The content of these inscriptions is both consistent with the Athenaion Politeia’s 
description and provides additional information on various aspects of the ephebeia: they 
use the term epheboi in a way which is consistent with the treatise, mention the same 
officials (along with others which only appear on inscriptions in this period), and show 
ephebes performing the same garrison duties as those described in the Athenaion Politeia. 
The epigraphic and literary evidence thus clearly refer to the same institution,13 though 
they do not call it the ephebeia or any other such term.14  
While the Athenaion Politeia does not shed light on the ephebeia’s origins or 
indicate for how long the institution had existed,15 the epigraphic evidence is suggestive 
of a terminus ante quem for its inception. Beginning with Foucart’s publication of E2 in 
1889, the earliest securely dated ephebic inscriptions are for the enrollment class in the 
archonship of Ctesicles (334/3),16 which were erected at the end of the ephebes’ second 
year of service (333/2).17 Wilamowitz argued that Foucart’s inscription was proof that the 
ephebeia was created after Chaeronea.18 Both the advocates for an early ephebeia and 
their opponents generally consider this epigraphic evidence his strongest argument and 
the most difficult to counter.19 Pélékidis, realizing that the discovery of an earlier 
inscription would prove the existence of an early ephebeia, suggests that “[Wilamowitz’s] 
epigraphic argument is still doubtful for another reason: it is precisely from 350-330 that 
                                                
13 Mitchel 1964, 344, n. 34; Reinmuth 1966, 794; Rhodes 1981, 494.  
14 The term ephebeia first appears in the ephebic corpus in the Hellenistic period. While it occurs as a likely 
restoration on two third-century inscriptions (IG II2 700, line 16; SEG 26.98, line 21), the first certain 
instance is on IG II2 1028, line 43, dated to 100/99. 
15 Wilamowitz 1893, 194, took this as proof that the ephebeia was a newly introduced institution  
(“Aristotle seine vor seinem augen neu eingefürte institution schildert”), because there was no such 
documentation on its origins to be found (“Auch ist nirgend formelhafte urkundensprache”). But this is 
misreading the writer’s purpose: his aim was to provide a contemporary description of the ephebeia, not an 
analysis of its origins. 
16 Foucart 1889, 253, published E2 = IG II2 1156. A year later Philios AE 1890, 91-94, published E3 = IG 
II2 1189. A third inscription was added when Mitchel 1961, 349-50, reedited E4 = IG II2 2970 and moved 
the date from the archonship of Praxiboulos (315/14) to Ctesicles. 
17 For the dating of ephebic inscriptions, see p. 187, n. 4. 
18 Wilamowitz 1893, 193-4. 
19 E.g. Forbes 1929, 119; Roscam 1969, 200.  
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our epigraphic material becomes more and more abundant.”20 But the inscriptions he 
cites as potential candidates have now been shown to be non-ephebic.21 Nor has his 
attempt to move two archonless ephebic inscriptions to the early 340’s been accepted.22  
In 1967 Mitsos published two stones which he thought belonged to a single 
stele.23 The first inscription (EM 13354) was clearly dated (lines 9-10) to the archonship 
of Nicophemus (361/0). In the second (EM 13354a = E1), the tribe Acamantis honored 
Autolycus the κοσμητὴς τῶν ἐφ]ήβων with an olive crown for his care of the ephebes 
(lines 15-20). The formulaic phraseology of the decree’s unrestored section (the right 
hand side), which is typical of ephebic inscriptions in the Lycurgan Period, along with the 
technical use of ephebos and the certain restoration of kosmetes, suggested that EM 
13354a was an ephebic inscription. While archontos could be read on the heading of the 
inscription, the name of the archon could not (line 13). Mitsos restored it as epi 
Nikophemo. His inscription, then, proved that the ephebeia as the Athenaion Politeia 
describes it existed in the 360’s. Despite Woodhead’s doubts about the restoration,24 
                                                
20 Pélékidis 1962, 12. His point seems to be that the vagaries of excavation and the Athenian epigraphic 
habit may account for why an earlier ephebic inscription has not been found. Certainly, as Lambert 2004, 
86, points out, the epigraphic evidence for Athens increases c. 338-322: “Probably more significant was the 
developing culture of the written word in the activities of the polis, which reached its zenith in the 
Lykourgan period, epigraphically the most intensely documented in Athenian history as regards the number 
and variety of inscriptions produced by the polis and its organs and subgroups.” See also Hedrick 1999, 
387-439. The epigraphic evidence for the Lycurgan period is collected in Schwenk 1985. But see also 
Lambert 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007. 
21 Pélékidis 1962, 12, cites Gomme 1933, 69-70, and Pritchett 1947, 184, no. 91. Gomme suggests that four 
fragmentary lists of names (IG II2 2370, 2382, 2384, 2388), dated c. 370-350, could be from ephebic 
rosters. But all are now known to be prytany decrees (see Meritt and Trail 1974, nos. 15, 18, 56, 74). 
Pritchett’s inscription is now recognized as bouletic (SEG 23.63). Pélékidis 1962, 252, n. 4, however, 
argues that the restoration [τοὺς βοὺς ἐφήβους οἱ] for IG I2 84, line 31, dated to 421/0, should be rejected. 
Sokolowski 1969, no. 13, has reedited the inscription and abandoned the restoration. 
22 Pélékidis 1962, 147-51, nos. 7 and 9. Pritchett 1949, 273-8, plausibly dates E18, a dedication of Oineis, 
to 330/29 because of the prosopographical evidence. Pouilloux 1954, 107-110, no. 2, uses the same 
criterion to date E15, a dedication of Pandionis, to around 332/1. Both authors assume that these 
inscriptions belong to the Lycurgan ephebic corpus. But Pélékidis dates them to 346-326 and 349/8-329/8 
respectively without citing new evidence. Mitchel 1964, 244, n. 34, rejects this approach as unsound while 
Reinmuth 1970, 34-8, 42-50, nos. 10 and 12, accepts Pritchett’s and Pouilloux’s dates over Pélékidis’ 
arguments. 
23 Mitsos 1965 (1967), 131-6. 
24 SEG 23.78 (1968): Ita Mitsos, sed nobis incertum manet an decreta ambo anno eidem sint attribuenda, et 
in vs. 13 fortasse archon alius (cum nomine paullo longiore) requirendus est. Quod si ita sit, decretum 
alterum in ex. s. IVa collocare debemus et de interpretatione institutionis ephebicae difficulties nonnullas 
evitemus; sed in ea re melius iudicabunt peritiores. 
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Reinmuth readily accepted it as confirmation of his theories and used it as his main 
evidence for further speculation into the nature of the early ephebeia.25  
Mitchel’s thorough reexamination of the stones confirmed the doubts of 
Woodhead about the restoration of Nicophemus and the association of the two 
inscriptions.26 He showed that EM 13354 and EM 13354a differ markedly, not only in the 
working of the stones’ surfaces, but also in their respective letter sizes, the length of their 
stoichedon lines (34 vs. 35), and their overall widths (0.496m vs. 0.498m). Mitchel also 
confirmed Lewis’ observation of the “basic improbability of repeating the same archon’s 
name in a second large heading.”27 Finally, Mitchel shows that the archon’s name needs 
eleven letters, not nine, and that the only candidate in the Lycurgan period who fits the 
gap exactly is Ctesicles, thus down-dating the decree from 361/0 to 333/2.28 Mitsos 
defended his restoration, but his arguments are insufficient to counter Mitchel’s 
observations.29 Despite the geological association of the two stones,30 the arguments 
against an early date for EM 13354a are decisive in showing that the inscription should 
be regarded as part of the Lycurgan ephebic corpus and that E1, like the three previously 
known examples (E2-E4), refers to the ephebic enrollment year of 334/3. 
The reception of these arguments among the advocates for an early ephebeia has 
been mixed. Some reject or at least suspend their belief in the date of E1,31 while others 
adhere to an early date for the inscription and use it as decisive proof that there was an 
ephebeia a generation before Chaeronea, sometimes without any acknowledgement that 
                                                
25 Reinmuth 1967 (1971), 47; 1971, 2, 123. Cf. Pritchett 1974, 104, n. 243; Piérart 1974, 278, n. 88. 
26 Mitchel 1975, 233-43.   
27 Lewis 1973, 254; Mitchel 1975, 240-1. 
28 Mitchel 1975, 241. Two archons have eleven letters in the genitive: Ctesicles (334/3) and Nicocrates 
(333/2). Mitchel rightly rejected the latter because […8….] Aenesistratou Acharneus was the kosmetes for 
that year, whereas Autolycus [….9….] Thoricios held that office on EM 13354a. Dow 1976, 84, also 
thought that the decree pointed to the first few years of the Lycurgan ephebeia.  
29 Mitsos 1975 (1976), 39-40. For a summary of the debate over EM 13354a, see Robert and Robert 1976, 
452, no. 194. 
30 Herz and Wenner 1978, 1071-2, note that the geological structures of the two stones suggest that they 
should be associated with each other. Hansen 1987, 138-9, n. 49, uses this as evidence that they belong to 
the same stele and hence share the same date. But the similarity in geological structure does not preclude 
the two stones from being cut and worked at different times or two inscriptions cut in different years on the 
same stele. 
31 E.g. Rhodes 1981, 494; Ober 1985a, 93-4; Burckhardt 1996, 30. 
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Mitsos’ restoration has been questioned.32 Moreover, Reinmuth, Gauthier,33 and Vidal-
Naquet,34 three of the four (the other being Pélékidis) most influential and cited 
authorities on the ephebeia, depend heavily upon E1 for their arguments and 
interpretation of the literary evidence. By doing so they give a false impression that there 
is direct and explicit evidence for a pre-Lycurgan institution. Even scholars who are well 
aware of the inscription’s problematic date can be misled on account of their reliance on 
the above three scholars’ arguments.35   
Despite this confusion over E1’s date and contrary to Pélékidis’ expectation that 
an earlier ephebic inscription would be found,36 the epigraphic evidence for the terminus 
post quem of the operation of the ephebeia has remained the same for over a century. 
Four ephebic inscriptions are known for the enrollment class of 334/3 and eight(?) more 
for the next year (333/2), with examples occurring thereafter, but none are attested 
earlier. Both the late and early ephebeia camps explain this “efflorescence” of ephebic 
inscriptions for these years, as Lewis puts it,37 by supposing that Epicrates’ law 
“concerning the ephebes,” preserved in Harpocration (s.v. Ἐπικράτης) and passed 
shortly before 334/3, created the organization as we know it from the Athenaion 
Politeia.38 They disagree, however, on its scope and significance since Harpocration does 
not say whether his legislation (1) created a new institution or (2) reformed an already 
existing ephebeia.39  
                                                
32 E.g. McCulloch and Cameron 1980, 13. 
33 Gauthier 1976, 193, 195. 
34 Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 97, 122, n. 1. 
35 E.g. Winkler 1990, 26, n. 11, notes that Mitsos’ inscription is disputed and consequently the earliest 
inscription is dated to 334/3. But he then cites Gauthier’s 1976, 190-5, interpretation of Xenophon’s Poroi 
4.51-2 as his chief evidence for military training before the ephebeia without mentioning Gauthier’s 
dependence on the inscription. Winkler’s anaylsis in turn has been widely cited by many scholars. 
36 Pélékidis 1962, 9: “et l’avenir on trouvera peut-être des inscriptions datées avec certitude d’avant 336/5.” 
37 Lewis 1973, 254. 
38 See pp. 65-9, for a detailed discussion of this law. 
39 A new institution: Wilamowitz 1893, 194; Brenot 1920, 30, 49; Forbes 1929, 126; Marcellus 1994, 48. 
Dow 1976, 84, does not mention Epicrates but draws the same conclusion. He comments that the large 
number of extant inscriptions for 334/3 and 333/2 “virtually proves that the Ephebia was then new, and this 
was the object of intense public interest. On this (strong) evidence, the Ephebia was created after 
Khaironeia and began to function in 334/3.” A reformed institution: e.g. Mitchel 1964, 344, n. 34; 
Reinmuth 1971, 124; Humphreys 1985, 202; Bosworth 1988a, 209; Faraguna 1992, 275; Habicht 1997, 16. 
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To resolve this, we should not assume, as some scholars have done,40 that the 
epigraphic evidence is decisive proof that the ephebeia did not exist before 334/3.41 Since 
the advocates for an early ephebeia maintain that the institution existed from at least the 
early fourth-century onwards because its essential features antedated the Athenaion 
Politeia, namely that citizens under twenty called epheboi were obligated to participate in 
a mass military training program and to perform mandatory garrison duty for two years, 
we must now determine the validity of their arguments and reassess the evidence 
presented for each of these claims. 
 
1.2: Military training before the Lycurgan Ephebeia? 
 
 A distinctive (and perhaps original) feature of the ephebeia was its publicly 
financed and compulsory program of peacetime citizen training. According to the 
Athenaion Politeia, two paidotribai taught them physical exercise and specialized 
instructors (didaskaloi) showed them how “to fight with hoplite weapons, to fire the bow, 
to hurl the javelin, and to discharge the catapult” (42.3). They were also trained to 
maneuver in formation (42.4). The ephebes’ instruction thus included all aspects of land 
warfare, except for the cavalry.42  
 Scholars, recognizing the important role that this training played in preparing 
ephebes for their two years of military service,43 argue that the ephebeia must have 
existed before Chaeronea because of the necessity of training young Athenians for their 
future duties in the hoplite phalanx. Ridley’s view is representative: “common-sense is 
enough to indicate … that no Athenian could be expected at the age of eighteen, on 
becoming a citizen, to be able without further ado to take his place in the phalanx to carry 
                                                
40 Siewert 1977, 102; Wheeler 1982, 229; Develin 1989, 5; Dillery 2002, 468 
41 Cf. Ridley 1979, 532: “Unfortunately, there is no epigraphical evidence before the late fourth-century  
(IG II2 1156, 1189), although on the other hand, there is nothing here proving that this was the very origin 
of the ephebeia, as is commonly claimed.” 
42 For a comprehensive discussion of military training in the ephebeia, see pp. 135-46.  
43 E.g. Reinmuth 1971, 126: “The ephebia in the fourth century was organized on military lines to carry out 
a military purpose: the training of the first two cadres of the 42 age-groups for active military duty.” 
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on this demanding and dangerous fighting for another forty-odd years.”44 Despite their 
conviction that young Athenians must or should have trained for war from the fifth 
century onwards, scholars present no evidence that explicitly refers to a pre-Lycurgan 
training program.45 Indeed, the argument for it depends almost entirely on Xenophon’s 
Poroi (4.51-2), which, it is claimed, is an indirect reference to an early ephebeia.46 It is 
important to point out, however, that most scholarly discussions of this passage have 
been made without reference to or without sufficient consideration for contemporary 
evidence on the state of military training in Greece and Athens in the Classical period.47 
My intention is first to discuss these general statements on military training and then 
assess this (supposed) positive evidence for the ephebeia. 
 The prevailing opinion is that some kind of training program already existed at 
the beginning of the fourth century, if not much earlier. While scholars disagree over the 
details of this program, most believe that it was obligatory for at least a substantial 
portion of ephebes and resembled the description of the program in the Athenaion 
Politeia: i.e. a state-organized program in which Athenian youths were trained in various 
aspects of the art of war.48 Yet ancient writers suggest that there was no mandatory 
training for Athenian citizens before Chaeronea. The starting point for any investigation 
is Aristotle’s statement in the Politics, in which he explains Sparta’s success in warfare in 
terms of the existence or non-existence of training programs outside of Sparta:  
 
                                                
44 Ridley 1979, 534. See also Bonner 1933, 89; Jaeger 1945, 250; Reinmuth 1952, 44-5, 50; 1971, 137; 
Roscam 1969, 205; Ober 1985a, 90-95; Burckhardt 1996, 32; Christ 2001, 416-7. 
45 Scholars often acknowledge the lack of explicit evidence (Girard 1892, 629; Ridley 1979, 531, 534; 
Burckhardt 1996, 32). Mitchel 1964, 344, n. 34, cites no sources but conjectures on how an early training 
system may have operated on the basis of the earliest attested ephebic inscriptions. Reinmuth 1952, 45-47, 
tries to explain this silence by conjecturing that the early ephebeia was a “purely military organization” or 
that “the supervision by the state of military training during the first years of citizenship developed so 
naturally and so logically from citizenship as the Athenians conceived it, that it is not strange that we read 
so little about this preliminary training in our sources.”  
46 Winkler 1990, 30, calls this passage “the text which comes nearest to being decisive on the issue of a pre-
Lykourgan ephebic training.” 
47 Exceptions: Marcellus 1994, 27-8, 30-31; Rawlings 2000, 237-243; van Wees 2004, 87-95. 
48 E.g. Reinmuth 1971, 127; Gauthier 1976, 190-5; Ober 1985a, 90-95; Sekunda 1990, 151-3; Munn 1993, 
188; Burckhardt 1996, 32-33; Christ 2001, 416.  
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And yet we know that the Spartans themselves surpassed others, so long 
as (ἕως μὲν) they themselves persisted in their laborious exercises, but 
now (νῦν δὲ) they are inferior to others in gymnastic and warlike contests: 
for in this way they excelled not because they trained their young, but only 
because they practiced against those who did not. … But we must not 
judge them from their former (προτέρων) activities, but from their 
present ones (νῦν). For they now (νῦν) have rivals in their educational 
system, but previously (προτέρον) they had none (Arist. Pol. 8.3.4, 
1338b25-39).49  
 
Aristotle is clearly contrasting two distinct periods. He first refers to an earlier period 
when the Spartans were dominant in land warfare because they alone trained for it. This 
training consisted of physical conditioning and collective weapons- and formation- 
drill.50 In Aristotle’s time, however, the Spartans were no longer preeminent because 
their enemies trained in a manner comparable to the Spartan method. Though he does not 
mention it, Aristotle must be thinking of the battle of Leuctra in 371, when the Thebans 
decisively defeated the Spartans, as the beginning of Sparta’s decline on the battlefield.51 
This view is corroborated by Xenophon, who says that “other men are mere improvisers 
in soldiering, but the Lacedaemonians alone are truly the technicians in warfare” 
(Lak.Pol. 13.5).52 Xenophon was writing in the late 370’s, when the Spartans were still 
dominant, and his description of Spartan drill assumes that other Greeks were unfamiliar 
with and incapable of performing similar maneuvers (Lak.Pol. 11.5-10). 
                                                
49 ἔτι δ’ αὐτοὺς τοὺς Λάκωνας ἴσμεν, ἕως μὲν αὐτοὶ προσήδρευον ταῖς φιλοπονίαις, ὑπερέχοντας 
τῶν ἄλλων, νῦν δὲ κἀν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι κἀν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς λειπομένους ἑτέρων· οὐ γὰρ 
τῷ τοὺς νέους γυμνάζειν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον διέφερον, ἀλλὰ τῷ μόνους μὴ πρὸς ἀσκοῦντας 
ἀσκεῖν. … δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἔργων κρίνειν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν νῦν· ἀνταγωνιστὰς γὰρ τῆς 
παιδείας νῦν ἔχουσι, πρότερον δ’ οὐκ εἶχον. This fundamental passage, which Pritchett 1974, 209, calls 
“possibly the most important single passage which compares methods of military training in early Greek 
states,” has been routinely ignored in discussions of the early ephebeia (e.g. Pélékidis 1962; Reinmuth 
1952; 1971). 
50 See Anderson 1970, 84-110; Lazenby 1985, 25-28. 
51 It is important to point out that Aristotle is referring to a general trend for military training before and 
after Leuctra. While Gorgidas created the Sacred Band in 378 (De Voto 1992, 5) and the Argives the One 
Thousand in 421-418 (Thuc. 5.67.2; D.S. 12.75.7; 12.79.1, 4), they were exceptions in that both of these 
picked corps were permanent and received constant training at public expense. Other élite units such as the 
Athenian Three Hundred at Plataea and at Syracuse (Hdt. 9.21.3; Thuc. 6.100.3) were ad hoc formations 
created for a particular task for whom there is no mention of training (for Athens, see Tritle 1989, 55-6; 
contra Pritchett 1974, 224).  
52 On Spartan training and the comparative lack of it elsewhere in Greece, see Pritchett 1974, 208-31; 1985, 
61-5; Lazenby 1985, 3-4; Hanson 2000, 31-2; van Wees 2004, 89-95; Lendon 2005, 91-114. 
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 Before 371, then, no Greek state, including Athens, trained its citizens in the 
Spartan manner. Sixty years earlier, Thucydides made Pericles boast in his Funeral 
Oration that the Athenians are no less brave than the Spartans should they meet in battle: 
 
And in our training practices for warfare we also differ from our enemy in 
the following way … And in education, while they right from their youth 
pursue manliness by laborious training (ἐπιπόνῳ ἀσκήσει), though 
leading a relaxed life we no less go to face equivalent dangers … And yet 
if we are willing to meet danger, by relaxation rather than by toilsome 
training (πόνων μελέτῃ) and not by the compulsion of laws more than by 
habits of manliness, we gain an advantage both in not suffering in advance 
for troubles we anticipate, and when we come to meet them we seem no 
less daring than those who always toil (τῶν αἰεὶ μοχθούντων) … (Thuc. 
2.39).53  
 
While the Spartans train continuously for warfare from childhood, the Athenians are not 
under any compulsion to train nor is it desirable for them to do so. It was this 
incompatibility of individual Athenian liberty with an obligatory training program which 
convinced Wilamowitz that the ephebeia did not exist in the fifth century.54 Pélékidis 
disagrees with Wilamowitz and argues that if there were such an incompatibility there 
would not have been universal acceptance of military conscription in Athens.55 Pericles, 
however, is not saying that the Athenians are less willing to perform military service than 
the Spartans, but that the former are just as courageous in hoplite warfare as the latter 
without any formal military training.56 Pélékidis mistakenly conflates the two and 
                                                
53 Διαφέρομεν δὲ καὶ ταῖς τῶν πολεμικῶν μελέταις τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖσδε. … καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις 
οἱ μὲν ἐπιπόνῳ ἀσκήσει εὐθὺς νέοι ὄντες τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέρχονται, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀνειμένως 
διαιτώμενοι οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἐπὶ τοὺς ἰσοπαλεῖς κινδύνους χωροῦμεν. … καίτοι εἰ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ 
πόνων μελέτῃ καὶ μὴ μετὰ νόμων τὸ πλέον ἢ τρόπων ἀνδρείας ἐθέλομεν κινδυνεύειν, 
περιγίγνεται ἡμῖν τοῖς τε μέλλουσιν ἀλγεινοῖς μὴ προκάμνειν, καὶ ἐς αὐτὰ ἐλθοῦσι μὴ 
ἀτολμοτέρους τῶν αἰεὶ μοχθούντων φαίνεσθαι … 
54 Wilamowitz 1893, 191: “das ist eine institution, die grell von der ἐλευθερία, der παρρησία dem ζῆν ὥς 
ἄν τις βούληται abstrict, auf die die demagogen Athens damals so stolz sind. wer über diese institution 
nicht zuerst den kopf schüttelt, dem ist das athenische leben und denken vollkommen fremd geblieben, mag 
er auch dicke bücher darüber geshrieben haben.” See also Brenot 1920, 7-8, 10; Marcellus 1994, 27.  
55 Pélékidis  1962, 9. 
56 It should be stressed that Pericles is restating the universal belief held among Greeks throughout the 
Archaic and Classical periods that the only proper military activity is a straightforward clash between rival 
phalanxes consisting of hoplite-farmers and other well-to-do citizens (i.e. excluding cavalry and light 
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assumes that the acceptance of one entails the existence of the other. Loraux attacks 
Wilamowitz for interpreting Pericles’ speech “in realistic terms,” because the claims of 
non-professionalism and the presentation of Athenians as aristocratic warriors imbued 
with inborn bravery are topoi characteristic of funeral orations.57  But, as we have seen, 
Aristotle does suggest that the Athenians did not engage in mandatory training before 
371: non-professionalism may have been a topos, but it was grounded in reality, at least 
on land.58 
Cawkwell, however, astutely points out that “Perikles’ words do not exclude 
some sort of drill at Athens.”59 Some minimal unit training was indeed necessary; 
Anderson has shown that hoplites needed to be drilled in formation in a few standard 
spear movements so as to avoid confusion in the ranks.60 Classical and later sources not 
only suggest that the Athenians held military reviews in the fifth- and fourth-centuries 
both in peacetime and when they were mustering before a campaign, but also that some 
kind of unit training took place at these reviews.61 While such reviews were the closest 
the Athenians came to peacetime mass training before the ephebeia, Isocrates’ 
                                                                                                                                            
infantry on land or naval warfare on the sea) and that only the participants in these clashes showed true 
courage.  
57 Loraux 1986, 150-3. See also Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 89-90. 
58 This is in contrast to the Athenians’ attitude that training was a necessary prerequisite for success on the 
sea (e.g. Thuc. 1.142.9; Xen. Hell. 6.2.2-32; Plut. Per. 11). On naval training, see Amit 1965, 49-50; Jordan 
1975, 103-6. 
59 Cawkwell 1972, 262, n. 4. 
60 Anderson 1970, 87. 
61 On drilling in Athens, see Cawkwell 1972, 262, n. 4; Pritchett 1974, 208, n. 3; Ridley 1979, 517. 
Aristophanes in the Peace has the chorus sing “for long enough we have lost and ruined ourselves by 
wandering from Lyceum to Lyceum with spear, with shield” (353-6). Aristophanes is clearly referring to 
hoplites (σὺν δόρει σὺν ἀσπίδι). The scholiast on 356 comments: πρὸ γὰρ τῶν ἐξόδων ἐξοπλίσεις 
τινὲς ἐγίνοντο ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ διὰ τὸ παρακεῖσθαι τῇ πόλει καὶ ἀποδείξεις τῶν μᾶλλον πολεμικῶν 
ἀνδρῶν. The close proximity of the Lyceum to the city made it an ideal place for mustering under arms 
(ἐξοπλίσεις) before campaign. Aristophanes probably means this. But “the displays of the more warlike 
men” suggests that the Athenians held voluntary peacetime reviews, in which formation drill regularly took 
place. Isocrates’ use of ἐξετάσεις (7.82, see the next note) implies that these reviews were held, though he 
does not specify how often. Nor does he distinguish between hoplite and cavalry reviews. Cavalry reviews 
were held in the Lyceum, the Academy, Phaleron, and the hippodrome from the 360’s onwards if not 
earlier (see Spence 1993, 43, 77-8 on Xen. Hipp. 3.1; 3.6; 3.14). Late fourth- and early third-century 
inscriptions praise taxiarchs for their attention to reviews, but it is unclear whether the same situation 
applied to the period before Chaeronea (e.g. IG II2 500 [305/4], line 12; Hesp. 2, 156 [275/4], no. 5, lines 
14-15; Agora 16.187 [271/70], line 17). The muster-reviews would have acted as a refresher for veteran 




Areopagiticus, dated to 356, suggests that they were reluctant to attend them: “we have so 
neglected warlike affairs, that we do not even venture to go to reviews unless we receive 
pay for it” (7.82).62 Badly attended reviews do not constitute a training program.63  
According to Aristotle, as we have seen, cities other than Sparta established 
peacetime training programs after Leuctra. Following the example of the Theban Sacred 
Band, these cities trained small élite units of citizen soldiers and maintained them at 
public expense.64 The Athenians, however, had no such program, not even for Athens’ 
élite citizen corps, the epilektoi.65 Xenophon, writing in c. 355,66 makes Socrates say to 
the younger Pericles: “when will the Athenians train their bodies [like the 
Lacedaemonians] in this way, they themselves who not only neglect their fitness, but also 
mock those who attend to it” (Mem. 3.5.15).67 Elsewhere, Socrates castigates Epigenes 
for his bad physical condition, and, having stated the advantages of fitness and the perils 
of unfitness in warfare, he says “indeed, because the city does not undertake military 
                                                
62 ἀλλήλοις μὲν γὰρ κακὰ παρέχοντες οὐδεμίαν ἡμέραν διαλείπομεν, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον 
οὕτω κατημελήκαμεν, ὥστ’ οὐδ’ εἰς τὰς ἐξετάσεις ἰέναι τολμῶμεν ἢν μὴ λαμβάνωμεν ἀργύριον. 
Plato’s proposal that men must train in peacetime as well as in wartime, “taking no heed of wintry-weather 
or the burning sun” (Leg. 829A-B), is a reaction against this lack of enthusiasm in Athens and elsewhere 
for such drill. Plato is well aware that that his audience would regard the notion of training in heavy armor 
“no less than once each month” as ridiculous and unnecessary (Leg. 829D). His training program, 
consisting of sham battles and ambushes (Leg. 830E), is unattested at Athens. On Plato’s proposals, see 
Morrow 1960, 318-52.  
63 Cf. Anderson’s 1970, 98, observation that Xenophon draws his inspiration for the tactical maneuvers in 
the Cyropaedeia from Sparta and not from Athens (i.e. Athenian drill was rudimentary and badly 
performed).  
64 E.g. Eparitoi of the Arcadian League: Xen. Hell. 7.4.22, 33-4, 7.5.3; D.S. 15.62.2, 15.67.2. For these 
élite units and the general trend towards citizen training, see Pritchett 1974, 221-3; van Wees 2004, 89-95; 
Lendon 2005, 106-114. For the Sacred Band, see de Voto 1992, 3-19. The Thebans were unusual because 
they trained a substantial portion of the citizen body (Pritchett 1985, 64-5; Hammond 2000, 92-3). 
65 Tritle 1989, 57, suggests that “the taxiarch had the responsibility of training and otherwise maintaining a 
high level of military preparedness, discipline, and spirit among the epilektoi of his tribe.” But the text he 
cites, SEG 3.116 (c. 330), only says that Procleides the taxiarch of Aiantis took care of the epilectoi and the 
duties assigned to them, not that he trained them. Tritle also argues that this élite corps was formed after the 
change to conscription by age-group in order to compensate for the numerous “physically unfit, untrained, 
and/or unmotivated” citizens who typically served on campaign (56). If so, it reflects the general lack of 
enthusiasm for training among the Athenian citizenry. Christ 2001, 417-8, rejects Tritle’s argument, but his 
position depends on the view that all ephebes trained for war from the second quarter of the fourth century. 
66 Delebecque 1957, 477-95, dates the third and fourth books of the Memorabilia to c. 355. 
67 The dramatic date of the dialogue is late fifth century, but the historical context is the Theban threat to 
Athens before the battle of Mantineia in 362. πότε γὰρ οὕτως Ἀθηναῖοι ὥσπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἢ 
πρεσβυτέρους αἰδέσονται, οἳ ἀπὸ τῶν πατέρων ἄρχονται καταφρονεῖν τῶν γεραιτέρων, ἢ 




training at public expense, you must not make it an excuse for neglecting it in private, but 
for attending to it no less carefully yourself” (Xen. Mem. 3.12.5).68 Socrates would not 
have needed to state the advantages of physical training if such training were compulsory. 
These literary sources strongly suggest that the Athenians had no publicly funded training 
system before the mid 350’s.69 Consequently few Athenians had sufficient wealth and 
leisure to undertake physical training in the various gymnasia in Athens before the mass 
participation of ephebes in the ephebeia.70  
At no point do Xenophon and the other authors qualify the above statements to 
the effect that the youngest Athenians were treated differently from the rest of the citizen 
body, nor do they hint that they were compelled to undertake military training. The 
proponents of an early ephebeia, however, claim that a passage of Xenophon’s Poroi (c. 
355),71 does refer to such a training program. Xenophon, having suggested various 
methods to increase Athens’ revenue, suggests using it in the following way:  
 
If the things which I have spoken of are carried out, I claim that not only 
would the city be better off financially, but would also become more 
obedient and more disciplined and more successful in war. For those 
                                                
68 οὔτοι χρή, ὅτι οὐκ ἀσκεῖ δημοσίᾳ ἡ πόλις τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀμελεῖν, 
ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἧττον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. Reinmuth 1952, 48 and Bonner 1933, 89, reject this passage as an 
exaggeration without explanation. 
69 This is the usual reading of δημοσίᾳ (e.g. Pritchett 1974, 217, n. 5; 1985, 64, n. 195; Wheeler 1982, 
230; Rawlings 2000, 242). Ridley 1979, 535, however, argues that “what Xenophon is getting at is not that 
Athenians did not maintain any military fitness in a state connection; rather, his once comparing Athens to 
Sparta.” Xenophon is clearly contrasting Athens with Sparta, but surely the basis of Xenophon’s 
comparison is that Athens did not have a state organized training system while Sparta did. Otherwise what 
is Xenophon trying to compare? 
70 Xenophon, comparing the general situation among citizens in Greece with the disciplined mercenaries of 
Jason, tyrant of Pherae, makes Polydamos (quoting Jason) say “very few men train their bodies in each city 
(σωμασκοῦσί γε μὴν μάλα ὀλίγοι τινὲς ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει), but no one serves among my mercenaries 
unless he can endure as severe toils as I myself” (Hell. 6.1.5). This “general situation” in 374 can be taken 
to apply to Athens, though Xenophon does not explain what he means by “very few”. Pritchard 2003, 293-
349, argues persuasively that regular participation in physical training in the Classical period was limited 
to the wealthy, who comprised a small portion of the Athenian citizen body. See also Kyle 1987, 102-23; 
contra Fisher 1998, 84-104. Contemporary with the Memorabilia, Xenophon, comparing the Athenian 
hoplites with the Thebans, has the same concern for the lack of Athenian attention to physical training: 
“and our hoplites will be no lesser and having no worse bodies ... if they are trained correctly with god’s 
help (ὁπλῖταί τε οὐ μείους ἔσονται καὶ τὰ σώματα τοίνυν οὐ χείρω ἔχοντες … ἢν ὀρθῶς 
ἀσκηθῶσι σὺν θεῷ)” (Hipp. 7.3). 
71 For the date of the Poroi, see Gauthier 1976, 4-6. 
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assigned to physical training in the gymnasia (οἵ τε γὰρ ταχθέντες 
γυμνάζεσθαι) would do this far more attentively by receiving 
maintenance (τὴν τροφὴν ἀπολαμβάνοντες) more than when under the 
gymnasiarchs in the torch races: and those [assigned to] garrison duty in 
the fortresses and those [assigned to] serve as peltasts and [assigned to] 
patrol the countryside would perform more of all these things, if 
maintenance (τροφή) were given for each of the tasks (Xen. Por. 4.51-
2).72 
 
Who is the subject? Gauthier argues that οἱ ταχθέντες were epheboi because (1) only 
ephebes were compelled to train in the gymnasium (γυμνάζεσθαι),73 and (2) οἱ 
ταχθέντες performed the same activities – competing in torch races, undertaking 
garrison duty, and patrolling the countryside – which are attested for ephebes in the 
Athenaion Politeia (42.2-5) and the ephebic inscriptions.74 This analysis has been very 
influential among scholars, not only providing additional evidence for the existence of an 
early ephebeia, but also fuelling more speculation about the nature of its training 
program.75  
 Gauthier’s interpretation, however, is problematic. First, he cannot explain why 
Xenophon chose to use οἱ ταχθέντες instead of epheboi or some other term to refer to 
Athenian citizens under twenty. Indeed, if Xenophon meant for οἱ ταχθέντες to be taken 
as epheboi, why didn’t he use the latter as he did in the Cyropaedeia (1.2.5-13), which 
was written about the same time as the Poroi? While Gauthier is right to point out that 
Xenophon’s use of trophe, or ration-payment, suggests that the subject of this passage are 
                                                
72 Πραχθέντων γε μὴν ὧν εἴρηκα ξύμφημὶ ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον ἂν χρήμασιν εὐπορωτέραν τὴν πόλιν 
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐπειθεστέραν καὶ εὐτακτοτέραν καὶ εὐπολεμωτέραν γενέσθαι. οἵ τε γὰρ 
ταχθέντες γυμνάζεσθαι πολὺ ἂν ἐπιμελέστερον τοῦτο πράττοιεν ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις τὴν τροφὴν 
ἀπολαμβάνοντες πλείω ἢ ἐν ταῖς λαμπάσι γυμνασιαρχούμενοι· οἵ τε φρουρεῖν ἐν τοῖς φρουρίοις 
οἵ τε πελτάζειν καὶ περιπολεῖν τὴν χώραν πάντα ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἂν πράττοιεν, ἐφ’ ἑκάστοις τῶν 
ἔργων τῆς τροφῆς ἀποδιδομένης. 
73 Gauthier 1976, 192: “Mais aux seuls éphèbes il est prescript (cf. ταχθέντες) de s’etraîner dans les 
gymnases.” Sekunda 1990, 151, makes the same point: “This passage can hardly be referring to anything 
other than the ephebate since only the ephebes, at any period in Athenian history, were ‘ordered’ to train in 
the gymnasia (οἵ ταχθέντες γυμνάζεσθαι).” 
74 Gauthier 1976, 190-5. Bryant 1907, 86, had previously noted the similarity between the Poroi and the 
ephebeia, but doubted the authorship of the treatise. Lofberg 1925, 331, and Reinmuth 1952, 37, have also 
examined the passage before Gauthier, but do not associate it with the ephebeia. 
75 E.g. Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 122, n. 1; Hansen 1987, 139-40, n. 49; Winkler 1990, 28-31; Sekunda 1990, 
151-3; Faraguna 1992, 276; Burckhardt 1996, 30; Chankowski 1997, 333, n. 8; Rawlings 2000, 253, n. 40; 
Fisher 2001, 182; van Wees 2004, 94. 
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the citizens of Athens rather than mercenaries,76 his argument that οἱ ταχθέντες should 
not be taken as politai but as epheboi is unconvincing because his assumption that the 
ephebeia existed in the 350’s (and hence that Xenophon must be referring to the 
institution) depends upon an early date for E1, which, as we have seen, should instead be 
dated to 333/2.77 
 Second, Gauthier has misunderstood the nature of Xenophon’s proposal 
concerning military training. For Gauthier Xenophon is recommending that the ephebes 
should be maintained at public expense so that they could train with more dedication.78 
He thus assumes that ephebes were already being trained en masse in the gymnasia. But, 
as we have seen, Xenophon says explicitly in the Memorabilia that Athens did not have a 
publicly funded training program in the mid 350’s and consequently the majority of 
Athenian citizens neglected to train their bodies for war (3.5.15; 3.12.5).79 Xenophon’s 
proposal in the Poroi should therefore be understood as his solution to this problem of 
getting more Athenians to train regularly in the gymnasia. When Xenophon says οἵ τε 
γὰρ ταχθέντες γυμνάζεσθαι πολὺ ἂν ἐπιμελέστερον τοῦτο πράττοιεν ἐν τοῖς 
                                                
76 For the use of trophe and misthos in the Poroi, see Gauthier 1976, 20-32. The communis opinio is that 
Xenophon is referring to citizens, whereas he would have used misthos and sitos if they were mercenaries: 
Lofberg 1925, 331; Gauthier 1976, 191; Ober 1985a, 93, n. 17; Sekunda 1990, 151. Marcellus 1994, 42, 
compares the trophe to the payment of rations in the Athenaion Politeia. Forbes 1929, 121, argues that they 
are irregularly paid mercenaries. On trophe generally, see Pritchett 1974, 3-6; Griffith 1935, 268-72; 
Loomis 1998.  
77 Gauthier 1976, 193. He follows Reinmuth’s discussion of E1 and his inferences from it that the ephebeia 
existed as a formal institution from at least c. 371 (1971, 1-4, 123-38). Gauthier’s explanation for why 
Xenophon chose not to mention ἔφηβοι but instead οἱ ταχθέντες is that the former was ambiguous in 
meaning before the Lycurgan ephebeia (193-4). His evidence for this supposed ambiguity is E1, lines 15-
20, in which neaniskoi and epheboi are used interchangeably: ὁ κοσμητὴς τῶν ἐφ]ήβων Αὐτόλυκος 
κ[αλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως ἐπεμε]λήθη τῶν νεανίσκ[ων, δεδόχθαι τῆι Ἀκαμαντίδ]ι φυλῆι ἐπαινέσ[αι 
Αὐτόλυκον ....9..... Θο]ρίκιον φιλοτιμ[ίας ἕνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας τῆ]ς περὶ τοὺς ἐφή[βους. But a more 
convincing explanation for the use of these two terms is an attempt to avoid the repetition of epheboi in the 
same clause (Pélékidis 1962, 126-7). Gauthier does not cite, but should have noticed, that both terms also 
occur in an ephebic inscription of the tribe Leontis (E8), dated to the archonship of Nicocrates (332/1), 
when there cannot have been any ambiguity with the meaning of epheboi: ἐπειδὴ Φιλόθεος ὁ 
σωφ[ρον]ιστὴς τῆς Λεωντίδος φυλῆς τ[ῶν ἐ]φήβων ἀπαγγέλλει περὶ τῶν ν[εαν]ίσκων (Col. I., 
lines 4-7).  
78 Gauthier 1976, 193-5. 
79 This is consistent with the statements of his contemporary Isocrates, who in On the Peace criticizes the 
Athenians for their apathy in military matters: “but we seek to rule the whole world, but are unwilling to go 
on campaign, and choose to make war against almost all men, but we do not train ourselves for it (οὐχ 
ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀσκοῦμεν) …” (8.44). 
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γυμνασίοις τὴν τροφὴν ἀπολαμβάνοντες πλείω ἢ ἐν ταῖς λαμπάσι 
γυμνασιαρχούμενοι (4.52), he is suggesting that Athens should create a mandatory 
physical training program in which all Athenian citizens, not just those under twenty, 
would receive state-funded trophe to help them train.80 
To illustrate the level of physical fitness he expects his new training program to 
achieve, Xenophon thinks that “those [citizens] assigned to physical training in the 
gymnasia” would pay more attention (ἐπιμελέστερον) to their training than those who 
ἐν ταῖς λαμπάσι γυμνασιαρχούμενοι. He invokes this comparison, not because all οἱ 
ταχθέντες competed in the torch races, as Gauthier believes,81 but because the few 
wealthy citizens who competed as lampadephoroi as youths in Athenian festivals trained 
assiduously for the event and received trophe from their tribal gymnasiarchs.82 Though 
these youths were probably of ephebic age, this should not be taken as evidence that the 
ephebeia existed at this time. The implication of the passage is that the physical prowess 
of these lampadephoroi, who comprised a small portion of the citizen body, was far 
superior to that of the average Athenian citizen: i.e. all Athenians could attain this 
standard if and only if Athens provided trophe just as the gymnasiarchs did for the 
members of their torch racing teams. 
                                                
80 Xenophon is using trophe in the same way as in Poroi 4.33, in which he, having discussed various 
methods to increase mining revenues, says that “there would be sufficient trophe for all Athenians from 
public funds (καὶ ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ εἴρηται ὡς ἂν ἡγοῦμαι κατασκευασθείσης τῆς πόλεως ἱκανὴν ἂν 
πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις τροφὴν ἀπὸ κοινοῦ γενέσθαι).” I thank Joe Jansen, who has recently completed his 
dissertation on the Poroi, for this reference. 
81 Gauthier 1976, 192. Sekunda 1990, 158, following Gauthier, argues that the ephebes trained in the 
gymnasia in order to compete in the torch races in their first year of the ephebeia. 
82 The evidence for training for the torch race is Aristophanes’ Frogs 1087-8: (λαμπάδα δ’ οὐδεὶς οἷός τε 
φέρειν ὑπ’ ἀγυμνασίας ἔτι νυνί). For the view that few Athenians had the wealth and leisure to train and 
compete in these races, see Prichard 2000, 110-1; 2003, 328-30. The epigraphic evidence supports 
Prichard’s view, as an inscription of a victorious team of Aiantis, dated to 350’s or 340’s, has ten members 
(IG II2 1250, lines 13-22). For the introduction of the gymnasiarchy for the torch race (421/0), see Davies 
1967, 35. On the liturgy and its duties, see Sekunda 1990, 156-8. Following Gauthier 1976, 191, I take 
γυμνασιαρχούμενοι to be a passive temporal participle. If οἵ ταχθέντες are Athenian citizens and not 
just ephebes, then γυμνασιαρχούμενοι refers to those few wealthy citizens who, as ephebes, competed as 
lampadephoroi under the supervision of the tribal gymnasiarchs. For the torch race in the Lycurgan 
ephebeia, see pp. 116-8. 
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Marcellus suggests that ταχθέντες γυμνάζεσθαι should be taken in the sense of 
“the young men assigned to the gymnasiarch in charge of festival lampadephoroi.”83 But 
this reading is inconsistent and is unnecessary with the use of the three other infinitives in 
the passage (φρουρεῖν, πελτάζειν, περιπολεῖν), which refer to those citizens 
conscripted to perform garrison duty, to serve as peltasts (i.e. those citizens who could 
not afford hoplite armor), and to patrol the countryside as peripoloi (4.52).84 If we accept 
that Xenophon’s proposal is to create a mass training program for all Athenian citizens, 
we should then accept that ταχθέντες γυμνάζεσθαι refers to those Athenians who were 
conscripted to do gymnastic training. By offering trophe for all these military activities, 
Xenophon hopes to make the Athenian citizen body better disciplined, more obedient, 
and more formidable in war.85 This passage of the Poroi, then, is neither concerned with 
the ephebeia nor ephebes in particular. It is not evidence for ephebic training, but for its 
absence.  
The evidence taken together suggests that at no point before Chaeronea were 
Athenian citizens, ephebes included, obliged to train for hoplite warfare. With the 
exception of the badly attended drills, training was an informal affair, the personal 
concern of the citizen. Socrates, for example, tries to persuade Epigenes, whose age is 
somewhere between eighteen and thirty years of age, that it is in his best interest to train 
his body for war (3.12.1-8). The decision to train, however, is Epigenes’; he is free to 
train if he is so inclined, but chooses not to. Despite the efforts of Xenophon and Plato in 
the Memorabilia/Cyropaedeia and Republic/Laws respectively, who argued that training 
was vital for success in war, the Athenians clung stubbornly to their conviction that such 
                                                
83 Marcellus 1994, 42. He cites no evidence to support his case.  
84 For a discussion of military conscription, see pp. 28-31. 
85 Gauthier 1976, 190-1, compares εὐπειθεστέραν καὶ εὐτακτοτέραν to the terminology of the ephebic 
inscriptions (see also Faraguna 1992, 276), citing E8 (332/1), lines 7-8 and IG II2 665 (266/5), lines 9-10, 
as evidence, and concludes that they must refer to youths who served in the ephebeia. But eutaxia, “good 
order”, and peitharchia, “obedience”, are two of Xenophon’s stock terms when he discusses military 
discipline (e.g. Xen. Mem. 3.5.6, 3.5.21; Anab. 3.2.30; Ages. 6.4; cf. Isoc. Pan. 115). There is nothing in 
these terms themselves that limits their application in this passage just to ephebes nor should they be used 
as evidence for an early ephebeia. 
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training was unnecessary.86 Indeed, Pericles, as we have seen, could boast that the 
Athenians had as much courage as the Spartans without concerning themselves with such 
excessive training (Thuc. 2.39). This prevailing amateurism is reflected in Plato’s 
complaint that a man who takes up a shield could not become a skilled soldier on the very 
same day (Resp. 374D). As Plato observes, the necessity of making a living was far more 
important to the average citizen than undertaking military exercises (Leg. 831C-832A). 
This amateur ethos left no room for a mandatory training program as described in the 
Athenaion Politeia. With this understood, let us now discuss the term ephebos. 
 
1.3: Aeschines’ Synepheboi and the Athenian Military System 
Perhaps the most important piece of evidence for an early ephebeia occurs in 
Aeschines’ On The Embassy, dated to 343. In this speech, Aeschines, defends himself 
against Demosthenes’ slandering of his military record (19.113),87 with the claim that 
“for having passed from the boys I became a peripolos of this land for two years, and I 
will provide for you my fellow epheboi and my officers as witnesses of these statements” 
(2.167).88 Aeschines states his age, and hence provides a date for his peripoleia, in his 
speech Against Timarchus. Talking about youthful appearance in old age, he says, 
“Misgolas is one of these men. For he happens to be my equal in age and a fellow 
ephebos, and we are forty-five years old at this time” (1.49).89 Since Aeschines delivered 
                                                
86 Lendon 2005, 109: “that training was irrelevant to military success was not a position Xenophon shared, 
but in his generation he had to argue for the importance of training in his polemical Cyropaedia because in 
his day the value of training could not be taken for granted.” See also Jaeger 1945, 251-8; Vidal-Naquet 
1986a, 95; Rawlings 2000, 242. 
87 On Aeschines’ response to Demosthenes’ allegation, see Burckhardt 1996, 237-9; Fisher 2001, 13-14; 
Roisman 2005, 118-19. Charges of cowardice on and off the battlefield between public figures in order to 
gain political advantage were common in fourth-century Athenian oratory. For a list of such accusations 
and the ongoing exchange between Demosthenes and Aeschines, see Christ 2006, 58, n. 37, and 132-42. 
88 ἐκ παίδων μὲν γὰρ ἀπαλλαγεὶς περίπολος τῆς χώρας ταύτης ἐγενόμην δύ’ ἔτη, καὶ τούτων 
ὑμῖν τοὺς συνεφήβους καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἡμῶν μάρτυρας παρέξομαι· The manuscripts have 
συνάρχοντας, but Bekker emended it to ἄρχοντας. 
89 Τούτων δ’ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὁ Μισγόλας. Τυγχάνει μὲν γὰρ ἡλικιώτης ὢν ἐμὸς καὶ συνέφηβος, 
καὶ ἔστιν ἡμῖν τουτὶ πέμπτον καὶ τετταρακοστὸν ἔτος. 
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his speech in 346/5,90 he was born in 391/0 or 390/89, which suggests that he served his 
two years as a peripolos in 373/2-371/0 or 372/1-370/69. 91  
Scholars associate Aeschines’ On The Embassy with the ephebeia because 
Aeschines calls his companions sunepheboi, and so presumably would have called 
himself an ephebos, a term which is attested in the Athenaion Politeia and in the ephebic 
inscriptions. These scholars, convinced that Aeschines is referring to a formal ephebic 
institution (see section four below), argue that ephebos in the Classical period meant 
without exception “a young man who undertakes his ephebic service.”92 But does 
Aeschines’ use of sunepheboi presuppose the existence of the ephebeia? No – I argue in 
this section that while Aeschines and the Athenaion Politeia use ephebos in the same 
technical sense, the term does not have the meaning in these authors and in the other 
epigraphic and literary attestations of ephebos before Chaeronea which Chankowski and 
other scholars have supposed.  
 
(a) Ephebos as a civic term 
The literal meaning of ἔφηβος, consisting of the prefix ἐπί and the stem ἥβη, 
can perhaps best be rendered as “a youth in the period of adolescence/puberty.”93 The 
                                                
90 Harris 1985, 376-80. 
91 Determining when Aeschines undertook his peripoleia has been problematic on account of the orator’s 
assertion that he and Misgolas were both forty-five years old, but Timarchus is younger (1.49), even though 
Aeschines says elsewhere (1.109) that Timarchus was a bouletes in the archonship of Nikophemus (361/0), 
which implies that Timarchus was in fact the same age. Scholars have proposed various solutions to this 
chronological inconsistency concerning Aeschines’ age. Lewis 1958, 108, has suggested that πέμπτον καὶ 
τετταρακοστόν in 1.49 should be emended to τέταρτον καὶ πεντηκοστόν, which would have pushed 
back Aeschines’ peripoleia to 380/79-378/7 or 379/8-377/6. Harris 1988, 211-214, has noted problems 
with this emendation and shows that Aeschines is lying about Misgolas’ age, but not his own, in order to 
make his charge against Timarchus plausible. Certainly Harris’ solution is less problematic than Munn’s 
188, n. 5, proposed emendation, who assumes that Aeschines did not die in Antipater’s purge of 322/1 but 
instead in the democratic purge of 318/7 and that μθ΄ has been corrupted to με΄. If so, Aeschines’ peripoleia 
would have occurred during 377/6-375/4 or 376/5-374/3. Fisher 2001, 10-12, in his recent commentary on 
the Against Timarchus, has reexamined the chronological problems and accepts Harris’ argument over 
Lewis and Munn.  
92 Chankowski 1997, 339: “En effect, dans aucun texte de la période classique l’acception non technique du 
mot “éphèbe” n’est attestée. Ce terme n’a qu’une seule signification, technique et institutionelle à la fois: 
celle d’un “jeune homme qui exerce son service éphèbique”, c’est-à-dire celle décrite par Aristotle.” See 
also Pélékidis 1962, 60; Winkler 1990, 31; Kennell 2006, ix.  
93 For ephebos as a compound of ἥβη rather than ἡβάω, see Pélékidis 1962, 57; Chaintraine 1983, 404-5, 
s.v. ἥβη. Hebe was the nearest the Greeks came to the modern notion of adolescence, though “puberty is 
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phrase ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβῆσαι or “to be two years older than puberty” – attested in Attic 
oratory and in the lexicographers – suggests that hebe in a civic sense began for Athenian 
males at sixteen, approximately when their fathers enrolled them in the phratry,94 and 
continued for two more years until they turned eighteen years old.95 At the completion of 
these two years of hebe the youths were considered sufficiently mature to be eligible for 
citizenship. The Athenaion Politeia provides the fullest account of how they became 
citizens. The author makes it clear that all youths who had attained eighteen years of age 
in the preceding year were admitted into the citizen body by enrolling them in the “deme 
register” or the lexiarchicon grammateion, provided that they could demonstrate to their 
(potential) fellow demesmen, to the law court (if necessary), and to the bouletai in the 
dokimasia that they satisfied the criteria for citizenship – their age, their status as 
freemen, and their Athenian parentage (42.1-2).96  
At the beginning of the Athenaion Politeia’s description of the enrollment 
procedure the author defines the youths in terms of their Athenian parentage, using the 
circumlocution οἱ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γεγονότες ἀστῶν or “those born of citizens on both 
                                                                                                                                            
often a more satisfactory translation” (Garland 1990, 166; also see Golden 1990, 28). See Pélékidis 1962, 
59-60, for various words formed from ἥβη. 
94 See Lambert 1993, 167, 173-4. 
95 For a detailed discussion of ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβῆσαι, see Labarbe 1957, 67-75; Pélékidis 1962, 51-60. The 
lexicographers show that there were divergent interpretations of this phrase in antiquity. While Didymus 
defines hebe as fourteen and hence ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβῆσαι as sixteen (Harp. s.v. ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβῆσαι; schol. on 
Aeschin. 3.122), the Anecdota Graeca s.v. ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβῆσαι gives sixteen and eighteen respectively. 
Pélékidis 1962, 51-60, tries to explain this difference by arguing that the ephebeia in Solon’s time was a 
period of four years beginning when Athenians turned sixteen, but later was reduced to two years when the 
age of hebe was raised to sixteen. He provides no evidence, however, that the ephebeia existed in the early 
sixth-century. Golden 1990, 28-9, more plausibly argues that ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβῆσαι was pre-Cleisthenic 
expression which originally referred to Athenians gaining citizenship by enrolling in the phratry (i.e. at 
sixteen), but was then modified after the reforms to satisfy the new admission age of eighteen for 
enrollment in the deme registry (see the next note).  
96 The Athenaion Politeia does not mention the lexiarchicon grammateion but the author must have been 
thinking of the register when he says ἐγγράφονται δ’ εἰς τοὺς δημότας (42.1). Cf. Harp. s.v. Κοινὸν 
γραμματεῖον καὶ ληξιαρχικόν: τὸ μὲν κοινὸν γραμματεῖόν ἐστιν εἰς ὃ ἐνεγράφοντο οἱ εἰσαγόμενοι 
εἰς τοὺς φράτορας καὶ γεννήτας, τὸ δὲ ληξιαρχικὸν εἰς ὃ ἐνεγράφοντο οἱ εἰς τοὺς δήμους 
ἐγγραφόμενοι, ὡς δεικνύουσιν ἄλλοι τε ῥήτορες καὶ Ἰσαῖος ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ Ἀπολλοδώρου 
κλήρου. For a detailed analysis of Ath.Pol. 42.1-2 and citizen registration generally, see Rhodes 1972, 171-
4; 1981, 497-502; Whitehead 1986, 97-104. The author says that the youths had to be ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτη 
γεγονότες when they enrolled among the demesmen (42.1). The arguments of Golden 1979, 25-38, and 
Rhodes 1981, 497-8, show that ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτη γεγονότες should be understood as “eighteen years 
old” and not “in their eighteenth year,” as Sealey 1957, 195-7, and Welsh 1977, 77-85, maintain. 
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sides” (42.1). It is only when they have successfully passed their dokimasia before the 
boule and hence received formal recognition from the polis of their new status as citizens 
that he calls them epheboi (42.2: ἐπὰν … δοκιμασθῶσιν οἱ ἔφηβοι).97 This suggests 
that ephebos was used in the technical sense of “one who has become a citizen” rather 
“one who is in the act of becoming a citizen,” as Marcellus has argued.98 Being an 
ephebos meant that the youth, at the end of his ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβῆσαι, assumed the rights 
and responsibilities of citizenship: i.e. he has ceased to be under the authority of his 
father and has gained the right to be kurios over his own affairs and participate in public 
life. The ephebe could now inherit his patrimony and own property, participate in 
Athenian cults and festivals, attend and vote in the ecclesia (see below for a discussion on 
the pinax ecclesiastikos), represent himself in the lawcourt and make legal contracts, and 
be eligible for public largesse.99 But passing the dokimasia entailed more for the new 
citizen than the acquisition of legal rights. For an Athenian youth, to be called an ephebos 
was also an acknowledgement of his new status as an adult male and that he was no 
longer considered to be among the boys.100 The use of ἐφηβάω in fifth- and fourth-
century authors with the meaning “to reach adulthood” conveys this idea of maturation 
                                                
97 Rhodes 1981, 502-3.  
98 Marcellus 1994, 47-8.  
99 See Lacey 1968, 125-9; Sinclair 1988; Manville 1990, 8-9; Hansen 1991, 97-9; Strauss 1993, 95. The use 
of ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβῆσαι as an expression of legal competence in forensic speeches suggests that civic 
majority began at the end of a youth’s hebe (i.e. two years after puberty). See [Dem]. 46.20, 24; Isae. 8.31; 
10.12; Aeschin. 3.122; Hyp. Fr. 192 Jensen = Harp. s.v. ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβῆσαι: see Labarbe 1957, 68, n. 1. 
Demosthenes and other speakers would refer to the passing of their dokimasia as the time when they came 
of age and began their lives as citizens (Dem. 27.5; 30.6; Lys. 10.31; 32.9). 
100 Goldhill 1987, 67. Cf. the Athenaion Politeia’s statement that if the demesmen do not agree that the 
candidate-citizens have attained the prescribed age (τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου), the latter “return 
again to the boys (ἀπέρχονται πάλιν εἰς παῖδας)” (42.1). The only direct evidence that sexual maturity 
played a role in determining a youth’s age comes from Aristophanes’ Wasps, where Philocleon says that 
one of the pleasures of being a juryman (probably during an appeal) is gazing upon the private parts of 
youths undergoing their dokimasia (577-8). Robertson 2000, 149-74, investigates the implications of 
Philocleon’s statement and argues that not only did the adult Athenians’ subjective assessment of a youth’s 
physique play a dominant role in determining his age but also that “his adulthood was not something which 
he possessed before the dokimasia, but rather something which the dokimasia conferred upon him” (153). 
Robertson may be going too far in asserting that physical attributes were the most important factor in 
determining adulthood, but there is no doubt that it was one of the criteria. See Rhodes 1972, 173; 
Whitehead 1986, 100-1. 
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and associates it with the physical capability of undertaking the military obligations 
expected of citizens.101  
Aeschines seems to have used sunephebos in his On The Embassy in the same 
sense as the Athenaion Politeia, though he does not mention his dokimasia and 
enrollment on the deme register,102 because his account suggests that he became an 
ephebos when he had “passed from the boys (ἐκ παίδων … ἀπαλλαθείς),” (2.167): i.e. 
he had reached legal adulthood and become a citizen.103 But was he called an ephebos 
when he had turned eighteen c. 372? Scholars have assumed rather than demonstrated 
that he was an ephebos at this time. Aeschines’ Against Timarchus suggests that the 
youngest Athenians citizens were called epheboi in 346/5 (1.49) and that his audience 
was already familiar with the term because he did not explain its meaning. Given that 
ephebos is unattested in fifth-century Athenian literature104 and that the earliest extant 
example occurs in Xenophon’s Cyropaedeia dated c. 355 (1.2.5-13),105 it is likely that the 
term came into use at some time during the first half of the fourth century. 
 
(b) Epheboi as the First Helikia 
 There is in fact reason to think that Aeschines’ use of sunepheboi is not 
anachronistic but reflects contemporary usage in the late 370’s. To show this, we need to 
understand what Aeschines meant when he said that Misgolas was his ἡλικιώτης … καὶ 
συνέφηβος in Against Timarchus (1.49). Scholars have disagreed over the significance 
                                                
101 Aesch. Sept. 665; Eur. fr.  559 Nauck; Hdt. 6.83.1; Xen. Cyr. 6.1.12. Also see Garland’s 1990, 170-4, 
analysis of Telemachus’ attainment of manhood, which emphasizes these ideas. 
102 Whitehead 1986, 97-103, argues that the dokimasia was first introduced after Cleisthenes’ reforms (for 
the fifth century, see Ar. Vesp. 578), though it is unclear whether the three-stage procedure as described in 
the Athenaion Politeia antedated the fourth century.  
103 Cf. Aeschines’ use of the same phrase in referring to the activities of Timarchus and Demosthenes when 
they became adults (1.40; 2.99). 
104 McCulloch and Cameron 1980, 1-14, claim that Aeschylus in the Seven Against Thebes makes Eteocles 
use ἔξηβος rather than ἔφηβος in line 11, though he is in fact referring to a citizen of ephebic age (i.e. 18-
19 years old). This is unconvincing for three reasons. (1) As we have seen, no direct evidence supports their 
view that the ephebeia existed at this time. (2) They follow Reinmuth’s interpretation of the Mitsos 
inscription without any indication that it has been misdated. (3) They fail to mention that Aeschylus’ clever 
allusion to ephebos would be unique in fifth-century literature.  
105 Garland 1990, 324, n. 166, mistakenly cites Aeschin. 2.167 and Dem. 19.303 as the earliest attested 
instances of ephebos. Lacey 1968, 294, n. 28, incorrectly holds that ephebos was first used after 336. 
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of these terms. Brenot and Forbes maintain that sunephebos was used non-technically 
before the creation of the ephebeia: the orator thus meant no more than “a fellow youth of 
the same age.”106 But if sunephebos had this meaning, why then did Aeschines use 
ἡλικιώτης? Foxhall observes that a “hēlikiōtēs is a ‘mate’, a ‘companion’. The word 
itself implies that both parties are around the same age.”107 Certainly Aeschines uses the 
term elsewhere with this meaning (1.42; 2.168, 184; cf. Lys. 20.36; Hdt. 5.71). The 
advocates for an early ephebeia, rejecting Brenot’s and Forbes’ position, argue that 
ἡλικιώτης … καὶ συνέφηβος can only be explained with reference to the ephebeia: i.e. 
sunephebos meant “a comrade in the ephebeia.”108 
The significance of sunephebos is suggested by a passage in the Athenaion 
Politeia. At the time of its composition, the conscription method used in Athens was by 
age-groups. The author describes how this system operated: 
 
The arbitrators are men who are in their sixtieth year. This is clear from 
archons and the eponymous heroes. For there are ten eponymous heroes of 
the tribes, and forty-two [i.e. 18-59 years old] of the age-classes [eligible 
for military service]. Previously, when the epheboi were enrolled they 
used to be inscribed onto whitened tablets, both the archon under whom 
they enrolled and the eponymous hero of the previous year’s arbitrators 
were being inscribed upon them [i.e. the whitened tablets]. But now [the 
epheboi] are inscribed onto a bronze stele, and the stele is set up in front of 
the Bouleterion beside the eponymous heroes … And they also use the 
eponymous heroes for military expeditions, and whenever they send out 
an age-class [on an expedition], they give public notice, from what archon 
and eponymous hero up to which must serve on campaign ([Arist]. 
Ath.Pol. 53.4, 7).109 
                                                
106 Brenot 1920, 17-18; Forbes 1929, 122, 124.  
107 Foxhall 1998, 58. 
108 Pélékidis 1962, 41. Also see Lofberg 1925, 333; Ober 1985a, 93; Winkler 1990, 29; Burckhardt 1996, 
26, 30; Fisher 2001, 182. Other scholars hold a similar position based upon Aeschin. 2.167 alone: e.g. 
Ridley 1979, 533; Mathieu 1937, 315. Sunephebos occurs on numerous ephebic inscriptions of the 
Hellenistic and Roman periods (209 B.C. – 256 A.D.). For a list, see Kennell 2006, 16. Despite this later 
association with the ephebeia, these instances of sunephebos should not be taken as evidence for how 
Aeschines used the term in the second and third quarters of the fourth century. 
109 διαιτηταὶ δ’ εἰσὶν οἷς ἂν ἑξηκοστὸν ἔτος ᾖ. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ τῶν 
ἐπωνύμων. εἰσὶ γὰρ ἐπώνυμοι δέκα μὲν οἱ τῶν φυλῶν, δύο δὲ καὶ τετταράκοντα οἱ τῶν ἡλικιῶν· 
οἱ δὲ ἔφηβοι ἐγγραφόμενοι πρότερον μὲν εἰς λελευκωμένα γραμματεῖα ἐνεγράφοντο, καὶ 
ἐπεγράφοντο αὐτοῖς ὅ τ’ ἄρχων ἐφ’ οὗ ἐνεγράφησαν, καὶ ὁ ἐπώνυμος ὁ τῷ προτέρῳ ἔ[τ]ει 




According to the Athenaion Politeia the epheboi were those eighteen year olds in a given 
archon year whose names were enrolled on the centrally compiled and permanent hoplite 
register for that year.110 These epheboi, as first year conscripts, collectively formed a new 
conscript age-class (ἡλικία), which was identified by the name of its eponymous hero 
(ἐπωνύμος). A dedication of the ephebes and sophronistes of Aiantis to the hero 
Munichus for the helikia enrolled in the archonship of Nicocrates (333/2) (E6, line 5) 
provides the sole surviving instance of an eponumos.111 The helikia acquired the name of 
its eponymous hero from the previous year’s arbitrators, who, at sixty, were ineligible for 
military service (Cf. Plut. Phoc. 24.3). The names of the epheboi were inscribed on a 
bronze stele, which was erected outside the Bouleterion.112  
The Athenaion Politeia implies that conscription by eponumoi existed before the 
work was written. The author distinguishes between two mediums used for inscribing 
new conscripts: the imperfect ἐνεγράφοντο along with πρότερον suggests that the 
ephebes were enrolling on the λελευκωμένα γραμματεῖα for some time before the 
present situation (νῦν δ’), when the ephebes “are inscribed (ἀναγράφονται)” on the 
στήλην χαλκῆν. Pélékidis argues that the interval of time implied by πρότερον μὲν … 
νῦν δ’ must antedate the composition of the Athenaion Politeia.113 He is right to propose 
this, since the imperfect ἐπεγράφοντο does suggest that “the system of the forty-two 
ἐπωνύμοι was older than” the Lycurgan ephebeia.114 Though the author of the 
                                                                                                                                            
βουλευτηρίου παρὰ τοὺς ἐπωνύμους … χρῶνται δὲ τοῖς ἐπωνύμοις καὶ πρὸς τὰς στρατείας, καὶ 
ὅταν ἡλικίαν ἐκπέμπωσι, προγράφουσιν, ἀπὸ τίνος ἄρχοντος καὶ ἐπωνύμου μέχρι τίνων δεῖ 
στρατεύεσθαι. For a detailed discussion of this passage and conscription system, see Rhodes 1981, 591-6; 
Hansen 1985, 15, 83-9; Hamel 1998a, 26-8; Christ 2001, 409-12. This passage has not been mentioned in 
many previous discussions on the ephebeia despite its importance in determining the meaning of ephebos. 
Scholars who mention it briefly include Pélékidis 1962, 73-4; Faraguna 1992, 275; Marcellus 1994, 26. 
110 For the creation and upkeep of these age-class lists, see Hansen 1985, 15; Christ 2001, 410.  
111 See Habicht 1961 (1962), 143-6; Reinmuth 1971, 17; Rhodes 1981, 593. Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 100, n. 
11, suggests that Panops may have been another eponymous hero, but this is uncertain.  
112 Sekunda 1992, 321, wrongly asserts that the stelai and the ephebic inscriptions had the same function, 
though the former were inscribed at enrollment and the latter after the completion of the ephebes’ service. 
For the triangular bases upon which these stelai stood, see Stroud 1979, 49-57.  
113 Pélékidis 1962, 73-4. 
114 Rhodes 1981, 592-3. See also Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 87. Rhodes believes that the shift from 
λελευκωμένα γραμματεῖα to στήλην χαλκῆν occurred when the ephebeia was reformed, which he 
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Athenaion Politeia does not indicate for how long this method of conscription had been 
in operation before his time, the Athenians were probably first conscripted by eponumoi 
somewhere in the period 386-366, when they replaced the older system ek katalogou.115 
Certainly this new conscription system was in use when Aeschines delivered his Against 
Timarchus in 346/5. It is likely, then, that Aeschines had it in mind when he called 
Misgolas a ἡλικιώτης … καὶ συνέφηβος. If so, it follows that he was not only claiming 
that Misgolas was a fellow member of his helikia when he himself had turned eighteen 
and gained his citizen rights, but also that they had the same eponymous hero because 
they became eligible for military conscription in the same year.116  
This technical use of ephebos is probably best rendered as “new citizen 
conscript.” Given that the Athenians had introduced conscription by eponumoi sometime 
in the two decades before 366, it is therefore possible that this system was in operation 
when Aeschines came of age (c. 372). If we accept this, Aeschines and his companions 
would have been called epheboi when they had passed their dokimasia and become 
citizens (2.167), unless there had been a change in terminology before the mid 340’s. 
While this confirms Winkler’s suspicion that Aeschines was not using sunephebos 
anachronistically in both of his speeches,117 it does not imply the existence of the 
                                                                                                                                            
dates c. 335/4. Wilamowitz 1893, 224, n. 77, argues that the creation of the ephebeia was responsible 
(contra Pélékidis 1962, 101). 
115 The Athenians used two conscription methods in the fifth- and fourth-centuries. In the older method, 
first attested in the 450’s (D.S. 11.81.4; 84.4-5), the strategoi would select hoplites for service on a given 
campaign by publishing tribal lists (katalogoi) of conscripts under the names of the ten eponymous heroes 
(Ar. Pax 1183-4; Av. 450). This system was known as ek katalogou or “from the katalogos,” because the 
strategoi (with the assistance of the tribal taxiarchoi) would compile a katalogos of the hoplites they 
needed from each tribe (Thuc. 6.26.2; 31.5) rather than from a central register (Hansen 1985, 83-7; Christ 
2001, 400-3; contra Jones 1957, 163; Burckhardt 1996, 21, n. 31). The prevailing opinion is that the first 
unambiguous case of conscription by eponumoi is in 352 (Dem. 3.4), while the last recorded instance of ek 
katalogou was in 348 (Dem. 39.8). The two systems thus coexisted side by side until ek katalogou was 
abandoned in the early 340’s (Andrewes 1981, 2; Hansen 1985, 88-9; Hamel 1998a, 26-7). Christ 2001, 
412-6, however, has convincingly argued that this change occurred much earlier, that Aeschines’ account 
of his first military campaign to Phlius in 366 (2.168) implies that conscription by eponumoi was already in 
use at that time, and that its adoption should therefore be dated between 386-366.  
116 Aeschines’ motive was perhaps to deceive his audience into thinking that there was irrefutable evidence 
on the λελευκωμένα γραμματεῖα outside the Bouleuterion that Misgolas was indeed the same age as 
himself. This explanation reinforces Harris’ 1988, 213, point that Aeschines is lying to his audience. 
117 Winkler 1990, 29. This would mean that the use of ephebos antedated Xenophon’s Cyropaedeia.   
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ephebeia, as Pélékidis and Chankowski have maintained;118 ephebos in this context is 
explicitly connected with the conscription of the youngest citizens. Some scholars, 
however, argue that the ephebeia was responsible for the adoption of the new 
conscription system because ephebes were already organized by age groups.119 But it is 
difficult to see why, if the ephebeia existed, Athens would have had two conscription 
methods in operation at the same time, one for citizens under twenty (eponumoi), another 
for those older (ek katalogou), before the latter was abandoned. This would have made 
conscription complicated, especially if the Athenians were calling up both groups at the 
same time. Instead, the Athenians probably introduced the new system because it enabled 
a faster mobilization and it was considered a more equitable and democratic form of 
conscription than ek katalogou.120 
 
(c) The Ephebic Oath 
An examination of the ephebic oath may provide a plausible explanation for why 
the Athenians decided to use the term epheboi for conscription by eponumoi. The ephebic 
oath certainly antedates Chaeronea. In his speech Against Leocrates, Lycurgus implies 
that the oath was one of “the ancient laws of the city (τῆς πόλεως οἱ παλαιοὶ νόμοι)” 
(75-6). Demosthenes, referring to the events of 348, says that Aeschines, urging action 
against Philip, read “the oath of the ephebes in the temple of Aglauros (τὸν ἐν τῷ τῆς 
Ἀγλαύρου τῶν ἐφήβων ὅρκον)” (19.303).121 Contemporary with this is the text of the 
ephebic oath inscribed upon a mid-fourth century inscription found at Acharnae:122 
 
The ancestral oath of the ephebes, which the ephebes must swear. I shall 
not bring shame upon these sacred weapons, nor shall I desert the man 
                                                
118 Pélékidis 1962, 73-4; Chankowski 1997, 339. 
119 Hansen 1985, 89; I take Ober’s 1985a, 96, mention of “a highly mobile rapid deployment force” as 
ephebes; Munn 1993, 189; Christ 2001, 416-7. 
120 See Ober 1985, 96; Munn 1993, 189; Christ 2001, 418-9, on Ar. Eq. 1369-72; Lys. 9.4. 
121 Winkler 1990, 29, incorrectly says that Aeschines took the oath. 
122 The bibliography on the text, date, and content of this inscription is extensive: SEG 21.519; Tod 204; 
Robert 1938, 297-307; Daux 1971, 370-383; Siewert 1977, 102-11; Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 440-9, no. 
88. The text of the oath is also quoted in Pollux (8.105-6) and Stobaeus (43.48). Lycurgus paraphrases the 
oath in the Against Leocrates (76-8), but the text of the oath read out by the clerk does not survive (77).  
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beside me, wherever I stand in the line. I shall fight in defence of things 
sacred and profane and I shall not hand the fatherland on lessened, but 
greater and better as far as I am able and with all. And I shall be obedient 
to whoever exercise power reasonably on any occasion and to the laws 
currently in force and any reasonably put into force in the future. If anyone 
destroys these, I shall not give them allegiance both as far as in my own 
power and in union with all. I shall honour the ancestral religion Aglauros, 
Hestia, Enyo, Enyalios, Ares and Athena Areia, Zeus, Thallo, Auxo, 
Hegemone, Herakles, and the boundaries of the fatherland, wheat, barley, 
vines, olive-trees, fig-trees (Trans. Rhodes and Osborne 2003, no. 88, lines 
5-20).123 
 
The oath claims to be “ancestral (πάτριος),” but how old in fact was it? There are 
several reasons for thinking that it antedates the fourth century. Scholars have drawn 
attention to the archaic nature of the vocabulary and the content of the oath. The literary 
versions of the oath as preserved in Pollux (8.105-6) and Stobaeus (43.48) show that 
these authors have modified the archaisms present in the epigraphic text so that the oath 
would be better comprehended by their readers.124 Similarily, the presence of functional 
divinities of military prowess (Enyo, Enyalios) and fertility (Thallo, Auxo) whose cults 
were obscure in the Classical period and the appeal to the “boundaries of the fatherland, 
wheat, barley, vines, olive-trees, fig-trees” as witnesses of the oath suggest an early 
origin.125 Furthermore, scholars have claimed that faint echoes of the oath can be found in 
                                                
123 ὅρκος ἐφήβων πάτριος, ὃν ὀμνύναι δεῖ τοὺς ἐφήβους· οὐκ αἰσχυνῶ τὰ ἱερὰ ὅπλα οὐδὲ λείψω 
τὸν παραστάτην ὅπου ἂν στειχήσω· ἀμυνῶ δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων, καὶ ὀκ ἐλάττω 
παραδώσω τὴν πατρίδα, πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀρείω κατά τε ἐμαυτὸν καὶ μετὰ ἁπάντων, καὶ 
εὐηκοήσω τῶν ἀεὶ κραινόντων ἐμφρόνως καὶ τῶν θεσμῶν τῶν ἱδρυμένων καὶ οὓς ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν 
ἱδρύσωνται ἐμφρόνως· ἐὰν δέ τις ἀναιρεῖ, οὐκ ἐπιτρέψω κατά τε ἐμαυτὸν καὶ μετὰ πάντων, καὶ 
τιμήσω ἱερὰ τὰ πάτρια. ἵστορες θεοί Ἄγλαυρος, Ἑστία, Ἐνυώ, Ἐνυάλιος, Ἄρης καὶ Ἀθηνᾶ Ἀρεία, 
Ζεύς, Θαλλώ, Αὐξώ, Ἡγεμόνη, Ἡρακλῆς, ὅροι τῆς πατρίδος, πυροί, κριθαί, ἄμπελοι, ἐλᾶαι, 
συκαῖ. 
124 Siewert 1977, 109. Pollux and Stobaeus, for instance, modify τῶν ἀεὶ κραινόντων in the inscription 
(lines 11-12) to τῶν ἀεὶ κρινόντων. For an analysis of the various modifications made to the text, see 
Robert 1938, 303-5; Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 445-6. Marcellus 1994 argues that not only does the oath 
antedate Chaeronea (44-8) but also that “the wording of the oath which survives dates from the creation of 
the ephebeia in 335” (162-3). This is odd, because the text of the oath found at Archarnae is dated to the 
middle of the fourth century. He (44) cites Siewert 1977, 104, that the inscription dates from the 330’s, but 
Siewert makes no such claim.  
125 Siewert 1977, 109; Robert 1938, 305-6; Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 446. For a discussion of the deities 
and witnesses on the Archarnae stele, see Merklebach 1972, 281-3. Stobaeus omits the deities and other 
witnesses, while Pollux mentions some of the deities (Ἄγλαυρος, Ἐνυάλιος, Ἄρης, Ζεύς, Θαλλώ, 
Αὐξώ, Ἡγεμόνη), but omits the inanimate witnesses (ὅροι τῆς πατρίδος, πυροί, κριθαί, ἄμπελοι, 
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fifth-century literature, which suggest that the wording was familiar to their audiences.126 
Though Marcellus prudently points out the difficulties of this approach in examining 
these claims,127 there are nevertheless some examples that do seem to echo the oath, with 
Thucydides 1.144.4 the most convincing.128 Finally, two vase paintings dated to the early 
fifth century apparently show a young man of ephebic age taking the oath at the 
Aglaurion.129 
 The evidence taken together suggests a fifth-century or earlier origin for the 
ephebic oath, though there is no consensus over the date.130 The advocates for an early 
                                                                                                                                            
ἐλᾶαι, συκαῖ). The connection between agricultural production and hoplite fighting is consistent with the 
sporadic pitched battles which took place on borderland disputed by neighboring poleis in the Archaic 
period rather than the continuous fighting of the fourth century (see Thuc. 1.15.2). For a summary of 
warfare before the fifth century, see Hanson 2000, 202-6. 
126 See Pélékidis 1962, 24, on Ar. Neph. 1220; Aves. 1451; Siewert 1977, 104-7, on Thuc. 1.144; 2.37.3; 
Soph. Ant. 663-71; Aesch. Pers. 956-62; Loraux 1986, 201 and 423, n. 178, on Thuc. 2.37.3; 202, on Lys. 
13.63; 305, on Ar. Pax. 596-8. 
127 Marcellus 1994, 44: “We should be aware, however, that the similarities between the Siewert passages 
and the ephebic oath may not, in fact, stem from direct reference or borrowing, but may instead reflect a 
parent ideology common to both, without any direct relationship between the two.” 
128 Thucydides makes Pericles say: “we must not fall short of [our predecessors’] example, but must defend 
ourselves against our enemies in every way and endeavor to hand down our empire to posterity” (1.144.4). 
As Siewert 1977, 104, points out, Thucydides’ use of ἀμύνεσθαι … μὴ ἐλάσσω παραδοῦναι does 
resemble the wording of the oath: ἀμυνῶ δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων, καὶ ὀκ ἐλάττω παραδώσω 
τὴν πατρίδα (lines 8-10). It is likely, then, that Thucydides was thinking of the oath and his audience 
would have recognized it as such. Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 449, cautiously accept this and other 
examples. But also see Marcellus 1994, 44-5.   
129 See Conze 1868, 264-8, pls. H and I. The value of Plutarch’s statement that Alcibiades advised the 
Athenians “to make secure by deed the oath regularly put in the temple of Aglauros to the epheboi (τὸν ἐν 
Ἀγραύλου προβαλλόμενον ἀεὶ τοῖς ἐφήβοις ὅρκον ἔργῳ βεβαιοῦν)” is difficult to determine (Alc. 
15.7-8; cf. Cic. Rep. 3.15), since the wording of the oath and the use of epheboi may be anachronistic and 
not reliable evidence for a fifth-century oath. Pélékidis 1962, 72, 76, was hesitant to see such a late source 
as decisive. But Lofberg 1925, 332, makes the important point that Plutarch’s sources must have given him 
a reason to mention the oath. Siewert 1977, 108, n. 32, plausibly suggests that Plutarch’s source was 
“Theopompus’ excursus on Athenian demagogues in his Philippica.” He notes that Theopompus mentions 
the oath of Plataea (FGrHist 115, F 153), which is associated with the ephebic oath on the Archarnae stele 
(lines 21-51) and in Lycurgus (Leoc. 80-1). Russell 1995, 203-4, takes Plut. Alc. 15.7-8 as an apologia for 
Alcibiades against his critics and dates it to his lifetime or the fourth century. 
130 Robertson 1976, 21, dates the creation of the ephebic oath and the ephebeia to the 360’s. But Rhodes 
and Osborne 2003, 447-8, argue more convincingly that the oath was archaic in origin (for the evidence, 
see Siewert 1977) while the stele of the oath at Archarnae was erected to encourage resistance against 
Philip II. Robert 1938, 306, estimates “plus antique que le ive siècle.” Mathieu 1937, 313, suggests a date 
between the reforms of Cleisthenes and Ephialtes/Pericles (i.e. 510-455). Siewert 1977, 111, proposes an 
earlier date “within the 100 or 120 years between the introduction of hoplite warfare … and the definite 
ascendancy of Peisistratus.” Roussel 1921, 459, also argues that the oath dates from the Archaic period.  
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ephebeia adduce this as proof that the institution existed before Chaeronea.131 This is not 
conclusive, however, because the oath could have been administered before the creation 
of the ephebeia.132 Even if we accept that newly enrolled Athenians swore a citizenship 
oath in the fifth century, we cannot be certain that they were in fact called epheboi, since 
the noun ephebos is not attested before the fourth century. Nor can we be sure whether 
the Athenians called their citizenship oath ὁ ὅρκος ἐφήβων. The lack of evidence for 
ephebos in the fifth century suggests that it was a neologism created by the Athenians 
when they adopted the system of conscription by eponumoi c. 386-66. The noun was 
perhaps derived from either ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβῆσαι or ἐφηβάω (more likely); both terms 
were already associated with civic majority and hence the military obligations the new 
citizens were required to fulfill.133 This would mean that, though the citizenship oath 
existed in the fifth century, it was known as “the oath of the ephebes” only in the 
following century. It is also likely that the Athenians used ephebos from the very 
beginning with two different meanings depending upon context: i.e. one pertaining to the 
attainment of citizenship, which involved passing the dokimasia and swearing the oath, 




                                                
131 E.g. Girard 1892, 622; Roussel 1921, 459; Lofberg 1925, 332-3; Bonner 1933, 90; Reinmuth 1952, 40-
2; Pélékidis 1962, 75-7; Roscam 1969, 201-4; Ridley 1979, 532; Rhodes 1981, 494; Ober 1985a, 91, n. 14; 
Faraguna 1992, 274. 
132 Brenot 1920, 29; Forbes 1929, 123; Siewert 1977, 102. 
133 Sinclair 1988, 54-5, clarifies this relationship between citizenship and military obligation: “of all the 
citizen’s responsibilities the military was in many ways paramount. Traditionally, the ability to arm oneself 
as a hoplite and to defend the polis – that is, the physical ability and financial ability – in a sense 
constituted the fully qualified citizen.” See also Manville 1990, 9-10; Hansen 1991, 99-100. 
134 Previous studies are thus wrong in assuming that ephebos was limited to one meaning before 334/3. 
Marcellus 1994, 47, for instance, argues that “although cognates of the word ephebos can be found in 
various places with a range of meanings, the word only occurs in pre-Lycurgan Athenian sources in the 
limited context of citizen initiation: either enrollment in the register or taking the oath itself.” He thus 
explains Aeschines’ use of sunepheboi as those Athenians who swore the ephebic oath together when they 
became citizens. It is odd, however, that he cites Photius’ Lexicon as evidence for his theory (s.v. 
Συνέφηβος: ὁ μετά τινος τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν ἐφηβεύσας), but omits [Arist]. Ath.Pol. 53, whose context is 
clear and connection with Aeschines’ Against Timarchus can be demonstrated. He also contends that 
ἐφηβεύω means “to be in the act of becoming a citizen” and cites Aesch. Sept. 665 as evidence, though 
ἐφηβῆσεντα is formed from ἐφηβάω and not ἐφηβεύω. 
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(d) Epheboi as a Military Class 
If we are correct in asserting that epheboi in pre-Lycurgan Athens referred to the 
attainment of citizenship and the first age class to be conscripted by eponumoi, we are left 
to consider the nature of their military responsibilities. The best evidence for this is found 
in Aeschines’ On The Embassy (2.167-70).  In his defense of his military record the 
orator distinguishes between the kind of military service he undertook as a youth and as 
an older citizen. Having mentioned his two-year stint as a peripolos he then says that he 
took part in his first campaign (strateia) to Phlius in 366, followed by campaigns in 
Euboea (tas eis Euboian strateias) (2.168-9). The implication is that when he was a youth 
he was ineligible to be conscripted for strateia – a military campaign conducted beyond 
the borders of Attica.135 A century later Teles the Cynic in his On the Comparison of 
Wealth and Poverty, contrasting the unfortunate lot of the Athenian citizen at the 
different stages of his life, makes the same observation:  
 
And when he is a child he desires to become an ephebos, but when he has 
become an ephebos he once more seeks to put away his chlamys, but when 
he becomes a man he hastens once again to old age. “But now,” he says, 
“life is unlivable – the campaign, the liturgy, the political affairs – there is 
no spare time.” He has become an old man (fr. 42 Hense).136   
 
For Teles strateia is one of the responsibilities an Athenian acquires once he has taken 
off his chlamys (i.e. ceased to be an ephebos) and has attained manhood (andreia). Daly 
points out that “as the agent-noun to be associated with στρατεία is στρατιώτης, this 
passage would seem to imply that the soldier (στρατιώτης) must be distinct from the 
ephebe.”137 Teles, in other words, saw strateia as the duty of the aner, not the ephebos.  
 Aeschines and Teles suggest that Athenian citizens under twenty had a special 
military status. While every Athenian citizen was obliged to defend his homeland against 
                                                
135 Reinmuth 1952, 40. 
136 καὶ παῖς μὲν ὢν ἐπιθυμεῖ ἔφηβος γενέσθαι, ἔφηβος δὲ γενόμενος ζητεῖ πάλιν τὸ χλαμύδιον 
ἀποθέσθαι, ὅταν δὲ ἀνδρωθῇ πάλιν εἰς τὸ γῆρας σπεύδει. νῦν δέ, φησίν, ἀβίωτος ὁ βίος, 
στρατεία, λειτουργία, πολιτικὰ πράγματα, σχολάσαι [αὐτῷ] οὐκ ἔστι. πρεσβύτης γέγονε. I 
thank Kevin Daly for referring me to this passage. 
137 Daly 2001, 338. 
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all threats, the youngest (and oldest) citizens were exceptional in that their military 
service was usually restricted to Athenian soil, perhaps on account of their inferior 
physical strength (Xen. Hell. 6.1.7). The Athenaion Politeia’s description of the ephebes’ 
garrison duties in a “typical year” of the ephebeia implies that their military duties were 
confined to Attica (42.3-5).138 Late sources too suggest that Athenian citizens under 
twenty did not normally campaign abroad.139 Consistent with this is Diodorus’ comment 
that the Athenians sent out a full levy in 369, just three years after Aeschines’ peripoleia, 
which included “even the young (καὶ τοὺς νέους)”, in this case the youngest citizens, 
under Iphicrates to help the Spartans (D.S. 15.63.2).140 Hansen points out that “the 
adverbial καὶ shows that it was an extraordinary measure and that the neoi were not 
ordinarily sent out.”141  
 The youngest citizens must have had the same role in the fifth century, because 
Thucydides says that on the eve of the first invasion of the Peloponnesians in 431 the 
duty of the neotatoi and presbutatoi is to garrison the fortified areas of Attica (2.13.6-7). 
He then contrasts these citizens with the main field army of thirteen thousand hoplites, 
consisting of those citizens aged between the neotatoi and presbutatoi, which is free to 
campaign elsewhere in Greece. Thucydides also implies that this division of the Athenian 
army into three age classes existed as early as the First Peloponnesian War, since he uses 
both terms in his description of Myronides’ campaign against the Corinthians in 458 
(1.105.4-6; cf. Lys. 13.4-7).142 Like the campaign in 369 the Athenians used the neotatoi 
                                                
138 Cf. Forbes 1929, 120. For the epigraphic evidence concerning the ephebes’ garrison duties in Attica, see 
pp. 81-2. The terminology of the ephebic inscriptions should also be noted: they always call ephebes 
epheboi (on two inscriptions they are called neaniskoi, to avoid repeating epheboi – E1, lines 15-6; E8, 
Col. I, lines 5-6), never stratiotai or any other such term, because the latter unlike the former are liable for 
strateia.  
139 Schol. on Aeschin. 1.18; Schol. on Aeschin. 2.168; Schol. on Aeschin. 3.122; Suda s.v: Τερθρεία.  
140 ὁ γὰρ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δῆμος, μεγαλόψυχος ὢν καὶ φιλάνθρωπος, τὴν μὲν τῶν Θηβαίων ἰσχὺν 
οὐ κατεπλάγησαν, τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις ὑπὲρ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ κινδυνεύουσιν ἐψηφίσαντο 
βοηθεῖν πανδημεί. καὶ παραχρῆμα στρατηγὸν καταστήσαντες τὸν Ἰφικράτην ἐξέπεμψαν καὶ 
τοὺς νέους αὐθημερόν, ὄντας μυρίους καὶ δισχιλίους. 
141 Hansen 1985, 41, suggests that Diodorus’ use of καί marks out τοὺς νέους as “the youngest citizens” 
(cf. D.S. 18.46.3-7) rather than the more common meaning of “those of military age” found elsewhere in 
the author.  
142 οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ μὲν πρὸς Αἰγίνῃ στράτευμα οὐκ ἐκίνησαν, τῶν δ’ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὑπολοίπων 
οἵ τε πρεσβύτατοι καὶ οἱ νεώτατοι ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὰ Μέγαρα Μυρωνίδου στρατηγοῦντος. καὶ 
μάχης γενομένης ἰσορρόπου πρὸς Κορινθίους διεκρίθησαν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἐνόμισαν αὐτοὶ 
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and presbutatoi because they were compelled to: the main field army was fully engaged 
simultaneously in Aegina and Egypt (Thuc. 1.105.3). While Thucydides and Diodorus do 
not specify the ages of the neotatoi and neoi respectively, in both instances they were 
probably eighteen and nineteen years old, just as in the Athenaion Politeia.143  
Despite the variations in the terminology used to identify the youngest citizens – 
epheboi, neoi, and neotatoi – the Athenaion Politeia, Diodorus Siculus and Thucydides 
thus describe the same military system in which the youngest citizens constitute a special 
military class whose primary function is to garrison the countryside. Though these youths 
as a group were usually not obliged to undertake military service beyond the borders of 
Attica, it is possible that individuals could have volunteered for strateia if they wished 
to.144 With the exception of Pélékidis,145 both the advocates for an early ephebeia and 
their opponents agree that the epheboi in the Athenaion Politeia and the neotatoi in 
Thucydides refer to the same group of citizens who are required to perform the same 
duties. The former stress this continuity and hold this as proof that the institution existed 
before Chaeronea.146 But the latter rightly point out that the existence of the youngest 
                                                                                                                                            
ἑκάτεροι οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχειν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι (ἐκράτησαν γὰρ ὅμως μᾶλλον) 
ἀπελθόντων τῶν Κορινθίων τροπαῖον ἔστησαν. 
143 See Gomme 1927, 142-150; Jones 1957, 161-80; Hansen 1981, 19-32; van Wees 2004, 241-3. While 
scholars agree on the ages of the neotatoi, the age of the presbutatoi is disputed. Jones and van Wees 
suggest forty as the age at which Athenians were not normally conscripted for service outside of Attica, 
while Hansen and Gomme maintain that the presbutatoi began at fifty years old. Both views have textual 
support and the issue remains unresolved (cf. Lyc. Leoc. 39; D.S. 13.72.4; 18.10.12; Aeschin. 2.133; Dem. 
3.4).  
144 Westlake 1954, 90-94, suggests that citizens under twenty could have volunteered for overseas 
expeditions. His evidence is Aristophanes’ Birds, lines 1360-71, in which Peithetairus arms a father-beater 
as a hoplite and then persuades him to serve outside of Attica. Westlake takes the father-beater as a youth 
because he could not find evidence for voluntary enlistment ek katalogou. Andrewes 1981, 2, however, 
cites Plutarch as proof of citizen volunteers (Per. 18.2) and disputes Westlake’s identification. But this 
passage and others (e.g. Lys. 9.15; Diod. 11.84.4) do not exclude the possibility that Athenian youths 
volunteered for service abroad. 
145 Pélékidis 1962, 47-9, was hesitant to make this identification because Thucydides uses neotatoi (and 
neoteroi) elsewhere, especially for the Spartan army (4.125.3, 5.50.3, 5.64.3, 5.75.1). In doing so he 
misunderstands the differences between Spartan and Athenian military organization. While the Athenians 
in Thucydides’ time recognized three broad age categories for citizens – the youngest, oldest, and those in 
between – they were not organized into specific age classes like the Spartans (e.g. Xen. Hell. 2.4.32, 4.5.16, 
5.4.39, 6.4.17). Pélékidis thus fails to understand that Thucydides uses neotatoi in this sense when referring 
to the youngest hoplites in Brasidas’ army (4.125.3). On Spartan military organization, see Anderson 1970, 
225-51; Lazenby 1985. 
146 Dumont 1876, 4; Girard 1892, 622; Lofberg 1925, 330; Reinmuth 1952, 36-9; Roscam 1969, 207-10; 
Ridley 1979, 533; Munn 1993, 189; Burckhardt 1996, 32. 
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citizens as a special military class is not in itself proof for a formal ephebic institution or 
a mass training program.147 There is no reason to think that the neotatoi in the fifth 
century were members of a separate institution any more than the presbutatoi, who had 
identical military obligations.  
There remains to consider how we are to account for the Athenaion Politeia’s 
technical use of epheboi for the first two helikiai in the author’s description of the 
ephebeia (42.2-5), while the same term is limited to the first helikia in his account of 
conscription by eponumoi (53.4-7). It is clear that the Athenaion Politeia was not the first 
to use epheboi for a special military class, since Aeschines uses sunepheboi in the On The 
Embassy to refer to those citizens under twenty who were ineligible for strateia (2.167). 
This suggests that epheboi had this technical meaning at the latest by the mid 340’s. This 
date can be pushed back another decade if we consider Xenophon’s fictional Persian 
epheboi in the Cyropaedeia (c. 355). Though these epheboi begin their military service at 
a different age and serve for ten years (1.2.4-13), Xenophon nevertheless defines them as 
members of a distinct military class, irrespective of age, until they join the ranks of the 
mature men (1.2.15). Xenophon’s use of epheboi, then, is consistent with Aeschines and 
the Athenaion Politeia.  
Rhodes suggests that “it was an ancient practice to give the title ἔφηβος to young 
citizens in their first two years after the δοκιμασία.”148 But it is unlikely that ephebos 
was used for this military category before the adoption of conscription by eponumoi c. 
386-66. So long as the Athenians were conscripted ek katalogou, citizens under twenty 
were distinguished as a group from their older compatriots. But the abandonment of this 
system prompted the Athenians to use a term to differentiate between the first two age-
                                                
147 Bryant 1907, 79, n. 6; Forbes 1929, 120-1; Marcellus 1994, 38. But Brenot 1920, 9, and Forbes 1929, 
121, are unconvincing when they argue that the difference in the armament of the neotatoi in Thucydides 
and the epheboi in the Athenaion Politeia is decisive evidence against a fifth-century ephebeia (see Lofberg 
1925, 331; Roscam 1969, 208). Hansen 1981, 19-24, suggests that the neotatoi and presbutatoi in Thuc. 
2.13.6-7 should be taken as referring to all Athenian citizens 18-19 and 50-59 (i.e. from all census classes) 
who were equipped as hoplites and light troops, rather than just as hoplites (contra van Wees 2004, 242). 
148 Rhodes 1981, 495. 
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classes in their new conscription system.149 If the Athenians were conscripted by 
eponumoi c. 372 and Aeschines was not anachronistic in referring to his fellow epheboi 
as a military class at this time, epheboi probably acquired both of these technical 
meanings in the late 370’s. We do not know what term epheboi replaced, but citizens 
under twenty were probably still called neotatoi, just as in the fifth century (Thuc. 
1.105.4-6; 2.13.6-7). If so, the Athenians chose to use epheboi instead of neotatoi so as to 
avoid using two terms for the same group of citizens and because, after the adoption of 
the new conscription system, epheboi for the youngest helikia already referred to citizens 
whose primary military obligation was to act as a homeguard. Given this, we should take 
the extension of epheboi’s meaning to the entire military class (i.e. the first two helikiai 
in [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 53) as a straightforward development.  
If we accept the above, how do we explain the function of the pinax 
ecclesiastikos? Scholars argue that newly enrolled citizens could not enroll on this deme 
register and hence attend and/or address the ecclesia until they turned twenty (i.e. they 
gained their full civic rights), because they were required to complete their garrison duty 
and military training in the ephebeia, which lasted two years.150 The sources suggest, 
however, that citizens under twenty years old could attend the ecclesia if they wished to 
(Dem. 21.193), though it was “not the done thing” for them to speak.151 But there is no 
                                                
149 The Athenians probably would not have had a comprehensive list of all eighteen year olds before they 
were conscripted by eponumoi, since there was no central katalogos for the system ek katalogou (see p. 30, 
n. 115). Were there lists at a local level? Though we do not have any direct evidence for how the strategoi 
compiled their tribal katalogoi for a given campaign (Hansen 1985, 85), they must have been based upon 
the deme registers that the demarchs submitted either complete or in modified form of those demesmen 
eligible to serve (Whitehead 1986, 164; Bugh 1988, 55; Christ 2001, 401). While the lexiarchicon 
grammateion was apparently not arranged by age-classes to facilitate conscription (Whitehead 1986, 35, n. 
130; contra van Effenterre 1976, 11, 15), it cannot be ruled out that the demarch was able to identify the 
youngest citizens on the register.  
150 Hansen 1987, 7; 1991, 89, 100; Faraguna 1992, 274-5; Robertson 2000, 149-50. The pinax 
ecclesiasticos is a deme register mentioned only in [Dem]. 44.35, who provides no details about its nature 
and purpose. The name of the register suggests that it had something to do with the ecclesia, and scholars 
assume that it allowed a citizen to attend or speak to it. Since [Demosthenes] criticizes Leochares for 
enrolling on the pinax ecclesiasticos before the lexiarchicon grammateion it is reasonable to conclude that 
it was “an improper reversal of the normal order of events” (Whitehead 1986, 104). 
151 Xenophon says that whenever Glaucon, “who was not yet twenty,” attempted to address the ecclesia, he 
was met with ridicule and laughter from his fellow citizens (Mem. 3.6.1). It is unclear, however, whether 
this reaction was due to his lack of knowledge on issues important to the polis (cf. 3.6.2-18) or to the mere 
fact that he was trying to speak. The latter is suggested by Mantitheus, who says that his attempt to speak 
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need to assume an ephebeia to explain the pinax ecclesiastikos. Instead, it is likely that 
citizens of ephebic age were denied the right to speak in the ecclesia because they were 
not eligible for strateia except under exceptional circumstances: it is only when they 
became neoi and bore the burden of overseas military service that this right was 
granted.152 
To sum up, ephebos was used in three different technical senses in the Classical 
period. First, it referred to a new citizen who has just passed his dokimasia and then 
sworn the citizenship oath, which in the fourth century was called “the oath of the 
ephebes” and which bound him to his civic responsibilities when he became eligible for 
military service. Second, it was used for the first helikia or age-group liable for 
conscription by eponumoi. Third, it defined a military class, consisting of those citizens 
under twenty (i.e. the first two helekiai) whose main duty was to perform garrison duty in 
Attica. Aeschines used sunepheboi in his On The Embassy and Against Timarchus with 
all these meanings, none of which imply the existence of the ephebeia before 
Chaeronea.153  
 
1.4: Aeschines as Peripolos 
Another argument for an early ephebeia is premised upon Aeschines’ statement in 
the On The Embassy that when he was an ephebos he was a “peripolos of this land for 
two years (περίπολος τῆς χώρας ταύτης ἐγενόμην δύ’ ἔτη)” (167). Before we can 
examine the claims scholars have made concerning the role the youngest citizens played 
in garrisoning the fortresses of Attica, we should first determine what kind of activities 
Aeschines may have performed during his military service. Though he mentions no 
                                                                                                                                            
before the people created resentment against him because he was too young (see Roisman 2005, 24 on Lys. 
16.20). For Glaucon, see Rhodes 1981, 494-5; Whitehead 1986, 104, n. 95 & 97. 
152 Cf. Sinclair’s 1988, 31, comment on the link between political privilege and military service: “When he 
turned 30, more opportunities were available to him – the right to offer himself for election to the Boule 
(Council of 500) or to the various offices of state like the position of strategos (general) and the right to 
serve as a dikast or juryman on the jury panels (dikasteria). In the intervening period he had the opportunity 
to gain political experience and knowledge within the limitation that the 20-29 age group was most liable to 
be called up for military service.”  
153 One may object that meanings two and three could have caused confusion for Aeschines’ audience, but 
Aeschines is careful to stress to the jurors what meaning of ephebos he is using (i.e. in the former speech he 
uses sunephebos for a military class, while in the latter he clearly uses it for the first helikia).  
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details, we can nevertheless reconstruct them from the literary and epigraphic evidence 
concerning peripoloi and peripolarchoi in Athens in the Classical period.154  
The earliest mention of peripoloi in Athenian service occurs during the 
Peloponnesian War, when the strategos Demosthenes in 424 laid an ambush at the 
Eunalion in Megara with a contingent of “Plataean light-armed troops and the peripoloi 
in addition” (4.67.2).155 A scholiast commenting on this passage defines peripoloi as 
follows: “Peripoloi: Some of the guards are called fixed, others peripoloi. The fixed are 
those who always invest and besiege, but the peripoloi are those who go around and 
patrol the forts in protecting them.”156 This suggests that peripoloi are phylakes who 
garrison a fortress, patrol in its vicinity, and provide security for those living in the 
area.157 They should therefore be taken as a mobile force of garrison troops with policing 
functions, rather than a police force in the modern sense.158 The scholiast is right to 
associate peripoloi with garrison fortresses, since a fragment of the fifth-century comic 
Eupolis says that “and the peripoloi are to depart to the forts (fr. 341 Kock: καὶ τοὺς 
περιπόλους ἀπιέν’ εἰς τὰ φρούρια).” Though the context of the fragment is unclear, 
Eupolis is probably referring to the deployment of peripoloi at the forts.159 While scholars 
take τὰ φρούρια to mean border forts (cf. ἐν τοῖς φρουρίοις καὶ … παρ’ ἔπαλξιν in 
Thuc. 2.13.6), they mistakenly infer from this that peripoloi were exclusively border 
                                                
154 The principal studies of peripoloi in Athens are Foucart 1889, 265-8; Griffith 1936, 86-8; Hommel 
1937, Col. 852-6; Kent 1941, 348-9; Robert 1955, 283-92; Pélékidis 1962, 35-44; Cabanes 1991, 210-5; 
Daly 2001, 306-14.  
155 οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους τοῦ ἑτέρου στρατηγοῦ Πλαταιῆς τε ψιλοὶ καὶ ἕτεροι περίπολοι 
ἐνήδρευσαν ἐς τὸ Ἐνυάλιον. For ἕτεροι with the meaning of “in addition”, see Hornblower 1996, 234.  
156 π ε ρ ί π ο λ ο ι :  τῶν φυλάκων οἱ μὲν ἱδρυμένοι καλοῦνται, οἱ δὲ περίπολοι, ἱδρυμένοι μὲν οἱ 
ἀεὶ περικαθεζόμενοι καὶ πολιορκοῦντες, περίπολοι δὲ οἱ περιερχόμενοι καὶ περιπολοῦντες τὰ 
φρούρια ἐν τῷ φυλάττειν. 
157 Sekunda 1990, 153, wrongly claims that phylakes and peripoloi were two mutually exclusive groups. 
His evidence is Xenophon’s Poroi 4.52: οἵ τε φρουρεῖν ἐν τοῖς φρουρίοις οἵ τε πελτάζειν καὶ 
περιπολεῖν. He interprets the successive οἵ τε as contrastive (152), but Faraguna 1992, 277, n. 105, argues 
that they cannot be contrastive because there is no δέ, but inclusive, and must refer to the same group: i.e. 
citizens could be phylakes and peripoloi at the same time. 
158 Before peripoloi and peripolarchoi were recognized as garrison troops, they were considered to be rural 
police (Foucart 1889, 266) and police inspectors (Kent 1941, 348) respectively. 
159 Cf. Thucydides’ comment that the Syracusans “also brought their garrisons into the patrol-forts in the 
countryside (6.45.2: καὶ ἐς τὰ περιπόλια τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ φρουρὰς ἐσεκόμιζον).” Also see his use of 
peripolion for Locris (3.99) and Syrcause (7.48.5). 
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guards, perhaps because the epigraphic evidence in the Lycurgan period shows that the 
ephebes were stationed on the frontier of Attica in their second year.160  
The evidence provided by Thucydides and Xenophon, however, suggests that 
peripoloi were also deployed at fortified points within the Athens-Piraeus circuit. 
Thucydides says that one of the officers who arrested Alexicles in 411 was “a certain 
Hermon, archon of those peripoloi stationed at Munychia” (8.92.5).161 Munychia, whose 
strategic importance for controlling Piraeus and Athens was recognized from Hippias 
onwards on account of its defensive qualities, was an ideal place for a garrison and for 
patrolling the immediate hinterland of the city.162 Xenophon implies that this deployment 
was in no way exceptional in his Poroi, where he presents a hypothetical scenario in 
which an enemy force from Thebes or Megara invades the silver mines at Laurium. He 
says: “So if they [i.e. the invaders] march from some point to the silver mines, it will be 
necessary to go past the city: and if they are few, it is likely that they are destroyed both 
by the cavalry and the peripoloi” (4.47).163 Xenophon makes it clear that the peripoloi are 
sallying out from Athens, not the border forts, to attack the enemy.164  
Aeschines, then, could have been stationed in a border fort and/or in the Athens-
Piraeus enceinte. Wherever he was deployed, he was under the command of officers he 
calls archontes. This is Bekker’s emendation: if the manuscript reading – sunarchontes – 
is accepted, then Aeschines may have been an officer himself. One of these archontes 
must have been the peripolarchos, an office attested in literature and epigraphically from 
the fifth century.165 As the name suggests, the peripolarchos must have been a military 
                                                
160 Ober 1985a, 90-5; Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 107-8; Kent 1941, 348; Sekunda 1990, 153; Marcellus 1994, 
38.  
161 ξυνεπελάβοντο δὲ αὐτοῖς ἅμα καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ Ἕρμων τις τῶν περιπόλων τῶν Μουνιχίασι 
τεταγμένων ἄρχων. 
162 For Munychia from the Archaic period to the Macedonian occupation in the Hellenistic period, see 
McCredie 1966, 103-5; Rhodes 1981, 233-4, 455-8; Whitehead 1986, 402-3.  
163 ἢν οὖν πορεύωνται ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀργύρεια, παριέναι αὐτοὺς δεήσει τὴν πόλιν· κἂν 
μὲν ὦσιν ὀλίγοι, εἰκὸς αὐτοὺς ἀπόλλυσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ ἱππέων καὶ ὑπὸ περιπόλων. 
164 This is the implication of Munn’s 1993, 27, observation on Poroi 4.43-8 that “Xenophon regards the city 
itself as the primary base for troops to repel even small parties of the invading enemy.”  
165 For a list of peripolarchoi, see Kroll and Mitchel 1980, 88, n. 5. 
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officer in charge of the peripoloi.166 Hermon, mentioned above, was almost certainly a 
peripolarchos, though Thucydides calls him an archon.167 Τhe peripolarchos was 
probably elected by the demos and his prominence on garrison inscriptions suggests that 
he was of high rank in the military hierarchy, perhaps immediately under the strategos.168  
An honorary decree of the Eleusinians for the peripolarchos Smicythion, dated to 
the end of the fourth century, sheds light on the military responsibilities of the office: “… 
and he stationed himself and the soldiers (στρατιώτας) with him at Eleusis and acted 
according to the strategoi and the deme in order that sufficient protection might come to 
Eleusis and as many of the other things as were needed for the protection of Eleusis …” 
(IG II2 1193, lines 4-10; cf. IG II2 204, lines 16-23).169 Smicythion’s duty, then, was to 
ensure that he and his soldiers provided φυλακὴ ἱκανή for the inhabitants of Eleusis.170 
This is consistent with what we know about the duties of the peripoloi. The importance of 
this office suggests that Aeschines was under the command of a peripolarchos rather than 
                                                
166 Pélékidis 1962, 37; Kroll and Mitchel 1980, 88. Forbes 1929, 122, argues that all of Aeschines’ 
archontes were peripolarchoi and that this is proof that the ephebeia did not exist. But the archontes could 
have included the strategos, taxiarchos, and the lochagos (Brenot 1920, 17). The peripoloi in the ephebeia 
were probably also commanded by peripolarchoi, even though they do not appear on the ephebic 
inscriptions.  
167 A scholiast to Thuc. 8.92.2 defines a περιπόλαρχος as ὁ τῶν περιπόλων  ἄρχων. Jordan 1970, 
234, n. 16, plausibly identifies Hermon the peripolarchos in Thucydides with Hermon the archon on IG I2 
304A, lines 9-10.  
168 See Reinmuth 1952, 39; Pélékidis 1962, 37-8. For the election of the peripolarchos see Kent 1941, 349, 
on IG II2 1260, lines 10-11: περιπόλαρχ[ος χειροτονηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ] δῆμου. This restoration is 
plausible because a parallel phrase occurs for the strategos in lines 14-5. If so, we do not know how many 
peripolarchoi were elected: they are not mentioned in [Arist]. Ath.Pol. 61. See Rhodes 1981, 676-88, on 
this passage. This would explain why all known peripolarchoi are Athenian citizens (Kroll and Mitchel 
1980, 86-96). Given that the Athenaion Politeia says that the tribal taxiarchoi chose the lochagoi for their 
taxis or “regiment” (61.3), it is likely that the peripolarchoi outranked the lochagoi, as Pélékidis suggests. 
The peripolarchos is honored or mentioned alongside the strategos in several fourth-century inscriptions 
from Eleusis, Rhamnous, and Sounion: IG II2 204 (352/1), lines 19-21; SEG 41.150 (338/7), lines 1-2; SEG 
41.148 (ca. 338/7), lines 1-2; IG II2 2973 (336/5), lines 1-2; SEG 38.175 (330’s?), lines 1-2; IG II2 2968 
(ca. 324/3), lines 2-3; IG II2 1260 (ca. 307-304), lines 1-2; IG II2 1193 (ca. 300), lines 2-8. This suggests a 
relatively high rank for the peripolarchos, perhaps second in command of the fort he was assigned to.  
169 καὶ αὐτός τε αὑτὸν ἔταξεν Ἐλευσῖνάδε καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς μεθ’ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἔπραττεν 
πρός τε τοὺς στρατηγοὺς καὶ τὸν δῆ[μ]ον ὅπως φυλακὴ ἱκανὴ ἔλθοι Ἐλευ[σῖ]νάδε καὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων ὅσων ἐδεῖτο [εἰς φ]υλακὴν Ἐλευσῖνος. 
170 Smicythion may not have been alone, since IG II2 204 and 2973 attest to the existence of multiple 
peripolarchoi in service at Eleusis. Given that Eleusis was the most important fortified circuit outside of 
Athens (Munn 1993, 7), the Athenians may have needed several groups of peripoloi to ensure that the 
Thriasian plain was properly patrolled. See also Griffith 1935, 88. 
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one himself, probably on account of his youth and inexperience, even if he was an 
archon.171 
The evidence suggests that from at least as early as the beginning of the 
Archidamian War (431-21) peripoloi served as garrison troops and that the nature of their 
military duties – manning the fortresses and patrolling the countryside – remained 
unchanged throughout the Classical period. There is no reason to think that Aeschines’ 
military service as a περίπολος τῆς χώρας ταύτης was any different.172 The 
advocates for an early ephebeia associate Aeschines’ garrison duty with the Athenaion 
Politeia, which says that the epheboi in their second year of service, having demonstrated 
their skill in the art of war to the demos, “patrol the land and pass time in the fortresses 
(42.4: περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν καὶ διατρίβουσιν ἐν τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις).” They also 
take Aeschines’ mention of δύ’ ἔτη as proof that he is referring to his two years of 
mandatory military service because the ephebes in the Lycurgan period were required to 
complete a two-year term of duty in the garrisons before they were allowed to join the 
rest of the citizen body ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.5: φρουροῦσι δὲ τὰ δύο ἔτη … 
διε[ξ]ελθόντων δὲ τῶν δυεῖν ἐτῶν). 
 These parallels have convinced scholars that Aeschines must have undertaken his 
military service as a participant in a formal ephebic organization, which is distinct from 
the rest of the citizen body.173 They argue that it must have been the same as the ephebes 
                                                
171 Marcellus 1994, 36, states without argument that Aeschines was a peripolarchos. Mitchel 1961, 357, n. 
13, and Sekunda 1992, 329, argue that Aeschines was an ephebic taxiarchos or lochagos. These offices, 
however, are only attested on ephebic inscriptions in the Lycurgan period. For a discussion of ephebic 
taxiarchoi and lochagoi, see pp. 115-6. 
172 Brenot 1920, 17, and Forbes 1929, 119-20, argue that Aeschines served as a mercenary. They cite 
Foucart 1889, 264-6, as evidence, who does not make the claim. This interpretation is inconsistent with 
Aeschines’ account of his military record (2.167-70). As Harris 1995, 29, points out, Aeschines’ objective 
is to show that “he was a loyal citizen who had risked his life for his community and thus deserved their 
gratitude.” The orator thus emphasizes his bravery on the battlefield when he was called up to serve on 
overseas campaigns (strateiai) and notes carefully the honors and praise he received from his commanding 
officers for performing his duty in an exemplary manner. His aim is clearly to demonstrate that he had a 
distinguished and commendable record of military service as a citizen of Athens. If he was a mercenary, it 
would have undermined the purpose of his excursus, given the low esteem in which mercenaries were held 
(Lofberg 1922, 157; Reinmuth 1952, 36; Marcellus 1994, 37). 
173 Harpocration s.v. περίπολος was the first to compare Aeschines and the author of the Athenaion 
Politeia, with the assumption that both authors were referring to the same institution. Modern scholars who 
follow Harpocration are: Lofberg 1925, 333-4; Gomme 1933, 8, n. 3; Reinmuth 1952, 36-8; 1966, 798; 
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in the Lycurgan period, which consisted of garrison duty in the Piraeus in the first year, 
followed by garrison and patrol duty along the Boeotian frontier in the second year 
([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.3-5).174 Even their opponents concede that Aeschines’ testimony 
does suggest that there were eighteen and nineteen year-old Athenians called epheboi 
who routinely patrolled the Attic countryside nearly forty years before the earliest 
attested ephebic inscription.175 Scholars thus assume that every year hundreds of ephebes, 
just as in the Lycurgan ephebeia, were likewise obligated to garrison the border fortresses 
of Attica in times of peace and war.176 As Christ puts it: 
 
Aeschines suggests in his military autobiography that this [i.e. obligatory 
military service and training in the ephebeia] was the normal arrangement 
by the time he began his two years of service c. 372 B.C. with his fellow 
ephebes … he treats his service as routine and does not seek special credit 
for it, as he does later in the same excursus for his exceptional role as one 
of the epilektoi at Tamynae.177 
 
Christ assumes, as most advocates for an early ephebeia have done, that Aeschines’ 
ephebic service was unremarkable because the institution at this time consisted of a two-
year peripoleia.178 But if Aeschines’ military service was the “the normal arrangement,” 
                                                                                                                                            
1971, 126; Marrou 1956, 151; Pélékidis 1962, 40-42, 71; Ridley 1979, 532; Ober 1985a, 93; Vidal-Naquet 
1986a, 106; 1986b, 133; Winkler 1990, 29; Munn 1993, 188; Christ 2001, 416.  
174 Reinmuth 1952, 36-9; Ober 1985a, 90-6; Sekunda 1990, 151-3. 
175 Bryant 1907, 79; Forbes 1929, 122; Marcellus 1994, 39-40. Contra Brenot 1920, 15-9.  
176 Munn 1993, 188: “The realities of war [between Athens and Sparta in 378-5] on their own borders 
introduced them to this unpleasant necessity and prompted them to take thought as to how best to minimize 
reliance on mercenaries as they faced the continuing demands on manpower for the defense of Attica. The 
result was the concentration of the duties of citizen ephebes … on garrison and patrol duty along the 
frontiers … Now, under the press of the Boeotian War, their two years of mandatory service were focused 
on the defense of the countryside, as we learn from the example of Aeschines, who began his career in the 
370’s with two years of duty as an ephebe peripolos in the Attic countryside.”  
177 Christ 2001, 416. 
178 Munn 1993, 188, n. 5, argues that Aeschines “provides evidence that patrol duties in the countryside, 
which by Aristotles’ time were limited to the second year of ephebic service … were performed during 
both years of ephebic duty in the 370’s.” Reinmuth 1952, 37-8, suggests that the ephebes in Aeschines and 
the Athenaion Politeia must have been peripoloi in both years of their garrison duty. Reinmuth’s evidence 
is Pollux’s statement that “for two years the ephebes were numbered among the peripoloi (δύο δὲ εἰς 
περιπόλους ἠριθμοῦντο) (8.105 s.v. περίπολοι).” Reinmuth assumes that Pollux is referring to the 
ephebeia in Aeschines’ time as well as later. Pollux, however, does not mention Aeschines. Though one 
cannot place much confidence in Pollux’s confused passage, Reinmuth is right to point out that ephebes 
served as peripoloi in both years of the ephebeia (see pp. 87-8).  
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why then did the orator stress to his audience that he served for two years? Surely there 
would have been no need to mention this to his audience if Athenian citizens routinely 
carried out their mandatory peripoleia in their first two years of citizenship. Furthermore, 
given that Aeschines is careful to show that his witnesses could substantiate his claim that 
he did indeed perform garrison duty for two years (2.167: καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν τοὺς 
συνεφήβους καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἡμῶν μάρτυρας παρέξομαι), the implication is that 
his audience would have regarded his length of service as atypical for citizens of his age. 
Indeed, Harpocration found Aeschines’ statement problematic and concluded that 
his use of witnesses proves that his ephebic service was exceptional.179 Cabanes, 
following Harpocration, argues that the two-year length of Aeschines’ peripoleia was 
unusual because he had extended his stint in the ephebeia for one more year.180 This 
explanation is uncovincing, however, because (1) Aeschines would have been a neos 
during his third year, not an ephebos; yet he calls upon his fellow epheboi as witnesses, 
but not neoi. (2) There are no certain instances of ephebes extending their military service 
in the Lycurgan ephebeia.181 (3) Aeschines, having become a neos, would have been 
eligible for strateia and there is no evidence that Athenian citizens ever claimed garrison 
duty as an exemption from overseas military service.182  
Furthermore, while there is no reason to doubt Aeschines’ assertion that he did in 
fact carry out military service before he became a neos, it could not have been 
continuous, because according to Demosthenes Aeschines worked as an undersecretary 
as soon as he had registered in his deme (18.261),183 at the same time Aeschines said that 
he was serving as a peripolos. In the ephebeia, however, the ephebes were obligated to 
                                                
179 Harpocration s.v. περίπολος: Αἰσχίνης ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς πρεσβείας. Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν Ἀθηναίων 
πολιτείᾳ περὶ τῶν ἐφήβων λέγων φησὶν οὕτως τὸν δεύτερον ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκκλησίας ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ 
γενομένης ἀποδεξάμενοι τῷ δήμῳ περὶ τὰς τάξεις καὶ λαβόντες ἀσπίδα καὶ δόρυ παρὰ τοῦ 
δήμου περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν καὶ διατρίβουσιν ἐν τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις. παρατηρητέον οὖν ὅτι ὁ 
μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης ἕνα φησὶν ἐνιαυτὸν ἐν τοῖς περιπόλοις γίγνεσθαι τοὺς ἐφήβους, ὁ δὲ Αἰσχίνης 
δύο· καὶ τάχα διὰ τοῦτο ἐπεμνήσθη τοῦ πράγματος ὁ ῥήτωρ, καίπερ πάντων τῶν ἐφήβων ἐξ 
ἀνάγκης περιπολούντων, ὅτι αὐτὸς δύο ἔτη γέγονεν ἐν τοῖς περιπόλοις· διὸ καὶ μαρτυρῶν 
ἐδήλωσεν αὐτό. 
180 Cabanes 1991, 212. See also Foucart 1889, 264; Pélékidis 1962, 39; Daly 2001, 332-3.  
181 See p. 103, n. 20. 
182 For a summary of the exemptions citizens could claim when they were called up for sevice in the army, 
see Hansen 1985, 16-21; Christ 2001, 404-7.  
183 See Harris 1995, 29-30. 
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perform military service all year round. To ensure that they had no excuse for absence 
from their duties (ἵνα μὴ πρό[φ]ασις ᾖ τ[ο]ῦ ἀπιέναι), they were excluded from 
participating in civic life except in cases involving an inheritance, an heiress, or an 
hereditary priesthood ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.5). Nor is Aeschines unique. Bryant has 
provided numerous examples of other young Athenians under twenty in the Classical 
period who engage in civic life when they should have been undertaking their military 
service, if, that is, the ephebeia existed.184 The example of Glaucon in Xenophon’s 
Memorabilia is the most telling, because not only is he under twenty and trying to realize 
his political ambitions by speaking in the eccelesia (3.6.1), but he has also never visited 
the border garrisons and has no understanding of their purpose (3.6.10-11). This would 
not have been possible if Glaucon had served in the ephebeia as the Athenaion Politeia 
describes it. Pélékidis and Girard dismiss Glaucon as an exception,185 but all the 
examples Bryant and others have cited cannot have been exceptions if the ephebeia had 
existed before Chaeronea.186  
Reinmuth, reconciling this evidence with his belief in an early ephebeia, argues 
that the ephebes “were doubtless free to follow their own pursuits even as the older 
citizens during part of the year not occupied by military duties” before Lycurgus’ reform 
made their service continuous. While Aeschines was obliged to perform military service, 
it was intermittent or seasonal in nature.187 But Reinmuth does not explain how such a 
system could have worked successfully in practice: if ephebes were free to pursue their 
own interests, how could the Athenians have mustered enough of them at any one time to 
ensure that the permanent border garrisons remained well-manned all year round to 
protect the countryside of Attica?188 Indeed, the discontinuous nature of Aeschines’ 
                                                
184 Bryant 1907, 81-4. Cf. Brenot 1920, 23-4; Forbes 1929, 118, 122-3; Marcellus 1994, 28-9.  
185 Girard 1892, 79; Pélékidis 1962, 22. Golden, 1979, 29, n. 21, suggests that all of Bryant’s examples 
might have served in the cavalry instead. 
186 See Bryant 1907, 84.  
187 Reinmuth 1971, 126, 129; cf. 1952, 36-7. See also Marcellus 1994, 40; Burckhardt 1996, 32; van Wees 
2004, 94.  
188 Permanent garrisons are first attested during the Peloponnesian war, since Thucydides says that the 
Athenians had garrisoned the phrouria before the first Spartan invasion of Attica in 431 and then deployed 
and maintained the phylakai by land and sea throughout the war (Thuc. 2.13.6; 2.24.1; cf. Lys. 12.40; 
14.35). For the fifth-century border defense system, see Winter 1971, 13-14; Garlan 1974, 78-9; Munn 
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military service should cast doubt on the assumption made by scholars that he was 
obliged to serve a single two-year term. But if we acknowledge that there was no such 
requirement, we should instead admit the possibility that he was called out at least twice 
over a two-year period. 
Also, Aeschines could not have received trophe during his military service, 
because Xenophon explicitly says in the Poroi that it was not given for garrison duty, at 
least during the 350’s (4.52). This is in contrast to the ephebeia, where the Athenians 
allocated a daily trophe to the ephebes, dispensed by the sophronistes ([Arist].Ath.Pol. 
42.3). The Athenians did this because they recognized that state-funded maintenance was 
necessary since the majority of citizens worked out of necessity and did not possess 
sufficient wealth to maintain themselves throughout the two years of their military 
service.189 Given that Aeschines’ modest means forced him to work for a living, the 
amount of time he could afford to spend on garrison duty must have been limited.190  
Furthermore, if there was an ephebeia in Aeschines’ time, as the proponents of a 
pre-Lycurgan ephebeia claim, this institution could not have have existed without ephebic 
officials. At the minimum these officials would have been required to organize the 
ephebes and to liaise between them and the regular Athenian military officers. Reinmuth 
does identify the kosmetes restored on the Mitsos inscription (= E1) with one of the 
archontes Aeschines invokes as witnesses for his peripoleia. But this is unconvincing, 
since E1, as we have seen, dates to 333/2, not 361/0.191 Since Aeschines provides no 
additional information on these archontes, Reinmuth has no case for interpreting them as 
ephebic officials and hence no positive evidence for an ephebic organization. Apart from 
this, there is no evidence for ephebic kosmetai or sophronistai or their equivalent before 
                                                                                                                                            
1993, 7-11; Hanson 1998, 89-91. Ober 1985a, 193-5, denies the existence of this system at this time, but 
Daly 2001, 4-17, shows that this belief is without foundation. Xenophon attests to the existence of 
permanent rural garrisons in the fourth century when he makes Socrates ask Glaucon how many of the 
phrouroi are well placed and how many are redundant (Mem. 3.6.10). The epigraphic evidence suggests 
that perhaps 450-650 ephebes served annually in the Lycurgan period (see pp. 99-101). 
189 See Roisman 2005, 125-7, on [Dem]. 50.12-16, where Apollodorus discusses the reasons why his 
rowers, who must have included poor Athenian citizens, deserted his ship out of necessity because they 
received inadequate pay. 
190 On Aeschines’ family and his lack of wealth when he was an ephebe, see Harris 1995, 21-33.  
191 Reinmuth 1971, 127-133. He assumes that the ephebeia was under the kosmetes c. 372 while the tribal 
sophronistai were introduced in the Lycurgan period for the ephebes’ moral education.  
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the first securely dated enrollment class (334/3).192 With the exception of those scholars 
who accept the early date for E1, the advocates for an early ephebeia admit that it was 
Epicrates’ legislation which created these offices as part of the institution’s 
reorganization after Chaeronea.193 But these scholars cannot explain how it could have 
functioned c. 372 if there were no ephebic officials.194  
The evidence taken together suggests that Aeschines’ testimony should not be 
regarded as proof of a formal ephebic institution. Not only were his stints of garrison duty 
not of long duration but he must have also served under regular military officers, just like 
his older compatriots. We find additional support for this interpretation in Xenophon’s 
Cyropaedeia and Plato’s Laws, both written in the 350’s. These authors propose 
educational systems in which youths are obligated to perform garrison duty. Three 
positions have been taken on these works and their relevance to an early date for the 
ephebeia: (1) They are proof that an ephebeia existed because the authors adapted details 
of the institution to suit their own proposals.195 (2) They prove that the ephebeia did not 
exist at the time of composition.196 (3) They are irrelevant because their proposals are 
                                                
192 See Wilamowitz 1893, 191-2; Brenot 1920, 28-9; Forbes 1929, 115-21. Aristotle in the Politics does not 
include the kosmetes and the sophronistai in his list of magistrates concerned with instilling good order 
(eukosmia) nor does he mention any equivalent for these offices, though he considers his list fairly 
comprehensive (6.5.13, 1323a). The date of the Politics is uncertain, but the work was probably composed 
sometime between 348 and 322 (see Weil 1960, 182-210). Given the omission of the ephebic offices, this 
passage must have a terminus ante quem of 334/3.  
193 Gomme 1933, 8, n. 3; Reinmuth 1952, 39, 46 (before the publication of E1); Mitchel 1975, 233. 
194 Fisher 2001, 65-6, asserts that the kosmetes and sophronistai were among the new offices created when 
the ephebeia was reformed in 335/4, but says nothing about this aspect of the institution prior to this date. 
Burckhardt 1996, 32-3, gets into similar difficulties when he says that “war die Institution in der 
lykurgischen Zeit straffer organisiert,” but is unable to demonstrate how the ephebeia in Aeschines’ time 
was organized without ephebic officials: i.e. he assumes an organization which is similar to the ephebeia. 
Foucart 1889, 266, assumes rather than shows that the ephebic peripoloi in Aeschines’ time were 
commanded by sophronistai rather than peripolarchoi. Some scholars argue that the latter ran the 
institution (Reinmuth 1952, 38-9; Pélékidis 1962, 37-8; Ober 1985a, 93). While there is no reason to doubt 
that peripolarchoi were included among Aeschines’ archontes, they were military officers, whose task was 
to lead peripoloi that the strategos had assigned to them, not ephebic officials. But to speculate whether the 
ephebes were distributed among the ranks of the peripoloi or served in separate units begs the question 
(Kent 1941, 348-9; Reinmuth 1952, 38), because this presupposes the existence of officials who have 
already organized the ephebes before they were allocated to the peripolarchoi, just as the kosmetes and 
sophronistai did in the ephebeia ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.3).  
195 Lofberg 1925, 332, n. 4; Pélékidis 1962, 19-33; Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 107, 232; Winkler 1990, 31-2. 
196 Bryant 1907, 84-5; Brenot 1920, 28; Forbes 1929, 114; Marcellus 1994, 32-3. 
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modeled on Spartan institutions.197 The last position is untenable. While Xenophon and 
Plato are clearly inspired by the Spartan agoge and krypteia, it is nevertheless hard to 
understand why they would have not compared their ideas to or drawn upon elements of 
an Athenian institution which would have been familiar to their Athenian readers. Nor is 
it likely that these authors would have omitted an institution whose principles were in 
broad agreement with the ideas they were proposing.198  
In the Cyropaedeia, Xenophon devotes substantial space to youths he calls 
epheboi, one of the four age classes in his fictional Persian educational system (1.2.8-12). 
These epheboi guard the government buildings at night. During the day half of their 
number attend the Persian king on hunts, while the remainder spend their time training 
for war and providing security for the countryside. These epheboi begin their military 
service at sixteen or seventeen rather than eighteen and serve for ten years instead of 
Aeschines’ two (Cyr. 1.2.8, 12). Though Pélékidis admits that Xenophon’s ideas are 
Spartan in origin, he also draws attention to Xenophon’s use of the term epheboi and 
holds this as proof that the author has the ephebeia in mind.199 It is more likely, however, 
that Xenophon used epheboi because the term defined a special military class of the first 
two helikiai which is ineligible for strateia, as I have argued above. The author thus 
adapted this term to suit his proposal because it was familiar to his readers.  
Plato describes a different system in his Laws for guarding the countryside (760B-
763C, 778E). Having divided the country into twelve sections, one per tribe, he proposes 
that each tribe selects five officers called agronomoi or phrourarchoi. Each officer then 
selects twelve youths (neoi) to serve under him, or sixty per tribe. These youths are aged 
between twenty-five and thirty when they begin their military service. They serve for two 
                                                
197 Reinmuth 1966, 795; Ridley 1979, 534; Burckhardt 1996, 49-50. 
198 Bryant 1907, 85: “Xenophon, for all that his heart was in Sparta, would hardly pass over a home 
institution so entirely in the spirit of that Phaeacian realm he calls Persian, and Plato would scarcely have 
ignored an Attic ἐφηβέια to which he might have pointed as a triumphant vindication of his educational 
theory.” 
199 Pélékidis 1962, 23. 
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years and guard a different sector every month.200 The youths mess together, undertake 
engineering projects related to defense, and train in the gymnasia they build. Though the 
length of service for the neoi is the same as in the ephebeia, Plato’s proposal differs from 
the institution in that the youths are not called epheboi, they are not obligated to serve but 
are selected by their officers (cf. Xen. Cyr. 1.2.15), and they are older. Finally, Plato does 
not know what to call these neoi: “whether one delights in calling them kryptoi or 
agronomoi or whatever takes your fancy (763B: εἴτε τις κρυπτοὺς εἴτε ἀγρονόμους 
εἴθ’ ὅτι καλῶν).”  
 It should be clear that Xenophon’s and Plato’s detailed proposals concerning 
military service for youths share only the vaguest resemblence to the ephebeia as 
described in the Athenaion Politieia. These authors, who are clearly inspired by Spartan 
institutions, should therefore not be taken as evidence for the existence of the ephebeia in 
the 350’s.201 With the exception of this utopian literature, scholars’ claims that 
Aeschines’ testimony proves that the youngest Athenian citizens carried out two years of 
mandatory garrison duty before Chaeronea is supported by no other evidence.202 Nor can 
they show that these citizens were a perennial presence on the frontier.203 Indeed, apart 
from Xenophon’s Poroi 4.51-2 (discussed above), the only positive evidence produced 
by scholars is Memorabilia 3.5.25-7.204 In this passage Xenophon makes Socrates suggest 
to Pericles that lightly armed Athenian youths (μέχρι τῆς ἐλαφρᾶς ἡλικίας 
ὡπλισμένους κουφοτέροις ὅπλοις) should be deployed in the mountainous border 
                                                
200 Daly 2001, 361-5, shows that Plato’s system of protecting the chora of his ideal state diverges 
significantly from Athenian military practices, in that his division of the chora into tribal sectors and the 
rotation of the tribal units through these sectors are unattested elsewhere.  
201 See Bryant 1907, 85; Brenot 1920, 28; Forbes 1929, 114; Marcellus 1994, 33.   
202 As Bryant 1907, 84, puts it: “We may grant at once that it is dangerous to argue ex silentio. And yet if 
Aristotle’s ἐφηβέια, or any of its essential features, had been in existence at Athens in the fifth century, is it 
too much to suppose that somewhere in the pages of poet or philosopher, orator or historian, there would 
have been a reference to it?” 
203 Ober 1985a, 94, asserts that “even without the new inscription [i.e. E1] the evidence cited above 
[including Aeschines] is sufficient to prove that by the second quarter of the fourth century the chora was 
guarded by young citizen-soldiers, almost certainly ephebes, and there was a good deal of contemporary 
interest in these troops and their duties.” While Ober is right to point out that Aeschines patrolled the 
countryside and served in the garrisons, he assumes rather than offers clear evidence, apart from the 
Athenaion Politeia, that contingents of ephebes routinely manned these forts.  
204 E.g. Munn 1993, 107, n. 25, cites these two passages of Xenophon along with Aeschin. 2.167 and 
[Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.4 as evidence for ephebes equipped as light troops patrolling the borderlands of Attica.  
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regions, just like the Mysians and Pisidians in Asia Minor, where they would cause harm 
to their enemies and provide a strong defensive bulwark for the citizens of the chora. 
Xenophon’s proposal is clearly an innovation c. 355, but there is no evidence to suggest 
that ephebes fought exclusively as light-troops in the Lycurgan period.205  
But if we are correct in asserting that Aeschines’ garrison duty is not evidence for 
the existence of an early ephebeia, how then do we explain his military service? The most 
explicit statement concerning the circumstances under which the youngest citizens served 
as garrison troops is found in Thucydides, who makes Pericles say on the eve of the first 
Spartan invasion of Attica in 431: 
 
There are thirteen thousand hoplites without the sixteen thousand in the 
fortresses and along the battlements. For so many were guarding at first 
whenever the enemy made their invasion, both from the oldest 
(presbutatoi) and the youngest (neotatoi) citizens, and from the metics as 
many as were hoplites (Thuc.  2.13.6-7).206 
 
Thucydides’ point is clear: the neotatoi were called out as a group to man the fortresses 
(φρουρία) and the Athens-Piraeus enceinte (ἔπαλξις) whenever Attica was in danger of 
invasion. His use of the optative in secondary sequence (ὁπότε οἱ πολέμιοι ἐσβάλοιεν) 
suggests that they were used in this manner before 431, perhaps as early as 458 when the 
neotatoi are first attested (Thuc. 1.105.4-6). Thucydides does not say for how long they 
were required to serve during the five Spartan invasions of the Archidamian War (431-
421), but it was probably a little longer than the length of each invasion, which lasted 
                                                
205 Scholars have debated over whether Xenophon’s use of βλαβεροὺς in βλαβεροὺς μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις 
εἶναι, μεγάλην δὲ προβολὴν τοῖς πολίταις τῆς χώρας κατεσκευάσθαι is offensive or defensive in 
nature. Lofberg 1925, 332, argues that Xenophon is urging a hitherto defensive ephebeia to go on the 
offense against the Boeotians. His opponents think that the whole passage should be taken as defensive, 
which in their opinion shows that the ephebeia did not exist when Xenophon wrote the Memorabilia 
(Brenot 1920, 24; Forbes 1929, 121-2; Marcellus 1994, 32). While the author’s objective is to get the 
Athenians to raid Boeotian territory (Munn 1993, 31, n. 61), his proposal clearly assumes that no standing 
force of young Athenians armed as light-armed troops existed at that time to defend the frontier (Ober 
1985a, 77; Munn 1993, 187). For ephebes as light troops, see pp. 143-6. 
206 χρήμασι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐθάρσυνεν αὐτούς, ὁπλίτας δὲ τρισχιλίους καὶ μυρίους εἶναι ἄνευ τῶν 
ἐν τοῖς φρουρίοις καὶ τῶν παρ’ ἔπαλξιν ἑξακισχιλίων καὶ μυρίων. τοσοῦτοι γὰρ ἐφύλασσον τὸ 
πρῶτον ὁπότε οἱ πολέμιοι ἐσβάλοιεν, ἀπό τε τῶν πρεσβυτάτων καὶ τῶν νεωτάτων, καὶ 
μετοίκων ὅσοι ὁπλῖται ἦσαν. 
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from fifteen to forty days (Thuc. 2.57.2; 4.6.2).207 Thucydides’ description suggests that 
their service was limited to these invasions, though a more extended deployment in the 
Deceleian War (413-404) cannot be ruled out.208 
 Another passage which implies that citizens under twenty performed garrison 
duty under similar circumstances is Demosthenes’ Against Meidias, where the orator 
claims that Meidias slandered those who had voted against him at a recent Assembly:  
 
Then I think he won’t hesitate even to accuse the people and the Ekklesia, 
and he’ll repeat today what he was bold enough to say at the time of the 
probole – that the meeting comprised all those who had stayed in Athens 
when they should have gone on campaign, and all those who had left the 
forts unmanned, and that it was choristers and aliens and men of that sort 
who voted him down. 209 (Dem. 21.193. Trans. MacDowell 1990, 201) 
 
According to the orator, Meidias distinguished between those who ought to have marched 
out (δέον ἐξιέναι) against Euboea and those who had abandoned the fortresses they were 
assigned to (τὰ φρούρι’ ἦσαν ἔρημα λελοιπότες). Meidias then identifies the latter – 
χορευταὶ καὶ ξένοι. The χορευταί must refer to citizens under twenty, because 
choristers were exempt from military service (Dem. 21.15; 39.16).210 No reason is given 
for the deployment of these youngest citizens, but it is likely that they were called up for 
service after the Athenians had sent out an expedition under Phocion to Euboea to 
support the tyrant Plutarch in spring 348, possibly in response to increased tension on the 
Attic-Boeotian frontier, which prompted the Athenians to buttress their existing garrisons 
                                                
207 For an overview of these invasions, see Hanson 1998, 132-6. 
208 Most scholars who argue for the fifth-century existence of the ephebeia hold or imply that the neotatoi 
were used extensively as border guards and were a permanent presence on the frontier (e.g. Lofberg 1925, 
330-1; Reinmuth 1952, 44; Pélékidis 1962, 47-9; Ridley 1979, 533; Harding 1988, 64, n. 11; Burckhardt 
1996, 30; contra Ober 1985a, 90).  
209 οἶμαι τοίνυν αὐτὸν οὐδὲ τοῦ δήμου κατηγορεῖν ὀκνήσειν οὐδὲ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, ἀλλ’ ἅπερ τότ’ 
ἐτόλμα λέγειν ὅτ’ ἦν ἡ προβολή, ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἐρεῖν, ὡς ὅσοι δέον ἐξιέναι κατέμενον καὶ ὅσοι τὰ 
φρούρι’ ἦσαν ἔρημα λελοιπότες, ἐξεκλησίασαν, καὶ χορευταὶ καὶ ξένοι καὶ τοιοῦτοί τινες ἦσαν οἳ 
κατεχειροτόνησαν αὐτοῦ. 




for a limited time.211 A similar incident can perhaps be found in Ariston’s account of his 
phroura at Panactum in 343; it is likely that he was part of a mass call up of ephebes to 
reinforce the garrison because the Thebans were threatening the area. This should not be 
pressed too far, however, because of the uncertainty concerning Ariston’s age.212 
These passages suggest that the youngest citizens before the creation of the 
ephebeia not only comprised a special military class but also acted as a reserve of 
manpower to be drawn upon whenever the Athenians feared that their homeland was in 
danger of invasion; otherwise they were not required to perform garrison duty. If we 
accept this, Aeschines and his fellow epheboi were called out en masse for a limited time 
to provide additional border security. Given that they carried out their military service c. 
373/2-370/69, it is likely that Athenian anxiety over the rapidly growing power of Thebes 
                                                
211 Tritle 1988, 76-9, shows that Phocion’s force consisted of cavalry, the epilektoi (Athens’ élite hoplite 
regiment), along with a general levy of hoplites. The size of the contingent is unknown, but 3,000 should be 
considered a minimum (80). At any rate, this would have been the pick of the Athenian army. For a 
discussion of Phocion’s expedition and the events leading up to the campaign, see Brunt 1969, 247-51; 
Tritle 1988, 79-89. MacDowell 1990, 404, says: “in 348 there may have been apprehension that the 
Thebans would attack in order to divert Athenian forces from Euboia.” He offers no evidence to support his 
assertion, but it is likely given the Athenian fear of Theban aggression after 370 (e.g. Xen. Mem. 3.5.4; 
Poly. 3.9.20; Aeschin. 2.105; Plut. Phoc. 9.4), especially after the latter had occupied the disputed border 
area of Oropos in 366, which remained a major point of contention between the two powers (Xen. Hell. 
7.4.1; D.S. 15.76.1; Dem. 3.28; 19.325-6). 
212 Ariston says that two years before the speech he was conscripted for garrison duty at Panactum (Dem 
54.3: ἐξῆλθον ἔτος τουτὶ τρίτον εἰς Πάνακτον φρουρᾶς ἡμῖν προγραφείσης). Scholars assume that 
Ariston is referring to the Athenian expedition to Panactum in 343 mentioned by Demosthenes (19.326), 
rather than to an otherwise unknown incident which prompted the Athenians to garrison all their border 
fortresses in 357 (Carey and Reid 1985, 69, on schol. on Dem. 21.193). Ariston must have been young, 
since he talks about his age as a potential impediment in court (Dem. 54.1: ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡλικίαν). Scholars 
have argued that he could not have been an ephebos: (1) Ariston calls his fellow soldiers stratiotai, not 
epheboi, and his commanders were a taxiarchos and a strategos (Ober 1985a, 217-8; Burckhardt 1996, 244, 
n. 329, on Dem. 54.4-5). (2) “The phrase φρουρᾶς ἡμῖν προγραφείσης … suggests a selection from the 
roll of adult citizens, not the obligatory φρουρά of the ephebe” (Cary and Reid 1985, 69). (3) Ariston 
could have brought a suit against Conon’s sons, but chose not to (Daly 2001, 245, n. 172, on Dem. 54.6). 
Moreover, scholars cannot actually demonstrate that Panactum was permanently garrisoned by a contingent 
of ephebes undertaking their mandatory service (e.g. Ober 1985a, 218). The above arguments, however, are 
not decisive. First, Ariston’s use of φρουρᾶς ἡμῖν προγραφείσης does not exclude the youngest citizens, 
since, as we have seen, all the helikiai conscripted by eponymoi (i.e. citizens 18-59 years old) were eligible 
for garrison duty (for the connection between φρουρᾶς ἡμῖν προγραφείσης and [Arist]. Ath.Pol. 53. 4, 7, 
see Cary and Reid 1985, 78; Daly 2001, 244-7). Second, the presence of the taxiarchos is not decisive, 
because ephebic officials are not attested prior to the Lycurgan ephebeia and consequently ephebes, like 
other citizens, would have been organized by tribes under tribal taxiarchoi ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 61). Third, 
Ariston, if he was under twenty, would not have been prohibited from the lawcourt, unlike the ephebes in 
the Lycurgan period ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.5).  
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in this period was responsible for their peripoleiai. Though the Thebans in Aeschines’ 
time were not yet the openly hostile “rivals on the borders (ὅμοροι ἀντίπαλοι)” who 
were a constant threat to the Athenians after 370 (Xen. Hipp. 7.1), the latter were 
nevertheless alarmed at the Theban destruction of Plataea in 373/2 (an ally of Athens), 
followed by their aggression against Thespiae, and finally at the Thebans’ unexpected 
victory over the Spartans at Leuctra in 371.213  
But if Aeschines’ short stints as a peripolos were typical for citizens of his age, 
why then would the Athenians have found his testimony unusual? I suggest that, unlike 
his later military career, the orator had no opportunity to distinguish himself during his 
military service while he was an ephebos. This is why he does not draw attention to his 
martial qualities or mention any honor or praise he received from his commanding 
officers for his devotion to duty (cf. 2.168-9).214 Instead, he deliberately omits the 
circumstances under which he served and thereby creates the impression that he served 
continuously over a two-year period in order to convince his audience that even as a 
youth he was exceptionally devoted to the polis because he, unlike other epheboi, 
performed garrison duty above and beyond the call of duty. Certainly his intention was to 
contrast himself favorably with a youth like Glaucon, who had clearly never served in the 
frontier forts (Xen. Mem. 3.6.10-11). 
 
 
                                                
213 See Buckler 1980, 182-4. The destruction of Plataea (Xen. Hell. 6.3.1; D.S. 15.46.4-6; Isoc. 14.6; Paus. 
9.1.8). The Athenians awarded citizenship to the Plataean refugees (Isoc. 14.51-2; [Dem]. 59.104-6). The 
pillaging of Thespiae, followed by expulsion of pro-Spartan Thespians (D.S. 15.46.6; 51.3; Xen. Hell. 
6.3.1). For the incorporation of Thebes’ rivals into the Boeotian League in the 370’s and 360’s and the 
negative reaction of Athens, see Buckley 1980, 15-23; Bakhuizen 1994, 307-30; Hammond 2000, 88-93. 
The Athenians listened with consternation to the garlanded Theban messenger, who addressed the boule on 
their victory at Leuctra, and dismissed him without providing the customary hospitality and with no reply 
(Xen. Hell. 6.4.19-20). 
214 Aeschines mentions the following military exploits: (1) His bravery in the Nemean Ravine on the 
expedition under Alcibiades to Phlius in 366, which was praised by his commanders (ἠγωνισάμην ὥστε 
ὑπὸ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ἐπαινεῖσθαι). (2) He fought at the battle of Mantineia in 362 in a manner “not 
shamefully nor unworthily for the city (οὐκ αἰσχρῶς οὐδ’ ἀναξίως τῆς πόλεως).” (3) He took part in 
two expeditions to Euboea. In the second (349/8) he fought as an epilektos, a member of Athens’ élite 





 Despite the arguments of the advocates for an early ephebeia, the institution as 
described in the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia is unlikely to have antedated the 
Lycurgan period because its essential features – mass military training, mandatory 
garrison duty, and a formal ephebic organization – are unattested before 334/3, the year 
in which the earliest securely dated ephebic inscriptions indicate that ephebes were 
enrolled in the ephebeia. While scholars have maintained that Aeschines’ use of 
peripolos and ephebos is decisive evidence that the ephebeia existed c. 372 and that his 
military service must have been the same as the ephebes c. 330, we have seen that 
Aeschines’ peripoleia, despite the similar terminology, can be explained without 
assuming a pre-Lycurgan institution. Indeed, if we accept the arguments presented here, 
we can understand that Aeschines uses sunephebos with various technical meanings 
associated with the attainment of civic majority and the obligation of military service. But 
ephebos in the fourth century never meant “a youth who serves in the ephebeia,” as 
scholars have assumed, not even in the Athenaion Politeia, which provides our most 
detailed description of the ephebeia. Also, an examination of Aeschines’ military service 
shows that the youngest citizens, since they constituted a special military category called 
neotatoi in the fifth century and epheboi in the fourth, were not only not usually 
conscripted for strateia, but were also not called up en masse for garrison duty except 
under exceptional conditions. Having discussed the role of citizens under twenty in the 





Chapter Two: The Creation of the Ephebeia 
 
But there is a tragic irony in all this. For Athens developed this meticulous 
organization for recruiting her national army just when Philip’s victory 
and Macedonian hegemony had ended Hellenic independence and the free 
city. As happens so often in the history of human institutions, the ephebia 
did not reach perfection until for all practical purposes it had lost its raison 
d’être.1 
 
 Though Marrou is mistaken in his belief that the ephebeia existed prior to the 
battle of Chaeronea, his analysis draws attention to a seeming paradox concerning the 
inception of the institution. Why did the Athenians, having paid no heed to the 
suggestions of utopian theorists such as Xenophon and Plato to create systems of youth 
education when Athens had full autonomy, decide to do so under the domination of 
Macedon? The first positive evidence for the ephebeia occurs after Chaeronea, since the 
corpus of ephebic inscriptions strongly suggests that the institution began to function in 
334/3 (E1-E4). This is the limit of our knowledge concerning the origin of the ephebeia: 
we have no direct evidence for why the Athenians created the institution. 
Modern attempts to provide an explanation have rightly focused on the military 
nature of the institution.2 Given that the Athenaion Politeia treats the ephebeia as a 
military organization and nowhere hints that the ephebes’ military activities were 
“ceremonial” or “nominal” as some scholars have supposed (42.2-5),3 there is no reason 
                                                
1 Marrou 1956, 152.  
2 Dillery 2002, 469: “While it would be a serious mistake to underestimate the broader cultural importance 
of the ephebate, especially in the Lycurgan era, it is equally wrong to lose sight of the basic fact that it was 
designed as a military institution.” 
3 Sawada 1996, 77, argues that the “nature of this two-year military training of young men at the age of 18-
20, however, was quite ceremonial.” He cites Pélékidis 1962, 103-117, who makes no such claim. On the 
contrary, Pélékidis explicitly says: “La caractère militaire de l’institution est constamment souligné, mais 
cela n’exclut pas d’autres activitiés [i.e. participation in festivals and religious processions] (117).” Loomis 
1998, 53, treats the ephebeia as if it was a military academy: “Although the ephebes had nominal military 
duties, serving as a national guard, they really were training for their future responsibilities as citizens and 
soldiers; certainly their work was neither as strenuous nor as dangerous as that of soldiers in combat.” 
Loomis, however, provides no evidence to justify this assertion. In fact, as we will see in this chapter, the 
military activities the ephebes performed were vital for the security of Athens. Will 1983, 94, n. 310, 
argues that the ephebeia was not a military organization, but was created for the purpose of increasing 
citizen participation in the democracy. There is no evidence to suggest this and his theory is contradicted by 
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to think that the ephebeia should not be regarded as a solution to a military problem 
which arose at some point in the first few years of Macedonian hegemony (i.e. 338/7-
335/4). I argue that if we consider what immediate military benefit the ephebeia conferred 
upon Athens and place it in its proper historical context – namely Athens’ relationship 
with Macedon in the reigns of Philip II and Alexander the Great – it is clear that scholars 
have misunderstood what problem the institution was intended to fix and which events 
prior to 334/3 were responsible for its creation. Since scholars have attributed the 
creation/reformation of the ephebeia to Lycurgus, let us begin with the aftermath of 
Chaeronea and the Athenian recovery program undertaken during his administration. 
 
2.1: Chaeronea and The Lycurgan Program4  
 In the summer of 338/7 Philip II of Macedon decisively defeated the Athenians 
and their allies at the battle of Chaeronea and became the dominant power in Greece.5 
When the surviving Athenians made their way back to Athens and brought news of the 
catastrophe, pandemonium erupted in the city (Lyc. Leoc. 39-40, 131; Dem. 18.248). 
With the expectation that an invasion of Attica was imminent (Dem. 18.195), the 
Athenians prepared for a prolonged siege, determined to resist to the bitter end. But 
Philip and his army never crossed into Attica (Aeschin. 3.131). Instead, he offered terms 
to the Athenians. To convince them that they were genuine, he returned the ashes of the 
citizens killed at Chaeronea, conveyed to Athens by Alexander himself as a mark of 
                                                                                                                                            
the tight restrictions placed upon the ephebes while they served in the ephebeia to ensure that they did not 
take part in public life ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.5).  
4 There is, unfortunately, no contemporary source that provides a connected historical narrative of 
Mainland Greece for the period between Chaeronea and the Lamian war. We are dependent on Arrian, 
Justin’s epitome of Pompeius Trogus, Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch, the earliest of whom wrote several 
centuries after the events described in their works. It is therefore difficult to assess the trustworthiness of 
these authors, though their writings make it clear that they drew upon a variety of earlier sources. On these 
matters, see Bosworth 1988b, esp. 1-15. While we are fortunate to possess a number of Attic speeches that 
provides a rich vein of information about Athenian politics and insight into the Athenians’ perception of 
important events during Lycurgan period, the accuracy of this historical information is open to distortion, 
deception, and outright fabrication (see Worthington 1994, 109-29). Consequently, I have used this literary 
evidence with caution throughout this chapter, limiting my assertions to those matters which scholars are in 
general agreement.  
5 According to Plutarch, Chaeronea was fought on the seventh of Metageitnion, i.e. on the second of 
August 338/7 (Cam. 19.8). 
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honor, and then released the prisoners without ransom (Plut. Dem. 21.2; Just. 9.4.5; D.S. 
16.87.3).6 Swayed by his generosity, the Athenians, advised by Phocion, accepted his 
terms (Plut. Phoc. 16.4).7  
Philip allowed them to retain full control of their constitution (Paus. 7.10.5). He 
did not station a garrison on Athenian soil (Aristid. 13.182); neither was there a purge of 
Athens’ political leaders, including staunch anti-Macedonians such as Demosthenes, who 
later delivered the funeral oration in honor of the citizens slain at Chaeronea (Dem. 
18.285 [Plut]. Mor. 845F). The Athenians lost the Chersonese and their naval league was 
dissolved, but the city retained the cleruchies of Samos, Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, and 
continued to control Delos.8 Lastly, Philip returned Oropos, which had been under 
Theban control since 366, to Athens.9 Grateful for his leniency, the Athenians voted to 
grant Philip and Alexander citizenship and then erected a statue of the former in the 
Agora.10 With this generous settlement, Philip hoped to ease the Athenians’ humiliation 
at their defeat, to make their subordination to Macedon more palatable, and to build up 
the necessary goodwill so that they would actively assist him against the Persians.11  
                                                
6 Diodorus attributes Philip’s generosity towards the Athenians to Demades’ rebuke that Philip was acting 
like a Thersites in mocking his prisoners after the battle when fortune had made him an Agamemnon. 
Philip, stung by this admonishment, freed Demades, who then persuaded him to release the captive 
Athenians and to offer favorable terms to Athens (16.87). For differing opinions on the historicity of this 
anecdote, see Cawkwell 1978, 167; Hammond and Griffith 1979, 605; Sealey 1993, 198; Hammond 1994, 
156. 
7 For a detailed discussion of Philip’s treaty with the Athenians, see Schaefer 1887, 25-31; Roebuck 1948, 
79-82; Hammond and Griffith 1979, 606-9.  
8 Although no ancient source says that Athens lost the Chersonese, this is deduced from the fact that there 
is no positive evidence for Athenian control over the area after 338/7 (see Hammond and Griffith 1979, 
607). For the loss of the naval league, see Paus. 1.25.3. Athenian control of the islands: Samos ([Arist]. 
Ath.Pol. 62.2; Plut. Alex. 28; D.S. 18.56.7); Lemnos ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 61.6; 62.2); Imbros and Skyros 
([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 62.2); Delos (IG II2 1652). 
9 For the return of Oropos, see Paus. 1.34.1; D.S. 18.56.6; Hyp. Eux. 16; [Demad]. 9; Schol. on Dem. 
18.99. Knoepfler 1993, 295-6, argues that Alexander, not Philip, returned Oropos to Athenian control. The 
above sources are quite specific, however, that Philip performed the act.  
10 For Philip and Alexander, see Plut. Dem. 22.3; [Demad]. 9; Paus. 1.9.4; Schol. on Aristid. 13.178 
(Dindorf); Just. 9.4.5. For a discussion of the evidence concerning these honors, see Schaefer 1887, 31-3; 
Osborne 1983, T68-71. 
11 For a discussion of Philip’s motives towards Athens, see Ellis 1976, 199-201; Cawkwell 1978, 166-7. As 
Hammond and Griffith 1979, 619-21, put it: “The Athenian navy could have been destroyed after 
Chaeronea. If Philip had been implacable and put Athens under siege, the navy could have been among the 
first victims of an unconditional surrender. The conclusion is unavoidable that he wanted the Athenian 
navy to survive, and the presumption must be that he recognized his own need of it, for a war against Persia 
… Peace without dishonour was the setting in which the Athenians, guided by their wiser counsellors, 
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In early 337 Philip summoned the delegates of the Athenians and other cities 
(except for Sparta) to a congress in Corinth and had them agree to a Common Peace,12 
which resulted in the establishment of the League of Corinth.13 The Greeks were 
guaranteed freedom and autonomy and it was stipulated that their constitutions would be 
free from outside interference. They also swore to maintain the peace and to undertake 
military action led by the hegemon of the league against those who broke it. Finally, they 
voted Philip as hegemon and swore never to subvert the kingdom of Philip and his 
successors.14 These provisions effectively deprived the Greeks of their independence in 
international affairs and ensured that they had to conform to Philip’s wishes, since any 
attempt by them to extend their power beyond the bounds set by their settlement with 
Philip would violate the Common Peace and risk retaliation from the Macedonian king.15 
The Athenians, for example, had no choice but to comply with Philip’s demand for 
triremes and cavalry for his campaign against Persia (Plut. Phoc. 16.6-7; cf. D.S. 16.89.3; 
Just. 9.5.1-7), even though they knew that the war was not to their own advantage.16 It is 
                                                                                                                                            
might salvage their pride, turn away from acts or thoughts of disloyalty, and lend their necessary support on 
the element which was truly their own, the sea, in its Aegean and eastern waters.”   
12 According to Plutarch, the Athenians voted to participate in the Common Peace (on Demades’ motion) 
against the advice of Phocion, who urged them to wait until they had ascertained what Philip required of 
them (Phoc. 16.5-6). It is doubtful, however, whether the Athenians had a choice in the matter, given 
Philip’s superior military might. Cawkwell 1969, 167, n. 5, dates the congress to early 337. 
13 For the institution’s foundation, constitution, officials, and its juridical nature, see Ryder 1965, 150-62; 
Hammond and Griffith 1979, 623-46. 
14 A fragmentary copy of the terms of the Common Peace has been found in Athens (Tod. II, no. 177 = IG 
II2 236 [338/7]). This inscription, together with the Pseudo-Demosthenic speech On the Treaty with 
Alexander (17), constitutes the principal evidence for the sunthekai in 338/7 (see Ryder 1965, 150-1). The 
date of [Dem]. 17 is disputed. Will 1983, 68-70, suggests a date no latter than 333/2, but Cawkwell’s 1961, 
74-8, argument for 331/0 is more convincing.  
15 For the Common Peace as an instrument of Macedonian domination, see Ryder 1965, 104-5; Hammond 
and Griffith 1979, 633; Bosworth 1988a, 187. As Cawkwell 1978, 176, aptly puts it: “By the League of 
Corinth the King of Macedon was instilled with authority and power to enforce it [i.e. transgressions of the 
Common Peace] within Greece itself; let trouble arise and ‘those in charge of the general security’ would 
swiftly act … under the King of Macedon, once at her doorstep, now within her doors, she had total peace 
and no liberty.” 
16 Macedonian propaganda framed the war as a joint undertaking between Philip and the Greeks to exact 
vengeance for Xerxes’ destruction of Greek temples in 480-79 (D.S. 16.89.3). The Athenians, however, 
were well aware that a successful campaign would increase Philip’s power further and weaken Persia, 
which they considered as a potential ally against Macedon (see Hammond and Griffith 1979, 631-2; Sealey 
1993, 200-1; Habicht 1997, 12).  
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unsurprising, then, that Lycurgus regarded Chaeronea as the moment when Greek 
freedom was buried with those who died on that battlefield (Leoc. 50).17  
The loss of independence did not lead to demoralization and paralysis in Athens. 
Instead it spurred the Athenians under the administration of Lycurgus to carry out an 
extensive revitalization program to give Athens the necessary strength and will to resist 
the hegemony of Macedon.18 Lycurgus, son of Lycophron, of the deme Boutadae, was 
born c. 390 into the aristocratic genos of the Eteoboutadae. This aristocratic clan traced 
its ancestry to Erechtheus and handed down through its membership the ancient and 
important priesthood of Poseidon Erechtheus, centered on the Erectheum and hence at the 
heart of Athens’ state religion.  Lycurgus himself held the priesthood as did his son 
Habron ([Plut]. Mor. 843E-F).19 Alongside the genos’ importance in the religious life of 
the polis, the sources stress the long-established loyalty of Lycurgus and his ancestors to 
the democracy ([Plut]. Mor. 852A).20 Nothing certain is known about his political career 
until his prosecution of the general Lysicles for his role in the defeat of the Athenians at 
                                                
17 μόνοι γὰρ τῶν ἁπάντων τὴν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐλευθερίαν ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν σώμασιν εἶχον. ἅμα γὰρ 
οὗτοί τε τὸν βίον μετήλλαξαν, καὶ τὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος εἰς δουλείαν μετέπεσεν· συνετάφη γὰρ τοῖς 
τούτων σώμασιν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερία. The Spartans had a similar opinion of the 
Common Peace: soli Lacedaemonii et regem et leges contempserunt, servitutem, non pacem rati, quae non 
ipsis civitatibus conveniret, sed a victore ferretur (Just. 9.5.1-3). 
18 The main literary source for Lycurgus and the Lycurgan program is the Vitae decem oratorum (Mor. 
841A-844A). This treatise, preserved among Plutarch’s works, is of unknown authorship and probably 
dates at the earliest to the Augustan period, since the stemma of Lycurgus’ descendants continues to this 
time (See Merkel 1986, 45, n. 18, on [Plut]. Mor. 843B-C). In the “Epigraphical Appendix” of the work is 
the decree of Stratocles (Mor. 851F-852E), which was passed in 307/6 after the restoration of the 
democracy. The decree honored Lycurgus for his achievements and granted him a statue in the Agora (for 
the base, see IG II2 3776 = EM 10607). Fragments of the decree have also been found (IG II2 457 and 513), 
which differ in some respects from the literary version. For the text of both versions, see Conomis 1970, 
13-17; Mitchel 1986, 51-4. Interpretation of the decree is problematic, however, because it says more about 
how Athenians wished to see Lycurgus in the restored democracy than a faithful account of his 
accomplishments (see Merker 1986, 45; Sealey 1993, 21). Fifteen speeches of Lycurgus were known in 
antiquity (see Conomis 1961, 76-9, on [Plut]. Mor. 843C), of which one speech – Against Leocrates 
(331/0) – has survived complete, while fragments exist for the others (collected in Conomis 1970). 
19 For a history of the Eteoboutidae, see Kirchner 1903, nos. 9232, 9251; Davies 1971, 348-53, no. 9251; 
Bourriot 1976, 1304-47; Parker 1995, 290-3. The graves of Lycurgus’ family have recently been found in 
the Ceramicus: see Matthaiou 1987, 31-44.  
20 ἐπειδὴ Λυκοῦργος Λυκόφρονος Βουτάδης παραλαβὼν παρὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ προγόνων οἰκείαν 
ἐκ παλαιοῦ τὴν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον εὔνοιαν καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι οἱ Λυκούργου, Λυκομήδης τε καὶ 
Λυκοῦργος, καὶ ζῶντες ἐτιμῶντο ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τελευτήσασιν αὐτοῖς δι’ ἀνδραγαθίαν 
ἔδωκεν ὁ δῆμος δημοσίας ταφὰς ἐν Κεραμεικῷ. The author also says that this Lycurgus, grandfather of 
the fourth-century statesman, was executed by the Thirty (841B). He was probably the same man of that 
name lampooned in Aristophanes’ Birds (1296).  
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Chaeronea (D.S. 16.88.2).21 Even so, the demos could not have entrusted him with the 
charge of Athens’ financial affairs in the 330’s unless he had already gained a “reputation 
as an honest and able administrator,” as Mitchel puts it.22 Late evidence does suggest that 
he was held in good regard by his compatriots.23 
The literary sources do not explicitly name the office which Lycurgus held as the 
head administrator of Athens, though they use similar terminology – namely variations of 
the root διοικε- “to manage” – to describe it.24 Even so, there is no evidence that his 
official title, as some scholars have supposed, was ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει, which literally 
means “the man in charge of administration” but is perhaps best rendered as “state 
treasurer” or “state comptroller.”25 Whatever the name of his office, it is clear that 
Lycurgus controlled Athens’ finances for three consecutive four-year terms ([Plut]. Mor. 
841B, 852B), or for twelve years in all (D.S. 16.88.1). Since a law limited his tenure in 
the office to one term, Lycurgus had his friends elected to it for the next two terms while 
                                                
21 Lycurgus may have accompanied Demosthenes and Polyeuctus to the Peloponnese in 343 to arouse 
animosity towards Philip ([Plut]. Mor. 841E), though Demosthenes does not mention him (9.72). 
Humphreys 2004, 77-8, argues from Lucian Parasite 42 that he was bouletes in 338/7. But Hansen 1992, 
58, rightly rejects Lucian, because a citizen could only be a bouletes twice in his life ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 62.3) 
and he is already attested epigraphically as bouletes in 336/5 (IG II2 328) and in 329/8 (IG II2 1672). 
22 Mitchel 1970, 12. 
23 The decree of Stratocles stresses his honesty and may also allude to his earlier offices: καὶ διδοὺς 
εὐθύνας πολλάκις τῶν πεπολιτευμένων ἐν ἐλευθέρᾳ καὶ δημοκρατουμένῃ τῇ πόλει διετέλεσεν 
ἀνεξέλεγκτος καὶ ἀδωροδόκητος τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ([Plut]. Mor. 852D). The Vitae decem 
oratorum says that Lycurgus “continued to be held in high esteem for his entire life in the opinion of the 
Athenians and to be considered a just man (841F; cf. 842F).” 
24 Hyp. Fr. 118 Sauppe (ταχθεὶς δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει τῶν χρημάτων); D.S. 16.88.1 (δώδεκα μὲν ἔτη 
τὰς προσόδους τῆς πόλεως διοικήσας); [Plut]. Mor. 841B-C (πιστευσάμενος τὴν διοίκησιν τῶν 
χρημάτων· ταμίας γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐπὶ τρεῖς πενταετηρίδας ταλάντων μυρίων τετρακισχιλίων, ἢ 
ὥς τινες μυρίων ὀκτακισχιλίων ἑξακοσίων πεντήκοντα); 852B (γενόμενος τῆς κοινῆς προσόδου 
ταμίας τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ τρεῖς πενταετηρίδας καὶ διανείμας ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς προσόδου μύρια καὶ 
ὀκτακισχίλια καὶ ἐνακόσια τάλαντα … δόξας δὲ ἅπαντα ταῦτα δικαίως διῳκηκέναι πολλάκις). 
For a discussion of these sources, see Faraguna 1992, 197-9.  
25 See Merker 1986, 43, n. 9, for a range of possible translations for this difficult technical term. The 
Athenaion Politeia does not mention this office in its account of the city’s administration nor refer to any 
which approximates to it (see esp. 43.1), probably because it was an extraordinary one, initially at least, 
created for Lycurgus by psephismata rather than by nomoi, unlike the other offices mentioned in the 
treatise (See Rhodes 1981, 516; Henry 1984, 52, n. 13). The first attested instance of an official called ὁ 
ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει was Habron, Lycurgus’ son, in 307/6, (IG II2 436, line 36). Scholars disagree over 
whether Lycurgus himself or his successors ever held this title (there is no certainty given the extant 
evidence: see the previous note), with some suggesting that it was used only after the restoration of the 
democracy. For various opinions, see Merrit 1960, 4, no. 3; Buchanan 1962, 77; Mitchel 1970, 28; Merker 
1986, 43, n. 9; Faragua 1992, 198-9; Hakkarainen 1997, 7.   
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still retaining control of the administration in his own hands ([Plut]. Mor. 841C). The 
epigraphic evidence suggests that Xenocles of Sphettus served as his proxy for the 
second term; the name of the holder of the third term is unknown.26 Controversy exists 
over when Lycurgus began his first four-year term.27 Some scholars maintain that his 
three terms ran from Greater Panathenaea to Greater Panathenaea (i.e. 338/7-326/5).28 
But more convincing is the argument that Lycurgus entered his office in 336/5 rather than 
338/7, while his third term would have ended in 324/3, had he not died late in 325/4.29  
 His activities as state treasurer are summarized in a fragment of Hyperides’ 
speech In Defense of the Children of Lycurgus, delivered after Lycurgus’ death: 
 
What will those who pass by his grave say? “This man lived a prudent life, 
when he was appointed for the administration of the finances, he 
discovered sources of revenue, he built the theatre, the odeium, the 
dockyards, he constructed triremes and harbors: Our city disgraced him 
and imprisoned his children (Fr. 118 Sauppe).30 
 
The fragment is consistent with the Vitae decem oratorum, which says that Lycurgus 
increased Athens’ annual income, without tribute, to the unprecedented figure of 1,200 
                                                
26 Meritt 1960, 2-4, no. 3 = SEG 19.119, lines 4-5 (Ξενοκλῆς Ξ]είνιδος Σ[φήττιος) and lines 7-9 
(κ⟨α⟩τ[ασταθεὶς ἐ]πὶ τῇ διοι[κήσει τῆς π]όλεως). Merrit has dated the inscription to the Lycurgan 
period on account of its lettering. This has been accepted by scholars, including Lewis 1997, 227, n. 40 = 
Rhodes 1972, 108, n. 1. For a discussion of this inscription and how Lycurgus might have controlled 
Athens’ finances after his first term, see Engels 1992, 8-12.  
27 For a summary of the various views, see Merker 1986, 44-5; Engels 1992, 6-8. 
28 E.g. Markianos 1969, 326; Mitchel 1970, 28-9; Will 1983, 22-3; Engels 1992, 6; Hakkarainen 1997, 7. 
The case for 338/7 assumes that the treasurers of the Theoric and the Military Funds ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 43.1) 
ran from Greater Panathenaea to Greater Panathenaea and that Lycurgus’ office was no different (see 
Develin 1984, 133-8). 
29 Rhodes 1972, 236-7, and Lewis 1997, 212-4, have shown that the turn of the treasurers of the Theoric 
and Military funds ran for annual terms (i.e. to and from each Lesser or Greater Panathenaea). Lewis 1997, 
221-4, has also demonstrated that Lycurgus was still in his third term of office when he died in 325/4 (see 
[Plut]. Mor. 842F). For the date of his death, see Davies 1971, 351, on  [Plut]. Mor. 848F. Lewis’ view is 
now generally accepted by scholars: e.g. Bosworth 1988a, 205, n. 21; Wallace 1989, 195; Faraguna 1992, 
199-200; Humphreys 2004, 78. 
30 τίνα φήσουσιν οἱ παριόντες αὐτοῦ τὸν τάφον; οὗτος ἐβίω μὲν σωφρόνως, ταχθεὶς δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ 
διοικήσει τῶν χρημάτων εὗρε πόρους, ᾠκοδόμησε τὸ θέατρον, τὸ ᾠδεῖον, τὰ νεώρια, τριήρεις, 
ἐποιήσατο, λιμένας· τοῦτονἡ πόλις ἡμῶν ἠτίμωσε καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἔδησεν αὐτοῦ. 
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talents ([Plut]. Mor. 842F).31 This does not contradict the 14-19,000 talents said to have 
passed through his hands during his twelve years in office.32 How Lycurgus managed to 
increase public revenues, without tribute, to a level unprecedented in Athenian history is 
unclear. Faraguna has suggested that Lycurgus boosted Athens’ income through the 
exploitation of the silver mines of Laurium, the selling of public land, the leasing of 
sacred land, and the reorganization of cults on a sound financial footing.33 In addition, 
Lycurgus fully realized the potential of Piraeus as a commercial center and raised 
considerable revenues by taxing the merchants passing through Athens.34  
 This increase in income made it possible for the Athenians under Lycurgus’ 
administration to carry out the most important projects in the period between Chaeronea 
and the Lamian War (i.e. 338/7-323/2): (1) The strengthening of Athens’ military 
defenses. (2) The enhancement of the polis’ traditional cults by the refurbishment and 
construction of sanctuaries and through the adornment of these cults with magnificent 
dedications and sacred vessels. (3) The construction of public buildings, such as the 
Panathenaic Stadium and the gymnasium at the Lyceum ([Plut]. Mor. 852C).35 While 
Lycurgus is rightly considered to be the leading figure in these projects on account of his 
control of public finances, it is clear from the literary and epigraphic evidence that he also 
depended upon the energetic cooperation of many members of the upper class, several of 
whom were politically prominent in their own right, such as Demosthenes, Demades, and 
                                                
31 For a detailed and thorough analysis of Athenian finances in the Lycurgan period, see Faraguna 1992, 
286-400. Also see Mitchel 1970, 31-4; Will 1983, 77-9; Burke 1984, 251-264; Bosworth 1988a, 206-8; 
Humphreys 2004, 85-6. 
32 The Vitae decem oratorum says fourteen thousand talents and wrongly reports that the Stratocles’ decree 
gives a higher figure of 18,650 talents ([Plut]. Mor. 841B), whereas the decree actually says that revenues 
were 8,900 talents ([Plut]. Mor. 852B). Burke 1984, 251, n. 5, discusses these figures, which cannot be 
easily reconciled, and concludes that these cumulative totals are consistent with an average of 1,200 talents 
per annum over twelve years. Stratocles may have obtained these figures from the stele of Lycurgus’ 
financial records which was set up outside the Lyceum ([Plut]. Mor. 843F).  
33 Faraguna 1992, 289-380.  
34 Burke 1984, 258-64. 
35 For these projects, see Mitchel 1965; 1970; Mossé 1973, 68-101; Will 1983; Schwenk 1985; Bosworth 
1988a, 187-228; Engels 1992; Faraguna 1992; Marcellus 1994, 123-69; Habicht 1997, 6-35; Hintzen-
Bohlen 1997; Humphreys 2004, 77-129, = 1985, 199-252. These will be discussed further in this and 
subsequent chapters in connection with the ephebeia.  
 
 65 
Xenocles of Sphettus.36 The Lycurgan program, then, should be seen as a collective 
effort, even if the decree of Stratocles gives all the credit to Lycurgus and often omits 
those who cooperated with him in the implementation of a given project.37  
 
2.2: Epicrates’ Ephebic Legislation 
Certainly an organization such as the ephebeia cannot have been created without 
broad support among Athens’ political leadership and the demos, given the military, 
social, economic, and political ramifications of the institution. No contemporary source, 
however, discusses the ephebeia’s foundation.38 Nor does the decree of Stratocles and the 
Vitae decem oratorum mention the ephebeia as one of Lycurgus’ achievements. Indeed, 
the only passage which can be understood to refer to the creation of the ephebeia is a 
fragment of Lycurgus’ On the Financial Administration (ἐν τῷ περὶ διοικήσεως), a 
speech in which he gave an account of his management of Athens’ finances, probably at 
his euthuna, after the expiration of one of his pentaeterides in office.39 The second-
                                                
36 For a discussion of the Athenians who participated in the Lycurgan program, see Mitchel 1970, 11-26; 
Faraguna 1992, 211-43; Mikalson 1998, 32-6; Humphreys 2004, 83-99. Hansen’s 1983, 158-80, list of 
politically active citizens in fourth-century Athens who introduced laws during Lycurgus’ administration 
contains more than fifty names. Mitchel 1970, 26, rightly says that “the governing of the city was 
throughout the Lykourgan Period in the hands of a conservative group within which the ideological 
differences were less than generally supposed and personal dislikes did not prevent cooperation on essential 
matters of external and internal policy.” Lewis 1955, 27-36, has studied those who participated with 
Lycurgus in three important religious projects and concludes that they were of high average age (for those 
whose ages can be ascertained), wealthy, and were important individuals in their own right (35): these 
citizens acted as commissioners for the Amphiareia (SIG3 298 [329/8]), contributors towards a dedication at 
the Amphiareion (AE 1917, 41 [328/7]), and hieropoioi for the Pythais (SIG3 296 [326/5]). Other studies 
suggest that the wealthy Athenians who worked with Lycurgus, at least in religious activities, should not be 
considered a monolithic group but as a fluid group of individuals who contributed in accordance with their 
personal religious tastes (Mikalson 1998, 36; Humphreys 2004, 97).  
37 In the decree of Stratocles, for example, Lycurgus is praised for adorning Athena with new processional 
vessels and solid gold victories ([Plut]. Mor. 852B; cf. 841D; IG II2 457b, lines 3-4). The epigraphic 
evidence, however, suggests that while Lycurgus proposed the law to reorganize Athens’ cult finances (IG 
II2 333 = Schwenk 1985, no. 21 [335/4]), it was executed by many officials, not the least Demades, who 
was treasurer of the stratiotic fund at that time (see Mitchel 1962, 213-29, esp. 222, on IG II2 1493, 1494, 
and 1495). This cooperation occurred despite the fact that Lycurgus and Demades were often bitter political 
enemies, as can be seen in the former’s attack on Cephisodotus’ proposal of honors for Demades’ services 
on behalf of Athens (see Conomis 1961, 126-8, on Lycurgus Fr. 9.1-4 Conomis). 
38 Contemporary references to the ephebeia: Arist. Pol. 1322a, 6.5.7; Din. 3.16; Against Agasicles fr. 68; 
Demad. fr. 68 De Falco; Lyc. Leoc. 76-7. 
39 The speech survives in fragments. For a collection and commentary on these fragments, see Conomis 
1961, 98-107; 1970, 98-100. Conomis 1961, 99, suggests that it dates to the euthuna of Lycurgus’ first 
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century A.D. grammarian Harpocration preserves the following fragment, under the 
heading Epicrates: 
 
And there is another Epicrates whom Lycurgus mentions in his speech On 
the Financial Administration, when he says that a bronze statue of him 
was erected on account of his legislation concerning the ephebes (διὰ τὸν 
νόμον τὸν περὶ τῶν ἐφήβων), who he says possessed property worth 
six hundred talents (Harp. s.v. Ἐπικράτης = Lyc. Fr. 5.3 Conomis).40 
 
Pélékidis argues that “le passage d’Harpocration pose plusieurs questions qui restent sans 
réponse, nous ne savons ni à quelle époque a vécu Épicratès, ni à quel moment il a 
proposé sa loi sur les éphèbes, ni si cette loi établissait l’éphébie, ni si elle apportait des 
modifications à son statut, ni pourquoi Lycurgue mentionne la statue de bronze érigée en 
l’honneur d’Épicratès.”41 While some scholars agree with Pélékidis,42 the prevailing 
opinion is that Epicrates’ legislation was responsible for the creation of the ephebeia as 
the Athenaion Politeia describes it.43 Pélékidis’ objections, however, do carry some 
weight and the following discussion will examine what, if anything, can be deduced from 
Harpocration’s fragment.  
 First, who was Epicrates? Harpocration’s paraphrase of Lycurgus says nothing 
about him except that he is said to have “possessed property worth six hundred talents 
(κεκτῆσθαι ταλάντων ἑξακοσίων οὐσίαν).” From this we can infer that Epicrates was 
wealthy. Some scholars have therefore sought to identify him with a certain Epicrates of 
Pallene mentioned by Hyperides in the Defense of Euxenippus, dated c. 330-324,44 whom 
                                                                                                                                            
four-year term. Since the euthunai of Athens’ magistrates took place in the first two months after their 
offices had ended (see Hansen 1991, 223), Lycurgus must have delivered the On the Financial 
Administration in early 332/1. 
40 ἕτερος δ’ ἐστὶν Ἐπικράτης οὗ μνημονεύει Λυκοῦργος ἐν τῷ Περὶ <τῆς> διοικήσεως, λέγων ὡς 
χαλκοῦς ἐστάθη διὰ τὸν νόμον τὸν περὶ τῶν ἐφήβων, ὅν φασι κεκτῆσθαι ταλάντων ἑξακοσίων 
οὐσίαν.  
41 Pélékidis 1962, 13.  
42 E.g.: Reinmuth 1971, 124: “This Epikrates is otherwise not indentifiable. The nature of his law can only 
be the subject of conjecture. Neither man nor measure can be dated.”  
43 For a list of scholars, see p. 11, n. 39. Mitchel 1964, 344, n.34, rather puzzlingly says that scholars “need 
not insist that the law was moved by Epikrates, although he is the only likely candidate” despite the fact 
that Harpocration explicitly attributes the law to him. 
44 For the date, see Whitehead 2000, 155-7. 
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Lysander had unsuccessfully accused of illegally working the silver mines at Laurion: the 
prosecutor had claimed that this Epicrates and his associates had made three hundred 
talents in profit from mine-working in just three years (35).45 Davies also suggests, 
without explanation, that he was the same man as Ἐπικράτης … οτητου, who was a 
bouletes from Pallene in 335/4 (IG II2 1700 = Agora 15.43, lines 200-1).46 But these 
identifications are by no means compelling. For example, it is just as likely that the 
Epicrates in Harpocration could have been the Epicrates of Pallene who owned a 
workshop at Nape in the mining area in the 330’s, as Humphreys and Faraguna suggest,47 
or the Epicrates, son of Isocrates, of the deme Euonymon, who also leased a mine c. 
342/1-339/8.48 Given the available evidence, the identity of Epicrates cannot be 
established with any certainty. 
 It should also be stressed that nothing is known about the content of Epicrates’ ὁ 
νόμος ὁ περὶ τῶν ἐφήβων. The supposition that it created the ephebeia is based upon 
the likelihood that the institution, as we have seen in Chapter One, did not exist as a 
formal organization before the Lycurgan period. But if the nomos did found the ephebeia, 
Epicrates must have proposed his legislation in 336/5 or 335/4, since Lycurgus began his 
first four-year term in 336/5 and the ephebeia is first attested epigraphically in 334/3.49 
Another possibility is that the nomos was one of the regulations (nomoi) attested in the 
ephebic inscriptions that governed the activities of the ephebes when they undertook their 
                                                
45 See Davies 1971, no. 4909 E & G; Hansen 1989, 45; Traill 1997, no. 393520, identifies this Epicrates 
with the man of the same name (no. 393525) who proposed a decree concerning the funding of a festival in 
354/3 (Agora I 7495, line 4); Whitehead 2000, 248. Habicht 1997, 23, n. 28, takes Hyperides to mean that 
Epicrates’ himself made 300 talents, but Whitehead 2000, 250, is surely right that Hyperides is referring to 
the profit made by a consortium, not just Epicrates. 
46 Davies 1971, no. 4909 D. But Traill 1997, no. 394115, does not make this identification. 
47 Faraguna 1992, 275, n. 96; Humphreys 2004, 82, n. 13. 
48 For Epicrates of Euonymon and Pallene, see Davies 1971, nos. 4386 and 4909 F; Traill 1997, nos. 
393395 and 393885. 
49 The usual assumption is that the nomos was passed in either 336/5 or 335/4 because the epigraphic 
evidence would not allow a date much earlier (see Mitchel 1964, 344, n. 34; 1975, 233) than the earliest 
attested ephebic inscription, which scholars have often incorrectly thought to be 335/4 rather than 334/3. 
E.g. 336/5: Wilamowitz 1892, 194; Brenot 1920, 41; Bosworth 1988a, 209; Engels 1989, 322, n. 677; 
Habicht 1995, 16. 335/4: Gauthier 1976, 193; Rhodes 1981, 494; Vidal-Naquet 1986b, 133; Chankowski 
1997, 333; Knoepfler 2001, 382. Rawlings 2000, 237, suggests a date of c. 337/6. Atkinson 1981, 43, 
opines “soon after Chaeronea.” Marcellus 1994, 154, accepting Davies’ identification of the Epicrates in 
Harpocration with Ἐπικράτης … οτητου, suggests that Epicrates proposed his law in 335/4 while he 
served in the Boule, though he offers no evidence to substantiate this claim. 
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military service: E2 (= IG II2 1156 [333/2]), line 28: πάντα ὅ[σα αὐτ]οῖς οἱ νόμοι 
προστάττουσιν, and line 54: πάντα ὅσα οἱ νόμοι αὐτοῖς προστάττουσιν. E8 (= 
Meritt 1940, 59-66, no. 8 [332/1], Col. I, lines 7-9): φησιν εἶναι εὐτα[κτο̑ν]τας καὶ 
πειθομένος τοῖς τ[ε νόμο]ις καὶ ἑαυτῶι.50 If so, Epicrates’ law could have been passed 
at any time during Lycurgus’ term in office or those of his proxies (i.e. 336/5-325/4).51 
 There are two reasons to think that Epicrates’ nomos could have created the 
ephebeia. First, as Faraguna suggests, Lycurgus mentioned Epicrates’ legislation in the 
On the Financial Administration because he considered it one of the achievements of his 
first term in office.52 It is unlikely that he would have done so if the nomos was merely 
one of the regulations discussed above. Second, the Athenians set up a bronze statue of 
Epicrates (χαλκοῦς ἐστάθη) on account of his law. We know from the literary and 
epigraphic evidence that Lycurgus energetically solicited wealthy individuals to 
contribute money and material towards important projects, who then received public 
honors from the demos for their benefactions.53 The few individuals honored with a statue 
in the Agora had, as far as we can tell, performed some duty of vital importance to 
Athens or had spent much money on the city’s behalf: e.g. the demos honored 
Neoptolemus of Melite, on Lycurgus’ motion, with a bronze statue and a crown for 
promising to gild the altar of Apollo ([Plut]. Mor. 843F-844A).54 Forbes, then, is 
                                                
50 Pélékidis 1962, 213: “la vie éphébique était régulementée dans ses moindres détails par les lois et les 
décrets du people.” Conomis 1961, 102, suggests that Epicrates’ nomos may have been a series of laws. 
51 Given the paucity of the evidence, we cannot rule out the following: (1) The regulations in E2 could have 
been enacted between the creation of the ephebeia and the first ephebic enrollment year (i.e. they were not 
necessarily part of the legislation which established the institution). (2) New regulations continued to be 
introduced as the ephebeia matured in the Lycurgan period (i.e. the nomoi in E2 and E8 need not have been 
identical).  The earliest such change attested in the ephebic corpus is on the highly fragmentary inscription 
IG II2 556 (c. 305/4) = Reinmuth 1971, no. 18, which probably reduced ephebic service from two years to 
one (i.e. IG II2 478 [305/4] = Reinmuth 1971, no. 17). Inscriptions from the second-century onwards 
routinely mention the name of the proposer of the new regulation (e.g. SEG 15.104 [127/6], line 105; Hesp. 
16, 147, 171, no. 67 [116/5], line 32; IG II2 1043 [38/7], line 50). 
52 Faraguna, 1992, 275, n. 96.  
53 The decree of Stratocles says that Lycurgus raised 650 talents as loans from rich individuals ([Plut]. Mor. 
852B; cf. 250 talents in 841D). On the granting of public honors for private benefactors in Lycurgan 
Athens, see Mitchel 1970, 34-5; Hakkarainen 1997, 9-10, 20-1, 25-8; Mikalson 2000, 34-5. Many of the 
inscriptions collected in Schwenk 1985 are honorary decrees. Lambert 2004; 2006; 2007 has also complied 
a register of fourth-century honorary inscriptions, including the Lycurgan period.  
54 Epicrates and Neoptolemus probably had their statues erected in the Agora, as had Demades for his 
mission to Alexander after the destruction of Thebes (Din. 1.101) and Diphilus for unknown reasons (Din. 
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probably right to suggest that Epicrates’ “patriotic zeal impelled him to make a generous 
contribution toward the expenses of founding and maintaining the ephebia.”55  
 Even so, it cannot be established with certainty from Harpocration’s fragment that 
Epicrates’ legislation did in fact create the ephebeia. At any rate, the passage provides no 
insight into what military problem prompted the Athenians to found the institution. Nor 
does it explain why they employed this solution in 334/3. It is to these matters that we 
must now turn. 
 
2.3: The Professionalization of an Amateur Militia? 
Scholars, regardless of their position on the existence of an early ephebeia, 
generally agree that the Lycurgan institution should be seen as a reaction to the defeat 
which the Macedonians under Philip II had inflicted upon the numerically superior 
coalition of the Athenians and their allies at Chaeronea.56 The Athenians themselves 
suffered terribly – 1,000 dead and 2,000 captured – about half of those who fought in the 
battle.57 If we can trust two stratagems of the battle preserved in Polyaenus, Philip 
himself commanded the Macedonians facing the Athenians and gained victory over them 
on account of his excellent generalship and the superior fighting quality of his army. In 
the first stratagem, Philip staged a controlled withdrawal of his troops to high ground, 
which caused the Athenians under Stratocles to pursue him impetuously. Philip then 
reversed direction and charged the Athenians, putting them to flight (Poly. Strat. 4.2.2). 
                                                                                                                                            
1.43). The epigraphic evidence suggests that the awarding of a statue for an Athenian citizen was rare in the 
fourth century: see Henry 1983, 294-6. Marcellus 1994, 155, assumes that Lycurgus proposed the honor for 
Epicrates, but Harpocration does not mention the name of the proposer. 
55 Forbes 1929, 126. See also Conomis 1961, 102; Sealey 1993, 211. 
56 E.g. Brenot 1920, 47-8; Forbes 1929, 125; Nilsson 1955, 20; Mitchel 1965, 197; 1970, 37; Garlan 1975, 
175; Atkinson 1981, 43; Hansen 1991, 89; Sekunda 1992, 345; Marcellus 1994, 141, 156; Burckhardt 
1996, 45-6; van Wees 2004, 95. Pélékidis 1962, 7-17, however, argues that Chaeronea had no impact on 
the ephebeia because the institution in the late fifth or early fourth centuries was identical to the one 
described in the Athenaion Politeia (see also Reinmuth 1971, 132-3; Ober 1985a, 91, n. 14; Munn 1993, 
188; Christ 2001, 416). 
57 D.S. 16.86.5; Paus. 7.10.5; Dem. 18.264; [Demad]. 9-10. The Boeotian and Achaean contingents, the 
allies of the Athenians, also suffered considerable losses: D.S. 16.86.6 (Boeotians); Plut. Pel. 18.5 (Sacred 
Band); Paus. 7.6.5 (Achaeans). The extant sources make a detailed reconstruction of the battle impossible: 
D.S. 16.85.5-86.6; Poly. Strat. 4.2.2, 7; Plut. Alex. 9.3; Dem. 19.2; Just. 9.3; Paus. 9.40.10. The most 
thorough and convincing modern account of Chaeronea is Hammond 1938, 186-218. Also see the 
discussions of Pritchett 1958, 307-11; Hammond and Griffith 1979, 589-603; Rahe 1981, 84-7. 
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Referring to the aforementioned maneuver, Polyaenus in the second stratagem makes a 
general statement concerning the relative martial prowess of the combatants:  
 
At Chaeronea Philip, realizing that the Athenians were impulsive (ὀξεῖς) 
and in poor physical condition (ἀγυμνάστους), while his Macedonians 
were well trained (ἠσκηκότας) and were in a state of excellent physical 
fitness (γεγυμνασμένους), prolonged the engagement and thus quickly 
exhausted the Athenians and made them easy to defeat (Poly. Strat. 
4.2.7).58 
 
Certainly the amateur citizen militia of Athens would have stood little chance in pitched 
battle against the superbly drilled and physically conditioned, organized, and equipped 
professionals of the Macedonian phalanx, who could undertake long marches at a speed 
unmatched by any other army in Greece and perform battlefield maneuvers beyond the 
capability of even the Spartans in their prime.59 As Justin puts it, the Greeks at Chaeronea 
were superior in numbers, but the Macedonians were victorious because they were 
“invigorated by constant service in the field (9.3.9).”60 
Scholars argue that the demos, having realized that their fellow citizens had 
performed poorly against the Macedonians because the former lacked sufficient training 
and discipline, sought to remedy these deficiencies by hiring specialized military 
instructors to teach the ephebes how to fight more effectively ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.3), so 
that they “might stand firm in the battle line and be obedient to their officers.”61 In 
making this argument scholars stress that the primary motivation behind Epicrates’ 
                                                
58 Φίλιππος ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ γιγνώσκων τοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίους ὀξεῖς καὶ ἀγυμνάστους, τοὺς δὲ 
Μακεδόνας ἠσκηκότας καὶ γεγυμνασμένους, ἐπὶ πολὺ τὴν παράταξιν ἐκτείνας ταχέως παρέλυσε 
τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ εὐχειρώτους ἐποίησε. Cf. Frontinus, who is probably drawing from the same 
source: Philippus ad Chaeroneam memor, sibi esse militem longo usu duratum, Atheniensibus acrem 
quidem, sed inexercitatum et in impetus tantum violentum, ex industria proelium traxit, moxque 
languentibus iam Atheniensibus concitatius intulit signa et ipsos cecidit (Strat. 2.1.9).   
59 Philip was famous in antiquity for turning his army into a formidable military machine: e.g. Dem. 2.17; 
D.S. 16.3.1-3; Poly. Strat. 4.2.10; Front. Strat. 4.1.6; Arr. Anab. 7.9.2-4. For a detailed discussion of his 
army, see Hammond and Griffith 1979, 405-449.  
60 Proelio commisso, cum Athenienses longe maiore militum numero praestarent, adsiduis bellis indurate 
virtute Macedonum vincuntur. Justin’s use of Athenienses should be taken to refer to all the Greeks who 
fought at Chaeronea, not just the Athenian contingent. 
61 Mitchel 1970, 37. See also Burckhardt 1996, 45. 
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legislation was to train Athenian citizens, especially for hoplite battle.62 Others also 
suppose that the obligatory nature of ephebic service for all classes of citizens, including 
thetes, and especially the state-funded issue of hoplite arms to every ephebe ([Arist]. 
Ath.Pol. 42.4), should be understood as an effort by the demos to increase the numerical 
strength of Athens’ hoplite forces.63 The overall objective of the ephebeia was thus to 
create a citizen army, uniformly equipped and trained, which could fight more 
successfully against the Macedonians should Athens and Philip once more come to 
blows.64 This view has led scholars to believe that the institution was conceived as the 
land component of Lycurgus’ program to revitalize Athens’ military power,65 or even as 
the centerpiece of his efforts to increase patriotism, piety, and civic pride among the 
citizen body of Athens.66  
The consensus view, then, is that the ephebeia was the solution to the Athenians’ 
need to improve the effectiveness of the hoplite phalanx in the wake of their catastrophic 
defeat at Chaeronea. As Reinmuth puts it: 
 
Under these circumstances [i.e. Macedonian domination], Lycurgus and 
his associates may well have felt that Athens could in time regain her old 
position. To make possible the continuance of the demos kai demokratia, 
                                                
62 E.g. Forbes 1929, 115: “The compulsion to enter the ephebia was occasioned by the desire to train as 
many soldiers as possible to fight for Athens in the period of her military decline.” Conomis 1961, 102: “I 
also share the belief that the main innovation of Epicrates’ law was that it made the institution public and 
compulsory, its primary aim being military training. Bosworth 1988a, 209: “The ephebic legislation was 
clearly intended to produce a more efficient citizen army … The result of the training was in theory an 
effective citizen army, well armed and trained and deeply motivated to defend Athens.” Sealey 1993, 211: 
“The purpose [of Epicrates’ reform] was to train young men for military service.” 
63 Bertosa 2003, 372: The “gist of the ephebic reform was to admit thetes to the program for the first time; 
given that they constituted the majority of the citizens, the purpose of this had to have been to effect a 
massive increase in the city’s hoplite forces.” Also see Forbes 1929, 115; Ridley 1979, 519; Sekunda 1992, 
345; Habicht 1997, 17.  
64 See Reinmuth 1967, 49; Burckhardt 1996, 45, 51-2; Rawlings 2000, 242; van Wees 2004, 94-5. 
65 E.g.: Atkinson 1981, 43: “Thus walls, shipsheds and a naval arsenal were built, and probably soon after 
Chaeronea Lycurgus organized the reform of the ephebate, obliging all 18 year olds to enroll for two years 
military training and service.” Bosworth 1988a, 209: “Parallel to the refurbishment of the navy was the 
reorganization of the ephebeia.” Tracy 1995, 10: “The inscriptions reveal that the fleet was well 
maintained, and a new arsenal designed by the architect Philon was completed in Piraeus. Complementing 
this, the training of young men as soldiers, the ephebeia, gained an active new life.” Harding 1995, 125: 
“During the period between Khaironeia and the death of Alexander the city rebuilt its walls, strengthened 
its navy, retrained its youth and restored its finances.” 
66 As Marcellus 1994, 143, puts it: “the novelty of the ephebeia would fit well with Lycurgan ideas about 
religion and patriotism.” See also Mitchel 1970, 37; Habicht 1997, 16-7; Humphreys 2004, 88.  
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Athens must create a land army which would be as effective against such 
an army as Philip’s. To accomplish this, the system of ephebic military 
service was overhauled in 335/4. There is no documentation for the 
statement, but the striking way in which the distinctive features of the 
Aristotelian ephebia are designed to meet the weaknesses of the Athenian 
army of the times [as revealed at Chaeronea] … almost force the 
conclusion upon us.67  
 
But should the “distinctive features” of the ephebeia be seen as the means by which the 
Athenians attempted to catch up with Philip’s formidable military machine? Scholars 
have assumed that the Athenians’ overriding concern after Chaeronea was to train the 
whole citizen body or at least the top three census classes to be better fighters. But if so, it 
is hard to understand why they created an institution which restricted its training to 
eighteen year old citizens, who traditionally did not fight outside the borders of Attica 
except in emergencies and comprised only about three percent of the male citizen body.68 
Furthermore, since the ephebes began their training in 334/3 (E1-E4), the ephebeia did 
nothing to improve the fighting quality of those Athenians who had been beaten so badly 
by the Macedonians. 69  
It is also difficult to reconcile the view that the main purpose of the ephebeia was 
to train Athenian citizens to fight pitched battles against the Macedonian phalanx with the 
type of weapons training the ephebes actually received, which included instruction in the 
use of non-hoplite weaponry – the bow, javelin, and catapult– which are useless in close 
combat (Thuc. 4.32.4; Xen. Cyr. 2.1.7; 6.3.24; 7.4.15). This is not to say that the ephebes 
                                                
67 Reinmuth 1967, 49. The italics are his. Though Reinmuth later rejected this view – the ephebeia’s 
reorganization in response to Philip’s victory at Chaeronea – on account of his acceptance of an early date 
for E1 (1971, 125-6), his argument is nevertheless representative of prevailing scholarly opinion.  
68 Comparative demographic data and literary evidence suggests that 3.3% of c. 31,000 Athenian citizens 
were aged 18 in the Lycurgan period: i.e. c. 900-950 males became citizens in a typical year (see pp. 105-
6). While 18-19 year old citizens served in the ephebeia, about 6.7% of the adult male population aged 18-
80+, only those ephebes in their first year of military service were required to undertake military training 
([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.4). 
69 It should be stressed, however, that scholars, to the best of my knowledge, do not even consider this a 
problem on account of their mistaken belief that the ephebeia existed as formal institution prior to 
Chaeronea and hence falsely assume that the Athenian citizens who fought in the battle had already 
received instruction in the art of war. For these scholars the ephebic training system as described in the 
Athenaion Politeia should be regarded as a “new approach to the existing practices, whatever they may 
have been (Mitchel 1970, 37).” 
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were not instructed in skills useful for hoplite warfare, since they were drilled in unit 
tactics and the paidotribai trained them in physical exercise ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.4): 
Polyaenus’ statement that the Athenian soldiers were ἀγυμνάστοι at Chaeronea could 
not apply to those citizens trained in the ephebeia (Strat. 4.2.7). Even so, one would have 
expected the Athenians to have trained the ephebes exclusively for hoplite warfare, given 
that they had little chance of regaining their freedom unless they could decisively defeat 
the Macedonians in pitched battle, just as the Thebans (335/4), the Spartans (331/0), and 
the Greeks (under the leadership of the Athenians) tried to do in the Lamian War 
(323/2).70  
Sekunda argues that “the defeat at Chaironeia had impressed upon the Athenians 
the need to extend the strength of their hoplite forces, by including all citizens and not 
just those of ‘the hoplite census classes’” and that the ephebeia was intended to fix this 
problem.71 The evidence he presents, however, does not support his argument. The 
donation of shields made by the strategoi Diotimos and Charidemos immediately after 
Chaeronea should be seen as an attempt to reequip those citizens who had lost their 
shields in the battle rather than an effort to furnish hoplite arms for the thetes who had 
never possessed them (Dem. 18.114, 116).72 The gifting of the shields was one of the 
emergency measures undertaken in the aftermath of Chaeronea, when the Athenians 
                                                
70 Scholars who assume that some kind of mass training existed before Chaeronea miss this important 
point. Burckhardt 1996, 44, for example, argues that the ephebes prior to Epicrates’ legislation were trained 
as hoplites, implying that the instruction in non-hoplite weaponry was a consequence of the reform. He 
does not explain, however, why the Athenians should introduce non-hoplite weapons into the training 
program when the object of the reform was to improve citizens’ skills in hoplite warfare (cf. 45-6). See also 
Ridley 1979, 530-47. 
71 Sekunda 1992, 345-6. Cf. Engels 1992, 22: “eine wirkliche Verstaatlichung und Professionalisierung des 
Hoplitendienstes der jungen Bürger im lykurgischen Athen.” 
72 For Diotimos and Charidemos as strategoi in 338/7, see Pritchett 1974, 88; Develin 1989, 343. While 
Sekunda recognizes that these shields were issued in the crisis after Chaeronea, he does not take into 
account that a minority of the 5,000 Athenian hoplites who were not killed at Chaeronea would have 
returned to Athens with their panoply intact: (1) The 2,000 citizens captured on the battlefield would have 
been despoiled of their arms (see Vaughn 1991, 46-7). (2) Many of the remainder who fled to Athens 
would have thrown away their shields and other items in order to save themselves (cf. Archil. Fr. 5 West; 
Hdt. 5.95.1). The interpolated decree in Demosthenes, if genuine, explicitly says that Charidemos supplied 
the shieldless neaniskoi who had been disarmed (18.116; cf. Kroll 1977, 146, n. 16). Demosthenes’ 
equipping of citizens who lacked arms (καθώπλισε τοὺς πολίτας τῶν ἐλλειπόντων) may also refer to 
those Athenians who fought in the battle and who had lost their arms afterwards ([Plut]. Mor. 851A), 
though all that can be deduced from Demochares’ decree (since the events depicted are not in chronological 
order) is that Demosthenes made the gift at some point in 338/7-337/6.  
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manned the city walls with every adult male capable of bearing arms in the expectation of 
a Macedonian assault on Athens: Hyperides even illegally proposed enfranchising the 
resident aliens and freeing the slaves if they were willing to defend Athens.73 
Before the ephebeia regular state involvement in the equipping of citizens for 
hoplite warfare was limited to the orphaned sons of Athenians killed in battle,74 though 
Athens would supply thetes with hoplite armor in emergencies (e.g. Thuc. 6.72.4; 
8.25.1).75 Otherwise the procurement of arms and armor was a private affair, subject to 
the personal wealth and inclination of the individual citizen.76 The issuance of the hoplite 
spear and shield at public expense to all ephebes at the beginning of their second year in 
the ephebeia therefore marked a decisive break with established Athenian military 
practice ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.4).77 But did this lead to a substantial increase in the size of 
Athens’ hoplite forces after Chaeronea? While Sekunda is right to argue that thetes were 
required to serve in the ephebeia, it would have taken thirty-one years (from 334/3), or 
thirty-five years after Chaeronea (338/7), before the entire phalanx consisted of former 
cadets (i.e. those aged 20-50 years old including the thetes), who had been trained and 
                                                
73 According to Lycurgus the defense of Athens immediately after Chaeronea chiefly depended upon men 
fifty years old and over (Leoc. 39-40). He does not mention the youngest citizens, though they too must 
have been present en masse (cf. 44). The Athenians gave the strategoi wide powers to mobilize whomever 
they needed for the defense of Athens (16). For Hyperides’ proposal, see [Plut]. Mor. 849A; Lyc. Leoc. 41. 
He also moved to arm the boule and send it to Piraeus (Lyc. Leoc. 36-7). Aristogeiton later indicted the 
orator for his graphe paranomon, but he was not found guilty (see Osborne 1990, T 67, on [Plut]. Mor. 
848F-849A; Suda s.v. Ἀριστογείτων).  
74 The orphans, having been supported by the state during their minority, were given a panoply and paraded 
before the demos at the start of the Greater Dionysia in the theatre of Dionysus: see Aeschin. 3.154; Arist. 
Pol. 2.5.4, 1268a9; Dem. 60.32; Isoc. 8.82; Lys. 2.75-6; Thuc. 2.46; Plato. Men. 248E-249B; [Xen]. 
Ath.Pol. 3.4. Some scholars have suggested that the origins of the ephebeia should be seen in the passing-
out parade of war orphans because it fell out of use after the inception of the institution (see Bryant 1907, 
87-8; Mathieu 1937, 315-8). Pélékidis 1962, 14-17, and Dillery 2002, 466-9, however, have shown that this 
view is without foundation.  
75 Athens routinely supplied garrison troops with missile weapons (e.g. javelins and arrows) as an 
inscription, dated to the archonship of Pythodotus (343/2), recently found at the fortress of Panactum attests 
(see Munn 1996, 52-3, on inv. 1992-300). 
76 See Pritchett 1971, 3, n. 3; Loomis 1998, 58-9; van Wees 1998, 333-78; 2004, 52-4. 
77 The arms were probably distributed from the arsenal on the Acropolis, where Lycurgus is said to have 
stockpiled “many suits of armor and fifty thousand missiles ([Plut]. Mor. 852C; cf. Paus. 1.29.16).” 
Sekunda 1992, 346, plausibly suggests that the Athenians had collected so many panoplies over the 
Lycurgan period that they also equipped part of Leosthenes’ mercenary force (D.S. 17.9.4). 
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equipped in the institution.78 The evidence taken together suggests that we should reject 
the claim of scholars that the ephebeia was in its conception intended primarily to 
improve the fighting ability of the Athenian army.  
 
2.4: The Ephebeia as a Reaction to Chaeronea? 
The conventional view, as we have seen, is that the Athenians created the 
ephebeia on account of their defeat at Chaeronea. This assertion is problematic, however, 
because there is a four-year gap between the supposed cause (i.e. Chaeronea) and the 
effect (i.e. the first attested ephebic enrollment class).79 Since these scholars also accept 
that Epicrates’ nomos founded the institution, it would mean that the Athenians waited at 
least two years after Chaeronea (336/5-335/4) before they decided to pass the legislation 
to create it.80 Some scholars, recognizing this difficulty, have sought to explain this 
interval by supposing that the Lycurgan ephebeia was intended to be and was perceived 
by the Macedonians to be a threat to their hegemony, which prompted the Athenians to 
delay the founding of the institution until it was safe to do so in 334/3.81 Mitchel, for 
example, makes this assumption when he suggests that Alexander intended to abolish the 
ephebeia after the destruction of Thebes until Phocion persuaded him to relent because 
                                                
78 Bertosa 2003, 372, also recognizes this difficulty, that “bolstering the ranks of the hoplites one age class 
at a time [i.e. the newly admitted thetes] via the ephebeia would have been a very inefficient way of going 
about this (his italics).” Reinmuth 1967, 50-1, seems to be unaware that this is a problem, though he says 
that of “the citizen troops at Lamia in 323/2, all under 40 years of age, slightly more than half, 11 out of 20 
yearly cadres, had been epheboi.”  
79 Both Knoepfler 2001, 382, and Bertosa 2003, 370-1, have voiced similar concerns.  
80 In making this argument I do not mean to imply that the Athenians could have created a complex 
institution such as the ephebeia without taking some time to plan and then to put their plan into effect – I 
suggest later in this chapter that this process may have taken months. Even so, I contend in this section that 
a four-year interval makes it unlikely that Chaeronea was the cause if we consider the Athenians’ military 
strength compared to the Macedonians and the military activities of the Lycurgan program.  
81 Reinmuth 1967, 49: “A programme which so obviously looked forward to the re-establishment of Athens 
among the contenders for leadership could not have been tolerated by Philip or Alexander. Antipater would 
be inclined to overlook its implications. It was only after Philip’s death and Alexander’s departure for Asia 
in the spring of 334/3 that Lycurgus ventured to put it into effect.” The argument is nonsensical. If the 
ephebeia presented a military threat to Philip and Alexander when they had the full Macedonian army at 
their disposal, how then could the institution have been less threatening to Antipater, who now had only a 
portion of those forces available to enforce the Common Peace? 
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the latter claimed that the program of ephebic training was of negligible military value.82 
Indeed, some scholars have argued that the institution was so great a threat to Philip and 
Alexander that the ephebeia cannot have been created de novo because both monarchs 
would not have permitted it to continue.83  
But was the ephebeia a threat? No – if we consider the nature of Macedonian 
hegemony over Greece. The Athenians were acutely aware that freedom could be 
regained if and only if they could assemble a coalition at least as strong as the one which 
had opposed Philip at Chaeronea and if the Macedonians dissipated their strength at the 
same time through internal struggle (see below).84 Given this, the Athenians, like other 
Greeks, had no choice but to submit so long as Philip remained in firm control of the 
Macedonian army. Certainly Philip tried to ensure that potentially hostile Greek states 
would remain disunited. First, in the settlements which he made with his enemies after 
Chaeronea he installed many pro-Macedonian regimes and stationed several garrisons in 
strategic locations.85 The Athenians’ most important ally, the Thebans, suffered this 
fate.86 Second, the Macedonian-enforced Common Peace kept the Athenians and 
Thebans, two of the three traditional Greek powers (Sparta being the other), on a tight 
leash and prevented them from reforming an anti-Macedonian alliance.87 
The Athenian reaction to Philip’s assassination in October 336 shows the 
weakness of their position after Chaeronea.88 When news of the assassination reached 
Athens, the Athenians received it with joy and awarded honors to Pausanias, Philip’s 
murderer (D.S. 17.3.2; Plut. Dem. 22.2). Confident that Alexander would not leave Pella 
                                                
82 Mitchel 1962, 224, n. 36. Bertosa 2003, 373, argues that the Athenians decided to reform the ephebeia 
while Alexander was campaigning in Illyria in 335/4 because any attempt to do so after the destruction of 
Thebes would have been “suicidal” for Athens. He offers no explanation, however, for this assertion. 
83 Reinmuth 1952, 49; Pélékidis 1962, 11. Contra Marcellus 1994, 140. 
84 See Sealey 1993, 198, for this important observation.  
85 See Roebuck 1948, 73-92; Hammond and Griffith 1979, 604-23. 
86 Philip exacted a ransom for the Thebans killed and captured at Chaeronea, executed or exiled the 
political leaders in Thebes, overthrew the constitution and installed an oligarchy of three hundred 
supporters to run affairs as he wished, and stationed a Macedonian garrison on the Cadmea (D.S. 16.87.3; 
Just. 9.4.6-8). Philip also attempted to drive a wedge between Athens and Thebes by returning Oropus to 
the former: see Hammond and Griffith 1979, 608, 611. 
87 See Ryder 1965, 104-5; Hammond and Griffith 1979, 633. 
88 For the date of the assassination, see Bosworth 1980, 45-6. These events are discussed in Schaefer 1887, 
88-97; Will 1983, 31-6; Bosworth 1988a, 25-8, 188-90; Hammond and Walbank 1988, 3-17. 
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(Aeschin. 3.160), the Athenians encouraged other Greeks to revolt and, through 
Demosthenes, seemingly got in contact with Attalus and Alexander’s generals in Asia 
(D.S. 17.3.2, 5.1; Plut. Dem. 23.2), both flagrant violations of the Common Peace. 
Phocion opposed these activities and pointed out (correctly) that Macedonian power had 
been reduced only by one man (Plut. Phoc. 16.6). The Athenian aim was clearly to gather 
a coalition against Alexander (anti-Macedon opposition had already appeared in Aetolia, 
Thebes, Argos, Elis, and Arcadia: D.S. 17.3.3-5), if given enough time, and to exploit 
divisions within the Macedonian leadership. Alexander’s lightning march to Thebes 
threw the Athenians and the rest of Greece into confusion and ended all hopes for a 
unified resistance (D.S. 17.4.4; Just. 11.2.5). In this situation Athens prepared for war by 
abandoning the countryside and defending the city-walls (D.S. 17.4.5) and had no choice 
but to submit to Alexander, seek his forgiveness, and renew the alliance (Arr. Anab. 
1.1.3; D.S. 17.4.6-9). 
It should be clear, then, that without allies the Athenians by themselves posed no 
threat to Philip or his successor Alexander, because no polis, Athens included, had 
sufficient strength to match the military might of Macedon on land.89 Indeed, the 
Athenians could not even hope to fight against the Boeotians on equal terms, as Phocion 
bluntly stated to the Athenians when they were clamoring to go to war with the Boeotians 
after the latter had seized Oropus in 366 (Plut. Phoc. 9.4; cf. Xen. Hipp. 7.3; Mem. 3.5.4). 
This is understandable, since the hoplite phalanx from the fifth century onwards was 
regarded as the weakest arm of Athens’ military forces on account of its inferior numbers 
(compared to the city’s enemies), inadequate discipline, and lack of skill ([Xen]. Ath.Pol. 
2.1; Xen. Mem. 3.5.19). Given that the training and equipping of citizens in the ephebeia 
did not put right the deficiencies of the Athenian forces which had been beaten so badly 
by Philip at Chaeronea, as we have seen, it is hard to see how the Macedonians could 
have regarded the institution as a threat. 
Moreover, the notion that the Athenians were compelled by fear of Macedonian 
retaliation c. 338/7-335/4 to delay the ephebeia’s foundation is belied by the Athenians’ 
                                                
89 Cawkwell 1969, 164: “the central fact of this age is military, not moral – viz. the huge preponderance in 
military potential of the Macedonian state over the power of any single Greek state.”  
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effort in this period to strengthen Athens’ fortifications. Immediately after Chaeronea the 
Athenians, realizing that their antiquated city walls were inadequate to withstand Philip’s 
formidable siege train, worked desperately to repair and upgrade them by building 
palisades and digging trenches (Dem. 18.248; Lyc. Leoc. 44; Aeschin. 3.236).90 This 
modernization of the Athens-Piraeus enceinte continued at least into the next year, since 
Demosthenes, who held the tribal office of Commissioner for the Walls in 338/7, moved 
a decree at the end of this year or in the first half of 337/6 to rebuild the walls and 
contributed funds for this task (Aeschin. 3.27-31; Dem. 18.299-300; [Plut]. Mor. 845F; 
851A).91 Extensive work was also undertaken on the border forts, if the construction at 
Rhamnous and Phyle is representative.92  
Nor did the Athenians let their fear of the Macedonians prevent them from 
devoting substantial resources to improving their navy and hence their ability to secure 
the corn supply, which was crucial for Athens’ continued independence after 
Chaeronea.93 According to the decree of Stratocles, Lycurgus “equipped four hundred 
                                                
90 Some scholars argue that the strength of Athens’ walls, the determined resistance of her defenders, and 
her naval superiority, which could keep the city supplied for a siege lasting months, dissuaded Philip from 
attacking the city (e.g. Roebuck 1948, 80; Mitchel 1970, 5; Sealey 1993, 199; Habicht 1997, 11). A more 
convincing explanation is that he chose not to attack the Athenians, not because he could not have taken 
Athens if he had determined to do so (Hammond 1994, 155; Cawkwell 1996, 98-9), though this cannot be 
proved since the siege did not occur, but because he needed the Athenian navy for his coming war against 
the Persians (Cawkwell 1978, 166). 
91 A fragmentary inscription records repairs of the walls of Piraeus (IG II2 244 = Schwenk 1985, no. 3). For 
the date, see Maier 1959, 36-48; Schwenk 1985, 24-6. Cawkwell 1963, 66, n. 109 dates the inscription to 
Eubulus’ time (contra Mitchel 1970, 34, n. 129). Archeological excavations have shown that the landward 
defenses were extensively remodeled, with a moat and a fore-wall added to the strengthened inner wall (see 
Threpsiades 1935, 31-2; Mitchel 1965, 197; Winter 1971, 276-7; Wycherley 1978, 18-20). 
92 For Rhamnous, see Poullioux 1954, 55-6, 62-6. For Phyle, see Maier 1959, 42; Munn 1993, 122, on IG 
II2 244, line 11.  
93 Athens’ independence, national prestige, and her position as a great power in the Greek world depended 
upon the possession of a navy whose strength surpassed all rivals (Ober 1978, 119-30, esp. 124-5; Harding 
1995, 111, n. 36). For the vulnerability of the grain supply in the 330’s and 320’s, including food shortages, 
see Garnsey 1988, 134-64. In the aftermath of Chaeronea Demosthenes was sent away from Athens as 
grain commissioner to ensure the supply of corn (Dem. 18. 248; Asech. 3.159; [Plut]. Mor. 851A-B; Din. 
1.78-80). The Athenians were well aware that Philip’s control of the Hellespont rendered Athens’ grain 
supply insecure and gave him a weapon to coerce the city if circumstances dictated. Hammond and Griffith 
1979, 607, rightly say that the loss of the Chersonese would “have acted as a standing discouragement to 
the Athenians from going to war with Philip again or making preparations to go to war.” To keep the grain 
supply open, Athens on several occasions dispatched ships to clear the seas of pirates: e.g. two ships sent 
under Diotimos in 334/3 (IG II2 1623, lines 276-308; [Plut]. Mor. 844A; Schwenk 1985, no. 25) and one 
hundred triremes after the Macedonians had seized the grain fleet at Tenedos in 332/1(?) ([Dem]. 17.19-
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seaworthy triremes, some he fitted out, others he built from scratch. Additionally he 
completed both the shipsheds and the naval arsenal … after he had taken them up half-
done.”94 While the Athenian navy had 349 triremes in 353/2 (IG II2 1613, lines 284-92), 
Lycurgus had increased the fleet to 410 ships in 330/29 of which 18 were the heavier and 
more up-to-date tetrereis (IG II2 1627, lines 266-78). Four years later (326/5) the 
Athenians appear to have had the same number of ships, but now possessed 50 tetrereis 
(IG II2 1628, lines 481-500), while in the following year 417 ships are attested including 
50 tetrereis and 7 pentereis (IG II2 1629, lines 783-812).95  
Lycurgus also completed the shipsheds (νεωσοίκοι) and the naval arsenal 
(σκευοθήκη), which Eubulus had begun but had left half-finished (ἡμίεργα) (Aeschin. 
3.25; Din. 1.96).96 Certainly more shipsheds were needed to keep pace with the 
shipbuilding program: 372 had been built by 330/29, of which 82 were in Munychia, 196 
in Zea, and 94 in Kantharus (IG II2 1627, lines 398-405). During the fourth century the 
Athenian navy suffered from a serious shortage of equipment, which had severely limited 
the number of ships ready for action.97 Eubulus’ solution was Philon’s arsenal, begun in 
347/6 (IG II2 505), which was intended to store the majority of the navy’s equipment.98 
Lycurgus resumed the arsenal’s construction after it was interrupted by the war against 
Philip (Philochorus FGrHist 328, F 135) and probably completed it by 330/29 (IG II2 
1627, lines 288, 292).99 These measures ensured that Athens’ huge fleet would be in a 
constant state of battle preparedness, perhaps for the first time since the Peloponnesian 
War. 
                                                                                                                                            
20). They also established a colony in the Adriatic in 325/4, whose purpose was to secure the grain supply 
and ward of Etruscan pirates (IG II2 1629, lines 2157-223). 
94 [Plut]. Mor. 852C: τετρακοσίας δὲ τριήρεις πλωΐμους κατεσκεύασε, τὰς μὲν ἐπισκευάσας τὰς δὲ 
ἐξ ἀρχῆς ναυπηγησάμενος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἡμίεργα παραλαβὼν τούς τε νεωσοίκους καὶ τὴν 
σκευοθήκην … ἐξειργάσατο. See also [Plut]. Mor. 841C-D; Hyp. Fr. 118 Sauppe; Paus. 1.29.16. 
95 For a discussion of these figures, see Ashton 1979, 237-42; Morrison 1987, 89-93. 
96 See Cawkwell 1963, 65-6. From 347/6-323/2 the Athenians exacted an annual levy of ten talents from 
metics for their construction (IG II2 505). 
97 See Gabrielsen 1994, 146-69. 
98 Plut. Sulla 14.7; Vitr. De arch. praef. 7.12; IG II2 1668. For the arsenal, with bibliography, see Townsend 
1982, 261-4; Will 1983, 89; Garland 1987, 156-8; Hintzen-Bohlen 1997, 15-7. 
99 Lycurgus also built another storehouse on the Acropolis with complete sets of equipment for 100 
triremes: see Gabrielsen 1994, 146-9, 157.  
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Though the decree of Stratocles portrays this military buildup – the strengthening 
of Athens’ land defenses, the expansion and modernization of the navy, and the 
improvement of the city’s naval infrastructure – as preparation for the Lamian War 
(323/2) ([Plut]. Mor. 852C: ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ πολέμου παρασκευῆς),100 the Athenians after 
Chaeronea could not have known when the opportunity (such as Philip’s assassination) 
would come to cast off the Macedonian yoke and reclaim their former leading position in 
Greek affairs.101 Under these circumstances the ephebeia should have been a priority for 
the Athenians, if, as scholars have claimed, the demos had recognized that the training 
and equipping of ephebes was vital for reviving Athens’ hoplite forces in the wake of 
Philip’s victory.102 But if we reject this claim and agree that the Athenians had no reason 
to delay the institution’s foundation to 334/3, we must seek another explanation for why 
the Athenians created the ephebeia, an institution without parallel in Athenian history.  
 
2.5: The Ephebeia and the Defense of Attica 
In Lycurgan Athens, if not earlier, “the defense of the countryside (ἡ φυλακὴ τῆς 
χώρας)” was one of the mandatory topics for discussion at the ten ἐκκλησίαι κύριαι and 
hence a matter of the highest institutional concern for the demos ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 
43.4).103 The Athenians devoted substantial human and material resources to protect the 
                                                
100 Will 1983, 96-7, denies that these military preparations were directed against Macedon. But Mitchel 
1970, 49-50, is surely right in arguing that the Athenians’ fear of and desire to be free from Macedonian 
domination provided the impetus behind the military buildup (cf. Bosworth 1985, 436). 
101 Badian 1995, 80-106, shows that Athenian foreign policy throughout the fourth century was ultimately 
directed to recovering the naval empire Athens’ possessed in the fifth century. Despite being no longer 
financially or militarily capable of realizing her aspirations to supremacy in the Greek world, the Athenians 
made repeated attempts to do so until they were completely defeated in the Lamian War, from which the 
Athenians never recovered (contra Harding 1995, 105-25). If so, the loss of what remained of the Athenian 
League would have been a bitter blow to Athens’ traditional claim of hegemony (see Hammond and 
Griffith 1979, 607). 
102 If the Athenians had considered it such a priority to train their citizenry, why didn’t they do so? They 
could have turned the city into a “workshop of war” in the same manner as the Spartan king Agesilaus did 
at Ephesus in the spring of 395, where all the (non-Spartan) contingents were vigorously training to be 
hoplites, cavalrymen, archers, and peltasts (Xen. Hell. 3.4.16-8). If we can trust Xenophon, the rest of the 
Boeotians likewise were quick to emulate the Thebans and train vigorously in their arms within a year after 
their victory at Leuctra (Hell. 6.5.23). 
103 See Hansen 1987, 25-7, for the agenda at the curial Assembly. For the use of ἡ φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας on 
decrees and what kind of business the heading entailed, see Rhodes 1972, 231-5. Ober 1985a, 88-9, argues 
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chora of Attica, building upon the rough terrain which made the border difficult for 
enemies to traverse (Xen. Mem. 3.5.25). Under the command of a general whose duty 
was exclusively concerned with the defense of Attica ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 61.1: στρατηγὸς 
ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν),104 the Athenians were protected by a sophisticated defensive system 
which consisted of the Athens-Piraeus enceinte and an extensive network of garrison 
fortresses built along the Megarian and Boeotian borders (Eleusis, Eleutherai, Oinoe, 
Panactum, Phyle, Aphidna, and Rhamnous) and the eastern seaboard (e.g. Thoricus and 
Sounium). In addition, numerous minor fortifications of various kinds, such as watch-
towers and signal stations, occupied the Attic landscape. Finally, the Athenians had 
constructed a wall across the Aigaleus-Parnes gap, known to historians as the Dema 
Wall.105  
From 334/3 onwards the ephebeia played an important role in garrisoning the 
fortified points of Attica. The Athenaion Politeia summarizes the ephebes’ duties as 
follows: “[The ephebes] march to the Piraeus, and some garrison Munychia and others 
Acte. … in the following year … they patrol the countryside and pass their time in the 
guard-posts. And they perform garrison duty for two years … ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.3-
5).”106 The epigraphic evidence suggests that the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῷ Πειραιεῖ and the 
στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῇ Ἀκτεῖ commanded the ephebes in their first year of service, while in 
their second year the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῇ χώραι (= στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν) had 
authority over them when they garrisoned the border fortresses.107 The central importance 
                                                                                                                                            
that “the defense of the chora” was already on the agenda at curial meetings from at least the 360’s, if not 
after the end of the Peloponnesian War (Arist. Rhet. 1359b-1360a; Xen. Mem. 3.6.10-11). 
104 The office is first attested on IG II2 204, lines 19-21, dated to 352/1. The Athenians may have created it 
after the Thebans annexed Oropus in 366 (Munn 1993, 190-1; cf. Ober 1985a, 89-90).  
105 The bibliography on Athenian fortifications is extensive. The most important works are: Pouilloux 1954; 
McCredie 1966; Winter 1971; Garlan 1974; Lawrence 1979; Ober 1985a; Munn 1993. I do not intend to 
discuss the controversies over the identification, location, and date of (re)construction of these 
fortifications. For the existence of various elements of this system in the fifth century, see p. 47, n. 188. 
106 εἶτ’ εἰς Πειραιέα πορεύονται, καὶ φρουροῦσιν οἱ μὲν τὴν Μουνιχίαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν Ἀκτήν … 
περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν καὶ διατρίβουσιν ἐν τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις. φρουροῦσι δὲ τὰ δύο ἔτη. 
107 For the relationship between the ephebes and these strategoi, see Pélékidis 1962, 109; Reinmuth 1971, 
78-80. The στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῷ Πειραιεῖ and the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῇ Ἀκτεῖ are attested on four ephebic 
inscriptions dating to the first few years of the institution: E4 (333/2), lines 4-6; E7 (332/1), lines 9-10; E8 
(332/1), Col. II, lines 9-12; E12 (333/2 or 332/1), lines 2-7. In E5 (332/1), the former is instead called 
στρατηγὸς τοῦ Πειραιῶς (lines 4-5). Though the author of the Athenaion Politeia says that two 
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of garrison duty is also made clear in E2 = IG II2 1156, dated to 333/2, in which two 
decrees (the Boule and the deme of Eleusis) honor the ephebes of the tribe Cecropis for 
their guard duty at Eleusis: ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἔφηβο[ι οἱ] τῆς Κεκροπίδος ταχθέντες 
Ἐλευσῖνι … (lines 36-7) and ἐπειδὴ … ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς φυλακῆς Ἐλευσῖνος ο[ἱ] 
τῆ[ς Κεκροπίδ]ο[ς ἔφηβ]οι … (lines 45-7).108 Other ephebic inscriptions confirm the 
presence of contingents of ephebes at the border forts.109 
Scholars have failed to realize this aspect of the ephebeia – the two-year period of 
mandatory military service for citizens of ephebic age – as a radical departure from 
previous Athenian military practices, because they believed (I think mistakenly) that 
ephebes routinely performed garrison duty at least from the time of Aeschines’ peripoleia 
(Aeschin. 2.167). On account of this they have argued that Epicrates’ nomos either had 
no effect on this pre-existing military system, or had modified it by making the ephebes’ 
service continuous (whereas Aeschines’ was intermittent) or by extending the 
requirement to serve to citizens of all census classes (i.e. including the thetes).110 But if 
the youngest Athenians were not called out en masse for service in the garrison forts prior 
to Chaeronea except in times of emergency (Thuc. 2.13.6-7; Dem. 21.193; cf. Glaucon in 
                                                                                                                                            
generals were assigned to Piraeus (61.1: δύο δ’ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιέα, τὸν μὲν εἰς τὴν Μουνιχίαν, τὸν δ’ εἰς 
τὴν Ἀκτήν, οἳ τῆς φυλακῆς ἐπιμελοῦνται καὶ τῶν ἐν Πειραιεῖ), the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῇ Ἀκτεῖ first 
appears on E20 (331/0-325/4) alongside the two generals mentioned above (left and right sides, lines 42-4). 
The likely deployment of the ephebes into two relatively equal groups of five tribes on Munychia and Acte 
(Pélékidis 1962, 114) was probably responsible for the creation of “the general on Acte” because the 
Athenians realized that two generals could provide more effective leadership for the ephebes than one. The 
following mention a στρατηγὸς but do not specify his assigned duties: E18 (329/8?), Left Side, lines 6-7; 
E21 (331/0 or 324/3), lines 3-5 (restored).  
108 Cf. Mitchel’s 1984, 117, heavy restoration of E3 = IG II2 1189, dated to the same year, in which the 
demesmen of Eleusis honor the ephebes of the tribe Hippothontis: ἐπειδὴ οἱ τῆς Ἱπποθ̣[ωντίδος ἔφηβοι 
καλῶς τῆς φυλακῆς Ἐλευσῖνος ἐπε]μ̣ελοῦντο καὶ ἐκόσ̣[μο]υν καὶ [πάντων ὧν οἱ νόμοι 
προσέταττον αὐτοῖς ταχθέντες] Ἐλευσῖνι ἐπεμελοῦντο … (lines 4-6). 
109 Panactum (E21 – Hippothontis 331/0 or 324/3; E23 – Leontis 334/3-323/2; E24 – Leontis 334/3-323/2); 
Eleusis, Phyle, Rhamnous (E15 – Pandionis 331/0 or 330/29); Eleusis, Rhamnous (E5 – Cecropis 332/1); 
Rhamnous (E10 – Erectheis 333/2 or 332/1; E16 – Aegeis 330/29; E22 – Acamantis 333/2-323/2). It 
should be pointed out, however, that E2 and E3 are the only inscriptions which explicitly state that the 
ephebes had performed garrison duty on the Attic-Boeotian border. The demes which honor the ephebes on 
E5 and E15 are rightly thought to do so because of the former’s gratitude to the latter for their dedication to 
their duty (Reinmuth 1971, 35; Clinton 1988, 22). The dedications of Hippothontis and Leontis at 
Panactum, which was not a deme, should likewise be understood as the tribes honoring the ephebes for 
their sterling service. The remaining inscriptions are suggestive but not conclusive. 
110 E.g. Reinmuth 1971, 123-38; Gauthier 1976, 193-5; Ober 1985a, 90-6; Burckhardt 1996, 44; van Wees 
2004, 94-5.  
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Xen. Mem. 3.6.10-11), as I have argued in the previous chapter,111 we must accept that 
compulsory garrison duty was a new obligation imposed upon these citizens in the 
Lycurgan Period.  
Ascertaining why the demos made this choice is central to our understanding of 
why the Athenians created the ephebeia. I contend that the institution was founded 
because the Athenians recognized the need to raise and maintain a standing army to 
ensure greater security for the chora and that the publicly funded mass-training system 
and ephebic officials – both unattested before the creation of the ephebeia – should be 
seen in the light of training, organizing, and leading this armed force. Indeed, it is clear 
from the epigraphic evidence that the ephebeia provided Athens with the immediate 
benefit, unlike the program of military training, of 450-500 additional citizens in 334/3 
and at least 1,000 in subsequent years (i.e. 333/2-322/1) devoted to protecting the 
countryside of Attica throughout the year.112 From the inception of the institution to the 
Lamian War (334/3-323/2) these ephebes probably made up a significant portion, if not 
the majority, of the garrison troops deployed in Attica.113 
But how did the ephebeia contribute to the φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας? The first 
possibility is that the creation of the ephebeia improved the Athenians’ chances of 
withstanding an invasion. If we believe Ober, the Athenians in the fourth century had 
rejected the city-based strategy of Pericles on account of their defeat in the Peloponnesian 
War in favor of a preclusive frontier defense, in which the border forts, by guarding the 
                                                
111 See pp. 44-55. 
112 The number of citizens who served in the ephebeia can be roughly estimated from the rosters of seven 
(E2, E5, E9, E10, E14, E18, E20) of the twenty-eight inscriptions of the Lycurgan ephebic corpus. These 
suggest that 450-500 citizens served in the first two enrollment years of the institution (i.e. 334/3 and 
333/2) and perhaps 600-650 thereafter. For the epigraphic evidence, see pp.  99-101. 
113 Few scholars have conjectured the overall number of garrison troops employed to defend Attica in 
peacetime. Munn 1993, 169, n. 61, estimates that around 2,500 men garrisoned the border fortresses in 378-
375, which he considers an absolute minimum for the Athenian forces marshaled at the frontier to ward off 
the threat of Spartan forces at this time. This figure, even if correct, however, applies only to reinforced 
frontier garrisons at a heightened state of alert (he cites the 2,500 hoplites mentioned in [Arist]. Ath.Pol. 
24.3 as evidence; but see Rhodes 1981, 306). The nominal establishment strength of the border garrisons 
and Piraeus in peacetime therefore must have been significantly lower than Munn’s estimate, though how 
much lower cannot be determined given the evidence. van Wees 2002, 71, supposes that “except when the 
army was mobilized, they [i.e. the ephebes] constituted the largest organized groups of armed men in the 
country”, but it is impossible to be certain. 
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major routes into Attica, would so effectively block the advance of an invading army that 
the enemy would be forced to withdraw when the main Athenian force arrived to relieve 
the garrisons.114 In his view the ephebeia was intended to provide the garrisons on the 
border with the troops, consisting of second-year ephebes and ex-ephebes, necessary to 
achieve this objective.115 This hypothesis on preclusive defense should be rejected, 
however, because there is no evidence that Athens’ extensive system of border fortresses 
could in fact prevent a full-scale enemy invasion of Attica, and fourth-century literature 
betrays no knowledge of a system akin to the French Maginot line such as Ober 
describes.116  
The Athenians’ efforts to modernize the Athens-Piraeus enceinte and to increase 
the readiness of the fleet after Chaeronea, discussed in the previous section, should been 
seen in the light of their continued willingness to employ a city-based strategy of 
territorial defense.117 That they should do so is unsurprising given that the Athenians 
responded to the threat of Macedonian invasions on at least four occasions from 346 to 
335 in the same way as their fifth-century ancestors did when they faced the Spartans in 
the Peloponnesian War.118 A standing army of one thousand ephebes, then, who would 
                                                
114 Ober 1985a, esp. 191-222. He summarizes his theory as follows: “The economic and military realities of 
the postwar era in conjunction with an emotional reaction against the failed policy of city-based defense led 
to the growth of a defensive mentality among the Athenians who became determined to protect the chora of 
Attica against future incursions. The defensive mentality led fourth-century military theorists to consider 
new approaches to land defense and most of them came to prefer a defensive system based on the 
preclusive protection of the state frontiers (208).” 
115 Ober 1985a, 95-6. See also Faraguna 1992, 279. 
116 Harding 1988, 61-71, has shown that the notion of the Athenians’ “defensive mentality” and the 
development of a preclusive system of defense after 404 should be rejected. Despite Ober’s 1989b, 294-
301, attempts to defend his thesis, Harding’s objections still stand. See also Harding’s 1990, 377-80, 
response to Ober 1989b. Munn 1993, 15-25, has also clearly demonstrated from Xenophon’s discussions of 
territorial defense (Xen. Hipp. 7.2-4; Por. 4.43-8) that “Xenophon’s scenario is surprisingly consonant with 
the Periklean approach to the defense of Attica (21):” i.e. Xenophon did not think that the border fortresses 
could have acted as a preclusive defensive system. To this must be added Lycurgus’ praise of the Athenians 
who died at Chaeronea, who fought in Boeotia rather than from the walls of Athens (Leoc. 47). Munn also 
shows that there is no evidence to support the view that fortresses could prevent the passage of a 
numerically superior invading army. 
117 Atkinson 1981, 4, is therefore mistaken in his belief that the ephebeia was tantamount to a rejection of 
the Periclean defensive strategy. 
118 346/5 (Dem. 19.86, 125; Aeschin. 3.139); 338/7 (Lyc. Leoc. 16, 38); 336/5 (D.S. 17.4.6); 335/4 (Arr. 
Anab. 1.10.2; [Demad]. 14). Pericles’ strategy entailed avoiding an open confrontation with a more 
powerful invader, sending out cavalry patrols from the city and the border fortresses to harass the enemy as 
they sought to ravage and plunder the chora of Attica, evacuating the rural population to the city, and 
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have been called out in any case to defend Athenian territory in the event of an invasion 
(cf. Thuc. 2.13.6-7), would have been no more effective at preventing a Macedonian 
attack from 334/3 onwards than the Athenians were in 378 when a large force under 
Sphodrias eluded Athens’ border defenses and penetrated undetected into the Thriasian 
plain (Xen. Hell. 5.4.20-1). 
But if the φυλακτήρια did not constitute a Maginot line, what role did the forts 
play in the φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας? First, these rural fortifications, many of which were 
located near deme-centers,119 served in times of emergency as places of refuge from 
enemy attacks for those citizens who had insufficient time to evacuate their families and 
property to the city.120 When Philip threatened to invade Attica in 346, a decree of 
Callisthenes, inserted into the text of Demosthenes, specifies that the Athenians should 
“remove all property from the countryside as quickly as possible, if within 120 stades to 
the city and Piraeus, but if outside this distance to Eleusis, Phyle, Aphidna, Rhamnous, 
and Sounium (18.38).”121 In the Poroi Xenophon suggests that if a new fort was 
constructed at Mt. Besa in southern Attica between the existing ones of Thoricus and 
Anaphlystus, the inhabitants around Laurium would have a shorter distance to flee to 
safety in the event of an invasion (4.43-9; cf. Cyr. 5.2.2; 6.1.14). The ephebes stationed at 
the border forts would have helped to ensure that the garrisons could offer sufficient 
protection for those citizens who sought their safety. 
Second, the garrison fortresses functioned as strong-points from which garrison 
troops would patrol the chora to protect the citizenry from small raiding parties of enemy 
                                                                                                                                            
depending upon the fleet to supply sufficient corn to feed the throngs of citizens gathered within Athens 
(Thuc. 143.3-5). For the use of cavalry to harass invaders in the Peloponnesian War, see Thuc. 2.19.2; 
2.22.2 and the detailed discussions of Ober 1985b, 171-88; Spence 1990, 91-109. Xenophon advocates the 
very same practice in the 350’s (Hipp. 4.15; 7.2-4, 14-15). 
119 McCredie 1966, 91-2. 
120 See McCredie 1966, 92-4; Hanson 1983, 112-16; Munn 1993, 25-7. 
121 κατακομίζειν δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν πάντα τὴν ταχίστην, τὰ μὲν ἐντὸς σταδίων ἑκατὸν 
εἴκοσι εἰς ἄστυ καὶ Πειραιᾶ, τὰ δὲ ἐκτὸς σταδίων ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι εἰς Ἐλευσῖνα καὶ Φυλὴν καὶ 
Ἄφιδναν καὶ Ῥαμνοῦντα καὶ Σούνιον. Hanson 1998, 113, says that it “is impossible to determine the 
degree of authenticity of this decree; it may represent the essence of genuine legislation in the time of 
Demsothenes.” Munn 1993, 26, n. 55, maintains that the decree, though Hellenistic in origin, accurately 
reflects the role of Attica’s forts when Athens readied itself for war. He opines that the decree may have 
been part of a collection of Attic decrees assembled by Craterus of Macedon in the third century. 
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soldiers (in wartime) and bands of freebooters (in peace).122 In Xenophon’s Hiero 
Simonides advises the tyrant on the advantages of deploying a standing army of 
mercenary soldiers for this very purpose:  
 
If therefore the first duty enjoined on the mercenaries were to act as the 
bodyguard of the whole community and render help to all … the citizens 
would know that this is one service rendered to them by the mercenaries. 
Nor is this all: for naturally the mercenaries would also be able to give 
fearlessness and security in the fullest measure to the labourers and 
livestock in this country, and the benefit would not be confined to your 
own estates, but would be felt up and down the countryside. Again, they 
are competent to afford the citizens leisure for attending to their private 
affairs by guarding the vital positions (τὰ ἐπίκαιρα φυλάττοντες). 
Besides, should an enemy plan a secret and sudden attack (πολεμίων 
ἐφόδους κρυφαίας καὶ ἐξαπιναίας), what handier agents can be found 
for detecting or preventing their design than a standing force, armed and 
organized (τῶν ἀεὶ ἐν ὅπλοις τε ὄντων καὶ συντεταγμένων)  … And 
must not those who possess a standing force impose on border states a 
strong desire for peace? For nothing equals an organized body of men, 
whether for protecting the property of friends or for thwarting the plans of 
enemies (10.4-7. Trans. E.C.Marchant).123  
 
The crucial role τὰ ἐπίκαιρα played in safeguarding the countryside from surprise 
attacks is made explicit in the Memorabilia, where Xenophon makes Socrates remark that 
it would be easy for Athens’ enemies to plunder the countryside if the phylakai were 
removed (3.6.11; cf. Cyr. 3.2.1-3.4; 6.1.14).124 In the Peloponnesian War, garrison troops 
                                                
122 Munn 1993, 27-32. See also Ober 1985a, 49-50; Harding 1988, 70.  
123 ἓν οὖν ἂν πρῶτον τοῦτ’ εἴη τῶν προστεταγμένων τοῖς μισθοφόροις, ὡς πάντων ὄντας 
δορυφόρους τῶν πολιτῶν βοηθεῖν πᾶσιν, ἄν τι τοιοῦτον αἰσθάνωνται. γίγνονται δέ που, ὡς 
πάντες ἐπιστάμεθα, κακοῦργοι ἐν πόλεσιν· εἰ οὖν καὶ τούτους φυλάττειν εἶεν τεταγμένοι, καὶ 
τοῦτ’ ἂν εἰδεῖεν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ὠφελούμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἐργάταις καὶ 
κτήνεσιν οὗτοι ἂν εἰκότως καὶ θάρρος καὶ ἀσφάλειαν δύναιντο μάλιστα παρέχειν, ὁμοίως μὲν 
τοῖς σοῖς ἰδίοις, ὁμοίως δὲ τοῖς ἀνὰ τὴν χώραν. ἱκανοί γε μήν εἰσι καὶ σχολὴν παρέχειν τοῖς 
πολίταις τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τὰ ἐπίκαιρα φυλάττοντες. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ πολεμίων 
ἐφόδους κρυφαίας καὶ ἐξαπιναίας τίνες ἑτοιμότεροι ἢ προαισθέσθαι ἢ κωλῦσαι τῶν ἀεὶ ἐν ὅπλοις 
τε ὄντων καὶ συντεταγμένων … τὰς <δ’> ἀγχιτέρμονας πόλεις οὐκ ἀνάγκη διὰ τοὺς ἀεὶ ἐν 
ὅπλοις ὄντας καὶ εἰρήνης μάλιστα ἐπιθυμεῖν; οἱ γὰρ συντεταγμένοι καὶ σῴζειν τὰ τῶν φίλων 
μάλιστα καὶ σφάλλειν τὰ τῶν πολεμίων δύναιντ’ ἄν. 
124 The importance of border forts in providing security for the chora is clear from the continuing conflict 
during the Peloponnesian War and the fourth century between the Boeotians and the Athenians over the 
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protected Attica by attacking enemy raiders who sought to plunder the chora. Thucydides 
informs us that the Athenian garrison at Oenoe inflicted heavy losses on Corinthian 
raiders as they returned from Deceleia (Thuc. 8.98.2).125 During the same conflict, 
Aristophanes’ Archarnians has it that the Athenians react to the Boeotians’ seizure of 
Dercetes’ oxen at Phyle by sending Lamachus and a company of soldiers to guard the 
mountain passes so as to ward off an expected raid during the winter (1022, 1073-5).126 
The responded by Whether in times of war or peace, garrisons were also needed to deal 
with the threat of bandits and highwaymen, often unemployed mercenaries or dislocated 
peoples, who robbed citizens, stole their livestock, and carried off their property by 
reason of economic necessity or desire for plunder.127 Given this, it is unsurprising that 
Xenophon in the Cyropaedeia makes his fictional Persian ephebes hunt down criminals 
(kakourgoi) and raiders (leistai) during their stint of garrison duty (1.2.12).128 
There is reason to think that the primary military function of the ephebeia was to 
intercept this threat posed by marauding bands of plunderers.129 The division of the 
ephebes into two distinct groups, the first garrisoning Piraeus (Munychia and Acte) and 
                                                                                                                                            
control of Panactum (see Thuc. 5.3.5; 5.35.5; 5.39.3; 5.42.1-2; Dem. 19.326), which was “the only 
defensible site viable for habitation” on the Scoúrta plain (Munn and Munn 1989, 122).  
125 While the garrisons were not strong enough to prevent the establishment of a fortified camp 
(epiteichismos) like Deceleia, they played an important role, alongside the cavalry, in protecting the chora 
from plundering raids issuing from the fort. For an overview of epiteichismos warfare in the Classical 
period, see Ober 1985a, 36-43; Westlake 1983, 12-24.   
126 For the value of Aristophanes’ comedies as a source for the Archidamian war, see Hanson 1998, 136-44. 
127 For piracy and brigandage in Greece out of hunger, poverty, or for other reasons: Arist. Pol. 1.3.4, 
1256a; 2.4.7, 1267a; Aeschin. 1.191; Isoc. 5.120-2; Plato. Leg. 823B, E; Xen. Hipp. 8.8. See also 
Mckechnie 1989, 101-141.  
128 Lysias provides an account of the metic Philon’s career as bandit immediately after the fall of Athens in 
404/3 (31.17-19). Garrison commanders apparently had the right to execute bandits and criminals who fell 
into their hands, if we can believe Lysias’ claim that there was a special place at Phyle reserved for 
executing highwaymen (13.78: see Fisher 1999, 78-80). Munn 1993, 28, sums up the situation as follows: 
“Garrisons and patrols routinely provided a local armed presence to protect the citizenry against animal 
theft or other forms of raiding brigandage that might be attempted at any time in remote areas. In practical 
terms, these functions became indistinguishable from civil police duties, which were concerned with 
disputes of the sort likely to arise between fellow citizens as well as neighbors across a state boundary.” 
This view should be qualified, however, as Hunter 1994, 129-153, discusses how communities in Attica 
relied on their own resources to repel thieves and other criminals such as the widespread use of towers in 
farmhouses (e.g. Dem. 47.56) as a defense against raiders. On these towers, see Pritchett 1991, 352-8. 
129 Aristotle in the Politics may in fact refer to the ephebeia in just this role when he mentions a taxis of 
epheboi (or phrouroi) being used to guard prisoners (6.5.7, 1322a). It is likely, though Aristotle does not 
say so, that these prisoners consisted of raiders and criminals apprehended by the ephebes in their patrols. 
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continuously patrolling the plains around the city and the second doing likewise along the 
border areas (i.e. from Eleusis to Rhamnous) ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.3-5), would have 
significantly reduced the possibility of raiders escaping detection and hence decreased 
their ability to pillage the chora of Attica.130 If we accept this, the tasks of the ephebes in 
Piraeus were (1) to repel raids which had managed to elude the border fortresses and 
penetrate into central and southern Attica (i.e. Xen. Por. 4.47; Aen.Tact. 23.7-8) and (2) 
to constitute a ready reserve of troops which could be sent, if needed, as reinforcements 
to the outlying areas of Attica (i.e. Ar. Acharn. 1022-3, 1073-7). The epigraphic evidence 
also suggests that ephebic contingents serving on the Attic-Boeotian frontier were 
sometimes required to perform stints of garrison duty in several φυλακτήρια in the 
course of the year – a practice unique to the ephebeia – which suggests that ephebes were 
concentrated in those (continually changing) “hotspots” on the border where raiders were 
most active.131   
Let us now consider the circumstances which created this need for a standing 
army and led to the foundation of the ephebeia. 
                                                
130 Scholars have misunderstood the crucial role which the contingent of ephebes stationed at Piraeus 
played in defending Attica because they have mistakenly assumed that these ephebes were only peripoloi in 
their second year of service. Scholars have followed Harpocration s.v. περίπολος in making this 
assumption (e.g. Forbes 1919, 146-7, 150; Pélékidis 1962, 39; Rhodes 1981, 506, 508; Faraguna 1992, 278; 
Burckhardt 1996, 71). Ober 1985a, 91: “In the second year of their service the ephebes were given a chance 
to practice their skills in the field [i.e. they did not patrol in their first year].” This view, however, is 
problematic for the following reasons: (1) The author uses περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν to  make it explicit 
that the ephebes are stationed at the border forts (which he does not name) rather than in Piraeus. If so, 
περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν should not be taken to mean that the ephebes in their first year were not 
peripoloi. (2) Thucydides attests to the existence of peripoloi at Munychia (8.92.5), the very same place 
where ephebes were garrisoned in their first year (See p. 42). (3) If the ephebes at Munychia and Acte were 
not peripoloi, how could they have provided security for those living in the area of Athens (cf. Schol. on 
Thuc. 4.67)? We would then have to assume that the ephebes were limited to guarding Piraeus, as 
Marcellus 1994, 139-140, does: “The positioning of a full year-group of ephebes in the Piraeus had 
strategic reasons. The fleet was intended to ensure a steady grain supply for Athens, and the contingent of 
ephebes to provide a constant guard for the fleet.” See also Ferguson 1911, 9.  
131 In E5 the ephebes of Cecropis, dated to 332/1, are honored for their service at Eleusis and Rhamnous, 
while in E15, dated to 331/0 or 330/29,  the ephebic contingent of Pandionis did their garrison duty at 
Eleusis, Phyle, and Rhamnous. The only author, to my knowledge, who refers to the rotation of tribal 
contingents for guard duty is Plato in his theoretical approach to the defense of the chora for his ideal city 
(Leg. 760A-763B). In this work he divides the chora into twelve sectors, each occupied by one tribe, which 
performs one month of guard duty in each sector. Each tribe rotates through all twelve sectors in the first 
year and then does the same in their second but in the opposite direction so that no part of the chora will be 
unguarded and the ephebes will have full knowledge of their homeland (760A-D). But Daly 2001, 361-5, 
has shown that Plato’s model does not reflect Athenian military practice.  
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2.6: Problems on the Border: The Ephebeia and Thebes’ Destruction  
 In the summer of 335/4 a rumor spread among the Greeks that Alexander had 
been killed while he was campaigning against the Illyrians (Arr. Anab. 1.7.3).132 The 
Thebans, believing the rumor, overthrew the pro-Macedonian oligarchy, rebelled against 
Alexander, and besieged the Macedonian garrison on the Cadmeia.133 Alexander 
responded by marching rapidly to Thebes, which forestalled any attempt by the Greeks to 
put up a united defense (Arr. Anab. 1.7.4-5).134 In late September 335 Alexander and his 
allies (Phocians and Boeotians) defeated the Thebans in battle, captured the city by 
assault, and thoroughly sacked it.135 Overall 6,000 Thebans are said to have been killed 
and 30,000 survivors captured (D.S. 17.14.1; Plut. Alex. 11.12; Ael. V.H. 13.7). On the 
next day Alexander convened an ad hoc council of the Corinthian League, including 
those who had just participated in the pillaging of Thebes, to determine the fate of the 
remaining Thebans. Passing judgment on the vanquished for their Medism in the Persian 
Wars and past crimes against his allies, the council, with Alexander’s acquiescence, 
decided to retain the garrison on the Cadmeia, raze the city to the ground, sell the 
captives into slavery, forbid other Greeks from accepting Thebans as refugees, and 
distribute Theban land among Alexander’s Boeotian allies.136  
The sudden destruction of Thebes shocked and horrified the Greek world (Arr. 
Anab. 1.9.1).137 Panic broke out immediately in Athens when fleeing Thebans arrived 
with news of the disaster: the Athenians hastily abandoned their celebration of the 
                                                
132 For a discussion of the following events and the sources cited, see Bosworth 1980, 73-91; Will 1983, 37-
47; Hammond and Walbank 1988, 56-66; Rubinsohn 1997, 99-123; Worthington 2003, 65-86. 
133 Arr. Anab. 1.7.1-3, 6; D.S. 17.8.2-4; Ael. V.H. 12.57. 
134 After the revolt the Thebans appealed for help from the Arcadians, Argives, Eleans, and the Athenians 
(D.S. 17.8.5). An Arcadian force did march out and encamped at the isthmus of Corinth, but their general 
Astylus refrained from intervening until it was too late to do so (See Bosworth 1980, 76, on Arr. Anab. 
1.10.1; D.S. 17.8.5-6). For these events, see also Hammand and Walbank 1988, 59-60. 
135 For the involvement of Alexander’s allies in the sack of Thebes: Arr. Anab. 1.8.8; Just. 11.3.8; D.S. 
17.13.5; Plut. Alex. 11.6.  
136 Arr. Anab. 1.9.6-10; D.S. 17.14.1-4; Just. 11.3.8-4.8. As Bosworth 1988a, 196, puts it: “The verdict was 
not Alexander’s but it was the verdict he wished to be passed.” See also Hamilton 1969, 30; Hammond and 
Walbank 1988, 62-5; Rubinsohn 1997, 116-7, on Arr. Anab. 1.9.9; Just. 11.4.5-7. The sale of the Thebans 
is said to have raised 440 talents (D.S. 17.14.4; cf. Cleitarchus FGrHist 137, F1).  
137 For the literary tradition of Thebes’ destruction, see Worthington 2003, 65-9. 
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Eleusinian mysteries and evacuated the countryside in the expectation of an invasion.138 
They had good reason to be afraid. Not only had they encouraged the Thebans to revolt 
and supplied them with weapons after their rebellion, but they had also voted to send an 
army to help the Thebans, though the army never entered Boeotia and left the latter to 
their fate.139 Desperate to soothe Alexander’s anger, the Athenians sent a delegation to 
congratulate him for his safe return from Illyria and his punishment of the Thebans (Arr. 
Anab. 1.10.3). Alexander, however, rejected this overture and demanded the surrender of 
prominent Athenians, including Demosthenes and Lycurgus, whom he considered as 
much to blame as the Thebans for the revolt and more generally for inciting resistance 
against himself and his father (Arr. Anab. 1.7.4; 1.10.5; Just. 11.4.10).140 The Athenians, 
however, refused to comply after debating the issue and sent another embassy under 
Demades and Phocion, who persuaded Alexander to drop his demand.141 It is likely that 
Athens’ glorious role in the Persian Wars (cf. Hdt. 7.139) brought about such lenient 
                                                
138 Arr. Anab. 1.10.2; Plut. Alex. 13.1; Plut. Dem. 23.3; [Demad]. 19. 
139 See Hammond and Walbank 1988, 57-9; Rubinsohn 1997, 101-4. According to pseudo-Demades 
Demosthenes and Lycurgus spurred on the Athenians and the Thebans by confirming the rumors of 
Alexander’s death, almost exhibiting “the body of Alexander on the podium” for the Assembly to see (17; 
cf. Just. 11.2.8). Demosthenes also seems to have accepted Persian funds (Aeschin. 3.239; Din. 1.10, 18; 
Plut. Dem. 20.5) and used them to equip all those Thebans who did not have hoplite armor (D.S. 17.8.5). 
On his motion the Athenians made an alliance with Thebes and voted to send an army (D.S. 17.8.6; 
Aeschin. 3.238-9). Sealey 1993, 203, is skeptical of the vote, but Tritle 1988, 117, shows that the 
opposition of Phocion and the other generals to Demosthenes’ plans, attributed perhaps to their fear of 
Macedonian military might, restrained the Athenians from supporting the Thebans more actively in the 
revolt (Plut. Phoc. 17.1). When Alexander appeared in Boeotia with his army, direct Athenian military 
support was no longer possible (Plut. Dem. 23.2).  
140 Arrian says that Alexander’s response was “friendly” (Anab. 1.10.4), but Plutarch is more credible in 
that Alexander turned his back on the ambassadors and cast away the decree (Phoc. 17.4). There are four 
extant lists of the men whom Alexander demanded: Arr. Anab. 1.10.4; Plut. Phoc. 17.2; Dem. 23.4; Suda 
s.v. Ἀντίπατρος). Bosworth 1980, 92-5, has analyzed them and has shown that Plutarch’s Demosthenes is 
the most reliable (Demosthenes, Polyeuctus, Charidemus, Ephialtes, Moerocles, Demon, and Callisthenes). 
Will 1983, 98, denies that Lycurgus had engaged in anti-Macedonian activity, even though his name 
appears on all the lists (alongside Demosthenes and Charidemus) and the decree of Stratocles honors him 
for his resistance to Macedon ([Plut]. Mor. 852C-D: see Heisserer 1980, 24-6; Bosworth 1985, 434-5). 
141 In the debate Phocion argued that it was enough for the Athenians to mourn Thebes and that those 
demanded by Alexander should willingly surrender themselves on behalf of Athens. Demosthenes, 
however, was successful in urging the demos not to submit to Macedon: D.S. 17.15.2; Plut. Phoc. 17.2-3; 
Plut. Dem. 23.4-5. The Athenians passed a second decree which stated that they would punish their leaders 
according to the law if they had done wrong: in the end Alexander insisted that Charidemus alone should 
be exiled (Arr. Anab. 1.10.6; D.S. 17.15.3-5; Plut. Phoc. 17.4-5).  
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treatment,142 along with the strength of her fleet and her modernized fortifications, which 
would have made a siege of the city time-consuming and arduous. 
 Nevertheless, Thebes, as Alexander had intended, served as a potent deterrent for 
those who desired to cast off the Macedonian yoke.143 Though “all he [i.e. Alexander] 
managed to produce in the minds of most Athenians was a hostile reaction and a steady 
hatred for himself in particular and for the Macedonian hegemony in general,”144 Thebes 
was a constant reminder to the Athenians of the terrible consequences of rebellion against 
Alexander. Five years afterwards Aeschines vividly lamented Thebes’ fate, saying “but 
Thebes! Thebes, our neighbor, has in one day been swept from the midst of Hellas! 
(3.133: Θῆβαι δέ, Θῆβαι, πόλις ἀστυγείτων, μεθ’ ἡμέραν μίαν ἐκ μέσης τῆς 
Ἑλλάδος ἀνήρπασται).”145 The loss of Thebes also deprived the Athenians of their 
most important ally and hence any chance of reforming the anti-Macedonian coalition 
which fought at Chaeronea. “Greece,” as pseudo-Demades declared, “has lost an eye in 
the annihilation of the Thebans’ city (65; cf. Hegesias FGrHist 142, F 12 Robinson).” 
Under these circumstances the Athenians realized that they had to accept Macedonian 
domination, albeit unwillingly, for the time being and hence adopted a more cautious 
policy towards Macedon, one in which an armed confrontation with Macedon had to be 
                                                
142 Bosworth 1988a, 196-7: “Alexander had invoked the decrees of the Hellenic alliance against Thebes and 
he could hardly now take drastic action against the city which had dared and suffered most during the 
Persian Wars, least of all when he was about to assume the mantle of Athens and take revenge for her 
injuries.” Alexander made an effort during his reign to profess outwardly his respect for the city, beginning 
with the second Athenian embassy after Thebes, followed by the dedication of 300 panoplies after his 
victory on the Granicus, and the return of Iphicrates’ remains to Athens (Arr. Anab. 1.10.6; 1.16.7; 2.15.3). 
That he may have privately held a more negative opinion is perhaps suggested by an anecdote of 
Athenaeus, in which Gorgus offers to supply Alexander with the weapons needed for a siege of Athens 
(12.538B).  
143 D.S. 17.14.4: ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἀκολούθως τῇ τοῦ συνεδρίου γνώμῃ τὴν μὲν πόλιν κατασκάψας 
πολὺν ἐπέστησε φόβον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων. Plut. Alex. 11.11: τὸ μὲν ὅλον 
προσδοκήσαντος αὐτοῦ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐκπλαγέντας πάθει τηλικούτῳ καὶ πτήξαντας 
ἀτρεμήσειν. See also Polyb. 4.23.8; 38.2.13.  
144 Mitchel 1965, 189. 
145 Other orators too express similar sentiments, doubtless to exploit the horror and revulsion the Athenians 
still felt more than a decade afterwards for the annihilation of Thebes: παῖδες καὶ γυναῖκες αἱ Θηβαίων 
ἐπὶ τὰς σκηνὰς τῶν βαρβάρων διενεμήθησαν, πόλις ἀστυγείτων καὶ σύμμαχος ἐκ μέσης τῆς 
Ἑλλάδος ἀνήρπασται, ἀροῦται καὶ σπείρεται τὸ Θηβαίων ἄστυ τῶν κοινωνησάντων ὑμῖν τοῦ 
πρὸς Φίλιππον πολέμου (Din. 1.24; cf. [Demad]. 26; Hyp. Epit. 17). See also the attempts by Aeschines 
3.239-240 and Dinarchus 1.10, 18-21 to convince their audiences that Demosthenes betrayed the Thebans 
so as to arouse hatred against him for contributing to the disaster (Worthington 1992, 139-143, 160-168). 
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evaded at all costs.146  
The Athenian position after Thebes was further complicated by increased tension 
on the Boeotian border. As we have seen, Alexander’s Boeotian allies  – the Thespians, 
Plataeans, and Orchomenians – had eagerly participated in the sack of Thebes and had 
received her land as part of their spoils.147 The sources inform us that they retained this 
land throughout the Lycurgan period and would later fight for the Macedonians against 
the Athenians in the Lamian War rather than give up the income they earned from it (D.S. 
18.11.4; Hyp. Epit. 15-7). They also had good reason to be hostile to the Athenians. If the 
latter were to defeat the Macedonians and regain their full independence in foreign 
affairs, the Boeotians knew that the Athenians would not only restore Thebes and 
confiscate the Theban land now under their control (D.S. 18.11.4), but they would also 
deprive them of their newly regained autonomy because the Athenians had recognized 
Theban supremacy in Boeotia and would actively assist the Thebans should any 
dependent city attempt to succede from the Boeotian league.148 The Athenians would 
have gained no favor from the Boeotians by providing a safe haven for Theban refugees, 
thus showing her continued support and sympathy for her ally.149  
I contend that Alexander’s Boeotian allies took advantage of the Athenians’ fear 
and defensiveness in the aftermath of Thebes’ destruction to plunder Attica in order to 
carry off valuable booty, such as livestock and other readily movable property (e.g. 
farming implements), to their own farms in Boeotia.150 The Athenian countryside, which 
had remained inviolate from large-scale enemy incursions since Sphodrias’ raid in 378 
                                                
146 Atkinson 1981, 38: “Alexander’s sack of Thebes cooled the hot-heads [i.e. Demosthenes] and from 335 
the political scene seems to be characterized not so much by a division between pro- and anti-Macedonians 
as by a consensus that direct military action against Macedon was not a practical strategy, and that a more 
pragmatic policy was required.” 
147 Arr. Anab. 1.9.9; D.S. 18.11.3; Just. 11.4.7; Plut. Alex. 11.11. 
148 Philip had restored the cities of Orchomenos, Plataea, and Thespiae after Chaeronea as a counterweight 
to Thebes in the Boeotian league (D.S. 17.13.5; Paus. 4.27.10; 9.1.8; Dio Chrys. Or. 37.42), the same cities 
which Thebes had destroyed earlier in the fourth century (see p. 55, n. 213). For the terms of the Athenian-
Theban alliance of 339/8, one of which stipulated that the Athenians were obligated to help the Thebans to 
maintain their dominance in the league, see Mosley 1971, 508-10, on Aeschin. 3.142. 
149 Demades persuaded Alexander to allow the Athenians to grant asylum to the refugees whom they had 
received in contravention of the League’s edict (cf. D.S. 17.15.4; Aeschin. 3.156; Just. 11.4.10; Paus. 
9.7.1).  
150 For these and other items likely to be plundered by raiders, see Hanson 1998, esp. 103-110. 
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(Xen. Hell. 5.4.20-1), must have been lavishly furnished in comparison to the chora of 
Boeotia (cf. Hell. Oxy. 12.5), in which the inhabitants were still in the process of 
rebuilding their cities and restocking the newly acquired farms which had been 
devastated during the sack of Thebes.151 If so, this border raiding would have provoked 
considerable alarm in Athens. Plato’s observation that all poleis are in a state of 
undeclared war despite the appearance of nominal peace (Leg. 626A) certainly holds true 
for the hostile relationship which existed between those citizens who possessed land near 
the frontier.152 The danger for the Athenians was that the Boeotians’ raiding, if left 
unchecked, would enrage the border dwellers so much that they would advocate military 
conflict against their adversaries, a conflict which was not necessarily in the best interests 
of the polis (Arist. Pol. 1330a; Xen. Hell. 3.5.3). It is likely that such pressure compelled 
the Athenians to make armed expeditions to Drymus and Panactum between 346 and 343 
in order to put a stop to excessive raiding on the Boeotian border (Dem. 19.326). 
But any such campaign against the Boeotians in 335/4 would have carried 
unacceptable risks for the Athenians, since it would have violated the Common Peace, if 
both sides came to blows, and left Athens open to retaliation by the League.153 Even 
worse, the Athenians could not rule out the possibility that the Macedonian garrison 
stationed on the Cadmeia (Arr. Anab. 1.9.9) would also become involved in any border 
confrontation, the very situation which the Athenians sought to avoid, since the demos 
                                                
151 Arrian implies that the resettlement of the Plataeans and Orchomenians was not far advanced in 335/4, 
since their cities still needed to be fortified, among other construction work (Anab. 1.9.10; cf. Plut. Alex. 
34; Plut. Arist. 11 for Plataea’s walls). According to Pausanias the countryside around Thebes was looted 
and burnt by Alexander and his allies (9.25.10), perhaps as thoroughly sacked as Thebes itself, which was 
razed to the ground except for the temples, the houses of Pindar and his descendents, and the dwellings of 
Alexander’s supporters (Arr. Anab. 1.9.9-10; Plut. Alex. 11.6; Ael. V.H. 13.7; Dio Chrys. Or. 2.33). Given 
that the Macedonians and Phocians had also participated in the sack, the Boeotians would have had only a 
portion of the possessions which had existed on the Thebans’ estates before the revolt. 
152 See also Plato’s remarks on the perennial feuds and property disputes that kept this enmity alive among 
border dwellers (373D-E; 843A; 955B-C). 
153 Tod. II, no. 177 = IG II2 236 [338/7], lines 5-8, stipulates that cities are not to bear arms against those 
who participate in the Common Peace. It is likely that the Athenians, having seen “the rough justice of the 
victors” at Thebes (Bosworth 1988a, 195), would have had little confidence that they would receive a fair 
hearing in the sunedrion of the League of Corinth, especially after their own involvement in the recent 
rebellion, which may have killed as many as five hundred Macedonian soldiers (D.S. 17.14.1). Not only 
would they have regarded the Common Peace after Thebes’ destruction as an instrument of Macedonian 
repression (see Hammond and Walbank 1988, 65), but they were also well aware that the League was 
hardly impartial when Macedonian interests were involved (see Bosworth 1988a, 191-2).  
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knew that Athens’ land forces had little chance of defeating the qualitatively and 
quantitatively superior Macedonian army. Furthermore, any defeat would have had 
disastrous consequences for Athens, including the loss of territory, the imposition of a 
garrison, or a change in constitution, such as Thebes had suffered after Chaeronea and 
Athens herself would experience after her defeat in the Lamian War.154 Lastly, armed 
conflict with Macedon would have endangered those Athenian citizens who served in the 
contingent of twenty triremes on Alexander’s Persian campaign (D.S. 17.22.5) and whom 
Alexander held as hostages to ensure Athens’ continued good behavior.155  
There was, however, an alternative. If the Athenians could deal with the raids of 
the Boeotians more effectively, they could keep border tensions down to manageable 
levels and hence ensure that no Athenian army would be compelled to undertake a 
potentially risky campaign on the frontier. As Xenophon puts it in the Hiero, a large 
armed force constantly under arms and dedicated to the protection of the countryside not 
only results in better security for the demos from raids and surprise attacks but also 
compels neighboring states (τὰς … ἀγχιτέρμονας πόλεις) to be more peaceful than 
they would otherwise be (10.4-7). While the numerical strength of the garrisons were 
periodically adjusted according to the perceived threat-level to the chora,156 the 
unrelenting hostility of the Boeotians throughout the Lycurgan period would have created 
a need among the Athenians for a substantial reinforcement of the garrison troops already 
                                                
154 For Thebes, see p. 76, n. 86. For Antipater’s settlement with Athens after the Lamian War, see p. 179-
80. 
155 Blakewell 1999, 59, aptly sums up the nature of Athens’ commitment to the Persian campaign: “Once 
Alexander’s war in Asia got under way, the Athenians … contributed some ships to Alexander’s initial 
expedition in 334, and the ships were few and likely not the pride of the Athenian navy. The extent of 
Athenian participation [in] the Persian War was a one-time show of cooperation in the immediate aftermath 
of Thebes’ destruction.” Even so, the Athenians must have valued these citizens as much as those who 
fought as mercenaries in Persian service and whom Alexander captured at the battle of the Granicus in 334 
(Arr. Anab, 1.16.6; Plut. Alex. 22). Alexander sent them off to Macedonia to do forced labor and the demos 
repeatedly petitioned him to free them; this was finally granted in 331 (Arr. Anab, 1.29.5; 3.6.2). It is 
therefore unlikely that the Athenians would have taken any overt action against Alexander so long as the 
contingent served in Asia, since they were well aware that Alexander’s actions at Thebes had shown that 
“he would not shrink from extreme measures against rebels” (Badian 1994, 259).   
156 Arist. Rhet. 1.4.10, 1360a: ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας μὴ λανθάνειν πῶς φυλάττεται, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰδέναι τῆς φυλακῆς καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τοὺς τόπους τῶν φυλακτηρίων, ἵν’ εἴ τ’ 
ἐλάττων ἡ φυλακὴ προστεθῇ καὶ εἴ τις περίεργος ἀφαιρεθῇ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τόπους τηρῶσι 
μᾶλλον. See also Xen. Mem. 3.6.10 
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stationed in Attica before Thebes’ destruction. Realizing that they would have to sustain 
these additional troops for the foreseeable future, the demos decided to undertake the 
unprecedented step of establishing a standing army, whose primary military function was 
to defend the chora of Attica.  
But who would fight in this standing army? The Athenians could have hired 
mercenaries.157 But, as Aeneas Tacticus recognized, a large force of mercenaries 
deployed in the homeland could pose as great a danger to the polis as the enemies they 
were hired to fight against (12.1-13.4). Not only was a mercenary army expensive to 
maintain, but also its reliability could never be taken for granted, since its continued 
loyalty depended upon the employer’s ability to provide sustenance and pay rather than 
obedience to any constitution. Consequently, there was no guarantee that the mercenaries 
would fight effectively on Athens’ behalf, would not plunder Attica for their own gain, or 
would not even be used to take over the state.158 The Athenians, then, had to rely upon a 
portion of their citizen body to provide the necessary manpower. They could have raised 
an elite corps such as the one thousand Argive hoplites, attested between 421 to 418, who 
were maintained and trained at public expense.159 But democratic ideology could never 
have allowed a standing force drawn from the wealthiest families, especially at a time 
when Athens was weak militarily and the demos feared that the democratic constitution 
was under threat.160 The Athenians’ suspicions of such corps were well grounded, since 
the picked Argives enlisted the support of the Lacedaemonians after the battle of 
                                                
157 The Athenians hired mercenaries throughout the Classical period. For an overview, see Parke 1933. 
158 For the superior fighting quality and loyalty of citizen-soldiers over mercenaries, see Arist. Eth.Nic. 
1116b. On several occasions mercenaries abandoned their employers on campaign if they were dissatisfied 
with the latter (e.g. Timoleon: Plut. Tim. 25; D.S. 16.78.5-6). Xenophon also mentions instances when the 
employers were not able to keep their mercenary contingents from raiding friendly territory (e.g. Anab. 
7.1.7-20; Hell. 4.8.30). In the eyes of Greeks, Thracian peltasts had a reputation as bandits and 
indiscriminate plunderers, see Best 1969, 126-33, on Thuc. 7.27.1-2; Ar. Acharn, 137-73. For Isocrates’ 
view of mercenaries as a threat to the stability of Greece, see Perlman 1976/7, 252-4. Aeneas Tacticus uses 
Heracleia as an example of how a large mercenary army can overthrow a city and establish a tyranny 
(12.5). For the career of Clearchus of Heracleia, see Parke 1933, 97-9. Given this, it is unsurprising that 
hired troops struck fear into the Greeks, such as the Phocians who lived in terror of Philip’s mercenaries 
billeted among them (Dem. 19.81). 
159 Thuc. 5.67.2; D.S. 12.75.7; 12.79.1, 4; 12.80.2-3. For a discussion of these passages, see Pritchett 1974, 
222-3. 




Mantineia to subvert the democracy and established an oligarchy in its place (Thuc. 
5.81.2; D.S. 12.80.2-3). 
Instead, the Athenians used ephebes. From the fifth century onwards the youngest 
citizens, whether called neotatoi or epheboi, had traditionally functioned as a homeguard 
whenever the Athenians were threatened with invasion, but were not otherwise obliged to 
perform garrison duty (Thuc. 2.13.6-7; Aeschin. 2.167; Dem. 21.193). But why, then, did 
the demos prefer ephebes over the rest of the citizen body, given that Athenian citizens 
aged 20-50 routinely undertook military service on the frontier? First, the standing army 
was intended to operate only within the confines of Attica.161 The ephebes were well 
suited for this role, because they, unlike their older compatriots, were not eligible for 
strateia except under exceptional circumstances (Thuc. 1.105.4-6; D.S. 15.63.2). Second, 
the citizens who served in this corps were required to devote all their time to their duties: 
i.e. they could not attend to their own affairs or participate in civic life throughout their 
stint of military service. Here too the ephebes were the obvious candidates, since they had 
little input into the running of the polis (Xen. Mem. 3.6.1; Lys. 16.20) and hence had the 
least political privileges to lose. Third, the demos had probably decided in advance how 
strong the corps needed to be to counter the Boeotians’ raids. If so, it is likely that they 
could estimate from the published conscript lists of eponymoi ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 53.4, 7) 
that the number of ephebes, consisting of the first two conscript age-classes, was 
sufficient without calling up older citizens.  
Though there is no certainty, I suggest that Epicrates’ legislation (Harpocration 
s.v. Ἐπικράτης) was probably passed soon after the destruction of Thebes. I further 
suggest that his legislation not only obligated all citizens of ephebic age to undertake 
military service for two years, beginning in the next archon year, but also made their 
attainment of full citizenship rights contingent upon them completing their military 
service. Even if we accept this, it is improbable that a complex institution such as the 
ephebeia was the product of one Assembly. Rather, I suggest that after the ephebeia’s 
foundation the demos would have had to meet on several occasions during the remainder 
                                                
161 This is in contrast to the epilektoi, Athens’ elite hoplite corps, which served on numerous campaigns 
overseas in the fourth century: see Tritle 1989, 54-9. 
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of 335/4 to determine such matters as how to provide the youths with the necessary skills 
to perform their duties, to define the responsibilities of the ephebic officials, and to 
decide upon the body of regulations which directed their activities (i.e. E2, lines 28, 54). 
The outcome of all these discussions was the ephebeia as we know it from the Athenaion 
Politeia and the ephebic inscriptions.162  
 
2.7: Conclusion 
The prevailing opinion of scholars is that the ephebeia was intended primarily to 
train Athenian citizens to fight more effectively against the Macedonian army. This view 
should be rejected, however, because the ephebeia, as we have seen, did little to revitalize 
the Athenian army which had been so decisively defeated at Chaeronea and this 
explanation cannot account for why the ephebeia began to operate in 334/3 but not earlier 
when such military training should have been a priority. The ephebeia should not be 
regarded as an inevitable consequence of the Macedonians’ domination of Greece after 
338/7, as scholars have assumed, but as an extraordinary solution to a border crisis in the 
aftermath of Alexander’s destruction of Thebes in 335/4. During this period of fear and 
confusion the Athenians sought to defend themselves against hostile Boeotian raids by 
employing a standing army of ephebes to ensure greater security for the chora of Attica. 
Seen in this light, the ephebeia should be considered another instance of the Athenians’ 
willingness to do whatever is necessary, including the introduction of new institutions or 
offices, in order to ensure that the defensive system would continue to be effective 
against all threats.163 While this chapter has discussed the circumstances which led to the 
                                                
162 Lycurgus’ contribution to these discussions is unclear, given that Harpocration’s fragment tells us 
nothing. At the minimum he would have had to be consulted over the financial implications of the 
institution just as in other projects (see Mikalson 1998, 29; Humphreys 2004, 84), since his financial office 
controlled the allocation of funds (merismos) as the decree for Xenocles of Sphettus demonstrates (Merritt 
1960, no. 3, line 10). Also, I suspect that the advice of Phocion, though no source connects him to the 
ephebeia, was constantly sought by the demos on the military aspects of the institution on account of his 
exceptional record of military service (he was strategos forty five times: Plut. Phoc. 8.1), the majority of 
which was probably spent as the general concerned with defense of the countryside (Munn 1993, 190-4).   
163 See Ober 1985a, 87-100; Munn 1993, 187-95. They argue that the creation of the office of στρατηγὸς 
ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν, the adoption of conscription by eponymoi (replacing the earlier system of selective 
enlistment by katalogos), and the reform of the ephebeia (in the 370’s) should be understood as an 
Athenian reaction to their defeat in the Peloponnesian War (Ober) or to their involvement in the Boeotian 
 
 98 
creation of the ephebeia, many important questions still remain to be discussed 
concerning the institution itself as it functioned and matured throughout the Lycurgan 
Period, especially to what extent the ephebeia shared the goals of the Lycurgan program. 
These questions will be the focus of the remainder of this dissertation. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
War (378-375) (Munn), which prompted the Athenians to improve their border defense system. Though 
they are mistaken about the ephebeia, I agree with their assessment of the Athenians’ readiness to adopt 
new military approaches to defense in the fourth century. As Munn 1993, 194-5, puts it: “The Boeotian 
War was the crucible out of which were forged the fourth-century Athenian standards for service in defense 
of Attica. Its effects can be traced in the writings of Xenophon and Plato, in the rhetoric of Demosthenes 
and Lykourgos, in the career of Phokion, and in the institutions of this latter generation of Athenians (my 
italics).”   
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Chapter Three: The Ephebeia as a Military Institution 
 
The Athenians, then, created the ephebeia in 335/4 in the aftermath of Thebes’ 
destruction in order to protect Attica against Boeotian plundering expeditions. Beginning 
in the next year, ephebes played a pivotal role in the defense of the countryside (φυλακὴ 
τῆς χώρας): they were obligated to undertake two years of garrison duty in the Piraeus 
and the forts on the Athenian frontier ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.3-5). The decision to entrust 
this vital task primarily to the youngest and most immature citizens with no combat 
experience (i.e. the first two helikiai of citizens eligible for military service) marked a 
decisive break with long-standing Athenian military practices in the Classical period.1 It 
is my intention in this chapter to show how the Athenians managed to turn a given helikia 
of inexperienced youths into a standing army capable of carrying out their primary 
military function. Let us begin with the conscription of citizens for the ephebeia in the 
Lycurgan period, a matter of great controversy among scholars and one whose 
significance has been misunderstood.  
 
3.1: Citizen Participation in the Ephebeia 
Out of the twenty-eight inscriptions that comprise the Lycurgan ephebic corpus, 
seven have complete or sufficiently well preserved rosters so that a reasonably accurate 
estimate can be made of the number of ephebes for a tribe in a given enrollment year.2 In 
chronological order, the estimates are as follows:  
 
                                                
1 Previously, citizens of different ages were conscripted at the same time to ensure that military contingents 
would have the appropriate mix of youthful vigor and veterans experienced in war (Christ 2001, 411). 
Youths called up for service in the ephebeia would have not had the benefit of guidance from older citizens 
in the ranks (see Hanson 1989, 89-95). 
2 Six other inscriptions have poorly preserved tribal rosters (minimum size of the ephebic contingents given 
in parentheses): E6 (2+), E7 (10+), E15 (28+), E21 (19+), E23 (16+), E24 (15+), E25 (4+). I follow 
Hansen 1988a, 4, in regarding E7, the roster of Pandionis dated to 333/2, as “too fragmentary to be of any 
value” (contra Reinmuth 1971, 107). Two further inscriptions (E8 and E11) have partially preserved 
rosters and are discussed below. 
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Inscription Tribe Enrollment Year Ephebes3 
E2 Cecropis 334/3 42-44 
E5 Cecropis 333/2 52-54 
E9 Leontis 333/2 384 
E10 Erectheis  333/2  47-485 
E14 Cecropis 332/1? 58-65 
E18 Oineis 330/29? 55-56 
E20 Leontis 332/1-326/56 62 
 
Reinmuth’s method of determining how many ephebes served annually during the 
Lycurgan period was to take a simple average of all the extant rosters and then multiply it 
by the ten tribes.7 If we did this, the mean yearly enrollment for 334/3-323/2 would 
amount to 520 or more ephebes. But such a total would not take into account three 
important factors: (1) The seven inscriptions are dated mainly to the first few years of the 
institution. (2) Only four out of the ten tribes are represented (i.e. Cecropis, Leontis, 
Erectheis, and Oineis). The numerical strength of these tribes was not equal.8 (3) The 
number of ephebes attested on the three Cecropis inscriptions grows from 42-44 in 334/3 
                                                
3 For the texts of these inscriptions and a discussion of the rosters, see the register of Lycurgan ephebic 
inscriptions in the appendix under the appropriate document heading. 
4 Two Leontid inscriptions are attested for the enrollment year of 333/2. Petrakos 2004, 167-76, reports that 
E9 has a complete roster of 38 ephebes, correcting Reinmuth’s 1971, 31-2, estimate of 40-44 ephebes from 
E8. 
5 Palagia and Lewis 1989, 334-5, have shown that E11 (= IG II2 2401) is also an inscription of Erectheis in 
the enrollment year of Nicocrates (333/2). The extant roster has less than half of the names (20+) attested 
on E10. 
6 It should be stressed that 332/1-326/5 is my tentative suggestion for this inscription, the date of which is 
highly controversial. For a discussion of possible dates ranging from 330/29 to 324/3, see pp. 219-221. 
7 Reinmuth 1971, 105-8. 
8 Two attempts have been made to determine the relative strength of the phylae in the Classical period. (1) 
Gomme 1933, 50, has compiled the number of bouletai attested epigraphically for each tribe in Kirchner’s 
Prosopgraphia Attica and suggests the following order from the largest to the smallest tribe (bouletai in 
parentheses): Aigeis (1540), Leontis (1502), Cecropis (1314), Erectheis (1312), Pandionis (1223), 
Acamantis (1149), Oineis (1125), Hippothontis (1077), Antiochis (1058), and Aiantis (979). Gomme 
admits, however, that the sample size is too small to have any hope of accuracy and he falsely assumes that 
the demes’ representation in the phyle was directly proportional to their population (see Hansen 1985, 61-
3). (2) Traill 1975, 31-2, claims that the size of the demes (in terms of their bouletic quota) given up by the 
original ten tribes for the two new ones in the tribal reorganization of 307/6 is a more reliable indicator: i.e. 
Cecropis and Pandionis were the largest, followed by Erectheis, Aigeis, Leontis, Acamantis, and Antiochis, 
which were similar in size, then the “slightly smaller” Oineis and Hippothontis, and with the smallest tribe 
being Aigeis. Even if we accept Traill for 307/6, I am very doubtful whether we can assume the same 
population distribution in the Lycurgan period, since, for example, one or more of the phyle may have 
suffered particularly heavy losses during the Lamian War or in subsequent conflicts. Consequently I use 
Traill with some hesitation.  
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to 52-54 in 333/2 to 58-65 in 332/1-330/29. This apparent increase in ephebic enrollment 
is also reflected in the rosters of Leontis, perhaps a smaller tribe than Cecropis, which 
had 38 ephebes in 333/2 and 62 in one year during the period 332/1-326/5. Finally, 
though Erectheis was probably a larger tribe than Oineis, the latter’s contingent of 55-56 
ephebes in 330/29? exceeded the 47-48 of the former in 333/2.  
 In such case, I suggest that 450-500 ephebes served in the first two enrollment 
years of the institution (i.e. 334/3 and 333/2), which seems to have risen to perhaps 600-
650 ephebes in subsequent years.9 Hansen points out that these figures, especially for the 
three rosters of Cecropis (334/3-332/1), cannot be explained by a rising fertility rate in 
354/3-352/1 nor by the assumption that more births occurred because one or more of 
these years was an intercalary year (i.e. 384 days long instead of 354 days in a normal 
year), but instead must reflect increasing citizen involvement in the institution.10 Indeed, 
if we accept that citizen enrollment did increase in the late 330’s, it is further evidence 
that the ephebeia was a new institution rather than the revivication of an older one. 
Sekunda, however, argues that citizen enrollment remained relatively constant 
throughout the Lycurgan period.11 For Sekunda the taxiarchoi and lochagoi attested on 
the ephebic inscriptions were not ephebes, as scholars have believed,12 but were “young 
soldiers who have already passed through the ephebate and are ‘squadded’ with the new 
ephebes to ‘show them the ropes’ during basic training.”13 In his view, these ex-ephebic 
                                                
9 For similar figures, see Hansen 1988a, 4; 1988b, 190. Previously Hansen 1986, 48, had estimated c. 450-
500 ephebes for a normal year, c. 500-550 for an intercalary year. Other estimates: Girard 1891, 288, 900-
1000 ephebes; Beloch 1923, 400, 530 ephebes; Gomme 1933, 10, 500 ephebes; Reinmuth 1971, 106, 490+ 
ephebes; Pélékidis 1962, 292, 650-700 ephebes; Ruschenbusch 1988a, 139, 500 ephebes; Marcellus 1994, 
22, c. 550 ephebes; Burckhardt 1996, 500 ephebes (or 600 later?). 
10 Hansen 1989b, 41. Contra Pélékidis 1962, 283-286. Any attempt to explain the variation in the rosters’ 
size by intercalary years has to contend with Meritt’s 1961, 4, observation that “the Athenians did not 
arrange their days, months, and years in a precisely regular or predictable pattern. Apparently they enjoyed 
liberty to add or not to add the intercalary year … whenever and wherever they pleased.”  
11 Sekunda 1992, 321-342. 
12 Leonardos 1918, 83, was the first to suggest that the lochagoi on the ephebic inscriptions were ephebes. 
Meritt 1940, 59-66, supposed that they were the same as the officers of the regular army (i.e. [Arist]. 
Ath.Pol. 61.3), but Roussel 1941, 222-6, has reaffirmed Leonardos’ view. Merritt 1945, 234-9, later 
assumed that the taxiarchos Φιλοκλέης Φιλοθέου Σουνιεὺς (E8, Col. I, lines, 21-2; Col. II, lines 15-6) 
was a regular officer, but Mitchel’s 1961, 350-3, careful analysis has established that the taxiarchos, like 
the lochagoi, was also an ephebe.  
13 Sekunda 1992, 312. 
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taxiarchoi and lochagoi should be subtracted from the rosters, resulting in an average of 
c. 470 ephebes per year.14 But why would citizens who were not ephebes be included in 
ephebic rosters (e.g. E5, E17, E20) rather than listed separately with the other officials 
such as the kosmetes, sophronistes, strategoi, and didaskaloi? Sekunda offers no adequate 
explanation for this except that it was done “for administrative purposes.”15 Moreover, 
strong counter-evidence is provided by E2 and E5, the Cecropis inscriptions for the first 
two enrollment years of 334/3 and 333/2. In E5, Ἀταρβίων Τυννίου Αἰξωνέυς was 
one of the lochagoi honored for their ephebic service (lines 8-9). If Sekunda is correct, 
we should expect Atarbion to have been an ephebe in the previous year. But he is not 
listed among the seven ephebes of the deme Aixone (a complete list) in the roster of E2, 
lines 10-19.   
Finally, Sekunda claims that his theory can account for the unusually large 
number of so-called “twin brothers” who appear on the rosters, namely that they should 
be understood as older brothers (i.e. ex-ephebes) serving as taxiarchoi and lochagoi 
alongside their younger siblings (i.e. ephebes of that year).16 While the normal incidence 
of twins in most populations is 1% of births,17 the roster of 62 ephebes of E20 (= 
Reinmuth 1971, no. 15), an inscription of Leontis (332/1-326/5), has five pairs of 
ephebes who share the same patronymic and demotic.18 But if we reject Sekunda’s 
hypothesis, how, then, do we explain the number of these “twins”? A plausible 
explanation is that not all these ephebes with homonymous fathers were twins, but some 
of them could have been instead brothers born in the same year (i.e. within the same 
twelve month period, about 3% of births) who were treated as if they were twins and 
                                                
14 Sekunda 1992, 340-2. 
15 Sekunda 1992, 329. 
16 Sekunda 1992, 329-30. 
17 Hansen 1994, 480. 
18 Examples: E5, lines 42-3, 58-9; E14, lines 101-2, 105-6; E20, Col. I, lines 7-8, 9-10, Col. II, lines 17-8, 
25-6, 29 and 32; E21, lines 24-5. For a discussion of E20 and “twin brothers” generally, see Pélékidis 
1962, 143-7; Reinmuth 1971, 72-3. 
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consequently served together in the ephebeia.19 Scholars have advanced other 
possibilities that do not stand up to scrutiny.20  
Did citizens of all census classes serve in the Ephebeia or were the thetes 
excluded? Scholars are divided on this question.21 The Athenaion Politeia’s detailed 
description of citizen registration and the ephebeia implies that the former view is correct, 
since the author at no point says that the thetes did not undertake their military service 
alongside their wealthier compatriots (42.1-5). Gomme tries to explain away this silence 
by claiming that “we must assume that Aristotle forgot to state that they [i.e. the thetes] 
were excluded from the ranks of the epheboi (and of the arbitrators) because such a fact 
was well-known and obvious to his readers: an assumption in itself unsatisfactory.”22 
Rhodes adds that the thetes could not have served because the ephebes were trained in 
hoplite warfare ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.3).23 The same passage, however, also says that the 
ephebes received instruction in non-hoplite weaponry. Nor should we assume that thetes 
served because the law that excluded them from magistracies was “a dead letter” in the 
Lycurgan period.24 
                                                
19 Hansen 1994, 303-4. Robertson 2000, 162-3, following Hansen, suggests that brothers close to each other 
in age would sometimes be included within the same class on account of having the same level of physical 
maturity. 
20 Reinmuth 1948, 215, supposes that youths who for some reason did not serve in the ephebeia when they 
had turned eighteen served at a later date. But why would an ephebe, who is free to participate in civic life, 
choose to give up his civic rights to do two years of ephebic service? This objection also applies to Traill’s 
1986, 13, theory that “the accumulated data suggest to me that brothers may indeed be listed in the same 
text honoris familiaeque causa, that, for the same or similar reasons, an ephebe may rarely be repeated in 
his following year.” Two ephebes – Ἀρχέδικος Ἀρχεδίκου Φλυεύς and Ἀριστόμαχος Δημοχάρους 
Μελιτεύς – appear to be listed on Cecropis inscriptions of successive enrollment years (333/2: E5, lines 48 
and 50; 332/1? E14, lines 79 and 101). Traill 1986, 11, thinks that they are the same individuals, but they 
are probably homonymns, even though Ἀρχέδικος is an uncommon name (Clinton 1988, 30). 
21 All citizens: e.g. Ferguson 1911, 8; Forbes 1929, 128, 150-1; Pélékidis 1962, 113-4; Ridley 1979, 519, 
531; Ruschenbusch 1979, 173-6; 1988a, 139-40; Hansen 1985, 47-50; Faraguna 1992, 276-7; Sekunda 
1992, 345; Marcellus 1994, 11, 223; Burckhardt 1996, 35, 42. Citizens of hoplite census and above: e.g. 
Girard 1892, 622; Beloch 1923, 402; Gomme 1933, 11; Jones 1957, 82-3; Reinmuth 1971, 106; Rhodes 
1980a, 194; 1981, 503; Osborne 1985, 44. 
22 Gomme 1933, 11. 
23 Rhodes 1981, 503. 
24 The Athenaion Politeia makes it clear that thetes could hold any magistracy so long as they did not admit 
to their property class (7.4). Thus a thete could be selected for the office of Treasurer of Athena, though he 
was not a pentakosiomedimnos (47.1). For the Solonian property classes as “a dead letter,” see Rhodes 
1981, 146, 551; Hansen 1991, 107. Marcellus 1994, 156, uses the Athenaion Politeia as evidence that 
thetes participated in the ephebeia. But in Demosthenes’ Against Neaera, delivered in 348, Theogenes was 
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Two additional arguments have been made for the inclusion of the thetes. First, 
the demos ensured that financial hardship would be no impediment for thetes because 
every ephebe received trophe during his two-year stint and was equipped with a state-
funded spear and shield ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.3-4).25 But the author says that the awarding 
of these arms occurred at the beginning of the ephebes’ second year of service (τὸν δ’ 
ὕστερον): they were of “valeur symbolique,” since the ephebes must have already 
possessed their own arms when they performed “tactical maneuvers (τὰ περὶ τὰς 
τάξεις)” before the demos ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.4).26 This argument is therefore not 
decisive for or against the participation of thetes. Second, Marcellus maintains that it “is 
unlikely that Lycurgus … or the demos would have spent such large amounts of public 
monies on a programme that excluded any group of citizens.”27 But this is unconvincing, 
because Xenophon says that the demos spent the same amount each year on the cavalry 
(Hipp. 1.19), even though only the wealthiest Athenians were eligible for cavalry 
service.28  
Scholars who hold that thetes served also cite Lycurgus’ Against Leocrates, which 
says “you have an oath, which all citizens swear, whenever you enroll upon the deme 
register and become ephebes” (76).29 Ruschenbush argues that πάντες is decisive, 
because it shows that all citizens served.30 Rhodes, however, considers the passage a 
“rhetorical exaggeration,”31 while Hansen maintains that a “literal interpretation [of 
                                                                                                                                            
appointed by lot to be Basileus even though he was poor (59.72). This implies that the law formally 
excluding thetes from holding office ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 26.2) had already become a legal fiction a generation 
before the ephebeia.  
25 Hansen 1986, 48-9; Faraguna 1992, 277; Burckhardt 1996, 35.  
26 Pélékidis 1962, 114-5; Garland 1975, 175-6.  
27 Marcellus 1994, 158. How much did the ephebeia cost the demos each year? Ferguson 1911, 10, 
estimates 40 talents, while Hansen 1991, 310, suggests 25 talents. With the exception of the first enrollment 
year (i.e. 334/3), the minimum cost would have been nearly 22 talents for 500 ephebes, consisting of 20 
talents spent on the trophe of 4 obols per diem for each ephebe in a non-intercalary year ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 
42.3) and 2 talents on a spear and shield at around 25 drachmas for each ephebe. For the cost of spear and 
shield, see van Wees 2004, 52, on IG XII 5647, lines 27-31.  
28 See Spence 1990, 180-230. 
29 ὑμῖν γὰρ ἔστιν ὅρκος, ὃν ὀμνύουσι πάντες οἱ πολῖται, ἐπειδὰν εἰς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον 
ἐγγραφῶσιν καὶ ἔφηβοι γένωνται. 
30 Ruschenbusch 1979, 174. See also Pélékidis 1962, 113; Faraguna 1992, 276. 
31 Rhodes 1980, 194.  
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πάντες] is unwarranted.”32 These scholars take ἔφηβοι to mean “the young men who 
undertake their ephebic service.” But ἔφηβοι, as we have seen, never had this meaning. 
Instead, Lycurgus’s mention of the lexiarchicon grammateion makes it clear that he is 
using ἔφηβοι in the technical sense of “those who have become citizens.”33 The orator, 
then, is simply asserting as a fact that every newly enrolled citizen (= ἔφηβος) swore the 
ephebic oath (ὅρκος) at the beginning of their military service and we should not infer 
from this statement whether every citizen did or did not serve.34 Consequently I suggest 
that this passage of Lycurgus is irrelevant to the question at hand.  
Since the literary evidence is inconclusive, let us now compare the number of 
ephebes estimated previously with the population of Athens in the Lycurgan period. 
Unfortunately there is no consensus concerning fourth-century Athenian demography, 
with some scholars arguing that the citizen body totaled c. 21,000, others c. 31,000.35 A 
recent discussion of the literary and epigraphic evidence suggests that the latter figure is 
more likely.36 If so, then what percentage of the citizen population consisted of eighteen 
year olds? Recent studies have estimated from a variety of demographic data that around 
3% of all male citizens of fourth-century Athens were eighteen years of age.37 If we 
                                                
32 Hansen 1988b, 191.  
33 See pp. 24-27.  
34 Similar sentiments are also expressed by Marcellus, 1994, 214. 
35 Diodorus Siculus (following Hieronymus of Cardia) says that 22,000 citizens were disenfranchised by 
Antipater’s imposition of a property qualification of 2,000 drachmas for citizenship in 322, leaving behind 
only 9,000 full citizens (18.18.4-5). Plutarch, however, says that 12,000 were disenfranchised (Phoc. 28.4). 
Scholars have tended to accept one of these sources and argue their position accordingly. A select 
bibliography of the debate: Gomme 1933; Pélékidis 1962; Reinmuth 1971; Ruschenbusch 1979; 1984; 
1988a; 1988b; Rhodes 1980a; Hansen 1985; 1988a; 1988b; 1989a; 1994b; Sekunda 1992; Marcellus 1994. 
36 See Hansen 1985 whose argument is based upon the following sources: Plut. Mor. 843D-E (confiscated 
estate of Diphilus distributed among the citizenry); Dem. 25.51 (20,000 Athenian citizens); Ctesicles 
FGrHistist 245, fr. 1 = Athen. 6.272C (census of Demetrius of Phalerum); D.S. 18.10.2 and 11.3 
(mobilization of the Athenian expeditionary force against Antipater in the Lamian War); D.S. 18.15.9 
(Athenian fleet of 170 ships). Hansen 1994 clarifies his arguments in response to Sekunda 1992, who 
favors 21,000 citizens. The former also argues that a citizen body of 21,000 is insufficient to ensure that 
there would be enough citizens to serve annually as bouletai. For a similar argument, see also Rhodes 
1980a.  
37 Hansen 1985, 12, estimates ephebes were 3.35% of all males over 18. He assumes that the demographic 
of the early Roman empire was similar to that of Greece and that statistical data from Europe c. 1500-1750 
should be used because it resembles Rome (10-11). Though he argues that European demographics from 
1750 onwards are not reliable indicators for classical Greece, many scholars have used them and have 
arrived at a similar ratio: e.g. Ruschenbusch 1979, 173 n. 3, gives 3%, which is accepted by Rhodes 1980a, 
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accept this admittedly speculative figure, it would mean that on average c. 900-950 
youths enrolled as citizens every year, of whom about half (450-500) served in the 
ephebeia in 334/3-333/2 and around two thirds (600-650) from 332/1 onwards. This 
suggests that the thetes must have also been included,38 since approximately one third of 
the citizenry was probably of hoplite status.39  
Scholarly opinion is also divided over whether every son of a cleruch also 
served.40 Cleruchic involvement is attested for Samos. Strabo says that the philosopher 
Epicurus son of Neocles served in the ephebeia at the same time as the comic poet 
Menander, probably in the enrollment year of 323/2 (14.1.18, 638C; Diog.Laert. 10.14).41 
The ephebic corpus provides the names of three more cleruchs: Δημήτριος Εὐκλέους 
Αἰξωνεύς (E2, line 29); Ἡδύλος Δρύωνος Ἁλαεύς (E2, line 58); Ταυρέας Αἰσίμου 
Σκαμβωνίδης (E20, Col. II, line 12).42 This implies that all Samian cleruchs performed 
military service. At any rate it is hard to understand why the Athenians would have 
neglected to conscript the thousands of citizens on Samos when they needed to deploy as 
many ephebes as possible to defend the chora of Attica against Boeotian raiders.43 
Though we have no evidence of ephebes from the other cleruchies – Lemnos, Imbros, 
                                                                                                                                            
191. Burckhardt 1996, 40-1, considers various possible ratios, from 2-4% but settles for 3%. Some scholars 
suppose a higher ratio. Pélékidis 1962, 288-9, relies upon population data from nineteenth- and twentieth-
century Italy and France for an estimate of 6.9%, while Jones 1957, 81-3, suggests 5% from Roman Africa 
and Carthage under the principate and early twentieth-century India (1901-10). 
38 Hansen 1985, 49.  
39 See the analyses of Hansen 1981, 19-24; 1988a, 23-5; Ober 1989a, 128-130. It should also be pointed out 
that if the population of Athens was c. 21,000 citizens and that 3% were ephebes (i.e. c. 630), citizen 
participation in the ephebeia must have included thetes. 
40 Hansen 1985, 50 (few served); Sekunda 1992, 316 (all served).   
41 For the date, see Marcellus 1996, 69-76. Epicuros cannot have been in the ephebeia after 322/1, because 
the cleruchs were expelled from Samos in that year (D.S. 18.18.9; Diog.Laert. 10.1). 
42 For the prosopography of Demetrios and Hdylos, see Clinton 1988, 24-6. Cargill 1983, 324-5, argues that 
Taureas, which is a Samian name, was an enfranchised Samian, but he should instead be regarded as a 
cleruch (Hansen 1985, 103, n. 170; Sekunda 1992, 315-6). [---]ὺς Καλλίου Εὐωνυμεύς appears on 
Reinmuth 1971 no. 16 = Hesp. 33 1964, 209, no. 54. Hansen 1985, 103, n. 170, suggests that he may be an 
ephebe from Samos. Given the strange layout of the inscription, it is highly likely that it is does not belong 
to the ephebic corpus (Lewis 1973, 254). 
43 At least three groups of cleruchs were sent to Samos (D.S. 18.18 in 366/5; Schol. to Aeschin. 1.53 in 
361/0; Philochorus FrGrHist 328 F 154 in 352/1), one of which was apparently 2,000 citizens strong 
(Strabo 14.1.18, 638C). The total size of the cleruchy probably numbered in the thousands, perhaps 
somewhere in the region of 6,000-12,000 (Shipley 1987, 14). Hansen 1985, 70-1, estimates that around 
5,000 citizens were sent out to Samos and the Thracian Chersonese.  
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and Skyros – I suggest that they were also obligated to serve, even if most cleruchs 
resided on these islands rather than in Athens.44 Beloch estimates that perhaps 150 
cleruchs annually passed through the ephebeia,45 but this cannot be confirmed or refuted. 
It is less clear whether Athenian citizens who also dwelt outside of Attica but 
were not cleruchs would or could have sent their sons to Athens for the ephebeia. These 
include the large number of Athenians who lived permanently elsewhere in Greece or 
overseas as metics (e.g. Lyc. 1.29; Dem. 29.3; Lys. 31.9) or served as mercenaries in the 
Persian army (e.g. Arr. Anab. 1.29.5; 3.6.2).46 Though many mercenaries would have left 
their wives and children behind in Athens, it is nevertheless highly likely that their 
families would have accompanied them while they served Darius.47 If so, I suggest that 
the sons of Athenian metics and mercenaries were not required to participate in the 
ephebeia because their fathers were probably exempt from military service.48 But this 
should not be taken to mean that all these youths did not serve, because we cannot 
dismiss the possibility that a few citizens, especially metics in Southern Greece, may 
have sent their sons back to Athens to register on the deme register and hence were called 
up for the ephebeia. 
Can we account for the hundreds of ephebes who did not serve by assuming that 
some could never have performed military service because they, like their older 
                                                
44 The nature of cleruchies is highly controversial. For some scholars, cleruchs were absentee landlords 
who lived in Attica (e.g. Brunt 1966, 81-4; Gauthier 1966, 65-6), while others argue that they resided on 
their plots (e.g. Gomme 1959, 64; Graham 1983, 167). The evidence of Thucydides concerning the   
cleruchs in Lesbos can be made to support both views: 3.50.2; 8.22-3, 100. See the recent discussion of 
Figueira 1991, 251-3, on these passages. Prosopographical research into an inscription (Samos Inv.No. J 
352) from the boule of Samos suggests another possibility, that some cleruchs regularly traveled between 
Athens and Samos, while the majority continued to live on the island (see Habicht 1995, 273-304). For a 
detailed discussion of cleruchies, see Figueira 1991; Cargill 1995.  
45 Beloch 1905, 354. 
46 For an overview of Athenians as metics and mercenaries, see Hansen 1982, 179-82. 
47 For mercenaries and their families, see Trundle 2004, 141-2, on Xen. Anab. 1.4.8; 3.1.3; Isoc. 4.168; 
Plut. Pel. 27. 
48 See Christ 2001, 405, n. 33, on [Arist]. Ath.Pol. 53.5; Dem. 14.16. Contra: Sekunda 1992, 348. Given the 
scarcity of information, we cannot tell, however, whether Xenophon, who was living at Corinth, was 




compatriots, suffered from significant physical impairments and acute illnesses?49 Based 
on comparative data from the conscription records of modern European states (8-15% 
unfit for 18-22 year olds), Hansen supposes that around 20% of all Athenian citizens 
aged 18-59 and “at least 10%” of ephebes were physically incapable of serving.50 Other 
estimates, varying from 8-20%, do not draw a distinction between ephebes and non-
ephebes.51 The reliability of these conjectures, however, cannot be determined given the 
absence of evidence. Even so, I suspect that a number of ephebes – how many is unclear 
– was granted an exemption from the ephebeia on account of physical disability:52 there 
was little point in conscripting lame or crippled citizens (or mentally incapacitated?) for 
the ephebeia if they were not mobile enough to patrol the mountainous border areas in 
their second year of service so as to hunt down marauding bands of plunderers ([Arist]. 
Ath.Pol. 42.3-4).53 
The evidence taken together suggests that there should have been no impediment 
for the demos to field a standing army consisting of perhaps three-quarters or more of all 
eighteen year-old citizens in a given enrollment year. The epigraphic evidence and the 
demographic data, however, suggest that not only did fewer citizens serve but also that 
citizen participation in the ephebeia seems to have increased significantly between 334/3 
                                                
49 Examples of physical ailments: Plut. Phoc. 10.2; Hdt. 7.229; Ar. Ran. 190-2. For physical incapacity as a 
bar to military service, see Baldwin 1967, 42-3; Christ 2001, 406-7. 
50 See Hansen 1985, 18-20 (citizens 20%); 49, 67 (Ephebes 10%+).  
51 Ruschenbusch 1988, 139 (10%); Sekunda 1992, 347-8 (less than 8%); Marcellus 1994, 218 (less than 
20%); Burckhardt 1996, 42 (10%). 
52 No source mentions when or where ephebes were granted exemptions from service. I suggest that all 
ephebes marched as a body to Piraeus after they had sworn the ephebic oath during their tour of the temples 
([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.3; Lyc. Leoc. 76). At this point the physically impaired ephebes approached the 
general of Piraeus (and later the generals of Munychia and Acte: E20), who had the authority to grant or 
deny exemptions (Lys. 9.4), and claimed an exemption from military service. The general may have also 
required the ephebe to swear before the boule that he was disabled (cf. cavalrymen before the boule: 
[Arist]. Ath.Pol. 49.4; see also Pélékidis 1962, 97). Successful ephebes were released from their obligation 
to serve. Afterwards they presumably attended to their own affairs over the next two years and could sit in 
the ecclesia until they registered on the pinax ecclesiastikos at the age of twenty (see p. 42 on [Dem]. 
44.35). As Hansen 1986, 21, and Robertson 2000, 163-4, point out, infirm ephebes could not be denied 
their citizenship rights on account of not doing ephebic service, because Lysias 24, On the Refusal of a 
Pension, shows that handicapped citizens unable to work (and hence exempted from service in the army) 
not only retained their political rights but also received welfare payments from the state (see also Aeschin. 
1.102-4). 
53 This perhaps implies that fitness standards were higher in the ephebeia than in the regular army, since 
Plutarch suggests that mobility-impaired citizens could fight effectively in hoplite battle (see Hanson 1989, 
95; Edwards 1996, 89-90, on Plut. Mor. 217C; 234E).  
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and 332/1. With the exception of Hansen and Burckhardt,54 scholars have not sought to 
explain this phenomenon.55 I argue in the next section that the rise in the number of 
citizens who served can be understood if we consider how those who chose not to 
participate may have viewed the ephebeia in its first years of existence.  
 
3.2: An Unwelcome Obligation? The Avoidance of Ephebic Service  
When the newly enrolled citizens took the ephebic oath in the archonship of 
Ctesicles (i.e. 334/3), they, like previous generations of Athenians, swore to defend the 
fatherland, its boundaries, temples, and crops, against all outside threats (Eur. Heracl. 
826-7).56 These ephebes, who comprised the first age-class or helikia of citizens liable for 
conscription ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 53.4, 7), were compelled under the force of law to perform 
military service.57 Failure to comply could result in a graphe astrateias for draft-dodging, 
a graphe lipotaxiou for desertion, or a graphe deilias for cowardice, of which the penalty 
was atimia or the loss of citizen rights.58 As Aeschines points out, the fear of such a 
punishment spurred citizens to fight for Athens (3.175-6; also see Lys. 14.15). In addition 
to this legal pressure, the use of αἰσχυνῶ τὰ ἱερὰ ὅπλα in lines 6-7 of the ephebic oath 
makes it clear that they were under a moral and religious obligation to fight. Ephebes 
would have regarded it as shameful to shirk from their duties and hence disgrace their 
heroic ancestors, whom the funeral orations (epitaphioi) praised for their zeal in serving 
                                                
54 Hansen 1988b, 189-93; Burckhardt 1996, 42-3. 
55 Scholars have generally followed the method of Reinmuth 1971, 105-8, that averages the ephebic rosters 
so as to estimate an annual figure for the Lycurgan period. The flaw in this line of reasoning is that it does 
not take into account the rise in the number of ephebes in the first three years of the ephebeia. This clearly 
distorts the epigraphic evidence, even if a scholar recognizes that the ephebes “seem to rise over the first 
several years” (Marcellus 1994, 21-2; cf. 214, 223).   
56 For the quotation and discussion of the ephebic oath, see pp. 31-4, 166-7. 
57 Hansen 1988a, 190, argues that the “increase of ephebes of Kekropis from 42 to over 52 to 65 is itself a 
strong indication that the ephebeia was not a compulsory “Wehrdienst”, but a public training which was 
felt to be a civic duty and caught on rapidly (his italics).” His interpretation, however, depends upon a 
highly speculative reading of Lycurgus’ Against Leocrates 76, which wrongly assumes that the ephebeia 
existed prior to Chaeronea. 
58 For the penalty of atimia: Aeschin. 3.175-6; Lys. 14.9; Dem. 24.103. Examples of these graphai: 
Aeschin. 1.29; And. 1.74; Dem. 15.32; 24.103-5; 39.17. Citizens in their capacity as prosecutors brought 
these graphai against accused individuals: the latter were tried before a court, presided over by the generals 
(Lys. 15.1-2) of the defendants’ fellow soldiers who had served with them on campaign (Lys. 14.5, 15, 17). 
For a collection and discussion of these military graphai, see Pritchett 1974, 233-4; Hansen 1976, 55-6, 62, 
66, 72, 91; Hamel 1998a, 63-4; Hamel 1998b, 361-405; Christ 2006, 59-62. 
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Athens in war and their willing self-sacrifice on behalf of freedom and the democracy:59 
no ephebe, given his highly developed sense of honor (e.g. Arist. Rhet. 2.12.5-6, 1389a9-
16; Xen. Mem. 6.4), would have desired to be mocked publicly as a coward, as 
Cleonymos was for throwing away his shield at some unknown battle, perhaps Delium in 
424.60 
But the ephebes of 334/3 differed from their predecessors in one crucial respect: 
they were the first enrollment class for the ephebeia. They were no longer required to 
guard the fortified points of Attica only when the homeland was threatened with invasion 
(e.g. Thuc. 2.13.6-7), but now had to undertake garrison duty for two whole years, the 
first spent in the Piraeus and the second on the Attic-Boeotian border ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 
42.3-5). For the first time, the youngest citizens were no longer free to do as they wished 
in peacetime, unlike previous generations (Thuc. 2.37.2; Isoc. 7.37; Plat. Leg. 624C-D), 
but were obliged to subordinate their own interests to that of the polis. While the previous 
section suggests that the majority of fit ephebes were ready and willing to do their stint of 
ephebic service, others would have had been less than enthusiastic for their new duties. 
Though we have no evidence for how ephebes viewed the ephebeia during the Lycurgan 
period, the notion that an unknown but significant number of ephebes would have been 
reluctant to serve and consequently would have sought to evade their civic obligations is 
nevertheless consistent with their older compatriots’ attitude towards conscription and 
military service in the Classical period.61  
As Aristotle astutely observes in the Nicomachean Ethics, “all men, or most men, 
wish what is noble (τὰ καλά) but choose what is profitable (τὰ ὠφέλιμα) (8.13.8, 
                                                
59 E.g. Thuc. 2.37.1; Lys. 2.18; Dem. 60.26, 28; Plato. Menex. 238C. For a detailed discussion of this genre, 
see Ziolkowski 1981; Loraux 1986.  
60 For Cleomynos, see Storey 1989, 247-61. His cowardice is the butt of jokes in Aristophanes’ plays, all 
composed after Delium: Nub. 353-4, 67-80; Vesp. 592-3, 822-3; Eq. 1369-72; Pax. 673-8, 1295-1304; 
Aves. 289-90, 1473-81; Plut. 1295-1304. 
61 Christ 2004, 33-57; 2006, 45-142, has gathered a considerable body of evidence from comedy and 
tragedy which shows that draft-evasion and desertion by citizens, despite the idealized rhetoric of the 
funeral orations, were issues of some concern to the demos throughout the Classical period, as we can see 
from the double title of Eupolis’ lost comedy Astrateutoi (The Draft-Dodgers) and Androgunoi (The 
Womanish Men) (see Storey 2003, 74-81, on frs. 31-41 Kock). 
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1162b34-6).”62 Given that perhaps half of the citizens registered in a given year would 
have come into their patrimony,63 I suggest that some were so concerned about their 
property interests that they were ready to avoid the responsibility of serving Athens.64 
Certainly the subsistence level state-funded trophe of four obols per diem ([Arist]. 
Ath.Pol. 42.3) would not have seemed fair compensation to those ephebes worried that 
their farms might suffer from a lengthy absence,65 or even to poor thetes who depended 
upon a living as hired laborers.66 Self-preservation may have motivated others, in that 
they desired to avoid dangerous situations such as Lamachus faced when he fought 
against Boeotian raiders (Ar. Arch. 1174-88). Two years of garrison duty in Attica would 
have also lacked the necessary inducements which had made overseas campaigns 
attractive to young citizen-conscripts, namely adventurism in foreign countries and the 
                                                
62 For self-interest as a reason for citizens to avoid military service, see Christ 2006, 50-1. 
63 Strauss 1993, 67-8, argues that “only about half of the males who reached the age of eighteen would have 
a living father. Hence about half of the population of Athenian young men took control of the patrimony at 
the age of eighteen.” Both Strauss and Golden 1990, 111-2, apply Saller’s 1987 computer model of life 
expectancy in Rome to Athens. They assume an average life expectancy of c. 25 years and median ages of 
25 and 15 years for the groom and bride respectively. For a discussion of ephebos and adulthood, see pp. 
24-7.  
64 In Plato’s Laws, the citizens’ obsessive pursuit of wealth and the need to take care of their own 
possessions are the greatest hindrance for waging war (831C-832A). 
65 While scholars have discussed how prolonged campaigning overseas could have damaged some 
Athenian citizens’ property interests (e.g. Cox 1998, 155-61), no one, to the best of my knowledge, has 
considered how an ephebe’s anxiety about his estate may have affected his attitude towards ephebic 
service. Such concerns perhaps included long running disputes with his neighbors over his farm’s 
boundaries, water disputes, trespassing, and injury to property, among other things (See Klingenburg 1976, 
21-62, on Plat. Leg. 842E-846D). He may have also feared that his absence would have encouraged thieves 
to ransack his estate or steal his crops, leaving him impoverished (cf. Ar. Arch. 230; Dem. 47.53-6; Men. 
Dysc. 109-21; Theophr. Char. 10.8). No source says who managed the ephebe’s estate in his absence, but it 
is likely that he entrusted one of his kinsmen to be the effective guardian of his property, such as his elder 
brother (e.g. Lys. 10.4-5) or his paternal uncle (e.g. Lys. 18.9). Even if the ephebe was lucky enough to 
avoid quarrelling with his siblings, unlike Chaerophon and his brother Chaerecrates (Xen. Mem. 2.3.1-10), 
or had no suspicion that his relations were embezzling whatever wealth he possessed, as Aphobus did to 
Demosthenes (Dem. 27), nevertheless he must have often been tempted to visit his farm to ensure that it 
was managed well, especially around harvest time (for farmers’ concerns during an agricultural year, see 
Hanson 1995, 152-64). 
66 Marcellus 1994, 157, argues: “one of the results of the ephebeia is that, like Lycurgus’ building 
programme, it would have produced a form of welfare (or workfare) for the city’s poor and young.” But the 
daily wage for laborers in the late fourth century seems to have ranged from one and a half to two and a 
half drachmas (Markle 1985, 293), considerably more than the four obols per day each ephebe received as 
their trophe, not misthos (Loomis 1998, 53-4). One suspects, then, that the poor would have regarded the 
ephebeia as less attractive financially than working in the numerous construction projects undertaken 
during the Lycurgan period.  
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prospect of booty (e.g. Thuc. 6.24.3; Eur. Supp. 232-7).67 Finally, others may have been 
reluctant to bear what they considered to be an unfair burden of protecting the 
fatherland.68  
 If so, the most effective way for an ephebe to avoid military service was to claim 
that he was physically incapable of undertaking his duties,69 namely by faking or 
exaggerating an injury or a long-term physical handicap, though perhaps not so blatantly 
as Aristogeiton did when he turned up at muster with both legs bandaged and leaning on 
a staff (Plut. Phoc. 10.2). In similar manner an ephebe could have also feigned a severe 
illness. That this strategy was not uncommon among the rest of the citizen-body is 
suggested by a fragment of Antiphon, which says that “illness is a holiday for cowards 
(87 B57 D-K: νόσος δειλοῖσιν ἑορτή).” Given that perhaps 15-20% of ephebes were 
physically unfit for service, as we have seen, a false claim concerning a physical 
disability would have sounded plausible when the ephebe presented himself before the 
general in the Piraeus. It is unlikely, however, that ephebes could have manipulated other 
exemptions, such as holding office or transferring from hoplite service to the cavalry, as 
older citizens sometimes did to avoid conscription.70 
Some could have also tried to dodge the ephebeia either (1) by failing to appear 
when the ephebes had mustered for their military service or (2) by deserting their tribal 
contingents at the first opportune moment afterwards. Though these draft-dodging 
ephebes had little chance of successfully evading their obligations without being 
                                                
67 See also van Wees 2004, 26-8. 
68 Lysias’ For the Soldier suggests that Athenian citizens resented being called up for overseas campaigns 
too frequently and were reluctant to serve again unless others did likewise (9.4, 15). In Aristophanes’ 
Peace, citizens show their annoyance at being called up yet again for military service while younger men 
stay at home (1180-1). In Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Nicomachides complains that Antisthenes was elected 
general despite the fact that the former has served on numerous campaigns and the latter has not even gone 
once (3.4.1). 
69 Christ 2004, 58; 2006, 54-5. 
70 For a full list of exemptions and some citizens’ abuse of them, see Christ 2006, 53-8. Burckhardt 1996, 
42, argues that ephebes had the choice to join the cavalry as an alternative to the ephebeia. But Bugh’s 
1988, 168-9, discussion of the cavalry corps after Chaeronea suggests that Athenian citizens were recruited 
as hippeis after they had left the ephebeia. Evidence for Bugh’s view perhaps comes from E2, an 
inscription of Cecropis, dated to 333/2. Νικίας Εὐκταίου from the deme Xypete (line 21) is later attested 
in a catalogue of hippeis c. 323/2 (IG II2 1955, line 5). These inscriptions imply that Nicias had served in 
the ephebeia from 334/3 to 333/2 and had at some later date joined the cavalry. We have no way of telling, 
however, whether Nicias was typical or not. 
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noticed,71 it should be pointed out that fear of detection did not prevent a substantial 
number of Athenian citizens from refusing to appear at muster for Myronides’ expedition 
against the Boeotians in 457 (D.S. 11.81.5) nor from deserting Phocion’s army while 
campaigning in Euboea in 350 (Plut. Phoc. 12.3). Furthermore, an ephebe could have 
also provided a plausible excuse for leaving the ephebeia: i.e. his absence was 
unavoidable because he was compelled to attend to his own affairs, such as prosecuting 
his guardians over his patrimony (Dem. 27.5; 30.15). Even if his excuse for absence was 
subsequently found to be false, he nevertheless had a good chance of escaping 
prosecution for his astrateia or lipotaxion because the sources suggest that politically 
prominent and/or wealthy individuals, not average citizens, were usually charged with 
these crimes by their personal enemies.72 Indeed, the systematic prosecution of ephebes, 
resulting in their disenfranchisement if successful, would not only not have been in the 
interest of the demos but also contrary to the leniency normally shown to errant citizens 
(Dem. 22.51; Plat. Leg. 955B-C).73  
How, then, did the demos, concerned about the lack of zeal some ephebes had for 
the ephebeia and hence the potentially ruinous consequences for the φυλακὴ τῆς 
χώρας, get them to serve? I suggest that before the next enrollment class of 333/2 the 
demos made it more difficult for ephebes to shirk their duty in an effort to increase citizen 
                                                
71 When the ephebes were mustered together for the first time, probably in the Agora (see p. 166, n. 86), the 
demos would have already complied a list of their names, set up on a bronze stele outside the Bouleterion 
([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 53.4), perhaps soon after the dokimasia of the boule (Pélékidis 1962, 99). The ephebes 
present at this muster, I suggest, would have been marked off this list, revealing the names of those who did 
not turn up (Poll. 8.115). Desertion without detection after the muster would have also been difficult, since 
the tribal sophronistes would have known each member of his contingent on account of his close 
relationship with the ephebes on a daily basis ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.3).  
72 E.g. Stephanos against Xenocleides in [Dem]. 59.27 and Demosthenes against Medias in Dem. 21.161-
66. On the view that such prosecutions were selective, see Christ 2006, 61, 119-21.  
73 See Hansen 1991, 310; Christ 2006, 118-9. Even if the ephebe had avoided prosecution for his draft-
dodging or desertion, he still had to contend with the negative consequences of his actions after he had left 
the ephebeia. Not only did the failure to serve mark out a man as disreputable in court, but a good record of 
military service was considered to be an important qualification for public office and political leadership 
(see Roisman 2005, 118, on [Lys]. 6.46; 16.17; 30.26), as we can see from Aeschines’ effort to defend 
himself against Demosthenes’ slander of his military record (Aeschin. 2.167-9; Dem. 19.112-3). If so, this 
consideration would have discouraged those who hoped for a public career from avoiding the ephebeia, 
namely those who had the necessary wealth and leisure to be politically active (Sinclair 1988, 191-6; Ober 
1989a, 116-8). If we consider that the leisure classes to a large extent monopolized the political leadership 
of Athens, one suspects that such concerns would have had little effect on the vast majority of thetes. 
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participation in the ephebeia. This may have included exerting considerable social 
pressure upon ephebes at deme level not to play the coward and to comply with 
conscription.74 Additionally, these demesmen (including the ephebes’ fathers and 
kinsmen), who had known the ephebes intimately from childhood, would have played an 
important role in preventing them from falsely passing themselves off as physically unfit: 
Lysias 24 implies that demesmen were aware of each others’ physical condition.75 
Furthermore, if citizens could indeed challenge an individual’s claim to an exemption, as 
Christ suggests,76 demesmen may have been encouraged to expose those ephebes 
blatantly abusing exemptions from the ephebeia. Lastly, the demos may have introduced 
new regulations in 334/3 which prohibited ephebes from going to law except in matters 
pertaining to estates, heiresses, and hereditary priesthoods so that they may have “no 
excuse for absence” from their military service ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.5).77  
The demos may have also sought to convince lukewarm ephebes not to put their 
private interests above their public obligations, just like their older compatriots (Isoc. 
18.60; Lys. 31.5-7). If so, they would have aimed to instill enthusiasm in the ephebes for 
their compulsory military service so that they would be ready and willing to make 
themselves useful to the polis (e.g. Dem. 19.281; Isoc. 4.27). The demos did this, I 
suggest, by harnessing the ephebes’ philotimia, which in Xenophon’s opinion separates 
ordinary people from brute beasts and real men from human beings (Hiero. 7.3-4). The 
concept of philotimia is reciprocal: the demos encouraged citizens to undertake activities 
                                                
74 The importance of being perceived as brave and manly is well illustrated in Theophrastus’ story of the 
coward calling upon his fellow demesmen and phyletai to see the casualty which he brought back with his 
own hands to camp (Char. 25.5-6).  
75 For the high degree of familiarity demesmen had for one another, see Whitehead 1986, 223-34.  
76 See Christ 2006, 54, n. 25, on Dem. 21.15. 
77 καὶ δίκην οὔτε διδόασιν οὔτε λαμβάνουσιν, ἵνα μὴ πρό[φ]ασις ᾖ τ[ο]ῦ ἀπιέναι, πλὴν περὶ 
κλήρου καὶ ἐπικλή[ρου], κἄν τ[ι]νι κατὰ τὸ γένος ἱερωσύνη γένηται. While scholars have assumed 
that the above restrictions dated to the time of the ephebeia’s creation/reform (e.g. Rhodes 1981, 509), it 
should be pointed out that the author of the Athenaion Politeia provides an outline of the institution as it 
appeared in c. 330 (p. 7, n. 10). This leaves open the possibility that the nomoi were introduced after 334/3 
but before 330/29. It is unclear, however, whether the regulation that all ephebes were exempt from 
liturgies (καὶ ἀτελεῖς εἰσι πάντων) was also enacted alongside the other legislation mentioned in [Arist]. 
Ath.Pol. 42.5. Given that citizens had previously been liable for liturgies once they had completed their 
dokimasia (e.g. the choregia in Lys.21.1 and the trierarchy in Dem. 21.154), this regulation may well have 
been an additional measure passed in 334/3 or later rather than in 335/4.  
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for their benefit on the understanding that the former would then award public honors 
(τιμαί) and gratitude (χάρις) to the latter in return for services rendered (e.g. Dem. 
18.257; 20.103).78 The ephebic corpus suggests that honoring corporations praised the 
ephebes for their philotimia in undertaking their guard duties that contributed to the 
security of Attica and in their scrupulous adherence to carrying out their orders.79 But if 
the demos expected the ephebes to exert themselves in these activities in order to gain 
honor (Xen. Hiero. 7.1; Mem. 3.3.13), what kind of honors could have served as an 
incentive for reluctant ephebes to participate in the ephebeia? 
Though the ephebeia apparently did not award prizes for valor (aristeia),80 an 
ephebe could still distinguish himself from the rest of his tribal contingent by being made 
a taxiarchos (regimental commander) or lochagos (company commander), officers that 
are first attested epigraphically in the enrollment class of 333/2.81 Their duties, however, 
are not stated in the sources. Were they the same as the taxiarchoi and lochagoi in the 
                                                
78 For philotimia in literature see Dover 1974, 229-34. Though the word originally had a pejorative 
connotation in the fifth and early fourth centuries (e.g. Thuc. 2.65.7; 3.82.8; 8.89.3), Whitehead 1983, 55-
74, has shown that it had become one of the cardinal civic virtues by the middle of the fourth century. 
Philotimia is first attested epigraphically in IG II2 223A, line 11, dated to 342, and is common in honorary 
inscriptions in the Lycugran period (e.g. Schwenk 1985, no. 28 = IG II2 338, line 13, dated to 333/2). For 
further discussions on philotimia in fourth-century Athens, see also Sinclair 1988, 188-90; Veligianni-Terzi 
1997, 283-4, 302-3. 
79 E2 [333/2]: ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἔφηβο[ι οἱ] τῆς Κεκροπίδος ταχθέντες Ἐλευσῖνι καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμω[ς 
ἐπ]ιμελοῦνται ὧν αὐτοῖς ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δῆμος προστάττει … (lines 36-8). ἐπειδὴ καλ[ῶς καὶ 
φι]λοτίμως ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς φυλακῆς Ἐλευσῖνος ο[ἱ] τῆ[ς Κεκροπίδ]ο[ς ἔφηβ]οι … (lines 45-7). 
ἐπειδὴ οἱ [ἔφηβοι] οἱ ἐπὶ Κτησικλέος ἄρχοντος ἐνγραφέντες … καὶ ὁ [σω]φρονιστὴς … ἀποφαίνει 
αὐτο[υς] πειθάρχοντας καὶ τἄλλα πάντα ποιοῦντας φιλοτίμως (lines 52-6). E3 (332/1): ἐψηφίσθαι 
τοῖς δ]ημόταις ἐπαινέσαι αὐτοὺς κα̣[ὶ στεφανῶσαι αὐτοὺς φιλοτιμίας ἕνεκα τῆς εἰς] τὸν δῆμον τὸν 
Ἐλευσινίων (lines 7-8). Kirchner’s restoration of φιλοτιμίας should be accepted, because the alternative – 
ἐπιμελείας – would make no sense given the use of ἐπεμελοῦντο for the ephebes in lines 5 and 6 of the 
inscription. E24 (c. 331/0-322/1): ἀρετῆς ἕν]εκα καὶ φιλ̣[οτιμίας … (lines 6-7).  
80 For the customary award of aristeia in Greek armies after battle, see Pritchett 1974, 276-90; Hamel 
1998a, 64-70. 
81 In the ephebic corpus the taxiarchoi and lochagoi are always honored separately as a group, either in the 
heading or on the sides of the stones. They are also listed under their deme captions alongside their fellow 
ephebes. Instances of ephebic taxiarchoi and lochagoi: E5 (332/1), lines 6-10; E7 (332/1), lines 14-8; E8 
(332/1), Col. I, lines 20-8, Col. II, lines 15-22; E15 (331/0 or 330/29), lines 2-7; E18 (329/8?), lines 70-9; 
E20 (331/0-325/4), lines 1-5, Left side, lines 11-13; E21 (331/0 or 324/3), lines 3-5, 9-11; E22 (332/1-
322/1), lines 3-15. It is likely, as Pélékidis 1962, 110, suggests, that the sophronistes selected these ephebic 
officers. Scholars claim that they were appointed at the beginning of the ephebes’ second year (e.g. 
Pélékidis 1962, 109; Sekunda 1992, 335), but this is contradicted by the appearance of lochagoi on E9, 
which dates to 333/2, the first year of the Leontid ephebes’ military service. 
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parent phyle ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 61.3)?82 Mitchel makes this assumption when he suggests 
that the taxiarchos and lochagoi were cadet officers intended for future employment in 
the army.83 Sekunda suggests that a lochagos commanded an ephebic lochos (company) 
with “the limited responsibility of ensuring that all recruits under his care turn up for 
training at the right place and time, and with the necessary equipment.”84 Finally, 
Pélékidis supposes that the lochagoi led both ephebic and mercenary peripoloi.85 It is 
hard to understand, however, why in this last case this duty should have been assigned to 
an ephebe rather than to a peripolarchos.86 Whatever duties the ephebic taxiarchos and 
lochagoi may have had – perhaps they did have command responsibilities – I suggest that 
the rationale behind the creation of these offices for the ephebic year of 333/2 was as 
much to spur the ephebes’ philotimia as for any military function.87 
The ephebeia also provided an opportunity for a phyle of ephebes to display its 
excellence in athletic competition by defeating rival tribal teams in the torch-race 
(lampadedromia) at various festivals and by setting up a dedication to commemorate its 
victory. Two such dedications have survived. (1) The sophronistes and the 
gymnasiarchoi of Erectheis erected E10 (333/2 or 332/1) at Rhamnous,88 probably after 
                                                
82 Mitchel 1961, 352, has shown that the ephebic phyle was regarded as an organization separate from the 
parent phyle. This is clear from E8, Col. I, lines 9-11, where the latter praises the former: δεδόχθαι τ[ῆι 
Λεω]ντίδι ἐπαινέσαι τὴν Λεωντίδα φυλὴν τῶν ἐφήβων τῶν ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους ἄρχοντος. 
83 Mitchel 1961, 356-7. His main evidence that ephebic taxiarchoi and lochagoi had this role is Aeschin. 
2.167 and Dem. 54.5. But, as we have seen in chapter one, the ephebeia did not exist before Chaeronea.  
84 Sekunda 1992, 329. While his claim concerning the lochagoi’s duties can neither be confirmed or denied, 
there is no positive evidence for his suggestion that an ephebic phyle could be subdivided into lochoi as the 
parent phyle could (Xen. Hell. 1.2.3). Indeed, as Reinmuth 1971, 23, observes, the number of lochagoi on 
the ephebic inscriptions appears to have little correspondence to the number of ephebes on the rosters: e.g. 
E5, 7 lochagoi and 52 ephebes; E8, 5 lochagoi and c. 44 ephebes; E18, 5 lochagoi and c. 52 ephebes; E20, 
12 lochagoi and 62 ephebes. Given this, it is unsurprising that Burckhardt 1996, 69-70, says that lochagoi 
led small troops of 5-10 ephebes, without further comment. 
85 Pélékidis 1962, 110.  
86 For a discussion of peripolarchoi, see pp. 42. 
87 Cf. Burckhardt 1996, 70: “Aspiration auf eine solche Stelle, die einen aus dem Rest der Kameraden 
heraushob, war natürlich ein zusätzlicher Ansporn für eine pünktliche Erfüllung des Dienstes.” 
88 Lines 1-4 of the heading: [ὁ σωφ]ρονιστὴς Περικ[— — — — — — — — —]άσιος [καὶ οἱ τῆς 
Ἐρε]χθεῖδος ἐφήβων γ[υμ]νασίαρχοι ἀνέθεσαν, [οἱ ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους ἄρχοντος λαμπάδι 
νικήσαντες [— —]ανδρος Τιμ[— — —] Εὐωνυμεύς, Χαρικλῆς Ἀλεξιμένου Περγασῆθεν. Palagia and 
Lewis 1989, 334-5, argue that [— —]ανδρος Τιμ[— — —] Εὐωνυμεύς and Χαρικλῆς Ἀλεξιμένου 
Περγασῆθεν are ephebes because the latter also appears in E11, line 9, another Erectheid inscription dated 
to the same year. This argument is not conclusive: (1) The Χαρικλῆς in E10 may not be the same 
individual as in E11 but a homonymous kinsman (Marcellus 1994, 16). (2) The first definite mention of 
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the ephebes of the phyle were victorious at the Nemesia.89 If we consider that later 
evidence explicitly says that the Greater Nemesia included athletic contests (SEG 41.75 
[c. 255], lines 8-9: τῶν μεγάλων Νεμεσίων τῶι γυμνικῶι ἀγῶνι), it is likely that the 
ephebes competed in the torch-race at the fourth-century festival as well.90 The discovery 
of herms suitable for ephebic dedications and reliefs depicting victorious lampadephoroi 
at Rhamnous suggests that other tribes made similar offerings during the Lycurgan 
period.91 (2) The ephebes and sophronistes of Aiantis dedicated E6 (333/2 or 332/1) to 
Munichus at an unidentified festival.92 Given the find spot (the Kerameikos) the torch-
race could have been held at the Panatheneia, the Hephaesteia, or the Prometheia, since 
Aristophanes says that all three torch races passed through there (Ran. 131). Late 
evidence also tentatively suggests that ephebes competed in each of these festivals, along 
with that of Pan.93 Evidence for the last festival may come from E25 (c. 334/3-322/1), a 
dedication erected by the lampadephoroi of an unknown tribe at Marathon, if it is 
ephebic.94  
While the torch-race certainly predated the Lycurgan period,95 citizen 
involvement in these events was limited to youths who had sufficient wealth and leisure 
                                                                                                                                            
ephebic gymnasiarchs does not occur until the Hellenistic Period (see Reinmuth 1971, 53, on IG II2 1039, 
lines 29-30, dated to 73/2). (3) The “ephebes” do not appear on the roster, though they could have been 
listed in the two erasures on the stone. (4) Ephebes were not allowed to undertake liturgies [Arist]. Ath.Pol. 
42.5. This restriction, however, may only apply to liturgies outside of the ephebeia. 
89 Pouilloux 1954, 111; Habicht 1961, 144, n. 3; Palagia and Lewis 1989, 344; Parker 1996, 254, n. 126.  
90 For the Nemesia at Rhamnous, see Stafford 2000, 94-6. Parker 1996, 246, suggests that the gymnikon 
agon may have even been an innovation of Lycurgan Athens.  
91 Palagia and Lewis 1989, 337-44, associate the base of E10 with one (NM 313) of the four hip-herms of a 
youthful male figure dressed in a short chiton and chlamys, which they identify as either Hermes, an 
Athenian ephebe, or Munichus, the eponymus hero of the helikia of 333/2. The three other hip-herms (NM 
314, 315, 316) and the two youthful heads thought to be from herms (NM 317, 318) probably also belonged 
to ephebic dedications which have not survived. Two fragmentary reliefs dated on stylistic grounds to the 
330’s have been found at Rhamnous (Rham. 531 [ex Athens NM 2332]; British Museum GR 1953.5.-30.1+ 
Rham. 530). These reliefs depict the procession of a team after a torch-race, perhaps at the Nemesia, and 
must have also been attached to victory stelai. For a discussion of these reliefs, see Palagia 2000, 403-8. 
92 Lines 1-6: [Αἰ]αντίδος ἔφηβ[οι οἱ] ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους ἄρχοντ[ος][κ]αὶ σωφρονιστὴ Ἐπιχάρης 
Ἐπιγένους Οἰναῖος λαμπάδι νικήσαντες ἥρωι Μουνίχωι ἀνέθεσαν. 
93 Two scholia on Dem. 57.43 (Lex.Patm. 142, 15-19; Lex.Seg. 228, 11-14) link ephebes to the torch-races 
at the festivals of Prometheus, Hephaestus, and Pan. Torch-races at these festivals and at the Panatheneia: 
Harpocration s.v. Λαμπάς; Suda s.v. Λαμπάδος; Schol. on Ar. Ran. 131, 1087; Hdt. 6.105. See Sekunda 
1990, 153-4; Humphreys 2004, 114-5.  
94 For a discussion of E25, see p. 224-5. 
95 See the evidence gathered in Kyle 1987, 190-3. 
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to compete as lampadephoroi.96 When the Athenians created the ephebeia, they 
incorporated the torch race into the institution not only because of its importance to the 
rituals of those festivals which the ephebes attended but also because the prospect of the 
honors gained from winning such races helped to motivate ephebes to do the duties 
required of them.97 Unlike earlier victory dedications, however, the entire ephebic phyle 
was honored for the victory – E10 has 47-48 ephebes under the heading 
ΛΑΜ[Π]ΑΔΗΦΟΡΟΙ – although only 10 ephebes would have actually competed in the 
race (cf. IG II2 1250, lines 13-22, dated to 350’s or 340’s). Since there is no evidence for 
specialized sports teams in the ephebeia until the second-century A.D.,98 Humphreys is 
right to suggest that all ephebes were listed because everyone trained for the torch-races 
and was available to compete on the team.99  
The effectiveness of the honors discussed above was probably limited in 
convincing unenthusiastic ephebes to serve, since not every ephebe could become a 
taxiarchos or lochagos and not every phyle could win the torch-race. What did make the 
ephebeia attractive to newly enrolled citizens, I suggest, is the extensive honors awarded 
by the demos and boule, the parent phylae, and individual demes, to those ephebes who 
had completed their military service. In E2 (= IG II2 1156), dated to 333/2, which is the 
most detailed and informative of the Lycurgan ephebic inscriptions,100 the ephebes of 
Cecropis were honored as follows (lines 26-62): 
 
[Tribe] Callicrates of Aixone proposed: Since the ephebes of Cecropis in 
the archonship of Ctesicles show discipline and do all things that the laws 
assign them and obey the sophronistes elected by the people, praise them 
and crown them with a gold crown worth 500 drachmas for their good 
                                                
96 See p. 21. 
97 For the ritual aspects of the torch-race, see Parke 1977, 45-6, 171-3; Simon 1983, 53-4, 63-4.  
98 Ephebic sports teams (sy(n)stremmata) first appear in 140 A.D. (IG II2 2047) and continue to 255 A.D. 
(IG II2 2245). For a discussion of sy(n)stremmata, see Oliver 1971, 66-74. 
99 Humphreys 2004, 115, n. 15. 
100 It should be pointed out that few inscriptions have decrees inscribed on them (E1, E3, E8, E14, E23), of 
which only E8 is relatively intact. The reason for this paucity was probably the expense of inscribing and 
erecting the stone, which was paid for by the phyle, as we can see from E8, an inscription of Leontis, dated 
to 332/1: [ἀναγράψαι δὲ] τόδε τὸ ψήφισμ̣[α τῆς φυλῆς τὸν γρ]αμματέα τῆς φ̣υ̣[λῆς καὶ στῆσαι ἐν] 
τῶι ἱερῶι, τὸ [δ’ ἀνάλωμα εἰς τὴν γρα]φὴν δοῦνα[ι τοὺς ἐπιμελητὰς τῆς φ]υλῆς, ἀ[ναγράψαι δὲ 
τὸ ψήφισμα εἰς τ]ὸ̣ [ἀν]άθ[ημα (Col. II, lines 3-8).  
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order and discipline; and also praise the sophronistes Adeistus son of 
Antimachus of Athmonon and crown him with a gold crown worth 500 
drachmas, because he took care of the ephebes of the tribe Cecropis with 
fine love of honor. And inscribe this decree on a stone stele and set it up in 
the sanctuary of Cecrops. 
[Council] Hegemachus son of Chaeremon of Perithoedae proposed: Since 
the ephebes of Cecropis stationed at Eleusis take care of the things which 
the council and the people assign them with fine love of honor and they 
show themselves disciplined, praise them for their good order and 
discipline and crown each of them with an olive crown; and also praise 
their sophronistes Adeistus son of Antimachus of the deme Athmonon and 
crown him with an olive crown whenever he may submit his accounts; and 
inscribe this decree additionally on the dedication which the ephebes of 
Cecropis dedicate.  
[Eleusis] Protias proposed: Decreed by the demesmen, since the ephebes 
of Cecropis and their sophronistes Adeistus son of Antimachus of 
Athmonon take care of the guarding of Eleusis with fine love of honor, 
praise them and crown each of them with an olive crown. And inscribe 
this decree on the dedication which the ephebes of Cecropis in the 
archonship of Ctesicles dedicate.  
[Athmonon] Euphronius proposed: Decreed by the demesmen, since the 
ephebes of Cecropis enrolled in the archonship of Ctesicles show 
discipline and do all things that the laws assign them, and the sophronistes 
elected by the people shows that they are obedient and do all other things 
with love of honor, praise them and crown them with a gold crown worth 
500 drachmas for their good order and discipline; and also praise their 
sophronistes Adeistus son of Antimachus of Athmonon, and crown him 
with a gold crown worth 500 drachmas, because he took care of both the 
demesmen and all the others of the tribe Cecropis with fine love of honor. 
And inscribe this decree additionally on the dedication which the ephebes 
of Cecropis and the sophronistes dedicate. 
 
The stone suggests that the ephebes of Cecropis, probably towards the end of their stint in 
the ephebeia, were honored and crowned in four separate ceremonies – by the tribe of 
Cecropis, the boule, the deme of Eleusis, and the deme of Athmonon.101 Other 
                                                
101 Marcellus 1994, 22, referring to E2 and to ephebic decrees generally, suggests that “these crowns were 
bestowed as part of a ceremony marking the completion of their service.” It is more likely, however, that 
the four decrees on E2 were inscribed in chronological order, as Pélékidis 1962, 120-2, has argued. If so, 
this would mean that Cecropis passed the decree and crowned the ephebes first, which was followed 
(soon?) afterwards by the boule and the two demes. In E3 (333/2), the Eleusinians, in addition to awarding 
crowns, also exceptionally honored the sophronistes and ephebes of Hippothontis with a grant of proedria 
at the rural Dionysia: Lines 10-12: στεφανωῖ ὁ δῆμος ….8… τραγωιδῶν τ]ῶν [Δ]ιονυσίων καὶ 
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inscriptions suggest that ephebes were routinely honored in similar manner (e.g. E5, E8, 
E14; E15; E23). It is unclear, however, whether the ceremony at the boule was in fact the 
Lycurgan version of the exititeria: i.e. a formal review for all the ephebic phylae of an 
enrollment class held before the boule to commemorate their departure from the 
ephebeia.102 The Athenaion Politeia does not mention any such ceremony, but says that 
“when two years have passed, they are now with the others ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.5).”103 
The epigraphic evidence is inconclusive. Though numerous inscriptions show that the 
demos and the boule crowned individual phylai throughout the Lycurgan period,104 this 
does not exclude (nor does it confirm) the possibility that all of the phylae were present at 
one ceremony and were also honored separately. 
Sometime after the ceremonies, probably in Boedromion,105 the ephebes erected 
E2, which originally rested on a base and was presumably accompanied by a sculpture of 
some kind, “in the sanctuary of Cecropis (Line 35: ἐν τῶι τοῦ Κέκροπος ἱερ[ῶι])” on 
the Acropolis.106 The function of E2, like other honorary decrees, was to be a monument 
of the timai awarded to the honorands for all time and a display of the ephebes’ 
                                                                                                                                            
καλείτω αὐ[τὸν ὁ δήμαρχος καθάπερ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἷς ὁ δῆμ]ος ἔδωκεν τὴν προεδρία̣[ν … . 
For the restoration, see Mitchel 1984, 118, on IG II2 1187 (319/8), lines 10-14, and IG II2 1193 (ca. 300), 
lines 13-17. 
102 For a discussion of the exititeria in the Hellenistic period, see Pélékidis 1962, 217-9. The term is 
unattested in the ephebic corpus until the third century, the earliest example being Hesperia 45 (1976), 297-
9 (I 7181), line 25, dated to 205/4. Pélékidis 1962, 114, suggests that the exititeria developed from the 
armed review the ephebes held at the theatre before the demos at the beginning of their second year of 
service ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.4). 
103 διε[ξ]ελθόντων δὲ τῶν δυεῖν ἐτῶν, ἤδη μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἰσίν. 
104 E.g. E8, lines 1-2: [τῶι ἥ]ρωι ὁ σ[ω]φρονιστ[ὴς τῆς Λεωντίδος ἐπὶ] Ν[ι]κ[οκράτους καὶ οἱ 
ἔφηβοι] σ[τεφανωθέντ]ε[ς vv] ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δ[ήμου καὶ τῆς φυλ]ῆς ἀρετῆς ἕνε[κα καὶ 
σωφρο]σύνης. E22, lines 1-2: [οἱ ἔφηβοι στεφ]ανωθέντες ὑπὸ [τῆς βουλῆς καὶ το]ῦ δήμου. 
105 Lycurgan inscriptions do not specify when the decrees were passed, but it was probably around mid to 
late Boedromion as in third-century ephebic decrees: e.g. IG II2 665 + I 3370 + I 6801 (266/5), Boed. 26; 
IG II2 700 + I 2054 (259/8?), Boed. 30; IG II2 787 (235/4), Boed. 18; IG II2 794 (216/5), Boed. 14; I 7484 
(214/3), Boed. 30. The Athenians preferred these dates because the next enrollment year of ephebes 
probably did not complete their tour of the temples until early Boedromion (see p. 164, n. 83).  
106 The majority of ephebic inscriptions are bases or fragments of bases which had a cavity cut into the top 
for a herm or tripod (E5, E8, E9, E13, E14, E15, E16, E19, E20, E21, E26, E27, E28). On E22, an 
inscription of Acamantis (332/1-322/1), a dowel secured the dedication. Ephebic inscriptions were usually 
set up in prominent public places, such as the entrance to the temenos of the Two Goddesses at Eleusis (see 
Clinton 1988, 22, on E5 [332/1]) or in the Agora (see Traill 1986, 6, on E14 [331/0?]). 
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philotimia towards the demos (cf. Dem. 20. 35-7, 64, 69).107 While the language and 
phraseology of E2 and other ephebic inscriptions are for the most part typical of fourth-
century Athenian decrees,108 it must nevertheless have been a highpoint in an otherwise 
quiet life for many undistinguished ephebes of Cecropis to be praised for their 
contribution to the security of Attica and commended for those “cardinal virtues” which 
the demos considered desirable for citizens to possess.109 Indeed, if we consider that the 
number of ephebes who served increased markedly from 450-500 in 333/2 to 600-650 in 
332/1, it is highly likely that the enrollment class of 332/1, impressed with the honors the 
ephebes of 334/3 had received and spurred on by their own desire for distinction (i.e. 
their philotimia), sought to do the tasks assigned to them in exemplary fashion so that 
they too would gain such honors.110 This eagerness to serve in turn ensured that there 
would be sufficient ephebes from 332/1 to defend Attica against Boeotian raids. 
 
3.3: Military Discipline in the Ephebeia: Εὐταξία  and Πειθαρχία  
 In the Memorabilia, Xenophon, contrasting the fleet and the army, observes that 
“it is amazing that … hoplites and cavalrymen, who seem to be the pick of the citizens 
for their noble character, are the most insubordinate (ἀπειθεστάτους) of them all.”111 
Later on in the same dialogue, he makes Socrates say “indeed in affairs of soldiers, where 
moral discipline (σωφροσύνη), good order (εὐταξία), and obedience (πειθαρχία) are 
                                                
107 Traill 1986, 3, restores lines 7-8 of E14 (331/0?) as follows: ἵνα ἅπαντες εἰδῶσιν] ὅ̣τι̣ [ἐ]πίσταται [ἡ 
φυλὴ χάριτας ἀποδιδόναι κατ’ ἀξίαν — — — — — — — —  τ]ῆς χώρας. Cf. IG II2 566 (fin. IV), 
lines 9-10; IG II2 794 (279/8), lines 30-1. Traill also suggests εἰς φυλακὴν τ]ῆς χώρας, among other 
possibilities, for line 8. These restorations are likely, because the ὅτι clause, uniquely for the Lycurgan 
corpus, is probably a “manifesto-clause,” as Whitehead 1983, 63, calls it, in which the phyle (1) is 
declaring its gratitude for the ephebes’ efforts in protecting the chora of Attica and (2) is stating its desire 
for similar benefits from would-be phyletai in the future.  
108 For an overview of these aspects of Athenian honorary decrees, see Henry 1983; Veligianni-Terzi 1997. 
109 For a detailed study of ten “cardinal democratic virtues” attested epigraphically in Athens, see 
Whitehead 1993, 37-75. Five of these appear on ephebic inscriptions: philotimia, eutaxia, arete, 
sophrosyne, and epimeleia.  
110 See Burckhardt 1996, 65-7, for similar sentiments concerning the ephebes’ desire for end of year 
honors. For the importance of honor in Athenian society, see Sinclair 1988, 176-9. 
111 Xen. Mem. 3.5.19: Τοῦτο γάρ τοι, ἔφη, καὶ θαυμαστόν ἐστι, τὸ τοὺς μὲν τοιούτους πειθαρχεῖν 
τοῖς ἐφεστῶσι, τοὺς δὲ ὁπλίτας καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας, οἳ δοκοῦσι καλοκαγαθίᾳ προκεκρίσθαι τῶν 
πολιτῶν, ἀπειθεστάτους εἶναι πάντων. See also [Xen].  Ath.Pol. 2.1. 
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most necessary, [the Athenians] pay no attention to these things.”112 Xenophon should 
not be taken to mean that the Athenians degenerated into an armed mob whenever they 
went on campaign. While insubordination in the ranks was hardly unique to Athens, his 
remarks imply that it was not an infrequent occurrence in the Classical period, at least 
compared to the Spartans.113 In the winter of 414/13, during the siege of Syracuse, Nicias 
is said to have written in a letter to the Athenians that “you [i.e. the demos] are by nature 
difficult to command (Thuc. 7.14.2: χαλεπαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑμέτεραι φύσεις ἄρξαι).” The 
distinguished general Phocion, for example, could not control the Athenian army before 
the battle of Tamynae in Euboea in 349/8: Plutarch informs us that some citizens deserted 
the camp and made their way back to Athens (Phoc. 12.3). 
 Why didn’t Phocion punish his soldiers for their insubordination? The Athenaion 
Politeia makes it clear that as strategos he did have the authority to enforce discipline by 
imprisoning, expelling, or fining disorderly citizens (61.2).114 Athenian generals, 
however, seem to have been reluctant to use these powers, if we can trust Lysias and 
Demosthenes. While the orators probably exaggerated the violent behavior of Simon and 
Conon’s sons respectively in order to arouse the juries’ anger against the defendants, it is 
likely that the generals’ reaction – to impose a light punishment for disobedience or to 
refrain from taking any disciplinary action – was not atypical in the circumstances.115 
                                                
112 Xen. Mem. 3.5.21: καὶ μὴν ἔν γε τοῖς στρατιωτικοῖς, ἔφη, ἔνθα μάλιστα δεῖ σωφρονεῖν τε καὶ 
εὐτακτεῖν καὶ πειθαρχεῖν, οὐδενὶ τούτων προσέχουσιν. 
113 On ataxia in Athens and generally in Greece, see Pritchett 1974, 232-45 (collected testimonia); Hamel 
1998a, 61; van Wees 2004, 108-113; Lendon 2005, 72-7. 
114 κύριοι δέ εἰσιν ὅταν ἡγῶνται καὶ δῆσαι τὸν ἀτακτοῦντα καὶ <ἐκ>κ[η]ρῦξαι καὶ ἐπιβολὴν 
ἐπιβάλλειν· οὐκ εἰώθασι δὲ ἐπιβάλλειν.  
115 According to Lysias (Against Simon 45), a certain Simon was not only absent when the Athenians had 
set off for Corinth in 394, but he also, having caught up with them, got involved in a scuffle with his 
commanding officer, the tribal taxiarchos, and gave him a beating. For this, “he alone of the Athenians was 
dismissed from the army by proclamation (μόνος Ἀθηναίων ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐξεκηρύχθη).” van 
Wees 2004, 109, remarks that this was a “mild penalty for such extreme insubordination” even though a 
dishonorable discharge would have publicly humiliated Simon. Carey 1989, 112; Todd 2007, 342, rightly 
suggest that Simon would have also been liable for a graphe astrateias, although Lysias does not say 
whether he was ever charged with the crime. In Demosthenes’ Against Conon 3-5, Ariston alleges that 
while he was undertaking garrison duty at Panactum, probably in 343 (see p. 54, n. 212), Conon’s sons 
spent their time getting drunk and abusing others in the encampment. When Ariston and other citizens in 
the neighboring tent complained to the strategos, the officer rebuked the young men verbally for their 
violent behavior. This had little effect, however, because Conon’s sons on the same night stormed into the 
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This attitude can be explained if we consider that they were officials annually elected by 
the very same citizens they were obliged to command ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 61.1).116 
Consequently a general would hesitate to inflict corporal punishment upon his fellow 
citizens lest his strict discipline make him unpopular and prevent his reelection when he 
returned to Athens.117 Unable to coerce citizens,118 he instead sought to convince them 
that good discipline was in their best interests, or to procure their willing obedience by 
impressing them with his superior excellence in war or by cultivating their goodwill with 
benefactions.119 Despite this, the Athenians at times still refused to be swayed by his 
authority, knowing that the latter would turn a blind eye to their insubordination.120 
But if military discipline in the modern sense did not exist in Classical Athens, 
how, then, are we to interpret the appearance of εὐταξία on two Lycurgan ephebic 
inscriptions?121 The term originally had the meaning of “maintaining a good formation or 
battle-order” – for hoplites, εὐταξία denotes a well-ordered phalanx – but is often best 
                                                                                                                                            
tent and assaulted Ariston and his mess-mates. The strategos and the taxiarchoi then responded by 
breaking up the fight but took no further action. For these events, see Carey and Reid 1985, 78-80. 
116 χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἀρχὰς ἁπάσας, στρατηγοὺς δέκα, πρότερον μὲν 
ἀφ’ <ἑκάστης> φυλῆς ἕνα, νῦν δ’ ἐξ ἁπάντων. Xenophon recognized that generals (and presumably 
their subordinate officers) did not constitute a distinct officer class, as in modern armies, but rather were 
citizens invested with temporary authority (Mem. 3.5.21: τῶν δὲ στρατηγῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι 
αὐτοσχεδιάζουσιν). 
117 Parke 1933, 78; Pritchett 1974, 243; Hamel 1998a, 62-3, 119-120. Xenophon’s Anabasis provides the 
best evidence that corporal punishment was capable of arousing considerable anger in a general’s 
command. When the mercenaries of the Τen Τhousand had resolved to scrutinize the generals’ past 
conduct, Xenophon had to defend himself in a trial against several soldiers’ accusations that he had 
arrogantly beat them (5.8.1-25).  
118 Lendon 2005, 76: “To Greeks other than Spartans … exact obedience seemed like the behavior of 
slaves, and beating treatment appropriate to slaves: the free citizen’s sense of aggressive individual 
autonomy constituted an obstacle to a strong ethical claim that leaders should be obeyed and that they had 
the right to enforce obedience with force.” 
119 Xen. Anab. 3.3.10; Hipp. 1.24; 6.1-6; Cyr. 1.6.21-5.  
120 Xen. Mem. 3.5.16: πότε δὲ οὕτω πείσονται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, οἲ καὶ ἀγάλλονται ἐπὶ τῷ 
καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων; Xen. Oec. 21.4: καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν ταύτῃ διαφέρουσιν, ἔφη, οἱ 
ἕτεροι τῶν ἑτέρων· οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὔτε πονεῖν ἐθέλοντας οὔτε κινδυνεύειν παρέχονται, πείθεσθαί τε 
οὐκ ἀξιοῦντας οὐδ’ ἐθέλοντας ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἀνάγκη ᾖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγαλυνομένους ἐπὶ τῷ 
ἐναντιοῦσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι· οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι οὐδ’ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπισταμένους παρέχουσιν, ἄν τι 
τῶν αἰσχρῶν συμβαίνῃ. 
121 Εὐταξία and its cognates in the Lycurgan corpus: E2 (333/2), lines 27, 31, 38-40, 53, 58; E8 (332/1), 
Col. I, lines 7-8. For εὐταξία in the ephebeia, see Pélékidis 1962, 38, 181; Marcellus 1994, 149-54; 
Burckhardt 1996, 65; Veligianni-Terzi 1997, 112, 124-5, 132. 
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rendered in English as “discipline.”122 In E8, a dedication of Leontis (332/1), εὐταξία 
occurs alongside πειθαρχία: ἐπειδὴ Φιλόθεος ὁ σωφ[ρον]ιστὴς τῆς Λεωντίδος 
φυλῆς τ[ῶν ἐ]φήβων ἀπαγγέλλει περὶ τῶν ν[εαν]ίσκων καί φησιν εἶναι 
εὐτα[κτο̑ν]τας καὶ πειθομένος τοῖς τ[ε νόμο]ις καὶ ἑαυτῶι (Col. I, lines: 4-9). E8 can 
be compared to a passage from the Cyropaedeia, where Xenophon calls the same group 
of soldiers οἱ εὔτακτοι or “the disciplined ones” in one sentence and οἱ πειθόμενοι or 
“the obedient ones” in the next (7.2.7-8). This suggests that the demos, like the cavalry 
commander in Xenophon’s Hipparchus (1.24),123 sought to instill both discipline and 
obedience in the ephebes, so that it would increase the effectiveness of the corps in the 
field.124 
I suggest that the demos had particular reason to be concerned about order in the 
ephebeia in the belief that young men, as characterized in Athenian literature throughout 
the Classical period, had a pronounced disposition towards physical violence, disorderly 
conduct, drunkenness, gambling, sexual excess, and thoughtlessness.125 Though older 
Athenians were often prepared to overlook this socially disruptive behavior (Lys. 24.17; 
Dem. 25.88; 54.21),126 despite their disapproval of such insolent and violent activity 
(Plat. Leg. 884), they could not afford to let “boys be boys” in the ephebeia. If we accept 
that discipline was less than ideal among older citizens, the demos may have little 
confidence that the strategoi of the Piraeus and the chora could have convinced the 
hundreds of armed ephebes under their command that all must play their part in enforcing 
εὐταξία and πειθαρχία in their phyle (cf. Xenophon’s exhortation to the Τen Τhousand: 
Anab. 3.2.30-1). Moreover, the citizen body may have feared that if severe ill-discipline 
were to occur in the garrison forts, as we have seen with Conon’s sons at Panactum, the 
                                                
122 E.g: Xen. Anab. 5.8.13; Cyr. 8.5.14; Thuc. 6.72.4; 7.77.5. See Robert and Robert 1970, 453; Pritchett 
1974, 236-8. It should be stressed that here I am only concerned with εὐταξία in a military context, not 
with “the broader societal connotations of the virtue, manifest as they are in diverse literary sources 
(Whithead 1993, 70).” 
123 εἴς γε μὴν τὸ εὐπειθεῖς εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους μέγα μὲν τὸ [καὶ] λόγῳ διδάσκειν ὅσα ἀγαθὰ ἔνι 
ἐν τῷ πειθαρχεῖν, μέγα δὲ καὶ τὸ ἔργῳ [κατὰ τὸν νόμον] πλεονεκτεῖν μὲν ποιεῖν τοὺς εὐτάκτους, 
μειονεκτεῖν δὲ ἐν πᾶσιτοὺς ἀτακτοῦντας. 
124 Cf. Xen. Anab. 3.1.38: ἡ μὲν γὰρ εὐταξία σῲζειν δοκεῖ, ἡ δὲ ἀταξία πολλοὺς ἤδη ἀπολώλεκεν. 
125 For these characteristics, see Dover 1974, 102-5; MacDowell 1990, 18-23; Fisher 1992, 97-99; Roisman 
2005, 14-5, 171-2. E.g.: Dem. 19.194, 229; 21.18; 54.14; Is. 3.16-17; Isoc. 7.43, 47-9; 15.286-7; Lys. 20.3. 
126 For the tolerance of limited violence between youths in Athenian society, see Fisher 1998b, 75-7. 
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ephebes could degenerate into lawless bands which could plunder farms for their own 
gain (Xen. Mem. 3.6.11; Plat. Leg. 762A) and hence could pose as much of a threat to the 
Athenian countryside as the marauding bands of raiders the ephebes were supposed to 
intercept. 
To ensure that ephebes would be tightly controlled during their military service, 
the Athenians created specialized officers – one kosmetes and ten sophronistai (one for 
each tribe) – who served for two years and supervised one enrollment class of ephebes.127 
The Athenaion Politeia says that the kosmetes, who is honored on several ephebic 
inscriptions,128 was elected from the entire citizen body and makes it clear that he was the 
head official of the ephebeia.129 The name of his office – “the orderer” – suggests that he 
was responsible in some way for maintaining kosmos or order in the institution.130 
Unfortunately, we know nothing about his duties in the Lycurgan period. Perhaps, I 
suggest, they included the disbursement of funds to the sophronistai and oversight over 
                                                
127 Controversy exists over the length of service for the kosmetes and sophronistes. They either served for 
two years and supervised one year class (Burckhardt 1996, 68-9), or were annual magistrates with 
supervision over two year classes (i.e. all ephebes in their first and second years: see Reinmuth 1971, 81), 
or oversaw the ephebes only in their first year, while the strategoi led them in the second (Pélékidis 1962, 
104, 108). Of these suggestions, the first is the most likely, because the Athenaion Politeia mentions these 
officers in connection with one group of ephebes for the duration of their ephebic service (Clinton 1988, 
28-9). The epigraphic evidence is consistent with this interpretation, since, as Rhodes 1981, 504, points out, 
the inscriptions erected at the end of the ephebes’ service honor only one kosmetes and sophronistes, not 
two. The recent discovery of E9, a dedication of Leontis (333/2), does not contradict Rhodes’s argument. 
While E9 does mention a different kosmetes, Θουγείτων Ἀριστοκράτου Ἀρχαρνεύς, instead of ….8…. 
Αἰνησιστράτου Ἀχαρνέυς in E8 (332/1), the other Leontid inscription of the same enrollment class, the 
same sophronistes – Φιλόθεος Φιλοκλέου Σουνιεύς – is attested on both inscriptions. Petrakos 2004, 174-
5, plausibly argues that Θουγείτων died in the first year of the ephebes’ service and was then replaced by 
the son of Αἰνησιστράτος in the second. 
128 E1 (333/2), a dedication of Acamantis, is unique in that it honors the kosmetes alone. Other attestations 
of the office: E4 (333/2), line 8; E7 (332/1), line 11; E8 (332/1), Col. II, lines 12-3; E17 (330/29 or later), 
line 2; E20 (331/0-325/4), Right Side, lines 7-10; E21 (331/0 or 324/3), lines 4-6; E18 (329/8?), Right 
Side, line 3(?).  
129 [Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.2: [ὁ δῆμος χειροτονεῖ] κοσμητὴν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ πάντας 
[φυλάς]. A minimum age for the kosmetes is not specified, but it was probably also forty years of age, just 
like the sophronistes (Rhodes 1981, 505). For the kosmetes, see Forbes 1929, 131-5; Pélékidis 1962, 104-6. 
130 Herodian defines the kosmetes in terms of eutaxia (s.v. κοσμηταί): οἱ τῶν ἐφήβων εὐταξίας 
προνοοῦντες. For the importance of order in Athenian society, see Roisman 2005, 192-9.  He comments 
(192-3): “On the state and communal level, order–or even better, good order (eukosmia)–meant good laws, 
dutiful citizenship, and disciplined, decent personal behavior. Order protected society from descending into 
anarchy and uncivilized forms of existence. The quest for order, then, was an attempt to decrease the 
danger of threatening or unpredictable elements in the human environment.” For kosmios, or “orderly,” 
used with these meanings in oratory: e.g. Isoc. 3.38; Lys. 12.20; 19.16; 21.19.  
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their disciplinary activities, acting as a liaison officer between the ephebeia and the 
various magistrates, ensuring that the training was carried out correctly, planning and 
coordinating the tribal contingents in the various festivals in which the ephebes 
participated, and carrying out the orders of the strategoi with regard to the deployment of 
the ephebes in the Piraeus and the garrison fortresses.131 The ephebes of Cecropis who 
had conducted themselves in an orderly fashion during their stint of military service were 
praised in E2 (333/2) κοσμιότητος ἕνεκα καὶ εὐταξίας (lines 30-1, 39-40, 58; cf. 
ἐκόσ[μο]υν in E3, line 5, dated to the same year) – for their civic orderliness as well as 
for displaying good discipline in their ranks. 
The sophronistes, like the kosmetes, was a publicly elected official.132 The 
Athenaion Politeia describes how the former was chosen:  
 
And when the ephebes have been examined, their fathers, gathered 
together tribe by tribe, choose under oath three of their tribesmen who are 
more than forty years old, whom they consider to be the best and the most 
suitable to take care of the ephebes, and from them the people elects one 
of each tribe as sophronistes (42.2).133 
 
The author makes it clear that the ephebes’ fathers (and presumably the ephebes’ 
guardians should they not have a father) determined the three candidates for the ten tribal 
                                                
131 Pélékidis 1962, 106-7; Marcellus 1994, 12; Burckhardt 1996, 69; Humphreys 2004, 92. That the 
kosmetes disbursed funds is suggested by Mitsos’ likely restoration (on the basis of E2, lines 42-3) of E1 
(333/2), lines 20-1: ἐπε[ιδὰν τὰς εὐθύνας δῶι]. Forbes 1929, 131-5, assumes that the kosmetes had 
similar powers in the fourth century as he had in the later Hellenistic period, but this cannot be proven 
given the lack of evidence. 
132 For an overview of the sophronistes, see Forbes 1929, 128-131; Pélékidis 1962, 106-8. The office is 
mentioned in the following inscriptions: E2 (333/2), lines 28-9, 31-2, 41-2, 47-8, 54-5, 58-9; E3 (333/2), 
lines 1-2, 8-9; E4 (333/2), line 3; E9 (333/2?), lines unknown; E6 (333/2 or 332/1), lines 3-4; E5 (332/1), 
lines 1-2, 5-6; E7 (332/1), lines 6-7; E8 (332/1), line 1, Col. I, lines 4-5, 14-6, Col. II, lines 13-5, Col. III, 
lines 14-5; E10 (333/2 or 332/1), line 1; E16 (330/29), lines 2-3; E6 (330/29 or later), line 2; E18 (329/8?), 
Right Side, lines 1-2; E20 (331/0-325/4), Left Side, lines 10-13; E21 (331/0 or 324/3), lines 4-6. 
133 ἐπὰν δὲ δοκιμασθῶσιν οἱ ἔφηβοι, συλλεγέντες οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν [κ]ατὰ φυλάς, ὀμόσαντες 
αἱροῦνται τρεῖς ἐκ τῶν φυλετῶν τῶν ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἔτη γεγονότων, οὓς ἂν ἡγῶνται 
βελτίστους εἶναι καὶ ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν ἐφήβων, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ὁ δῆμος ἕνα τῆς 
φυλῆς ἑκάστης χειροτονεῖ σωφρονιστήν. On E2 (333/2), the election of the sophronistes is mentioned 
twice: τ[ῶι σωφρ]ονι[στ]εῖ … τῶι χειροτονηθέντι ὑπὸ τοῦ δ[ήμου (lines 28-9) and ὁ 
[σω]φρονιστὴς ὁ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου χειροτονηθεὶς (lines 54-5). 
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sophronistai,134 but does not elaborate on what is meant by βελτίστους εἶναι καὶ 
ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν ἐφήβων. A clue is the age requirement of the 
sophronistes, namely at least forty years old (ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἔτη γεγονότων) – 
the same as choregoi ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 56.3). This suggests that the fathers’ perception of 
the candidates’ moral character was an important factor in their selection, perhaps 
because the young were considered impressionable and hence easily corruptible 
(Aeschin. 3.245-6). This age-restriction is understandable if we consider the demos’ 
assumptions, stated above, concerning the unruliness of youth, and the sophronistes’ 
daily duties:  
 
And it [i.e. the demos] also grants to the sophronistai a drachma per head 
for sustenance, and four obols per head to the ephebes: and each 
sophronistes, taking the pay for his own tribesmen, purchases the 
provisions for all in common (for they mess together by tribes), and takes 
care of all other things ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.3).135 
 
This intimate contact with the ephebes explains why he was almost always singled out for 
lavish praise and honors on ephebic inscriptions (with stress often placed on his 
ἐπιμελεία for the ephebes and towards the honoring corporation). Additionally, he 
usually had the honor of erecting the ephebic dedication alongside his former charges, 
and played a prominent role in the crowning ceremony at the end of the ephebes’ and his 
term of service.136 But what did τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖται πάντων entail? Scholars 
                                                
134 Sekunda 1992, 337, wrongly supposes that only the fathers could be candidates.  
135 δίδωσι δὲ καὶ εἰς τροφ[ὴν] τοῖς μὲν σωφρονισταῖς δραχμὴν αʹ ἑκάστῳ, τοῖς δ’ ἐφήβοις 
τέτταρας ὀβολοὺς ἑκάστῳ· τὰ δὲ τῶν φυλετῶν τῶν αὑτοῦ λαμβάνων ὁ σωφρονιστὴς ἕκαστος 
ἀγοράζει τὰ ἐπιτήδεια πᾶσιν εἰς τὸ κοινόν (συσσιτοῦσι γὰρ κατὰ φυλάς), καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
ἐπιμελεῖται πάντων. 
136 E.g. the heading of E5 (332/1), lines 1-4: [ο]ἱ̣ ἔφ̣[ηβ]ο̣ι ο̣[ἱ τῆς Κεκ]ρ[ο]π̣[ίδος οἱ ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους 
ἄρ]χο̣ν̣[τος καὶ ὁ σ]ωφ̣ρ̣ο̣νιστὴς̣̣ α̣ὐ̣τ̣ῶ̣ν Περικ[λῆς] Περ̣ικλε̣ί̣[δου] Π̣ιθ̣ε̣ὺ̣ς ἀ̣ν̣έ̣θ̣ε̣σα̣[ν 
στεφ]ανώσαντες χρυσῶι στεφάνωι ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἐπιμε̣λ̣είας τῆς εἰς ἑαυτοὺς. In E2 (333/2), 
Cecropis honors the sophronistes in the following manner (lines 31-4): ἐπαινέσαι δὲ καὶ τὸν 
σω[φρο]νιστὴν, Ἄδειστον Ἀντιμάχου Ἀθμονέα καὶ στεφανῶσαι χρυ[σῶι] στεφάνωι ἀπὸ ¯  
δραχμῶν, ὅτι καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως ἐπεμελή[θη] τῶν ἐφήβων τῆς Κεκροπίδος φυλῆς. In E3 
(333/20, the Eleusinoi praise him in a similar manner (lines 8-9): ἐπ[αινέσαι δὲ καὶ τὸν σωφρονιστὴν 
αὐτῶν ….8.…] ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας [τῆς εἰς τὸν δῆμον]. Before he could receive such honors, 
however, the sophronistes, like other officials handling state funds, was required to submit his accounts for 
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have rightly inferred from his title of sophronistes, which means “discipline master,”137 
that he had the duty of instilling and maintaining σωφροσύνη or “moral discipline” in 
the ephebic phyle he supervised.138 Apart from this the epigraphic evidence shows that 
ephebes were expected to be obedient to the sophronistes: e.g. E2 (333/2), lines 28-9: 
τ[ῶι σωφρ]ονι[στ]εῖ πειθ[αρχο]ῦσιν.139 Since εὐταξία is said to be the result of 
πειθαρχία,140 the sophronistes must have also been entrusted with the task of making the 
ephebes εὔτακτοι or disciplined in the military sense as well as σώφρονες in a civic and 
moral sense. 
Scholars have supposed that the sophronistes in the Lycurgan period had the right 
to inflict corporal punishment because a second-century A.D. relief depicts sophronistai 
wielding birches (IG II2 2122).141 The office of sophronistes, however, was abolished at 
the end of the fourth century and was reintroduced in the reign of the Emperor 
Hadrian.142 Support for this view comes from the pseudo-Platonic Axiochus, which 
probably dates to the late Hellenistic period although the author appears to have drawn 
from a late fourth-century source.143 In the dialogue, Socrates describes an unfortunate 
youth’s experience in the ephebeia: 
 
And whenever he enrolls among the ephebes, there are the kosmetes and 
worse fear, then there are the Lyceum and the Academy and the 
gymnasiarchy and the rods (ῥάβδοι) and miseries without measure 
(κακῶν ἀμετρίαι): and all the toil of the lad is subject to the 
                                                                                                                                            
audit: ἐπειδὰν τὰς εὐθύνας δῶι in E2 (333/2), lines 42-3 (Boule awarding laurel crown); E8 (332/1), Col. 
I, line 18 (Leontis awarding golden crown worth 1000 drachmas).  
137 Burckhardt 1996, 69, calls him a “Feldwebel” or “sergeant-major.”  
138 I defer a discussion of sophrosyne, a term associated with decent behavior and good citizenship, to pp. 
160-4. 
139 Cf. the decree of Athmonon in lines 54-6: καὶ ὁ [σω]φρονιστὴς ὁ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου χειροτονηθεὶς 
ἀποφαίνει αὐτο[υς] πειθάρχοντας καὶ τἄλλα πάντα ποιοῦντας φιλοτίμως.  
140 Cf. Xenophon’s formulation in Agesilaus (6.4): καίτοι πῶς ἂν ἰσχυροτέρα γένοιτο φάλαγξ ἢ διὰ 
τὸ μὲν πείθεσθαι εὔτακτος οὖσα, διὰ δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸν ἄρχοντα πιστῶς παροῦσα; 
141 Pélékidis 1962, 108; Rhodes 1981, 504. For a photo of the relief, see Graindor 1922, pl. lxiii. 79.  
142 Sophronistai are attested epigraphically from 334/3 (E1-E4) until Reinmuth 1971 no. 19 = IG II2 1159, 
line 5, dated to 303/2. The office then reappears in IG II2 2044, lines 2-9, dated to 139/40 A.D. On these 
inscriptions, see Reinmuth 1971, 120. 
143 The Axiochus has been recognized as spurious since Diogenes Laertius (3.62). For a commentary on the 
dialogue, see Hershbell 1981. He dates it to the second or first century based on linguistic, historical, and 
philosophical evidence (12-21). 
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sophronistai, and to the selection of the Areopagus of those empowered 
over the young (366D-367A).144  
 
The mention of sophronistai suggests the fourth-century institution.145 It is unclear, 
however, whether this garbled passage belongs to the Lycurgan period or after the re-
establishment of the democray in 307/6.146 Whatever the date, the role of the sophronistes 
in the Axiochus – πᾶς ὁ τοῦ μειρακίσκου πόνος ἐστὶν ὑπὸ σωφρονιστὰς – is 
consistent with his daily oversight of the ephebes’ activities as we have seen in the 
Athenaion Politeia and the Lycurgan ephebic corpus. As the tribal “discipline master,” 
the sophronistes, not the kosmetes, would have used the ῥάβδος to punish the youth for 
misbehavior during his military service.147 If so, these beatings may have been 
responsible for the youth’s κακῶν ἀμετρίαι. After all, if the sophronistes’ virtuous 
behavior could not persuade errant ephebes, there was always fear of punishment. As 
Xenophon acutely observed, “fear makes men more attentive (προσεκτικωτέρους), 
more obedient (εὐπειθεστέρους), and more disciplined (εὐτακτοτέρους) (Mem. 
3.5.5).” 
 If we accept this, why, then, did the demos allow the sophronistes to beat ephebes 
in order to enforce discipline when their older compatriots would have not tolerated such 
treatment should it have been meted out to them? The crucial factor is that the 
                                                
144 ἐπειδὰν δὲ εἰς τοὺς ἐφήβους ἐγγραφῇ, κοσμητὴς καὶ φόβος χειρῶν, ἔπειτα Λύκειον καὶ 
Ἀκαδήμεια καὶ γυμνασιαρχία καὶ ῥάβδοι καὶ κακῶν ἀμετρίαι· καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοῦ μειρακίσκου πόνος 
ἐστὶν ὑπὸ σωφρονιστὰς καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς νέους αἵρεσιν τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς. 
145 The author also included details belonging to the ephebeia of the late Hellenistic period, since 
attendance at the Academy is unattested in the ephebic corpus until the end of the second-century (see 
Hesp. 30 [1961], 15-7, line 4, dated to c. 100) and the gymnasiarchy, if the author means the ephebic 
liturgy, which is first mentioned in IG II2 1039, lines 29-30, dated to 73/2. For the Lyceum, however, see 
the next section. 
146 Wallace 1989, 270, n. 63, dates the passage to the tyranny of Demetrius of Phalerum (317/6-307/6), 
because of the role of the Areopagus in selecting the young, although it contradicts the Athenaion Politeia 
(42.1-2). He incorrectly interprets τὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς νέους αἵρεσιν τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς to mean 
that the Areopagus chose the sophronistai (cf. 205). See also Ferguson 1911, 129, n. 1. Marcellus 1994, 
176-81, claims that the “ephebeia under Demetrius of Phalerum was most likely an oligarchic imitation of 
the Lycurgan creation,” but the evidence adduced to support this assertion is unpersuasive.  
147 Marcellus 1994, 12, compares the sophronistes to the gymnasiarchos at Beroia, since the latter, 
according to an early second-century inscription found there, could thrash those under his charge, including 
ephebes, for disobedience, lack of discipline, and cheating in athletic contests (see Gauthier and 
Hatzopoulos 1993, 65-8, on Face B, lines 8-10, 21-3, 70-1). 
 
 130 
sophronistes was not conceived as a military officer but as a mature citizen acting in loco 
parentis.148 The ephebes’ fathers, by selecting the three “best” and “most suitable” 
phyletai as candidates for sophronistes ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.2), had shown to the demos 
the men whom they were willing to entrust with the power to act as they would in 
educating their own sons for the duration of the ephebeia: i.e. the sophronistes could 
physically coerce ephebes so as to make them obedient just as a father disciplined his 
children.149 The demos, by legitimizing the sophronistes’ right to act in this manner, in 
effect granted him disciplinary powers similar to Spartan officers.150  
But what about the ephebes who had suffered at his hands? Given that the 
sophronistes was an elected official, it is likely that some ephebes, angry at being beaten, 
would have sought to exact revenge upon him once he had left office.151 If we consider 
the important role that the ephebes’ fathers played in honoring the sophronistes for his 
services, however, moral and social pressure would have made it difficult for resentful 
ephebes to prosecute the latter. In IG II2 1159 (= Reinmuth 1971, no. 19), dated to 303/2, 
the tribe Pandionis honored the sophronistes Philonides for his good service. In lines 11-
14, the inscription says that “the fathers of the ephebes declare before the tribe that he has 
taken care of the ephebes according to the laws.”152 This display of communal support for 
                                                
148 Reinmuth 1971, 2, 120. 
149 Plat. Prot. 325D: καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἑκὼν πείθηται· εἰ δὲ μή, ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ 
καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς. See also Ar. Vesp. 1296-7; Nub. 1399-1401; Plat. Lys. 
208D-209; Xen. Anab. 5.8.18. For a discussion of fatherhood and corporal punishment as a means to 
correction, see Golden 1990, 64-5, 101; Strauss 1993, 82-3.  
150 Physical punishment by Spartan officers: e.g. Thuc. 8.84.2 (Astyochus); Xen. Anab. 1.5.11-17; 2.3.11; 
2.6.9-14 (Clearchus); Xen. Hell. 6.2.18-9 (Mnasippus). See also Pritchett 1974, 238-43; van Wees 2004, 
109-111; Lendon 2005, 74-7. 
151 Ephebes could not have gone to law during their military service because they were limited to cases 
concerning estates, heiresses, and hereditary priesthoods ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.5). Instead, they, like older 
citizens, could have laid a complaint at his euthuna (Dem. 18.117; Aeschin. 3.23) or could have prosecuted 
him afterwards, perhaps on the grounds that a conviction for his abusive behavior would be in the best 
interests of the demos (Dem. 25.26; Aeschin.  1.192). 
152 ἀποφ[αίν]ουσιν αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν φυλὴν [οἱ] πατέρες τῶν ἐφήβων ἐπιμεμε[λ]ῆσθαι κατὰ τοὺς 
νόμους τῶν [ἐ]φήβων. Cf. E8, Col. III, lines 10-19, dated to 332/1, which may also be a decree of the 
ephebes’ fathers: [ἐψηφίσθαι δὲ τοῖς πατράσι τῶν τῆς Λεω]ντίδος, Παν[name ca. 6, patronymic ca. 
8, demotic ca. 9, εἶπεν· ἐπειδ]ὴ Φιλόθεος [ὁ σωφρονιστὴς τῆς Λεωντίδος φυλῆς δικα]ίως 
ἐπιμεμέ[ληται  τῶν νεανίσκων καὶ χρήσιμον αὑτὸ]ν παρέσχηκε[ν τοῖς ἐφήβοις τοῖς ἐπὶ 
Νικοκράτους, ἐπ]αινέσαι Φιλ[ό]θεον Φιλοκλέους Σουνιᾶ καὶ στεφανῶσ]α̣ι αὐτὸν χρ[υσῶι 
στεφάνωι ἀπὸ χιλίων δραχμῶν ἀρετῆς] ἕνεκα κ̣αὶ [σωφροσύνης τῆς εἰς τὴν φυλήν, ἀναγράψαι 
δ]ὲ τόδε τὸ ψ[ήφισμα εἰς τὸ ἀνάθημα ὃ οἱ ἔ]φηβοι τῶ̣ι̣ ἥ[ρωι ἀνατιθέασι]. One should not place too 
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the sophronistes in combination with the demos’ recognition that exact obedience was 
virtuous for ephebes, I suggest, had two important consequences. First, it would have 
dissuaded vengeful ex-ephebes from going to law because they were afraid of incurring 
the wrath of their fathers and fellow demesmen.153 Second, it reassured the sophronistai 
that they could discipline ephebes without fear of prosecution, provided that they had 
conformed to the regulations of the ephebeia and had not acted contrary to what the 
demos considered acceptable behavior.154 
But the demos’ efforts to instill εὐταξία and πειθαρχία in ephebes were not 
limited to the sophronistes’ ability to inflict corporal punishment. In the Cyropaedeia 
Xenophon recommends competition as a means to improve discipline and obedience in 
the ranks because the awarding of prizes for excellence in soldiering spurs each soldier’s 
philotimia (2.1.22-4). This should not be regarded as merely utopian military theory, 
because he had seen how the Spartan King Agesilaus had harnessed the competitive 
instincts of his soldiers at Ephesus in the spring of 395 so as to turn his allied army into a 
formidable military machine (Hell. 3.4.16; Cf. 4.2.5-7). As Lendon has pointed out, 
Xenophon sought to emulate the Spartan “ethos of competitive obedience,” in which the 
Spartans competed amongst themselves to show their readiness to obey their 
commanders and the laws of the polis pertaining to their proper conduct on the 
battlefield.155 It is unsurprising, then, that in the Hiero Xenophon advises the fictional 
tyrant to set up athletic events (ἆθλα) for the citizen body on the analogy of Athenian 
choral competitions (9.4-8).  One of Xenophon’s ἆθλα was the εὐταξία (9.6). 
A generation after Xenophon, the Athenians established an ἆθλον εὐταξίας in 
the Lycurgan period.156 IG II2 417, recently reedited by Lambert,157 suggests that there 
                                                                                                                                            
much weight, however, on this admittedly speculative restoration (pp. 200-1). 
153 For the importance of cultivating good relations in deme society, see Whitehead 1986, 223-31. Certainly 
an ephebe would have hesitated to jeopardize this relationship because he, for example, depended upon a 
cooperative network of family and friends for apprehending criminals and bringing them to justice (Hunter 
1994, 134-9). 
154 The demos may have required the sophronistes to act with self-restraint in using the rod, since physical 
punishment may have also been intended to educate the offender (see p. 163). 
155 See Lendon 2005, 74-7.  
156 I do not mean to imply that the Athenians borrowed this idea directly from Xenophon, even though the 
latter in the Cyropaedeia makes his ephebes participate in public competitions in his fictional Persian 
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was a liturgy for the eutaxia in Athens, since the inscription contains a list of liturgists 
apparently of a single year, two from each tribe (with the exception of one from 
Hippothontis) under the heading of [ε]ὐταξίας, who had paid 50 drachmas (except for 49 
from Chares of Aixone) towards the cost of the event (Col. I, lines 6-30). The archon is 
not preserved in IG II2 417, but Lewis argues that the date can be inferred from SEG 
25.177, which records liturgists making dedications of phialai, each worth 50 drachmas, 
probably in the archonship of Aristophanes (i.e. 331/0).158 He assumes that IG II2 417 
contained “the founding law” which stipulated that liturgists were required to dedicate 
phialai on the Acropolis (cf. IG II2 1560) and that the stone should be dated “a year or 
two earlier” than SEG 25.177.159 But this date is less than secure. Even if the fragmentary 
text of IG II2 417 was a law rather than a decree, which is uncertain, we cannot deduce 
from this that the inscription dates to 333/2 or 332/1.160 
Ephebes are not mentioned in IG II2 417, but a relief discovered on the Acropolis 
(NM 2958), probably dated to the 330s, does suggest that they competed in an event 
called the eutaxia at an unknown festival.161 The relief depicts three figures, two of whom 
are full-sized: on the right there is a personification of the goddess Eutaxia, while a male 
figure occupies the center, who could be Demos, the tribal hero, or the eponymous hero 
of the helikia. On the left a smaller figure stands wearing a short chiton and chlamys, 
almost certainly an ephebe.162 While the relief may belong to IG II2 417, a more 
convincing explanation is that it honored ephebes for their victory in the eutaxia, as 
                                                                                                                                            
Ephebeia (1.2.12), since other writers who admired the Spartan military system also saw the value of armed 
competitions in encouraging excellence in the art of war (e.g. Plat. Leg. 829C, 830A-831A).  
157 Lambert 2001, 52-5, no. 4. 
158 Lewis 1968, 374-380, no. 51, pls. 111-112, reassembled SEG 25.177 out of three previously recognized 
fragments (IG II2 1575; IG II2 4332; Hesperia 30 1961, 246, no. 42, pl. 44) and a new fragment. See p. 378 
for his caveats concerning his restoration of Aristophanes in line two (ἐπ᾿ Ἀ[ριστοφάνο]υς ἄρχοντ[ος]).  
159 For the supposed relationship between IG II2 417 and SEG 25.177, see Lewis 1968, 376-7.  
160 Wilson 2000, 44, n. 184, suggests a date for the eutaxia liturgy soon after 330, but does not discuss IG 
II2 417. 
161 For bibliography and a photograph of the relief, see Lawton 1995, 146, no. 150, pl. 79. Lawton dates the 
relief to the last quarter of the fourth century. Palagia 1975, 181-2, however, presents two good reasons for 
the 330’s: (1) The personified Eutaxia on the relief is labeled, implying that it is a recent creation. (2) The 
pose of Eutaxia is probably borrowed from the Democratia crowning Demos on the relief of Eucrates’ anti-
tyranny law, passed in 337/6 (for a discussion of this inscription and relief, see pp. 149).   
162 For the identification of these figures, see Palagia 1975, 181-2; Lawton 1995, 146; Lambert 2002, 122-
3. Palagia also suggests that Athena stood on the missing part of the relief. 
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indicated by the tripod in the relief’s background.163 A reference to eutaxia is also found 
in IG VII 4254 from Oropus,164 dated to 329/8, in which the demos honors the ten 
epimeletai of the quadrennial Amphiaraea with golden crowns for their services at the 
festival and the games held during it (lines 1-39). Lines 39-45 contain the provision that 
at the next meeting of the nomothetai the tamias tou demou is to give 30 drachmas to 
“those in charge of the agon” which the law specifies should be allotted “to the one 
chosen for the eutaxia (τῶι αἱρεθέντι ἐπὶ τὴν εὐταξίαν).” Scholars are divided, 
however, whether eutaxia in this inscription refers to a competitive event at the festival or 
is used in the sense of keeping the festival goers in “good order.”165 
The ephebe on NM 2958 rests with his left hand on a hoplite shield. Given that 
the hoplomachos would have taught the ephebes how to march in phalanx formation and 
how to perform rudimentary hoplite drill, as we will see in the next section, the eutxaia 
probably involved tribal contingents competing against each other in these aspects of 
hoplite warfare.166 The title of the contest suggests that those ephebes who had excelled 
in demonstrating good order in maneuvering their formation and exemplary discipline in 
obeying orders – the very qualities the demos was hoping to foster in the ephebes 
generally (i.e. E2 and E8) – were victorious. Indeed, scholars have rightly associated the 
foundation of the eutaxia with the creation of the Lycurgan ephebeia on chronological 
                                                
163 For the possibility that IG II2 417 and NM 2958 belonged together, see Lawton 1995, 146. Lambert 
2002, 123, dissociates the two because of their different widths and since the relief “relates specifically to 
Eutaxia, the inscription lists the performers of other liturgies as well,” confirming the doubts of Lewis 
1968, 376, n. 25. Consequently the relief must have belonged to a victory dedication (Palagia 1975, 182; 
Lambert 2002, 123; Humphreys 2004, 115, n. 17).  
164 IG VII 4254 = Schwenk 1985, no. 15 = Petrakos 1997, no. 298.   
165 The festival included gymnastic, equestrian, and other events (IG VII 4254, lines 16-8). Eutaxia as an 
agon: Davies 1967, 39; Palagia 1975, 182. Lambert 2001, 56, however, argues that eutaxia must refer to 
good order because SEG 33.115 (c. 247), line 28, uses the term in this sense. This inscription, however, is 
inconclusive and can instead be taken as evidence for an agon (Humphreys 2004, 115, n. 17). Walbank 
1982, 173-82, has recently published a fragmentary stone, Agora I 7063 = SEG 32.86, which appears to 
contain regulations for a festival (see also Lambert 2005, no. 9). Line 38 reads … ]στα̣θέντων [ἐ]π̣ὶ 
εὐταξία̣[ν … , which Walbank compares to IG VII 4254 and interprets as officials “appointed for the 
purpose of ensuring good order” (178). He dates the inscription to c. 329/8, while Tracy 1995, 101, 
associates the hand of SEG 32.86 with the “Cutter of IG II2 244”, whom he dates 340/39-c. 320. Walbank 
restores ἐν τ̣ῶι Ἀ̣[μφιαράωι in line 33. Hansen 1985, 389, however, prefers the Bendida (contra Parker 
1996, 246, n. 100), while Humphreys 2004, 117, suggests the Epitaphia. 
166 For the eutaxia as a hoplite contest of some kind, see Palagia 1975, 182; Marcellus 1994, 152; 
Humphreys 2004, 115 
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grounds and because of the term’s appearance in the ephebic corpus.167 Though the 
eutaxia appears to have had a brief existence in Athens,168 it may have served as the 
template for similar competitions for youths or ephebes in numerous cities throughout the 
Hellenistic world in subsequent centuries.169 
The evidence taken together suggests that the demos went to considerable lengths 
to ensure that the thousands of ephebes who passed through the ephebeia from 334/3 to 
322/1 were sufficiently εὔτακτοι to carry out the duties assigned to them. But did the 
ephebeia change the citizens’ attitude towards discipline in the ranks? In the debate 
before the Lamian War, Phocion responded to Hypereides’ question of when should the 
Athenians go to war against Macedon with “whenever I see the young men (τοὺς νέους) 
willing to hold their places in the ranks (τὴν τάξιν βουλομένους φυλάττειν) [of the 
phalanx]” (Plut. Phoc. 23.2). Plutarch’s account of the Athenian victory over Micion’s 
Macedonians near Rhamnous during the Lamian War implies that Phocion’s concerns 
were well-founded; the Athenian force, consisting largely of ex-ephebes, suffered from 
severe disciplinary problems before the battle (25.1-2).170 These anecdotes suggest that 
once citizens had left the institution they were just as insubordinate as their ancestors: i.e. 
discipline in the ephebeia was an exception to the traditional Athenian laxity towards 
military service. 
                                                
167 Lambert 2001, 56-7; Humphreys 2004, 115.  
168 Lambert 2001, 56-7, argues that the eutaxia liturgy and hence the agon itself did not survive Demetrius 
of Phalerum’s elimination of festival choregiai between 317/6 and 307/6 (choregoi are no longer attested 
after IG II2 3055 and 3056, dated to 320/19: see Raubitschek 1943, 54-5). There is no evidence for the 
competition after the Lamian War. 
169 An inscription from Massalia, IG XIIII 2445 (201/0), for instance, honors an ephebe for his victory in 
the eutaxia. For more examples, see Crowther 1991, 301-4; Lambert 2002, 122. See also the commentary 
of Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993, 104-5, on the eutaxia contest in the second-century inscription 
containing the gymnasiarchic law at Beroia. 
170 Our main source for the mobilization and deployment of Athenian forces in the Lamian War is Diodorus 
Siculus 18.10.2, who says that the demos conscripted all citizens up to forty years old for service in 323/2 
and that three of the ten tribes were deployed for home defense. Given that the ephebes were not among the 
Athenians called up for overseas duty (i.e. 20-39) nor would have served in the three tribes (see Hansen 
1985, 37 and 100, n. 125), their involvement in the war was probably limited to garrisoning the fortresses. 
It is possible, then, that over half of Phocian’s army would have been ex-ephebes from the enrollment years 
334/3-324/3. Plutarch relates two instances of ill-discipline: (1) Phocion is surrounded by citizens 
beseeching him on how best to take a hill occupied by the enemy. (2) Having drawn up his hoplites in the 
line of battle, one man breaks ranks, advances far ahead, flees once he sees the enemy, and then returns to 
his previous position. Phocion addresses this man as a meirakion, which suggests that he was under thirty 
and hence had performed ephebic service.  
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3.4: Military Training in the Ephebeia  
Basic training has two clearly identifiable functions. Its most obvious task 
is to instill exactly what its name suggests, an adequate level of training in 
such things as weapon handling and minor tactics. Its second, though by 
no means less important, function is to inculcate the military ethos in 
recruits, and ensure that the individual values which prevail in most 
civilian societies are replaced by the group spirit and group loyalties 
which underlie all military organizations.171 
 
The aim of this section is to understand why the citizens of Lycurgan Athens, who 
had hitherto regarded training for war as a private affair (Thuc. 2.39; Xen. Mem. 3.12.5), 
decided to establish an institutionalized system of peacetime military training in the 
ephebeia? That is, why did the demos concede in the case of ephebes the reality of Plato’s 
complaint that a man who takes up a shield could not become a skilled soldier on the very 
same day (Resp. 374D)? What follows is a tentative reconstruction of this program based 
upon our scanty knowledge of Greek military training in the Classical period.172 In 
particular I have drawn heavily from two works of utopian literature dated to the 350’s – 
Plato’s Laws and Xenophon’s Cyropaedeia – that were inspired by Spartan military 
practices and reflect fourth-century developments in Greek warfare.173 Like previous 
scholarly discussions of the ephebes’ training, I have assumed that the peculiar 
combination of skills the ephebes were taught – physical training, hoplite weaponry, and 
non-hoplite arms – were intended for use during their military service and in war 
generally.174 With this understood, let us begin with the Athenaion Politeia’s brief 
description of the military training that the ephebes received during their first year of 
military service:  
 
                                                
171 Holmes 1985, 36. 
172 For Greek military training in the Classical period, see Anderson 1970, 84-110; Pritchett 1974, 208-231; 
Ridley 1979, 530-548; Rawlings 2000, 237-249; van Wees 2004, 89-95; Lendon 2005, 106-114. For the 
lack of information, see Pritchett 1974, 208; Wheeler 1982, 229. 
173 See Morrow, 318-352, for Plato’s training system in the Laws. For Xenophon’s Cyropaedeia, see 
Anderson 1970. 
174 E.g.: Forbes 1929, 136-141; Pélékidis 1962, 108-9, 114-5; Ridley 1979, 531-3; Ober 1985a, 90-5; 
Marcellus 1994, 76-83; Burckhardt 1996, 44-7; Rawlings 2000, 237-41. 
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The people also elects two physical trainers (παιδοτρίβας) for them, and 
instructors (διδασκάλους) who teach the ephebes how to fight with 
hoplite weapons (ὁπλομαχεῖν), to fire the bow (τοξεύειν), to cast the 
javelin (ἀκοντίζειν), and to discharge the catapult (καταπάλτην 
ἀφιέναι) (42.3).175  
 
The use of οἵτινες for the διδασκάλοι suggests that an indefinite number of military 
instructors, in addition to the two παιδοτρίβαι, were hired each year to train a given 
enrollment class.176 In E8 (332/1) the tribe of Leontis honors two instructors with laurel 
crowns because “they had taken care of the ephebes well.”177 Though later ephebic 
inscriptions honored individual instructors by their respective titles – ὁπλομάχος, 
τοξότης, ἀκοντιστής, and (καταπαλτ)αφετής (e.g. IG II2 665, dated to 266/5) – the 
Lycurgan corpus usually called them διδασκάλοι regardless of their area of 
specialization.178 Little else is known about their term of service,179 apart from the fact 
that they, unlike the kosmetes and sophronistai, could be foreigners: e.g. Ἀ̣γαθά̣νορα 
Συρακ̣ό̣σιο̣ν in E5 (332/1), line 11.180 Reinmuth claims that the ephebes in their second 
year periodically returned to the Piraeus to continue their training,181 but the Athenaion 
                                                
175 [ὁ δῆμος] χειροτ[ο]νεῖ δὲ καὶ παιδοτρίβας αὐτοῖς δύο καὶ διδασκάλους, οἵτινες ὁπλομαχεῖν καὶ 
τοξεύειν καὶ ἀκοντίζειν καὶ καταπάλτην ἀφιέναι διδάσκουσιν. 
176 Forbes 1929, 136, and Pélékidis 1962, 108, claim that demos employed four instructors, one of each 
specialty. Given the paucity of information, we simply do not know how many the demos hired each year. 
Plato had recommended in the Laws that specialized instructors should be hired at public expense to train 
the citizen body (813D-E). For an overview of paidotribai and didaskaloi in the ephebeia, see Florek 1965. 
177 Col. I, lines 33-8: ἐ]παινέσαι [δὲ καὶ] τὸς [δ]ιδ[ασκάλου]ς τῆς φυλῆ[ς …6…]την Α[…7….]υ 
Παλλην[έα …7….]ν Ἀρ[..]αινέ[ο] Μεθων[αῖον καὶ στεφ]ανῶ[σαι] θ̣α̣λ[λο]ῦ στ[εφάνωι ὅτι καλ]ῶς 
[ἐπ]εμεληθ̣η̣σαν τ[ῶν ἐφ]ή[βων]. 
178 Didaskaloi: E5 (332/1), lines 10-11; E8 (332/1), Col. I, lines 33-8; E15 (331/0 or 330/29), line 7; E20 
(331/0-325/4), Left Side, lines 14-7. Akontistes: E18 (329/8?), Left Side, lines 5-6. Paidotribes: E25 
(334/3-323/2), lines 1-2. Reinmuth 1971, 23, argues that the four untitled individuals with patronymic and 
demotic listed in E7 (332/1), lines 11-3, were didaskaloi. On E14 (331/0?), line 115, a certain Μεναῖος 
Θουδ<ό>του ἐκ Κοίλης could also be a paidotribes or a didaskalos (Traill 1986, 12).  
179 Pélékidis 1962, 108-9. 
180 According to Reinmuth 1971, 23, the epigraphic evidence shows not only that the four Pandionid 
didaskaloi listed in E7 were different from the two Leontid didaskaloi mentioned in E8, even though both 
inscriptions are from the same enrollment class of 333/2, but also that these tribal didaskaloi should be 
regarded as distinct from those mentioned in the Athenaion Politeia. His assumption that the four 
Pandionid officials listed in E7 were in fact didaskaloi is unproven. It is also hard to understand why the 
phylae and the demos should hire different instructors for the same training program. 
181 Reinmuth 1971, 80.  
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Politeia does seem to imply that the ephebes were not deployed sporadically on the 
border at this time (42.4: διατρίβουσιν ἐν τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις). 
 The ephebes probably trained at the Lyceum,182 though the gymnasium is 
unattested in the ephebic corpus until IG II2 900, line 17, dated to 185/4. From the fifth 
century onwards the Lyceum, because of its close proximity to Athens, had served as a 
muster point for the polis’ hoplite forces before embarking on campaign.183 This implies 
that the Lyceum possessed “an exercise ground which accommodated Athens’ sizable 
land forces.”184 Furthermore, the Vitae decem oratorum and other sources suggest that 
Lycurgus had extensively remodeled the gymnasium, including the planting of trees and 
the construction of a new palaestra.185 Mitchel argues that Lycurgus’ primary motivation 
for enhancing the gymnasium’s facilities was to “provide better places [for the ephebes] 
to drill and train.”186 Certainly the long-standing connection the Lyceum had with 
Athens’ military forces makes it a more likely candidate than the otherwise unknown 
“gymnasium of the ephebes” in the Piraeus, as some scholars have supposed.187 The 
presence of hundreds of ephebes attending the Lyceum on a daily(?) basis would also 
help to explain why Lycurgus chose to set up a stele in front of the palaestra he had built 
recording all his public acts as Athens’ chief financial officer ([Plut]. Mor. 843F).  
                                                
182 Mitchel 1970, 38; Faraguna 1992, 279-80; Humphreys 2004, 89, n. 32. 
183 Ar. Pax. 351-7; Schol. on Ar. Pax. 356; Schol. on Xen. Anab. 1.2.10; Suda s.v. Λυκεῖον; Hesych. s.v. 
Λυκεῖον. See also the discussion on drilling in Athens in pp. 16-7. For a collection of primary sources on 
the Lyceum, see Morison 1998, 240-260.  
184 Jameson 1980, 224. 
185 See Kyle 1987, 82-3, on Paus. 1.29; [Plut]. Mor. 841C-D; 852C; IG II2 457b, lines 7-8. For a discussion 
of the Lyceum in the Lycurgan period, see Hintzen-Bohlen 1997, 39-40. For the excavations of the 
Lycurgan palaistra and garden, see Ritchie 1989, 250-60. 
186 Mitchel 1970, 38.  
187 E.g. Pélékidis 1962, 114, n. 2; 260, n. 1; Reinmuth 1971, 115; Ober 1985a, 90. This view depends upon 
Sundwill’s plausible στῆσ[αι ἐν τῶι γυμνασί]ω̣ι τῶν ἐφήβων in line 30 of IG II2 478 (= Reinmuth 
1971, no. 19), dated to 305/4. This would mean that the ephebes trained in the Piraeus because the 
inscription’s fragments were found there. This is not decisive evidence against the Lyceum, however, since 
the ephebeia underwent several important changes after the democracy’s restoration in 307/6, such as the 
abolition of compulsory military service (suggested by the drop in enrollment to c. 370 ephebes for IG II2 
478) and the reduction of its length to one year (Koehler’s restoration in IG II2 478, line 10, of the archon 
Coroebus for the ephebes’ enrollment year is certain). For these and other changes, see Reinmuth 1971, 
108-115; Marcellus 1994, 183-6. We therefore cannot dismiss the possibility that the gymnasium was first 
used as the ephebes’ headquarters after 307/6.  
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The Lyceum at any rate was the ideal place for the two paidotribai to oversee the 
ephebes’ physical training.188 As Plutarch puts it, military fitness is the aim of athletics 
and competition (Mor. 639E).189 Utopian literature suggests what kind of militarily useful 
gymnastic exercises may have been taught to ephebes. Plato favored all round physical 
activity concentrating on exercises for the arms and legs: the former for strength and 
sturdiness when fighting at close quarters and the latter for pursuit and flight to and from 
battle (Leg. 832E-833A). He also rejected wrestling and boxing as sports useless for war 
(Leg. 796A; 814D),190 though there is reason to think that wrestling was an important part 
of ephebic training.191 In Aristotle’s view the pentathlete, who displayed all-round 
prowess in jumping, running, discus-throwing, javelin-throwing, and wrestling, was the 
best adapted for war, since he had excellence in strength, stature, and swiftness of foot 
(Rhet. 1361B).192 Aristotle, like other Classical Athenian writers, rejected the specialized 
nature of professional athletes’ training programs as unsuited for citizens on account of 
the athletes’ disproportionate physical development and excessive diet.193 
 In the Laws Plato recommends that citizens should exercise in full armor once a 
month and daily without armor (830D) and that all should compete in armed races which 
                                                
188 For a discussion of paidotribai at Athens, see Kyle 1987, 141-5. 
189 For the connection between athletics and war, see Pritchett 1974, 213-15; Golden 1998, 23-8. 
190 It was proverbial that skill in boxing did not make a man a brave or skillful warrior. Xenophon, for 
instance, refers to the Thessalian boxer Boscus as one of the most cowardly of the Ten Thousand (Anab. 
5.8.23).  
191 Plutarch attributed the Thebans’ success at Leuctra to their expertise in wrestling (Mor. 639F). Some 
scholars have taken this seriously (e.g. Cawkwell 1983, 398-9; Pritchett 1985, 64), but it is difficult to see 
how hoplites could have had sufficient space to wrestle opponents to the ground in the phalanx (Lazenby 
1990, 99). Nevertheless, their expertise in wrestling would account for the Thebans’ superior bodily 
strength, obtained though constant training in the gymnasium, when fighting against the Macedonians 
before Thebes in 335/4 (D.S. 17.11.4). I suggest that when the Thebans had taken refuge in Athens 
afterwards (Aeschin. 3.156), they impressed the Athenians with their bravery and inspired Lycurgus to 
build a new palaestra at the Lyceum so that the ephebes too could acquire greater proficiency in wrestling. 
Plato probably rejected wrestling because he thought that the Spartans did not train assiduously in it (Plut. 
Mor. 233E). Plutarch, however, preserves an anecdote about a Spartan winning the wrestling at the 
Olympic games (Lyc. 22.4-5), which suggests the contrary.   
192 According to Cornelius Nepos, however, Epaminondas preferred agility over strength because he 
thought that the former was more advantageous in war: he advocated running and wrestling as good for 
military training (15.2.4-5). 
193 Fifth- and fourth-century Athenian writers often expressed a disdain for the excesses of athletes: e.g. 
Plat. Resp. 404A; Xen. Symp. 2.17; Eur. Fr. 282 Nauck apud Athen. 10.413D-F; Arist. Pol. 1335B6-12. For 
a discussion of these and other sources, see Kyle 1987, 127-54. 
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varied in length from one stade (ca. 200 m.) to sixty stades (12 km.) (833A-B).194 One 
race is attested in Lycurgan Athens, namely the lampadedromia. If E25 (c. 334/3-322/1) 
is an ephebic inscription, we have evidence that the paidotribes at the Lyceum supervised 
the ephebes’ training as lampadephoroi, just as their fifth-century ancestors did (Ar. Ran. 
1087-8). Ephebes may have also received instruction in dancing the pyrrhic, though no 
epigraphic or literary source refers to this activity in the ephebeia. We know, however, 
that tribally organized teams of youths (alongside boys and men) competed in the pyrrhic 
at the Panatheneia: perhaps ephebes did the same in the Lycurgan period.195 This 
involved the manipulation of the hoplite shield in defense, leaping, and swerving to avoid 
melee and missile attacks, imitating offensive movements with the spear, and marching in 
step while in formation.196 The pyrrhic thus would have not only improved the ephebes’ 
fitness, agility, and familiarity with hoplite weaponry but also instilled discipline in 
them.197  
                                                
194 See Morrow 1960, 335. 
195 Pyrrhic held at the Panatheneia: Lys. 21.4; Isae. 5.36; Ar. Arch. 988-9; IG II2 2311 (c. 380), lines 72-4. 
See Wheeler 1982, 231; Kyle 1987, 36-37, 50, 132; Lonsdale 1993, 137-9; Fisher 1998a, 92, n. 59.  
196 On the pyrrhic, see Borthwick 1967, 18-23; 1970b, 318-331; Poursat 1968, 550-615. Plato’s version, 
probably borrowed from the Athenian pyrrhic (Wheeler 1982, 231), “imitated the avoidance of all blows 
and missiles by side movements and feints and leaps on high and crouching (Leg. 815A).” Maneuvering the 
shield is also attested in Euripides depiction of the pyrrhic (And. 1129-36) and in Philo. Gymn. 19 (the 
Spartan version). Despite Downes 1904, 101-6, the pyrrhic also included the use of offensive weapons, 
since Poursat’s study of Attic vases has shown that the warriors danced nude except for shield, helmet, and 
spear. Plato also has the dancers brandishing bows and javelins (Leg. 815A), but there is no visual evidence 
to confirm this (Wheeler 1982, 232; contra Rawlings 2000, 255, n. 72). A commemorative relief (AM 
1338) for a victorious pyrrhic chorus at some unknown festival, dated to the 320’s, depicts eight dancers in 
two rows of four to the right of the choregos. A fragmentary relief (AM 432), dated to c. 323 (IG II2 3026), 
also depicts multiple pyrrhicists. For these inscriptions, see Lonsdale 1993, 143-4.  
197 Socrates is reputed to have said that “those who dance best are the best in war” and likened dancing to 
armed maneuvers which improved the dancers’ physical condition and discipline (Athen. 14.628E-F; cf. 
14.629C). Xenophon held that dancers learn discipline by showing obedience to their trainers and likened 
the duties of  choregoi to strategoi (Mem. 3.4.3-6; 3.5.18). The choregos Phrynichos was apparently elected 
strategos (c. 460) because his lyrics were well suited for the pyrrhic (Ael. Var.Hist. 3.8). Some scholars 
have argued that the pyrrhic constituted military training at Athens (e.g. Borthwick 1970, 320; Ridley 1979, 
545-8; Winkler 1990, 41-44, for ephebes), but, as Anderson 1991, 30, points out, the dancers could “hardly 
have reproduced the figures of dance in actual battle.” Certainly some armed dances such as those 
described in Xenophon’s Anabasis 6.1.5-13 should be considered as no more than pantomimes and 
entertainment (Wheeler 1982, 230). Lonsdale 1993, 162-8, argues that the pyrrhic was a qualification rite 
for the ephebeia. This is unconvincing, however, because the Athenaion Politeia says that the ephebes 
trained after they had entered the institution. 
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Though the exact nature of the ephebes’ gymnastic exercises is unclear, the 
reasons for establishing this physical training program are readily comprehendible. The 
ephebes’ effectiveness in their patrolling and garrisoning duties, which in their second 
year consisted of traversing the rough terrain on the Athens-Boeotian border ([Arist]. Ath. 
Pol. 42.3; Xen. Mem. 3.5.25), was dependent upon them being in good physical 
condition. A given enrollment class of ephebes, however, would not have been 
considered to be in their physical prime (Xen. Hell. 6.1.5). Even worse, perhaps a fair 
proportion would have been out of shape, perhaps no more so than their older 
compatriots (Plut. Mor. 192C-D; Plat. Leg. 556C-D). Since there is no reason to think 
that ephebes would have been more enthusiastic about physical training than the reluctant 
Epigenes was in Xenophon’s Memorabilia (3.12.1-8), the demos probably had little 
choice but to hire paidotribai to improve their fitness. 
The ephebes’ military training also included formal instruction in hoplite arms 
under the hoplomachoi.198 Scholars infer from the Athenaion Politeia’s use of 
ὁπλομαχεῖν that these instructors taught ephebes hoplomachia or the art of fencing with 
hoplite weapons,199 skills hitherto limited to the wealthy few who could afford their 
costly fees.200 The effectiveness of such specialized weapons training was limited when 
fighting in formation (Plat. Lach. 182A), because there was little chance of missing the 
enemy and fighting was a matter of courage rather than skill (Xen. Cyr. 2.1.16; 2.3.9-11). 
                                                
198 On hoplomachoi, see Wheeler 1982, 223-233; 1983, 1-20. The main sources for hoplomachoi are Plat. 
Lach. 179E-184C; Euthyd. 271B-273C; Xen. Mem. 3.1. For the continued importance of citizen hoplites as 
the defenders of Athens in the Classical period, see Hanson 1996, 291-312; Burckhardt 1996, 154-257. The 
ephebes were equipped with the hoplite spear (δόρυ) and shield (ἀσπίς) ([Arist].Ath.Pol. 42.4), while 
Athena is depicted in hoplite armor on the relief of E4 (333/2), a dedication of Antiochis or Erectheis, and 
on the stele of the ephebic oath at Archarnae (SEG 21.519). For a discussion of these reliefs, see Lawton 
1995, no. 40 with pl. 21 and no. 143 with pl. 76.  
199 Wheeler 1982, 225: “Weapons training and the skills of individual attack and defense thus seem to be 
the meaning of hoplomachia [his italics].”  
200 Anderson 1991, 29; Marcellus 1994, 79; Rawlings 2000, 242; van Wees 2004, 94; Lendon 2005, 110. 
Euripides’ mention of the “Thessalian Trick” employed by Eteocles against Polynices in the Phoenician 
Women (1380-1420), however, implies that many Athenians were familiar with this maneuver. The 
“Thessalian Trick” was achieved by stepping back with the left foot and drawing the shield against the 
body, then stepping forward with the left foot and driving home the weapon (a sword in the case of 
Eteocles: Eur. Phoen. 1407-13) into the gap between the opponent’s shield and body. For this scene, see 
Borthwick 1970a, 15-21. In Plato’s Laches (178A-181C), which has a dramatic date of 421-18 and was 
composed in the late fifth or early fourth century (See Hoerber 1968, 95-105), the wealthy Lysimachus and 
a large crowd saw hoplomachoi put on a public display of hoplomachia, presumably to attract business.  
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But should the hoplite engage in single combat, whether in pursuit or defense, his 
expertise in hoplomachia allowed him to overcome one adversary easily or even several 
at once (Plat. Lach. 182A-B). Consequently one could argue that hoplomachia would 
have been useful for ephebes when fighting raiders individually or in small groups, just 
as Lamachus did in Aristophanes’ Archarnians (1174-88).201 If we accept this, how did 
the ephebes train? Perhaps they competed against each other in armed combat in the 
Lyceum, both as soloists and in teams consisting of two to ten men per side as in Plato’s 
Laws (833E). Another possibility is that they participated in mock battles, perhaps similar 
to the one described in Xenophon’s Cyropaideia (2.3.17-20). 
The hoplomachoi also instructed the ephebes in unit tactics, because the 
Athenaion Politeia says that “when the assembly is held in the theatre [where] the 
ephebes demonstrate their parade ground drill to the people (42.4).”202 Scholars correctly 
take τὰ περὶ τὰς τάξεις to mean that the ephebes displayed their skill at maneuvering in 
formation.203 To do this, the hoplomachoi must have taught the ephebes the following: 
(1) How to maintain good order in the phalanx: as Aristotle puts it, “a hoplite formation 
is useless without cohesion (Pol. 1297b20-1).” (2) How to form up in a battle-line, to 
move forward without falling into confusion, to turn about-face in good order, to change 
formation from line into column and vice-versa, and perhaps even to countermarch the 
phalanx.204 (3) How to drill their spears in unison: the sources attest that well-drilled 
hoplites were impressive to behold and inspired fear and respect in the enemy on account 
of their excellent discipline.205 Drilling had the additional benefit of reinforcing the 
                                                
201 Rawlings 2000, 243: “The skills of hoplomachia [his italics] appear most relevant to small-scale 
combat, either aboard warships, or during raids and ambushes on land.” 
202 τὸν δ’ ὕστερον ἐκκλησίας ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ γενομένης, ἀποδειξάμενοι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ περὶ τὰς 
τάξεις. 
203 Rhodes 1981, 508; Anderson 1991, 28; Rawlings 2000, 238; Dillery 2002, 462. 
204 For these maneuvers, see Anderson 1970, 94-110. In book two of the Cyropaedeia Xenophon 
demonstrates how raw recruits could have been trained in unit tactics (e.g. 2.2.6-9; 2.3.21-24; 2.4.1-6). His 
inspiration was Spartan parade ground drill, which he discusses in chapter 11 of the Lacedaimonion 
Politeia.  
205 Anderson 1970, 84-93, has shown from the visual and literary evidence that hoplites were drilled in a 
few standard spear movements (e.g. Xen. Anab. 6.5.25-7; Hell. 2.4.12): (1) In the “slope position” the spear 
was carried upon the right shoulder. (2) The hoplite, when charging the enemy, held his spear in the 
“underhand position” ready for the underhand thrust. (3) After the initial charge the hoplite reverted to the 
“overhand position,” where he held his spear over his shoulder and delivers a downward blow. (4) Hoplites 
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ephebes’ esprit de corps. Smith observes that such training preserves “the physical 
integrity of the unit both in the stress of battle and at other times; it makes an equally 
important contribution to the development of a group mentalité.”206 
This hoplite drill did not aim to professionalize Athens’ citizen soldiers in an 
effort to catch up with the Macedonian military machine, as scholars have supposed,207 
but to prevent a decline in the fighting ability of the phalanx.208 The last group of 
Athenian citizens to have fought in a pitched battle was the contingent of 6,000 at 
Chaeronea (D.S. 16.86.5). But citizens after 338/7 had no opportunity to hone their 
martial skills in this manner because the Common Peace forbade the Athenians from 
making war against other Greek states (Tod. II, no. 177, lines 5-8). Should the Common 
Peace be prolonged, the proportion of the citizen body with combat experience would 
decrease, through normal mortality, to less than half within a decade of Chaeronea.209 
Clearly such an inexperienced citizen army would have stood little chance against the 
well-drilled Macedonian phalanx (Poly. Strat. 4.2.7). The demos, realizing this, hired 
hoplomachoi to drill the ephebes in the hope that their newly acquired military skill 
(ἐπιστήμη) in mass-warfare combined with their courage (ἀνδρεία) would make them 
more formidable in combat (cf. the Syracusans in Thuc. 6.69.1; 6.72.4).210 Seen in this 
light, the military review held in the Panathenaic stadium may have also played an 
                                                                                                                                            
at rest grounded their shields against their knees and leaned their spears against their bodies. The ephebes 
presumably would have been required to perform these spear movements to a high standard, perhaps 
similar to that of Chabrias’ troops, whose mastery of hoplite drill deterred Agesilaus from battle (see 
Anderson 1963, 411-3 on D.S. 15.32-33). As the Athenians were well aware, generals were hesitant to fight 
if their troops could not drill properly, as Iphicrates was when he, having ordered his army to lower spears, 
heard more noise from the chattering of teeth than the clanging of spears (Poly. Strat. 3.9.8).  
206 Smith 1990, 155. 
207 See pp. 69-75. 
208 The ephebes, after all, could have only used their newly acquired skills in hoplite warfare against 
similarly-equipped opponents in pitched battle, not against small groups of raiders on the mountainous 
border areas of Attica.The phalanx preferred level and clear ground (Hdt. 7.9b1), because hoplites relied 
upon each others’ shields for their collective defense (Thuc. 5.71.1; Plut. Mor. 220A). On rough ground, 
however, hoplites had little hope of maintaining their formation (Poly. 18.31.5; Arist. Pol. 1303b). For the 
ground suitable for hoplite warfare, see Pritchett 1985, 76-85. For a “blow by blow” account of hoplite 
warfare, see Hanson 1989, 135-218; Lazenby 1991, 87-109. 
209 See the demographic table of Hansen 1985, 12. 
210 As Xenophon observes, “I think every man’s nature acquires more courage [in war] by learning 
(μαθήσει) and practice (μελέτῃ) (Mem. 3.9.2).” 
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important role in reassuring the demos that the ephebes would fight bravely against the 
Macedonians should conflict break out in the future ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.4).211  
Raaflaub claims that the ephebeia “in its military aspects, it always was 
exclusively a preparation for hoplite service.”212 This is incorrect, because the Athenaion 
Politeia says that ephebes were also taught how to use the bow, javelin, and catapult 
(42.3). For most scholars, this is proof that “the ephebes were trained to fight 
interchangeably in hoplite equipment, with the bow, with the javelin, and with the 
catapult.”213 Ober argues that the inclusion of non-hoplite weapons training was 
motivated by the need to provide ephebes with the necessary skills to defend the 
Athenian frontier: 
 
Training with the javelin, the typical weapon of the peltast, suggests that 
the ephebes were ready to fight in mountainous regions as peltasts. The 
ephebes were also trained to become skillful in weapons and techniques 
necessary for holding fortified positions. Projectile weapons (javelins and 
arrows) could be used effectively from fortress walls, and by the second 
quarter of the fourth century catapults were being used to defend 
fortresses.214 
 
If the ephebes were instructed in peltast tactics – the very antithesis of hoplite warfare 
(Thuc. 4.126.5-6) – it would mean that the training program, like the one Plato proposed 
for the citizens of his ideal state (Leg. 813D-E; 834A),215 was intended to create citizen-
soldiers equally adept at fighting as hoplites in the phalanx and as missile-wielding 
warriors in the rugged border areas of Attica:216 i.e. in two of the three troop types 
necessary for success in fourth-century warfare (Xen. Oec. 8.6; Poly. Strat. 3.9.22). The 
implication is that the demos had overcome their disdain for the lightly armed 
infantryman’s womanish weapons and cowardly tactics and had finally grasped the 
                                                
211 For an assessment of the ephebes’ fighting abilities in the Lamian War, see p. 181, n. 163. See also 
Phocion’s defeat of Micion (p. 134).  
212 Raaflaub 1996, 157. 
213 Lendon 2005, 113. 
214 Ober 1985a, 90-1.  
215 For Plato’s training system, see Morrow 1960, 327-37. 




advantages to be gained from equipping youths as light troops for border defense, just as 
Xenophon had recommended a generation earlier (Mem. 3.5.25-7).217 If we accept this, 
the ephebes must have been issued with the pelta, the light wicker shield that gave the 
peltast his name (Arist. Fr. 498 Rose; Plat. Prot. 350A),218 during their stint of military 
service.219 Given that the peltast depended upon his lack of armor to flee from his 
adversaries,220 an ephebe could not have fought effectively as a skirmisher while 
burdened with the hoplite shield (aspis), because it would have limited their mobility, 
made them prone to stumbling on difficult ground, and quickly worn them out after 
running a short distance.221 
As with the ephebes’ physical exercise and hoplite training, the Athenaion 
Politeia’s brief description tells us nothing about their instruction in non-hoplite arms. 
We have epigraphic evidence, however, which suggests that they practiced casting the 
javelin.222 They probably devoted just as much time to learning the bow and the catapult: 
certainly the complexity of late fourth-century artillery required careful training before 
the operator could fire it with a reasonable degree of accuracy.223 Perhaps the ephebes 
                                                
217 E.g.: Thuc. 4.40.2; 4.126.5-6; Eur. Her.Fur. 159-64; Plut. Mor 234E. For these and other sources, see 
Hanson 1989, 13-6; Spence 1993, 168-72. 
218 For the equipment of the peltast, see Best 1969, 3-16.  
219 Rawlings 2000, 238-9. 
220 Peltasts, like other types of light troops, would attack with their missiles, preferably from rough terrain, 
until their enemies retaliated by charging them. They would then escape rather than fight at close quarters. 
A typical battle would consist of peltasts advancing and retreating in accordance with the reaction of the 
enemy: Thuc. 3.97.3-98.4; 4.30.4-37.5; Xen. Hell. 3.2.2-5; Xen. Anab. 6.3.6-9. For the fighting manner of 
lightly armed infantrymen, see Best 1969; Anderson 1970, 111-140. 
221 On the aspis generally, see Hanson 1989, 65-9. Blyth’s 1982, 5-21, reconstruction of a fragmentary 
aspis from the Museo Gregoriano suggests that it weighed at least 13.5 lbs. It required considerable 
physical effort to hold the shield in a chest-high position: Ar. Nub. 987-9; Xen. Hell. 3.1.9. Also see the 
experiments of Donlan and Thompson 1976, 339-43. It limited the hoplite’s mobility: D.S. 15.44.2; Xen. 
Anab. 3.4.47; Hell. 4.3.23. It did not protect the hoplite’s right side (Thuc. 5.71.2; Plut. Mor. 220A) and it 
was difficult to maneuver (Cartledge 1977, 13, n. 17; contra Krentz 1985, 53-4). Overall the aspis was 
unsuited for individual combat (see Holliday 1982, 94-7). Scholars are therefore wrong to assume that 
ephebes could have both carried the aspis and fought as light armed troops (Hansen 1985, 49; Faraguna 
1992, 277; Marcellus 1994, 81). 
222 An inscription from Oropus (IG VII 444 = Petrakos 1997, 267-8, no. 348), dated c. 335-322, says that 
“the Athenian [name unknown] son of Autolycus, [having defeated] the ephebes in the javelin at the 
Amphiaraeum:” i.e. the ephebes competed in the javelin at Oropus. In E18 (329/8?), a dedication of Oineis, 
the akontistes Kephisippus (Left Side, lines 8-9) perhaps was honored because the ephebes gained victory 
with the javelin at an unknown festival. For javelin-throwing in athletics and war, see Harris 1963, 26-36. 
223 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics preserves an anecdote where a man accidentally fired a catapult when 
he only intended to show how it worked (1111a6). On the skill and extensive practice required to operate a 
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honed their skills by competing against one another in each of these projectile weapons, 
just as Agesilaus offered prizes for peltasts and archers at Ephesus in 395 (Xen. Hell. 
3.4.16).224 If we consider that lightly armed infantrymen would have had to train 
assiduously from boyhood to gain sufficient expertise in the javelin and bow so that they 
could hold their own in a skirmish against their opponents (Xen. Cyr. 2.1.16; D.S. 
15.85.4-5), the ephebes’ skills after one year of training must have been rudimentary in 
comparison to the professional light troops Athens recruited from Thrace and the less 
well-developed areas of Greece.225 The ephebes may have only required a basic 
proficiency in the javelin and bow, however, to fight effectively against Boeotian raiders 
in the Athenian countryside. 
 These limited skills could have also been employed to protect Athens’ fortresses, 
as Ober suggests.226 But the defense of fortified positions would have contributed little to 
the φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας against bands of plundering marauders because the latter could 
have easily avoided the garrisons on the frontier and would have had nothing to gain (i.e. 
booty) from attacking the forts directly.227 Indeed, the ephebes could have used them if 
and only if an invading force had brought the Athens-Piraeus enceinte or the border 
fortresses under siege. But what potential enemy could have prompted this concern? The 
obvious candidate is Macedon. The threat of Macedonian invasion was a distinct 
                                                                                                                                            
catapult effectively in combat, see Marsden 1969, 67-8. Unless a catapult was set up at the Lyceum, the 
training probably took place at the Piraeus, where catapult frames are known to have been stored in the 
Lycurgan period (IG II2 1627, Col. B, lines 328-41, dated to 330/29; see also IG II2 1467, Col. B, lines 48-
56, dated c. 338-326, from the Acropolis). If so, the demos probably appointed a καταπαλταφετής of 
proven experience and long-standing service to Athens, such as Ἡρα[κ]λείδας Μυσός καταπαλταφέτας 
(IG II2 9979 = Syll.3 III 1249, dated to the 340’s), whose gravestone was erected in the Piraeus. 
224 In the Laws Plato proposed contests for archers, peltasts, stone throwers, and slingers, in which prizes 
would be awarded to those who performed best (834A). 
225 Thracians, Aetolians, Locrians, and Acarnanians were noted for their skill with the javelin or sling (Xen. 
Mem. 3.9.2; Thuc. 2.81.2; 3.95.3; Eur. Phoen. 139-40; Poll. Onom. 1.140). Since these peoples produced an 
abundant supply of peltasts and slingers, Athens, like other Greek cities, routinely hired them as 
mercenaries or called upon them as allies throughout the Classical period rather than devote considerable 
resources over many years to train their own citizens: see Parke 1933; Best 1969. Plato is probably thinking 
of the Athenians’ lack of familiarity with missile weapons when he recommends that children should attend 
javelin-throwing and archery lessons from the age of six (Leg. 794C-D; cf. 813D-E).  
226 See also Anderson 1991, 28. 
227 Ober’s 1985a, 111-29, survey of roads on the Athenian frontier suggests that “a good number of ways 
into Attica were available to potential invaders (128).” Raiders thus had a good selection of routes and 
could bypass fortifications altogether unless garrisons sallied out against them or peripoloi intercepted them 
(see Munn 1993, 15-32).  
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possibility should war break out with Alexander, even though Athens managed to escape 
an actual invasion on three separate occasions in 338/7, 336/5, and 335/4 (Aeschin. 
3.131; D.S. 17.4.6-9; Arr. Anab. 1.10.2-6). If so, the ephebes’ training in missile weapons 
should also be seen in the light of the measures taken during the Lycurgan period to 
strengthen Athens’ land defenses against a possible invasion, alongside the refurbishment 
of the polis’ fortifications and the construction of an arsenal of 50,000 missiles on the 
Acropolis (Plut. Mor. 852C). 
 
3.5: Conclusion 
Citizens of every census class, including clerurchs, were required to serve in the 
ephebeia. But not all citizens initially wanted to participate, despite the institution’s 
importance for the defense of Attica, because two years of continuous military service 
conflicted with their personal interests. The demos persuaded reluctant ephebes to serve 
by appealing to their philotimia. Ephebes could aspire to become a taxiarchos or 
lochagos, distinguish themselves by winning the lampadedromia, or be honored at the 
end of their stint of service. Having mobilized nearly every available citizen for home 
defense, the ephebeia made two important innovations to turn a given helikia of ephebes 
into a militarily capable fighting corps. First, the ephebes were subject to strict military 
discipline at the hands of the tribal sophronistes, who could inflict physical punishment 
upon them without fear of prosecution. Indeed, the epigraphic evidence shows that the 
demos expected the ephebes to observe εὐταξία and πειθαρχία during their stint of 
service. Second, the demos established a peacetime military training program in which 
specialized instructors taught the ephebes physical training, hoplite weaponry, and non-
hoplite arms. Its primary purpose was to make the ephebes more effective in defending 
Attica against hostile raids. 
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Chapter Four: The Lycurgan Ephebeia: 
 
Conversely a good soldier must be a good citizen. Equally important with 
more extensive military training, therefore, is training in citizenship, – the 
cultivation of a sense of responsibility for the common weal, of behavioral 
discipline, of morals, of all that is implied in εὐκοσμία, κοσμιότης, and 
σωφροσύνη. Lycurgus, we may assume, took measures to transfer his 
logic into action and thus initiated modifications in the ephebia which 
were eventually to transform it from a purely military, into an educational 
organization.1 
 
  Reinmuth’s position is representative of scholarly opinion in that certain aspects 
of the ephebeia cannot be explained purely in terms of its military function. Scholars 
have long recognized that “the fourth-century ephebia also included a kind of civic 
novitiate, a system of moral and religious training in preparation for the full exercise of 
the rights and duties of citizenship.”2 Indeed, the communis opinio is that it was 
“reformed” because there was a need to educate the youngest citizens in the Lycurgan 
period.3 While scholars assert that the ephebeia also functioned as an institution with 
educational characteristics, there is no consensus as to what kind of paideia the ephebes 
received.4 This confusion is understandable if we take into account that the literary and 
epigraphic evidence for the ephebes’ non-military activities are scattered and difficult to 
interpret.5 The purpose of this chapter is therefore to reconstruct, tentatively, this system 
                                                
1 Reinmuth 1971, 130.  
2 Marrou 1956, 151. 
3 E.g. Ober 2001, 203: “Before the 330s, the Athenians had employed as border-guards young citizens, who 
were probably called ephêboi. But beginning in 335/4, the ephebeia came to include a stronger educational 
component. Upon turning eighteen, Athenian citizen-males were now inducted into a two-year program 
that conjoined military traning and moral education.” 
4 Examples of scholars’ contrasting positions: Mitchel 1970, 37 (intensive indoctrination in patriotism); 
Faraguna 1992, 278 (ephebeia designed to instill civic virtues); Marcellus 1994, 86 (military training as a 
medium to providing an extensive education in moral virtue); Ober 2001, 203 (no evidence for civic and 
moral education apart from the sophronistes); Humphreys 2004, 120 (education through ritual). 
5 This is in contrast to the Hellenistic ephebeia, where the epigraphic evidence attests that the ephebes 
played a conspicuous role in the public life of Athens, in that they competed and celebrated most of the 
polis’ major cults and festivals, met and provided an honor guard for foreign dignitaries, studied under 
various philosophers, and attended the Assembly and the theater of Dionysus. For a discussion of these 
activities, see Pélékidis 1962, 211-256. 
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of youth education, to ascertain its goals, and to establish why the Athenians under 
Lycurgus’ administration should have thought it necessary to create it.  
 
4.1: Lycurgus’ Paideia of the Young 
In the spring of 337/6, soon after the establishment of the League of Corinth and a 
few months before Philip’s assassination, Eucrates proposed a law that sought to prevent 
the overthrow of the democracy and the installation of tyranny in Athens.6 What 
prompted the Athenians to pass a law that superseded Demophantus’ anti-tyranny decree, 
dated to 410/9 (Andoc. 1.96-8)?7 It is possible that they feared a pro-Macedonian coup in 
Athens, despite the guarantee given in the Common Peace that all poleis would retain 
their constitutions (Tod. II, no. 177, lines 12-14).8 While there is no evidence to suggest 
that Philip in fact intended to establish a tyranny in Athens,9 the demos nevertheless may 
have been anxious since he had subverted the constitutions of several poleis and set up 
partisan regimes throughout Greece after Chaeronea.10 Eucrates’ legislation, then, should 
probably be regarded as a warning to Philip and his partisans in Athens, real or 
imagined,11 that the demos was determined to protect the constitution against all threats. 
                                                
6 Meritt 1952, 355-9, no. 5 = SEG 12.87 = Schwenk 1985, no. 6. See Engels 1989b, 189-92; Sawada 1996, 
82-4, for a bibliography on this law, which was passed in the month of Elaphebolion (February/March) of 
336. Eucrates son of Aristotimus of Piraeus, may have been the same man as the “Eucrates from Piraeus” 
executed with Hyperides and Demosthenes after the Lamian War in 322 (Luc. Dem.Enc. 31). The stele 
specifies that two copies were erected, one by “the entrance into the Areopagus where one goes into the 
Bouleuterion,” the other in the ecclesia (lines 22-7). There is no literary reference to the law. 
7 Ostwald 1955, 103-28, has compared Eucrates’ law to previous anti-tyranny legislation, including that of 
Demophantus (120-3). The law contains two main clauses. The first says that it is lawful to kill anyone who 
attempts to set up a tyranny or supports such an attempt (lines 7-11). The second prohibits the Areopagites 
from meeting during an anti-democratic coup. Should they do so they will lose their citizen rights and their 
property will be confiscated (lines 11-22). 
8 Some scholars argue that the law is intended to prevent the Areopagites from collaborating with Philip to 
overthrow the democracy (e.g. Meritt 1952, 355-9; Ostwald 1955, 119-28), but the Areopagus’ activities 
before and after Chaeronea cannot be considered anti-democratic, unpatriotic, or sympathetic to the king 
(Mossé 1973, 78; Wallace 1989, 182-3). Nor, as Schwenk 1985, 40-1, points out, does the law in any way 
limit the Areopagus’ powers but prevents “the Council or any of its members from giving (or being forced 
to give) legal sanction in case of tyranny.” 
9 Sealey 1958, 71-2; Mossé 1973, 77. 
10 For Philip’s pro-Macedonian regimes after Chaeronea, see Roebuck 1948, 73-92; Hammond and Griffith 
1979, 604-23.  
11 In the Against Philippides, delivered sometime in 338-336 (Whitehead 2000, 29-30), Hyperides accuses 
Phillipides and his associates of waiting for “opportunities to harm the city” (8). Whatever the truth of this 
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That the citizens of Lycurgan Athens continued to fear Macedonian autocracy and the 
threat it posed (in their eyes) to the democracy is suggested by the increased prominence 
of Demokratia in the late 330’s,12 though it is unclear whether the boule’s dedication of 
her statue in the Agora in 333/2 points to the beginning of a new cult or the revitalization 
of an existing one.13 
The Athenians had good reason to fear Macedon if we consider that Alexander’s 
hold over Athens tightened during this period. After the destruction of Thebes the 
Athenians’ main hope for liberation depended upon the Persians under Darius III 
defeating Alexander. This was dashed, however, by Alexander’s decisive victories at 
Issus in 333 and Gaugamela in 331:14 Aeschines laments the demise of the Persian king, 
who was once the lord of all Asia but now flees for his life (3.132). While Alexander was 
triumphant in Asia, the Spartan king Agis III initiated an uprising against Macedon early 
in 331. This revolt was short-lived, since Antipater, Alexander’s regent in Europe, 
defeated Agis and his allies at the battle of Megalopolis in the spring of 330.15 Despite 
the bellicosity of some Athenians and the demos’ open sympathy for Sparta, 
Demosthenes and Demades persuaded them to stay out of the conflict,16 since an armed 
                                                                                                                                            
charge, Hyperides was clearly playing upon the demos’ concerns that some citizens were plotting with 
Philip to subvert the democracy (Ostwald 1955, 124-5; Wallace 1989, 180).   
12 SEG 12.87 has a relief depicting a personified Demokratia crowning a seated Demos. For this relief, see 
Lawton 1995, no. 40, 100; Blanshard 2004, 1-15. Lawton, 2003, 123-7, associates her appearance on the 
relief with other anti-Macedonian and pro-democratic iconography after Chaeronea.  
13 Raubitschek 1962, 238-43, has published a fragment of her base (SEG 32.238). Palagia 1982, 99-113, 
initially identified the statue of Demokratia with Agora S 2370, but later preferred Agathe Tyche instead 
(1994, 113-22). For the location of the statue, see Palagia 1982, 112, on EM 12749, dated to 306/5-301. 
The strategoi are known to have sacrificed to Demokratia, between the Eleusinia (Metageitnion) and the 
Asclepieia (17 Boedromion), in 332/1 and 331/0 (IG II2 1496, lines 131-2, 140-1). This has led some to 
suggest these sacrifices were made on 12 Boedromion, on the anniversary of the restoration of the 
democracy in 403 (Oliver 1960, 164-6; Raubitschek 1962, 239; Mikalson 1974, 53, on Plut. Mor. 349F). 
Others, however, argue that the cult began when the boule dedicated her statue, probably her cult-statue, in 
333/2, since the first known sacrifice to her is attested in 332/1 (Mitchel 1970, 44-5; Versnel 1995, 385). 
14 The expectation of Demosthenes, and perhaps among the demos as a whole, was that the Macedonians 
would be “trampled underfoot by the Persian cavalry” at Issus in 333 (Aeschin. 3.164). Worthington 2000, 
94-5, argues that Demosthenes may have harbored similar hopes for Gaugamela. 
15 For a full discussion of Agis’ war, see Badian 1967, 170-92; 1994, 258-92. For Sparta’s allies, see 
McQueen 1978. For the chronology of the conflict, see Badian 1994, 268-77.  
16 While the speaker in the On the Treaty with Alexander ([Dem]. 17), dated to 331/0 (see p. 60, n. 13), 
urges his compatriots to declare war on Alexander, Demosthenes counseled non-intervention: he apparently 
made a token gesture of support for Agis, but then “cowered down” (Plut. Dem. 24.2) and did nothing 
(Aeschin. 3.166-7; Din. 1.35). Even so, the demos still agitated to mobilize the fleet to aid Agis, probably in 
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confrontation with Antipater would have endangered the lives of those citizens serving on 
the twenty triremes which the demos had sent to Alexander for his campaign against 
Darius (D.S. 17.22.5).17 While the decision not to get involved was justified given Agis’ 
rapid defeat, though Athens’ support may have made a difference to the outcome of the 
rebellion,18 the demos’ refusal to challenge Macedon showed that the city was now 
impotent in international affairs (Lyc. Leoc. 50; Aeschin. 3.134).19  
The Athenians, unsurprisingly, did not want to be reminded of this unpalatable 
fact.20 A few months after Agis’ defeat, Aeschines reopened his long-delayed suit against 
Ctesiphon.21 As Sawada has shown, Aeschines’ renewed attack on Demosthenes should 
not be seen as a confrontation between pro- and anti-Macedonians but made out of 
personal enmity.22 Even so, their speeches provide an insight into how the demos 
perceived Macedonian hegemony in 330. Demosthenes had little to say about the 
complex events from 336 to 330 (18.253, 270). Instead, he concentrated on Athens’ 
staunch and unyielding opposition to Philip before and at Chaeronea in which the 
Athenians fought nobly, if unsuccessfully, in the cause of Greek freedom (18. 139-210). 
Aeschines, however, talked at length about Demosthenes’ role in the downfall of Thebes, 
                                                                                                                                            
early 331 (Blackwell 1999, 58, n. 79), but Demades quashed this by threatening to use the Theoric fund for 
the venture instead of distributing the money to the citizenry for the Choes festival (See Mitchel 1962, 219-
21, on [Plut]. Mor. 818E-F). 
17 St Croix 1972, 376-8; Badian 1994, 259. Diodorus Siculus attributes the Athenians’ neutrality to 
Alexander’s benevolence (17.62.7), which may refer to the Macedonian king’s decision to return the 
tyrannicides and the citizens captured at the battle of the Granicus as a reward for Athens’ non-involvement 
in the rebellion (See Badian 1967, 183, on Arr. Anab. 3.6.2; 3.16.8). Sealey 1993, 207, unconvincingly 
suggests that the Macedonian garrison on the Cadmeia was sufficient to deter Athens from going to war 
(contra Cawkwell 1969, 179). 
18 See Blackwell 1999, 57, on Aeschin. 3.165. 
19 Cf. Cawkwell 1969, 176: “The Persian Empire was ended; the great revolt of Agis was over. No obstacle 
remained to Macedonian domination without end. With Thebes gone, and Sparta gone, and the heart of 
Greece crushed, what future in mid 330 could an Athenian see?” 
20 How would the demos have perceived Alexander’s dedication of 300 Persian panoplies to Athena after 
the battle of the Granicus in 334, along with the following inscription that read “Alexander son of Philip 
and the Greeks except the Lacedaemonians from the barbarians dwelling in Asia” (Arr. Anab. 1.16.7; Plut. 
Alex. 16.8)? While the Athenians could not have refused such a gift, most would have found it offensive 
because they were desiring a Persian victory and they knew that Alexander had enslaved those compatriots 
fighting as mercenaries for the Persians (Mitchel 1970, 8). They may have also regarded it as a blunt 
warning that they would suffer the same fate should they be foolish enough to oppose him (Green 1991, 
181; Hurwit 1997, 254).  
21 Harris 1995, 140-2, 173-4; contra Burke 1977, 330-40. 
22 Sawada, 1996, 60-71. 
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Sparta, and Persia – the most powerful opponents of Macedon – in an effort to stir ill-will 
against him (3.159-167). Though there were other reasons for Aeschines’ heavy defeat 
(less than 20% of the votes: Plut. Dem. 24.2-3),23 Worthington convincingly argues that 
he badly misread the jurors’ minds and earned their wrath in recounting how Alexander’s 
military supremacy in Greece and Asia had quickly ended all prospects for 
independence.24 
For Lycurgus, the demos’ nostalgia for the past could be used in a different way, 
namely to reassert the greatness of Athens despite Alexander’s hegemony over Greece. 
But how? In a fragment of the Against Cephisodotus concerning the Honors to Demades, 
Lycurgus praises Pericles’ conquests, his building program, and the immense funds 
stored on the Acropolis (Conomis Fr. 9.2), while in the Against Leocrates he extols his 
ancestors for defeating the Persians and their leadership over the Greeks (72-3). While he 
was in no position to match his ancestors’ military accomplishments under Pericles’ 
dynamic leadership, he nevertheless hoped to revive his compatriots’ civic pride and 
patriotism by emulating the culture and magnificence of the city’s golden age.25 Indeed, 
he had the financial means and will to carry out an extensive building program 
comparable to that undertaken in the fifth century, thus demonstrating Athens’ power and 
wealth to his fellow countrymen.26 The demos, frustrated by their inability to regain their 
independence in the late 330s, could be diverted from the painful present by their 
admiration for his program of urban renewal, which aimed to adorn Athens’ somewhat 
                                                
23 See also Harris 1994, 142-8. 
24 Worthington 2000, 99-100. 
25 For Periclean Athens as Lycurgus’ political and cultural ideal, see Mitchel 1970, 3-52; Humphreys 2004, 
77-129. He was hardly unique in his veneration for its achievements: [Dem]. 13.28; Dem. 22.76; 23.207; 
24.284; Aeschin. 2.105; Isoc. 5.146; 15.307; Din. 1.37. Cf. Perlman 1961, 156-7: “[Pericles] is practically 
the only politician for whom the orators have nothing but praise … the period of his leadership is a period 
of glory and prosperity, unlike the periods which preceeded or succeeded it. Apart from the Persian wars, 
this is an epoch of Athenian history of which Athenians ought to be proud. There can be no doubt that here 
is not only a widespread popular conception of past history, but also an expression of Athens’ aspirations to 
obtain a position of a great power and the leadership of Greece in the fourth century.” 
26 For Lycurgus as comptroller of Athens and an outline of his activities, see pp. 62-4. Cf. Mitchel 1970, 
48: “Only if we consider that Athens had completed no significant building since the Erectheion and the 
temple of Athena Nike, can we duly appreciate the Lycurgan building program. Hurwit 1997, 255: 
“Lykourgos’ building campaign did not, then, emerge out of nothing. Still, for sheer scale and 
concentration of resources, labor, and energy, Athens had seen nothing like it since the Periklean golden 
age (Lykourgos’ obvious model and inspiration).” 
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rundown city landscape in a manner befitting a people who still aspired to be the leaders 
of the Greek world ([Plut]. Mor. 852C: ἐκόσμησε τὴν πόλιν).27  
Alongside the extensive public works undertaken during his administration, 
Lycurgus sought to educate the younger generation on the duties and responsibilities of 
citizenship. As he himself puts it in the Against Leocrates: 
 
If you vote against this man [i.e. Leocrates], you will not only chastise 
him, but also turn all the younger men toward virtue (τοὺς νεωτέρους 
ἅπαντας ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν). For there are two things with which to teach the 
young (τὰ παιδεύοντα τοὺς νέους): the punishment of wrongdoers and 
the rewards that go to good men. Turning their attention to two 
alternatives, they shun the first out of fear and desire the second for the 
sake of a good reputation (10).28 
 
In Lycurgus’ view the Athenians excel all other men in their piety to the gods, respect for 
their parents, and patriotic devotion to their country (Leoc. 15). His conception of the 
loyal and virtuous citizen is made clear in his lengthy civics lesson, for the benefit of the 
young (Leoc. 93-9, 106), on the importance of patriotic self-sacrifice, an unswerving 
obedience to the laws, and a deep reverence for the cults of Athens (Leoc. 75-130).29 For 
Lycurgus, the military buildup after Chaeronea – the strengthening of the city’s 
fortifications, navy, and naval infrastructure ([Plut]. Mor. 852C)30 – would have been of 
little use if citizens were to act like the cowardly and treasonous Leocrates, who 
                                                
27 For vacant lots in Athens, temples needing to be repaired, slums near the Pnyx, and the decrepit 
condition of the city’s public buildings before the Lycurgan period, see Dem. 3.29; 23.206-8; [Dem]. 
13.28-30; Xen. Por. 2.6; 6.1; Aeschin. 2.81-2. Cf. Isoc. Anti. 234: τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον Περικλῆς καὶ 
δημαγωγὸς ὢν ἀγαθὸς καὶ ῥήτωρ ἄριστος οὕτως ἐκόσμησε τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοῖς ἱεροῖς  καὶ τοῖς 
ἀναθήμασιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὥστ’ ἔτι καὶ νῦν τοὺς εἰσαφικνουμένους εἰς αὐτὴν νομίζειν μὴ 
μόνον ἄρχειν ἀξίαν εἶναι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων. 
28 οὐ μόνον τοῦτον νῦν κολάσετε κατεψηφισμένοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς νεωτέρους ἅπαντας ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν 
προτρέψετε. δύο γάρ ἐστι τὰ παιδεύοντα τοὺς νέους, ἥ τε τῶν ἀδικούντων τιμωρία, καὶ ἡ τοῖς 
ἀνδράσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διδομένη δωρεά· πρὸς ἑκάτερον δὲ τούτων ἀποβλέποντες, τὴν μὲν διὰ 
τὸν φόβον φεύγουσι, τῆς δὲδιὰ τὴν δόξαν ἐπιθυμοῦσι. 
29 Hyperides declared that Lycurgus was “second to none … as a speaker” (4.12), while the Vitae decem 
oratorum suggests that his speeches were generally well received (841B; 842F). Ancient literary critics had 
divergent opinions of his style (see collected testimonia in Conomis 1970, 31-2). For a discussion of 
Lycurgus’ rhetoric, see Allen 2000, 5-33; Whitehead 2006, 132-51. Although Hermogenes noted his 
tendency to digress with stories, historical events, and poetry (π. ἰδεῶν Rabe p. 402, 14), we cannot be 
certain whether Lycurgus’ other speeches also contained “civic lessons” due to their fragmentary nature.  
30 See pp. 77-80. 
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abandoned Attica rather than face the expected Macedonian invasion after Chaeronea 
(Leoc. 16, 39-42). The goal of his educational program, I suggest, was to convince the 
young that they should place their devotion to the polis above all other considerations 
(Leoc. 101), so that they would not hesitate to risk their lives to defend the constitution 
and to fight against the Macedonians, just as their compatriots did at Chaeronea (Leoc. 
47), to regain their freedom. 
 In the passage quoted above, Lycurgus, like other litigants, claims that his 
adversary’s conviction would benefit the demos because it would encourage them, 
especially the young, to be better citizens.31 As his contemporary Aeschines observes, 
“you know well, Athenian gentlemen, that not just the wrestling-schools or educational 
institutions or musical training educate the young (παιδεύει τοὺς νέους), but more 
important by far are the public proclamations [of Athens’ democratic institutions]” 
(3.246).32 Furthermore, Plato recognizes that the decisions of the ecclesia, lawcourt, and 
theater, consisting of praise and blame for things said or done, exerted a far greater 
influence upon the behavior of young men than whatever formal schooling they had 
received at their fathers’ expense (Resp. 492A-D).33 Indeed, Lycurgus’ belief in the 
important role that these institutions played in educating young citizens may have 
provided an additional impetus behind his refurbishment of the theater of Dionysus,34 the 
buildings associated with the Heliaea and the dikasteria in the Agora,35 and perhaps also 
the Pnyx.36  
                                                
31 Ober 1989a, 161-3; Allen 2000, 20-1; Rubinstein 2000, 165-6. Examples of litigants making similar 
claims: Dem. 19.342-3; 22.37; 25.53; 54.43; Isoc.  20.18, 21; Din. 1.17; Lys. 1.47; 15.9; 22.19-21.  
32 Εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι οὐχ αἱ παλαῖστραι οὐδὲ τὰ διδασκαλεῖα οὐδ’ ἡ μουσικὴ 
μόνον παιδεύει τοὺς νέους, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰ δημόσια κηρύγματα.  
33 For the educational function of these institutions, see Loraux 1986, 144-5; Ober 1989a, 158-65; Garland 
1990, 133; Strauss 1993, 83.   
34 Lycurgus rebuilt the theater of Dionysus (Hyp. Fr. 118 Sauppe; [Plut]. Mor. 841D; 852C), where he 
transformed the wooden seating and stage into a stone auditorium and a skene with a marble façade 
(Travlos 1971, 537-52; Townsend 1982, 90-142). He also passed a law stipulating that bronze statues of 
Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides were to be set up in the theater and ordered that official copies of their 
plays should be stored in the state archive and that actors should not be permitted to use other versions 
([Plut]. Mor. 841F). Richter 1962, 24-9, argues that the statues of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides 
Pausanias (1.21.1-2) observed in the theater of Dionysus were in fact the Lycurgan originals or later copies.  
35 Mitchel 1970, 40-1, supposes that Lycurgus was responsible for changing the bronze of the dicastic 
pinakia to boxwood ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 63.4), but Kroll 1972, 103, shows that this change began c. 350 
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The ephebes, however, could not have gained the educational benefits of Athens’ 
democratic institutions. While Lycurgus, who portrayed himself as the moral guardian of 
the city,37 sought to educate the younger generation by impeaching those citizens guilty 
in his eyes of unpatriotic, impious, or immoral behavior ([Plut]. Mor. 841E, 843D-E),38 
the ephebes could not have listened to his (or anyone else’s) arguments since they were 
too young to serve on a jury ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 63.3). Nor could they have profited from 
the experience in communal decision making (such as the awarding of honors for public 
benefactors) under Lycurgus’ energetic leadership by sitting in the ecclesia because they 
were prohibited from participating in public life until they had completed their stint of 
military service ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.5: διε[ξ]ελθόντων δὲ τῶν δυεῖν ἐτῶν, ἤδη μετὰ 
τῶν ἄλλων εἰσίν).39 While some scholars argue from Hellenistic ephebic inscriptions 
and late literary sources that fourth-century ephebes not only had seats reserved for them 
in the bouleutikon but also played a prominent role in various aspects of the Great 
Dionysia, there is no evidence to suggest that they did in fact attend the festival in the 
Lycurgan period and hence draw useful moral lessons, as Lycurgus intended,40 from the 
plays performed there.41  
                                                                                                                                            
instead. Excavations suggest that some minor features of the Rectangular Peribolos and buildings A-D may 
have been rebuilt or extended in the Lycurgan period (see Boegehold 1995, 99-113). 
36 The date of Pnyx III has been controversial, but scholars who have recently reexamined the archeological 
evidence argue that construction should either be dated to the 340’s or to the period after Chaeronea 
(Engels 1992, 22-6; Rotroff and Camp 1996, 263-94).  
37 For Lycurgus as Athens’ self-appointed “public prosecutor” (Lyc. Leoc. 5-6), see Allen 2000, 17-8; 
Humphreys 2004, 106-7. 
38 Lycurgus preferred to use the procedure of eisangelia (impeachment) to prosecute unworthy citizens. For 
a discussion of eisangelia, see Hansen 1975. While Leocrates escaped conviction by one vote (Aeschin. 
3.252), Lycurgus convicted the strategos Lysicles for his role in the defeat at Chaeronea (D.S. 16.88.1-2), 
the Areopagite Autolycus for sending his family away after the battle (Lyc. Leoc. 53), and Menesaechmus 
for breach of ritual connected with a theoria to Delos (Berl.Pap. 11748). He also supported the 
impeachments against Lycophron for adultery (Hyp. 1 Fr. 3) and against Euxenippus for taking bribes 
when he slept at the Amphiaraeum to bring back the god’s message (Hyp. 4.12). Hyperides objected to 
eisangelia being used for such crimes as adultery and the over-pricing of flute-girls (4.1-8). This complaint 
could be taken as an oblique criticism of Lycurgus (see Whitehead 2000, 196-7, on Hyp. 4.12). Lycurgus’ 
abuse of eisangelia, originally intended for serious offences (Hyp. 4.7-9), may have prompted the demos to 
change the law in the late 330’s to prevent speakers from impeaching citizens for frivolous offenses 
(Hansen 1975, 12-31). 
39 The first certain instance of ephebes attending the ecclesia is IG II2 1006 [122/1], lines 20-1. For other 
examples, see Pélékidis 1962, 273-4. 
40 Humphreys 2004, 104-5, suggests that Lycurgus exploited Athens’ rich dramatic heritage in an effort to 
educate the young. Not only does the Against Leocrates contain many poetic references and quotations but 
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It is for this reason, I argue, that the demos incorporated “educational features” 
into the ephebeia that they believed would instill normative civic values in a given 
enrolment class of ephebes that would enhance the informal paideia that the latter would 
have received from undertaking their two years of military service,42 and the presumably 
favorable impression they gained by admiring the achievements of the Lycurgan period – 
the city’s wealth, military might, and fine buildings – which demonstrated Athens’ 
vitality and importance.43 Marcellus claims that “Lycurgus aimed at nothing short of 
wholesale indoctrination of all new citizens in proper civic, religious, and philosophical 
values.”44 We cannot be certain, however, as to what role he may have played in 
determining the nature of the ephebes’ paideia, because we have no explicit evidence for 
the extent of his involvement in the ephebeia.45 Even so, if we accept that Lycurgus and 
                                                                                                                                            
Lycurgus also declares that Euripides should be praised for the Erechtheus because the poet believed that 
the subject matter – Praxithea’s willing sacrifice of her daughter – would serve as the finest example for the 
demos to study and hence would implant philopatria in their souls (Leoc. 100). Apart from Euripides’ 
Erechtheus, Lycurgus quotes Homer, Tyrtaeus, the epigrams of the Spartans at Thermopylae and the 
Athenians at Marathon, and two unknown poets (Leoc. 92, 103, 107, 109, 132). For a discussion of poetic 
quotations in fourth-century Attic oratory, see Perlman 1964, 155-79. 
41 Second-century inscriptions, beginning with SEG 15.104 (127/6), line 25, attest that the ephebes played a 
leading part in the procession of Dionysus from Eleutherae to the theater, offered a bull for sacrifice, and 
then sacrificed it in the theater (for a detailed discussion of the evidence, see Pélékidis 1962, 239-47).  
Pickard-Cambridge 1968, 59-61, assumes that they performed these activities in the fifth century, while 
Goldhill 1987, 59, is justifiably more cautious. Winkler 1990, 38, argues that the ephebes were allocated 
seats in the bouleutikon of the theater from the late sixth-century onwards. Given the epigraphic evidence 
for the ephebes’ involvement in the Great Dionysia, however, it is more likely that the sources are referring 
to this practice in the Hellenistic period (Poll. 4.122; Hesych. s.v. βουλευτικόν; schol. on Ar. Av. 794).   
42 The ephebeia would have promoted an egalitarian ethos and reinforced the notion of citizen equality – 
key democratic concepts (see Raaflaub 1996, 139-74) – since the ephebes, regardless of their social class, 
fought with the same equipment (hoplite spear and shield), performed the same duties, and were bound to 
observe the same body of regulations (νόμοι) throughout their military service ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.3-5; E2  
[333/2], lines 28, 54). Furthermore, the ephebes, drawn from every geographical region of Attica, would 
have gained a hitherto unprecedented familiarity with their fellow phyletai during their stint in the 
ephebeia, perhaps contributing to increased social stability and cohesion in the citizen body, since it 
appears that “the phylai did not in fact maintain a particularly intimate associational life” outside of the 
institution (Jones 1999, 172).  
43 Cf. Mitchel 1970, 49: “Under the strong and skilful guidance of Lykourgos she [i.e. Athens] made the 
most of the unprecedented peace to recover her strength and pride and to renew those manifestations of 
vigorous public life which had in the past made Athens great, famous, and admired.” 
44 Marcellus 1994, 155. 
45 Parker 1996, 254, opines that “no source brings Lycurgus himself into an association of any kind with the 
institution; but the concern to train up the young shoots of the land as ‘shield-bearing inhabitants, reliable 
in (any) hour of need’ seems quintessentially Lycurgan.” For Lycurgus’ (suspected) contribution to the 
creation of the ephebeia in 335/4, see p. 97, n. 162. The direct evidence is limited to his mention of 
Epicrates’ “law concerning the ephebes” (Harp. s.v. Ἐπικράτης = Lyc. Fr. 5.3 Conomis), the content of 
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the demos would have shared similar concerns for the education of the youngest citizens, 
it is possible that the opinions he puts forth in the Against Leocrates may provide some 
insight into how the Athenians under his administration sought to turn the ephebes 
towards “the path of virtue,” as Xenophon puts it (Mem. 2.1.21). Let us begin with the so-
called “Platonic” aspects of the ephebeia, which scholars have attributed to Lycurgus’ 
education. 
 
4.2: The Ephebe as σώφρων  πολίτης  
The Vitae decem oratorum maintains that Lycurgus was a student of Plato and 
Isocrates before he embarked upon his public career ([Plut]. Mor. 841B; 848D).46 
Although the highly speculative nature of this text concerning the paideia of other 
famous orators does not inspire much confidence,47 other ancient literary sources do 
suggest that Lycurgus, presumably as a youth, did in fact attend the Academy.48 We 
cannot dismiss the possibility, then, that Lycurgus, like other ambitious and wealthy 
young men, did come to Plato to complete his education because he desired to be 
instructed in skills thought to be conducive towards a successful career as a statesman 
                                                                                                                                            
which next to nothing is known (see pp. 65-9). The restoration of the ephebeia after the overthrow of the 
tyranny of Demetrius of Phalerum in 307 and the re-establishment of the democratic government under 
Habron, Lycurgus’ son (See Marcellus 1994, 181-6, on IG II2 478; 556; 1159), who had performed his 
military service over twenty years before (E18 [329/8?], lines 6-7, 72-3), may suggest a somewhat closer 
connection between Lycurgus and the institution than is attested in contemporary sources. For an overview 
of the short-lived democracy, see Habicht 1997, 67-81, while Habron’s administration is discussed in 
Merker 1986, 47-50. 
46 ἀκροατὴς δὲ γενόμενος Πλάτωνος τοῦ φιλοσόφου, τὰ πρῶτα ἐφιλοσόφησεν· εἶτα καὶ 
Ἰσοκράτους τοῦ ῥήτορος γνώριμος γενόμενος ἐπολιτεύσατο ἐπιφανῶς, καὶ λέγων καὶ πράττων 
καὶ δὴ πιστευσάμενος τὴν διοίκησιν τῶν χρημάτων. 
47 The author, for example, presents three possibilities concerning Aeschines’ education: either Plato and 
Isocrates were his teachers, or he studied with Leodamas, or he received no formal training at all (840B, F). 
Harris 1995, 28, has shown that the last is correct.  
48 In his Commentary on Plato’s Gorgias, the sixth-century A.D. Alexandrian philosopher Olympiodorus 
says that Lycurgus was Plato’s student and adds that “Philiscus, who wrote the life of Lycurgus, says that 
Lycurgus was great and accomplished many things successfully which are impossible for one to 
accomplish unless he has heard the arguments of Plato” (Olympiod. in Plat. Gorg. 515C [Norvin 197.4-5 
and 198.1-4]). This Philiscus was probably the man of the same name from Miletus, who apparently wrote 
Lycurgus’ biography and was himself a student of Isocrates (Suda s.v. Φιλίσκος; [Plut]. Mor. 836C; 
Dion.Hal. Ep. ad. Amm. 120). Diogenes Laertius, citing the third-century Peripatetic author Chamaeleon as 
his authority, likewise claims that Lycurgus was Plato’s pupil (3.46). For these sources, see Morrow 1960, 
9; Renehan 1970, 218. 
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and legislator.49 Corroboration for this view comes from Lycurgus’ Against Leocrates 
where scholars, despite Zeller’s claim that none of Plato’s ideas are to be found in the 
speeches of any orator,50 show that the orator’s rhetoric and argumentation to some extent 
reflect the language and concepts of the Platonic corpus.51 The biographical tradition that 
he had a philosophical education also puts into perspective his friendship with individuals 
linked to the Academy and the Lyceum and his interest in their activities during his 
administration.52 Finally, the anecdote (if true) that Lycurgus hired “sophists” to educate 
his sons attests to the high esteem he had for philosophers in Athens in the late 330’s or 
early 320’s ([Plut]. Mor. 842D). 
The prevailing scholarly opinion is that philosophical treatises such as the Laws 
were not only important for the development of political theory in fourth-century Greece 
but also exerted an influence (how much is unclear) on the programs of prominent 
statesmen said to have been Plato’s students who put his theories into practice in the field 
of Realpolitik.53 Scholars have thus argued that Lycurgus implemented policies derived in 
                                                
49 For the Academy and its activities, see Field 1933, 30-47; Morrow 1960, 3-13; Saunders 1986, 200-210; 
Monoson 2000, 137-45. Zeller 1919, 30, n. 64, has collected and discussed the ancient sources (esp. Plut. 
Adv. Colot. 1126A) for those statesmen reputed to have been “students” of the Academy. Brunt 1993, 300, 
n. 32, observes that the “admirers of Plato would have had a natural temptation to give him credit for the 
development of other Athenians of his time who were also admired.” 
50 Zeller 1919, 420. 
51 Renehan 1970, 223-7, draws the following parallels: both authors quote Tyrtaeus and claim that he was 
an Athenian by birth (Leoc. 106-7 vs Leg. 629A-E, 660E), employ images of birds defending their young 
(Leoc. 131-2 vs Leg. 814B), and assert that some crimes deserve punishments worse than death (Leoc. 8, 
134 vs Leg. 854E, 869B, 881A). For Allen 2000, 29-31, Lycurgus’ argument that poetry played a vital role 
in teaching the young (Leoc. 95, 100) was influenced by Plato’s belief concerning the pedagogical value of 
fictional stories (Leg. 663D-664A; Resp. 377C). As Humphreys 2004, 104-5, points out, however, Plato 
would not have approved of Lycurgus’ assertion that poetry was superior to the laws in making citizens 
virtuous (Plato. Leg. 721A-E, 722D-723D; Lyc. Leoc. 100-2). 
52 Lycurgus is said to have assaulted and imprisoned a tax-collector for enforcing the metic-tax on 
Xenocrates, the successor to Plato as head of the Academy ([Plut]. Mor. 842B-C). Mitchel 1965, 198, n. 5, 
suggests that Lycurgus was responsible for setting up Socrates’ statue, sculptured by Lysippus, outside the 
Pompeium (D.L. 2.46), but Alexander is a more likely candidate (Pollitt 1986, 53). Lycurgus perhaps 
encouraged Aristotle to open his school at the Lyceum (Tracy 1995, 13), though no source associates the 
former with its foundation (Lynch 1972, 68-105) and the Lyceum was probably rebuilt as a training ground 
for the ephebeia (pp. 136-7). Even so, Lycurgus seems to have maintained some connection with 
Aristotle’s school, because Democles, pupil of Theophrastus, defended Lycurgus’ children against 
Menesaechmus after his death ([Plut]. Mor. 842D-E).  
53 Plato’s personal involvement in Syracusan affairs and the role of the Academy in dispensing political and 
constitutional advice to tyrants, kings, and several poleis has convinced the majority of scholars that the 
philosopher’s ideas had, and were intended to have, an influence on the practical politics of fourth-century 
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some way from the teachings of contemporary political philosophy, especially Plato, in 
the ephebeia. Wilamowitz certainly assumed such a relationship when he bluntly asserted 
that “Platons Gesetze haben die ephebie erzeugt.”54 But can we actually demonstrate 
Platonic influence in the institution? Should we assume, for instance, that Lycurgus had 
taken Plato’s proposals in toto concerning youth military service and modified them for 
the ephebeia (Plat. Leg. 760B-763C, 778E)?55 To attribute the ephebes’ two years of 
garrison duty and their training under specialized instructors ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.3-5) to 
Plato is unconvincing, however, because these aspects of the institution, as I have argued 
in earlier chapters, should instead be seen in the light of Athenian military practices in the 
Classical period and the need of the demos to defend Attica against bands of raiders after 
Thebes’ destruction in 335.56 
For scholars, the existence of syssitia is proof that Lycurgus, who admired Sparta 
and her system of citizen training (Lyc. Leoc. 105-9, 128-9), was inspired by Plato’s 
recognition of the important educational role the syssition played in Sparta and Crete and 
his adoption of the institution for his ideal state (Leg. 842B).57 Reinmuth thus claims that 
the “provision that the epheboi live and train together continuously for two years and eat 
in a common mess … was the translation into fact of Lycurgus’ ideal of the citizen, at 
one remove from Plato’s Laws.”58 Indeed, Murray goes so far as to suggest that Plato’s 
arguments were ultimately responsible for the syssitia in the ephebeia, even if Lycurgus 
                                                                                                                                            
Greece (e.g. Fields 1930, 43-5; Marrow 1960, 7-9; Saunders 1986, 202-3; Monoson 2000, 145-53; contra 
Brunt 1993, 282-342). Marcellus 1994, 124-8, argues that fourth-century philosophers such as Plato, 
Isocrates, and Aristotle had an effect on political events and institutional development through their former 
students. Ober 2001, 194-202, sees various fourth-century democratic reforms as a response to published 
educational works of Plato and other philosophers. Finally, some scholars have even sought to establish a 
direct relationship between philosophical ideas and historical events (e.g. Dusanic 1980, 111-44; Williams 
1982, 173-83).  
54 Wilamowitz 1893, 194.  
55 Cf. Forbes 1929, 114: “It is natural … that if Athens created the ephebia with Plato’s Laws in mind, it 
should adapt the philosopher’s recommendations to make them more feasible from a practical point of 
view.”  
56 See pp. 89-90 (garrison duty and Thebes’ destruction) and 135-46 (military training in the ephebeia). 
57 For a detailed discussion of syssitia in Plato’s Laws, see Morrow 1960, 389-98.  
58 Reinmuth 1967, 49. Cf. North 1979, 124: “It seems as though an effort was being made to secure for the 
young Athenians some of the advantages supposedly conferred on their Spartan counterparts by the 
syssition, the common mess.” Rhodes 1981, 507: “Ephebic service in the time of A.P. was a full-time 




had actually introduced them.59 The notion that Lycurgus incorporated Spartan-like 
syssitia into the ephebeia should be rejected, however, because συσσιτοῦσι … κατὰ 
φυλάς ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.3) probably means no more than “the ephebes dine together 
by tribes,” just like Ariston’s σύσσιτοι in Demosthenes’ Against Conon (54.4) or the 
Athenians who messed together at Phyle in 404/3 (Lys. 13.79). Moreover, given that the 
sophronistes received a daily state-funded trophe for his fellow phyletai ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 
42.3), how else would he have fed them but as a group?60 
Scholars also ascribe the creation of the ten tribal sophronistai, who, as the 
epigraphic evidence shows, were responsible for teaching sophrosyne to the ephebes 
under their care,61 to Lycurgus’ education under Plato. The following view is 
representative:  
 
It can scarcely be an accident that the Athenian statesman Lycurgus, 
whom tradition represents as a pupil of Plato, seems to have considered it 
his function to “sophronize” the demoralized state of which he was the 
chief financial officer and effective leader for twelve years (338-326). One 
of the ways he sought to achieve his purpose was through the institution of 
the officers known as Sôphronistai … Their function was to supervise the 
morals of the ephebes during their period of training. In Platonic terms, the 
young men would be learning to convert a natural tendency toward 
sophrosyne into a civic virtue which it was the purpose of the Laws to 
instill.62 
 
                                                
59 Murray 1991, 89. 
60 If so, this invalidates an argument often raised against an early ephebeia, namely that Plato assumes in 
the Laws that syssitia are not Athenian, but Spartan and Cretan institutions peculiar to these states (see 
Bryant 1907, 85; Forbes 1929, 118-9; Marcellus 1994, 30, on 666E; 780B).  
61 In IG II2 1159 (= Reinmuth 1971, no. 19), dated to 303/2, the fathers of Pandionis honor the sophronistes 
Philonides for taking care of the ephebes “with fine sophron and good order” (lines 9-11), while 
sophrosyne appears on E8, a dedication of Leontis (332/1), where the ephebes are praised ἀρετῆς ἕνε[κα 
καὶ σωφρο]σύνης (line 2; cf. the lochagoi in Col. I, lines 30-1). Merritt 1945, 238, restored 
σωφροσύν]ης in E7 (332/1), line 8, but Lewis’ 1973, 256, reading of ἐπιμελείας τῆς εἰ]ς is more 
convincing (see p. 197).  
62 North 1979, 109.  
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North assumes that the kind of sophrosyne taught to the youngest citizens was the one 
found in the texts of Plato and other writers.63 But even if Lycurgus was a “serious” 
student of philosophy ([Plut]. Mor. 842C), as Renehan suggests,64 we do not know his 
views on sophrosyne, since the term is unattested in the Lycurgan corpus,65 let alone to 
what extent he agreed with Plato’s educational theories in the Republic and the Laws.66 
Furthermore, North does not consider why the demos should have agreed to the office of 
sophronistes if the average citizen, who would not have had the benefit of a higher 
education,67 would have known little if anything about Plato’s theoretical treatment of the 
concept. As Burn rightly observes, “Plato is on most matters excellent evidence for what 
the ordinary Athenian did not think.”68 Consequently, I suggest that we can explain the 
sophronistes by examining the meanings of sophrosyne that the citizens of Lycurgan 
Athens would have readily understood, namely the cardinal democratic virtue reflected in 
                                                
63 Cf. North 1979, 125: “That Lycurgus is represented by tradition as a pupil of both Isocrates and Plato 
helps explain his concern for civic virtues and perhaps accounts for the prominence of sophrosyne, 
envinced by the very name sôphronistês, as well as by the stock phrases employed in the honorary 
inscriptions.” Though sophrosyne is prominent throughout the Classical period, Plato played a decisive role 
in its development as a philosophical virtue (Resp. 427C; Leg. 631C-D). Contemporaries, notably Isocrates 
and Xenophon, were heavily influenced by Plato’s treatment of the virtue in his philosophical texts, 
especially in his ideal constitution. For a detailed discussion of sophrosyne in Greek literature, see North 
1966, 1-257, esp. 150-96 (Plato); Rademaker 1994, esp. 293-353 (Plato).  
64 Renehan 1970, 229. Brunt 1993, 285, 287, draws an important distinction between the majority of 
students who “were seeking primarily to be trained as statesmen and legislators” and others who “immersed 
themselves in Plato’s dialectic and metaphysics.” Lycurgus probably belongs to the first group. 
65 For the absence of sophrosyne in Lycurgus’ Against Leocrates, see Allen 2000, 20. 
66 Marcellus 1994, 85-137, outlines the development of philosophical-critical ideas on state education 
during the Classical period in order to demonstrate the various ideas Lycurgus (and his supporters) may 
have come into contact with as a student of Plato and during his own studies after leaving the Academy that 
may have influenced the creation, function, and organization of the ephebeia. The major flaw in this 
approach is that we know little about Lycurgus’ own philosophical beliefs and consequently should not 
assume that a given aspect of the ephebeia was an adaptation of Plato’s theories, such as the “ephebic” 
syssition discussed above.  
67 Throughout the classical period a youth’s education and moral instruction were largely in the hands of 
his father, whose wealth and inclination determined the kind, length, and effectiveness of his paideia (Xen. 
Cyr. 1.2.2; Plat. Meno 93D-94C; Prot. 326C). Studies on formal education in Athens stress that while the 
vast majority of citizens received some kind of schooling until their early teens, few would have had 
sufficient wealth to pay for lessons in rhetoric or philosophy (Girard 1891, 63-270; Marrou 1956, 63-146; 
Beck 1964, 72-187). 
68 Burn 1936, xii. 
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the speeches delivered by fourth-century orators, without philosophical refinement, in the 
law-courts and the ecclesia.69  
 How, then, is the σώφρων πολίτης – often best translated as a “moderate” or 
“self-controlled” citizen – portrayed in Attic oratory? The following passage of 
Demosthenes, dated to 325, suggests that the demos regarded the practice of sophrosyne 
as essential for the well-being of the polis: 
 
For all the solemn and fine things by which the city is adorned and kept 
safe – moral-discipline (σωφροσύνη), the respect of your young for 
parents and elders, good-order – prevail by the assistance of the laws 
against what is disgraceful, namely shamelessness, audacity, and 
impudence (25.24).70 
 
The “moderate citizen” is characterized as one who has a modest personal lifestyle, is 
quiet and inoffensive to his fellow citizens, does not initiate litigation, resists bribes, and 
exercises self-control over his physical appetites, such as gluttony, anger, and sex (Lys. 
1.38; 21.19; Is. fr. 131 Sauppe; Dem. 38.26-7; Aeschin. 1.136-7).71 He is also a loyal 
democrat who obeys the laws and endeavors to make himself useful to the state, in 
contrast to the cowardly and servile oligarch (Dem. 24.75; 25.97).72 It is understandable, 
then, that Aeschines would include sophrosyne as one of the five qualities that distinguish 
the demotikos from the oligarch (3.169-70). The orators also associate sophrosyne with 
military valor, linking self-control to the courage (andreia) and excellence (arete) of 
                                                
69 For sophrosyne in oratory, see North 1966, 135-42; Dover 1974, 59-60; Rademaker 2004, 233-50; 
Roisman 2005, 176-85. As a cardinal virtue of the Athenian democracy, see Whitehead 1993, 37-42, 70-2.  
70 πάντα γὰρ τὰ σεμνὰ καὶ καλὰ καὶ δι’ ὧν ἡ πόλις κοσμεῖται καὶ σῴζεται, ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἡ πρὸς 
τοὺς γονέας καὶ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ὑμῶν παρὰ τῶν νέων αἰσχύνη, ἡ εὐταξία, τῇ τῶν νόμων 
προσθήκῃ τῶν αἰσχρῶν περίεστιν, τῆς ἀναισχυντίας, τῆς θρασύτητος, τῆς ἀναιδείας. 
71 Cf. Rademaker 2004, 246: “Thus, we see how, for the citizen of the Athenian πόλις, σωφροσύνη is 
linked to an extensive ideology of civic morality. The σώφρων defendant in the orators is in many 
respects a blameless citizen. He is orderly in his desires and therefore also moderate in his expenses … He 
refrains from injustice and violence against his fellow citizens. And in general, he is not a litigious person 
but leads a quiet and dignified life far from the courts.”  
72 North 1966, 135-6, argues that sophrosyne as a political term had originally been associated with an 
aristocratic or oligarchic form of government but was later appropriated by the demos as a democratic 
virtue from the second half of the fifth century onwards, especially after the unrestrained rule of the Thirty. 
Indeed, Aeschines described the restored democracy and hence the peace from civil strife as σωφρόνως 
πολιτεύεσθαι (2.176; cf. the citizens being σωφρονέστατοι in Isoc. 18.46).  
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citizens in battle (Aeschin. 2.151; Dem. 18.215-6; Hyp. 6.8). Though all Athenians were 
expected to be sophrones politai, the literary evidence suggests that sophrosyne “is the 
virtue proper to the young … to all those members of society of whom obedience is 
required:”73 i.e. the younger generation should act modestly and respectfully in the 
presence of their parents and elders (Dem. 25.88; 61.20-1; Aeschin. 2.180).  
Lycurgus (or his associates) may have persuaded the demos to establish the 
sophronistes, whose task was to oversee the ephebes’ moral and civic education, because 
they could not participate in public life and hence gain the educational benefits of 
Athens’ democratic institutions. Though we cannot be certain, it is possible that he may 
have modeled the sophronistes on Plato’s “superintendent of education,” who supervised 
the paideia of the children and youths of his utopian state (Leg. 765D, 936A).74 Perhaps 
subscribing to the Platonic view that virtue can be taught through social conditioning 
(Plat. Prot. 327E; cf. τὰ παιδεύοντα in Lyc. Leoc. 10),75 he may have argued that this 
official, who was intimately involved with the ephebes’ daily activities ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 
42.3), was in a position not only to subject them to strict military discipline,76 but also to 
make them virtuous citizens by instilling sophrosyne, the cardinal virtue associated with 
decent conduct and loyalty to the democracy. The demos, concerned about the moral 
welfare of the ephebes, found Lycurgus’ proposal attractive provided that they could 
select mature citizens who in their eyes had already demonstrated their excellence as 
sophrones and thus could be trusted to cultivate sophrosyne in the ephebeia.77 
                                                
73 North 1966, 131, n. 24. 
74 For this office in Plato’s Laws, see Morrow 1960, 324-5. 
75 Morrow 1960, 300: “’Can virtue be taught?’ is a question that must have concerned Plato as much as it 
did the Socrates’ whom he portrays in the early dialogues as almost obsessed by it. Plato’s answer is that 
virtue can be taught, but not primarily by admonition, nor by explanation and proof of principles, as one 
would teach a science … No virtue or technical skill can be acquired except by long practice, by a process 
of habituation.”   
76 When the Athenians created the ephebeia in 335/4, they, fearing that the ephebes might engage in 
socially disruptive behavior during their military service, entrusted a newly-created official with the task of 
rendering them εὔτακτοι and εὐπειθείς so that they could carry out their assigned duties (e.g. E8 [332/1], 
Col. I, lines 4-9). For discipline in the ephebeia, see pp. 124-31. 
77 In the previous chapter I argued that the perception of a citizen’s moral character, especially by the 
ephebes’ fathers, was an important factor in his selection as sophronistes (see p. 127 on [Arist]. Ath.Pol. 
42.2). If we also consider Aeschines’ comment that a man was considered to be most sophron from forty 
years old onwards (1.11), the very age of the sophronistes (ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἔτη γεγονότων), it is 
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But how was sophrosyne taught to the ephebes, given that we are told nothing 
about the sophronistes’ educational activities?78 If Allen is right to suggest that Lycurgus 
agreed with Plato’s theory of reformative punishment, it is likely that the sophronistes, 
who had the right to beat ephebes for disobedience and other forms of misbehavior 
([Plat]. Axioch. 366D-367A), was also expected to use corporal punishment to educate 
the offender so that he would act in a more moderate manner in the future.79 The 
sophronistes may have also served as “model of sophrosyne” for the ephebes,80 in that 
the latter, who were regarded as sufficiently mature to be able to distinguish between 
right and wrong (Aeschin. 1.18; Is. 9.20), would imitate his virtuous behavior in the 
mess-hall, at the gymnasium, and in whatever activities he and his charges undertook 
                                                                                                                                            
likely that his reputed self-control made him and the other candidates βελτίστους εἶναι καὶ 
ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν ἐφήβων. A passage from Hyperides’ Against Demosthenes, 
delivered in 324/3, is consistent with this view. In this speech he says that whereas the defendant on 
account of his age should be educating “the younger of the speakers,” the latter are instead making men 
over sixty sophron because of Demosthenes’ acceptance of Harpalus’ bribes (5.22: οἱ νέοι τοὺς ὑπὲρ 
ἑξήκοντα ἔτη σωφρονίζουσιν). If Whitehead 2000, 427-8, is right to take this as an allusion to the 
ephebeia, though Hyperides’ “terminology is less than precise,” it shows that the older man (i.e. the 
sophronistes) was expected to teach the young (i.e. the ephebes) sophrosyne, not vice versa. 
78 Ober 2001, 203. 
79 Allen 2000, 17-21, has analyzed Lycurgus’ use of κολάζειν, ψυχή, and κάλλιστον in the Against 
Leocrates and the orator’s claim that the only just ground for prosecuting wayward citizens like Leocrates 
is for the public good, not from personal enmity (5-6, 31-2). She argues that Lycurgus’ view of punishment 
reflects Platonic principles concerning reformative punishment (e.g. Plat. Leg. 731D; Prot. 323D-324B; 
Gorg. 476D-478D) where the goal was “to educate [the] wrongdoer to virtue (arete) and to make the soul 
of the wrongdoer καλή, noble or fine” (21). Certainly Plato conceives of the Sophronisterion or “House of 
Correction” as a place where criminals stay for five years and are released if they are of sound mind (see 
Morrow 1960, 491, on Plat. Leg. 908E). In the law-court, the demos would have been familiar with 
speakers urging the demos to punish their opponents so that they would be an example to citizens so that 
they would be σωφρονέστεροι in their behavior (e.g. Lys. 1.35; 14.12; Dem. 22.68; 24:18). For a list of 
such instances, see North 1966, 137, n.47; Allen 2000, 20, n. 21.   
80 It is possible that Lycurgus, whom Hyperides characterizes as a sophron man (Fr. 118 Sauppe: οὗτος 
ἐβίω … σωφρόνως), was himself considered by his contemporaries to be a model of sophrosyne during 
his lifetime, comparable to Pericles and other great Athenian statesmen of the past (Isoc. 15.111; 16.28). 
The orators praise the modest private dwellings of Aristides and Miltiades (Dem. 3.25) and the dignified 
posture of Aristides, Pericles, and Themistocles, while speaking in the Assembly (Aeschin. 1.25; 3.257). 
See Schmitz-Kahlmann 1939, 1-38. According to the Vitae decem oratorum, Lycurgus was restrained in his 
private life in that he wore the same cloak in the winter and summer and only occasionally wore sandals 
([Plut]. Mor. 842C). But Plutarch describes Phocion (lack of shoes and did not wear a mantle unless 
extremely cold), also reputed to have been Plato’s student, in similar fashion (Plut. Phoc. 4.1-2). Tritle 
1988, 10, considers this description to be a literary topos created after Phocion’s death. Williams 1982, 25, 
n. 74, however, suggests that Phocion modeled his behavior on Socrates (i.e. Plat. Symp. 219B-220B).   
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during their two years of military service.81 While the Athenians sought to make the 
ephebes virtuous citizens by training them in sophrosyne, the latter’s paideia was not 
limited to the sophronistes but also included the enigmatic “tour of temples,” about which 
little is known. It is to this “educational feature” of the ephebeia that we must now turn.  
 
4.3: The Tour of Temples: Patriotism, Glory, and Self-Sacrifice 
According to the Athenaion Politeia, the ephebes began their stint of service with 
a tour of the sanctuaries (τὰ ἱερὰ περιῆλθον) under the command of the newly elected 
kosmetes and sophronistai (42.3). The author, unfortunately, does not say whether the 
tour was confined only to the city or also included the rural areas, nor does he specify 
what places were visited.82 We cannot even be certain at which time it occurred, though 
perhaps a date in late Metageitnion or early Boedromion (i.e. late July to early August) 
can be inferred from later ephebic inscriptions.83 Despite the lack of information, 
Pélékidis suggests that the tour consisted of the following: 
 
Les éphèbes visitaient les sanctuaries de l’État, surtout ceux qui se 
trouvaient sur l’Acropole et dans l’Agora: peut-être aussi les éphèbes de 
chaque tribu visitaient-ils le sanctuaire du héros éponyme de la tribu … 
Au sanctuaire d’Aglauros, un de ceux qu’ils visitaient, les éphèbes 
prêtaient serment en présence du cosmète et des sophronistes et d’autres 
magistrates (sans doute les neuf archontes, les stratèges et les prytanes) qui 
représentaient la ville.84 
 
                                                
81 Cf. Xen. Cyr. 1.2.8: διδάσκουσι δὲ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ σωφροσύνην· μέγα δὲ συμβάλλεται εἰς τὸ 
μανθάνειν σωφρονεῖν αὐτοὺς ὅτι καὶ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ὁρῶσιν ἀνὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέραν σωφρόνως 
διάγοντας. 
82 Parker 1996, 255, assumes that it was limited to Athens, while Mikalson 1998, 42, thinks that the 
ephebes toured Attica. Faraguna 1992, 278, and Humphreys 2004, 89, are unsure.  Garland 1990, 183, 
suggests that they visited the “principal sanctuaries in the city.” 
83 Pélékidis’ 1962, 219-20, analysis of the Hellenistic ephebic corpus, dating from the second-century 
onwards, shows that the first event celebrated by ephebes was the festival of Artemis Agrotera (e.g. IG II2 
1011, line 7; IG II2 1028, line 8; IG II2 1040, lines 5-6), which took place on 6 Boedromion (see Mikalson 
1975, 50-1, on Plut. Mor. 849E). He plausibly extrapolates from this observation that the tour in the 
Lycurgan period must have ended by this date (111). Marcellus 1994, 13, 198-201, has reexamined the 
evidence for third- and second-century ephebic activity in Boedromion and suggests that the ephebes in 
Lycurgan Athens began their military service towards the end of Metageitnion and that the tour also 
occurred at this time or slightly later. 
84 Pélékidis 1962, 111. 
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There is reason to think that the ephebes during their visitation of the temples came to the 
Aglaurion, located in a cave on the east side of the Acropolis (Paus. 1.18.2),85 and swore 
the ephebic oath (Dem. 19.303). First, Lycurgus says that all citizens took it when they 
enrolled upon the lexiarchicon grammateion and became ephebes (Leoc. 76) and the 
Athenaion Politeia implies that all newly registered citizens were called ephebes after 
they had successfully passed the dokimasia before the boule (42.1-2).86 Second, a 
scholium of Ulpian on Demosthenes 19.303 says that the ephebes “swore the oath at the 
temenos of Aglauros in full armor (ἐν τῷ τεμένει αὐτῆς … μετὰ πανοπλιῶν 
ὤμνυον).” Given that the kosmetes and sophronistai would have issued these arms to the 
ephebes at the initial muster, probably in the Agora, the latter must have sworn it while 
they toured the sanctuaries.87 Reinmuth is perhaps right to suggest that “all young men 
took this oath when they became ephebes … in the sanctuary of Aglauros, perhaps the 
first step in the ‘circuit of temples’ which in Aristotle’s account was the first order of 
business [after the muster] for the whole body of ephebes under the guidance of their 
supervisors.”88 
                                                
85 For the location, see Dontas 1983, 48-63, on SEG 33.115. The identification of the cult with the east side 
of the Acropolis has been controversial, but no convincing argument has been made to disassociate the stele 
and its base from the findspot. A summary of recent scholarship on the Aglaurion is found in SEG 46.137.  
86 See pp. 24-7, for a discussion of the meaning of ephebos and the attainment of citizenship. Some 
scholars, however, reject Lycurgus in favor of Pollux, who says that the ephebes εἰκοστῷ δὲ 
ἐνεγράφοντο τῷ ληξιαρχικῷ γραμματείῳ, καὶ ὤμνυον ἐν Ἀγραύλου (8.105; cf. Harp. s.v. ἐπὶ 
διετὲς ἡβῆσαι; schol. on Aeschin. 1.7), which has been taken to mean that the oath was taken at the end of 
the ephebes’ first (Forbes 1929, 147-8) or second year (Burckhardt  1996, 58). But Pollux’s testimony 
should be rejected because he is probably confusing the pinax ecclesiasticus, which the ephebes would 
have registered upon after they had completed the ephebeia, with the lexiarchicon grammateion (see 
Whitehead 1986, 104; Hansen 1986, 14, on [Dem]. 44.35).  
87 The author of the Athenaion Politeia provides no details of the muster except that the kosmetes and 
sophronistai had “gathered the ephebes together (συλλαβόντες δ’ οὗτοι τοὺς ἐφήβους)” before they 
embarked upon their tour (42.3). The muster, I suggest, took place at the center of Athens’ civic life, the 
Agora, which had sufficient space to accommodate 500 or more ephebes (for citizen participation in the 
ephebeia, see pp. 99-109). Certainly the monument of the ten eponymous heroes, probably remodeled ca. 
330 (see Rotroff 1978, 196-209, on Agora I 7475), would have been an appropriate place for the ephebes to 
gather in their tribal contingents for the first time if we consider that the bronze stele listing their names 
was set up beside its base ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 53.4). For a discussion of this monument, see Hintzen-Bohlen 
1997, 40-2. The issuing of arms at the initial muster should be dinstinguished from the symbolic gifting of 
arms to the ephebes at the ceremony at the beginning of their second year of service (see p. 104 on [Arist]. 
Ath.Pol. 42.4). 
88 Reinmuth 1952, 42. 
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The oath stipulated that the ephebes had to stand their ground in battle (SEG 
21.519, lines 6-8: οὐκ αἰσχυνῶ τὰ ἱερὰ ὅπλα οὐδὲ λείψω τὸν παραστάτην ὅπου 
ἂν στειχήσω).89 It also “bound young men to the territory of Attika at the time of their 
eligibility for military service and identified that service with loyalty to comrades, 
obedience to the laws, and protection of the boundaries of the land of Attika.”90 In 
particular the ephebes swore to protect the sacred sites of Attica and to honor the 
ancestral religion (SEG 21.519, lines 8-9, 16: ἀμυνῶ δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων … 
τιμήσω ἱερὰ τὰ πάτρια). Though we are not told about the ceremony at the Aglaurion, 
it is possible that the priestess would have recounted the myth of Aglauros, whom 
Merkelbach calls “die Sondergötten der Epheben,” to the ephebes.91 According to 
Philochorus she had willingly leapt from the Acropolis to her death in order to save 
Athens by fulfilling Apollo’s oracle, which foretold that the war with Eumolpus would 
end after someone sacrificed himself for the city (FGrHist 328 F105).92 As Kerns points 
out, “Aglauros, then, who as a heroine continued to have a special interest in victory, had 
given her life for the city; the ephebes, young and unmarried like her, had to be prepared 
to do the same.”93 
The content of the oath, then, made it clear to the ephebes what the polis expected 
from them, namely patriotism, piety, bravery and sacrifice in battle, obedience, and 
respect for tradition.94 But if we accept that the youngest citizens had sworn this oath 
                                                
89 For the text and translation of the oath, see p. 31-2.  
90 Cole 1996, 229-30. 
91 For the gods invoked in the oath, see Merkelbach 1972, 277-83; esp. 279 on Aglauros. He has also 
shown how some gods reflect the military aspects of the ephebeia (Enyo, Enyalios, Ares, and Athena 
Areia), or the youth of the oath takers (Thallo and Auxo), or the crops grown within the chora of Attica 
(the horoi, wheat, barley, vines, olive-trees, and fig-trees). See also Graf 1985, 265-8. 
92 For a discussion of this fragment, see Dontas 1983, 61; Oikonomides 1990, 13-4. 
93 Kerns 1990, 330. For Aglauros as a model of patriotic loyalty and self-sacrifice for citizens in battle, see 
Larson 1995, 40-1, 102; Cuchet 2006, 300-3. Boedeker 1984, 108-9, claims that Aglauros is derived from 
agraulos, “spending the night in the field,” or agraulia, a noun used in a military context in later writers 
(D.S. 16.15; Dion.Hal. 6.44).  
94 Cf. Lycurgus’ claim that Leocrates violated each of the oath’s provisions (Leoc. 77-8): “It is a fine and 
solemn oath, gentlemen of the jury. Leocrates has violated it in all respects. Indeed, how could a man be 
more sacrilegious or a greater traitor to his country? How could anyone disgrace his arms more by refusing 
to take them up and make a defense against our enemies? How has he not deserted the man beside him and 
his place in the line of battle if he has not offered his body for duty? Where could he have defended what is 
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from at least the fifth century onwards (Plut. Alc. 15.7-8), why did the demos make them 
visit a number of sacred sites in addition to the Aglaurion, a practice first attested in the 
Lycurgan period, rather than proceed at once to the Piraeus and begin their garrison duty 
([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.3)? The tour, I argue, was intended not only to make the ephebes 
familiar with various sanctuaries, as scholars have supposed,95 but also to educate them 
on the importance of keeping to the ephebic oath. For Lycurgus the oath held the 
democracy together and collectively the oaths of the archon, juryman, and private citizen 
were the essential components of the politeia (Leoc. 79).96 I further suggest that the 
demos created the tour because they were concerned that those ephebes who tried to 
evade their assigned duties in the ephebeia would not be willing to fight for Athens 
should they have to face a Macedonian army which had decisively defeated its most 
formidable rivals on Mainland Greece: i.e. the Athenians in 338, the Thebans in 335, and 
the Spartans in 330.97 
If so, how did the tour convince a given enrollment year of ephebes that they 
should not break the ephebic oath, thus avoid revealing themselves to the demos as 
shameless perjurers deserving the gods’ vengeance and as traitors to their country, just 
like Leocrates (Lyc. Leoc. 76-9: φανερῶς ἐπιώρκηκεν … προδότης τῆς πατρίδος)? 
The ephebes’ paideia may have consisted of “a program of intensive indoctrination in 
patriotism,” as Mitchel puts it.98 They were perhaps taught that philopatria was a sacred 
obligation between them and the nurturing mother earth and that it was the responsibility 
of every citizen to fight in defense of the patris so that the tombs of his ancestors and the 
                                                                                                                                            
sacred and profane if he did not face danger? With what greater treachery could he have betrayed his 
country? For his part, the country was given up to the hands of the enemy.” 
95 Forbes 1929, 146: “Under the leadership of the kosmetes and sophronistai, Aristotle tells us, the first 
official act of the ephebi was to make the round of the temples and pay their respects to the gods.” Rhodes 
1981, 505: “The purpose of this tour of temples was presumably to instill in the ephebi a sense of devotion 
to the cults of Athens.” Burckhardt  1996, 57: “So gesehen, hat der Tempelrundgang der Epheben einen 
erzieherischen Charakter. Durch eine mehr oder weniger eingehende Vorstellung der Tempelbauten und 
der darin – von Staats wegen – verehrten Götter sollte also wohl die Identifikation der jungen Männer mit 
ihrer Stadt gefördert werden.”  
96 καὶ μὴν ὦ ἄνδρες καὶ τοῦθ’ ὑμᾶς δεῖ μαθεῖν, ὅτι τὸ συνέχον τὴν δημοκρατίαν ὅρκος ἐστί. τρία 
γάρ ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν ἡ πολιτεία συνέστηκεν, ὁ ἄρχων, ὁ δικαστής, ὁ ἰδιώτης. These oaths are discussed 
in Cole 1996, 236-7; Mikalson 1998, 15-7. 
97 For the lack of zeal some ephebes had for the ephebeia. See pp. 110-2. 
98 Mitchel 1970, 37. 
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temples of the ancestral gods will be kept free from harm.99 Indeed, Lycurgus, who 
characterizes Leocrates as the antithesis of the patriotic citizen, accuses him of impiety 
because he has done “everything in his power to ravage the sanctuaries and destroy the 
temples” and of maltreatment of his parents because he has neglected them “by 
obliterating their tombs and depriving them of their ancestral rites” (Lyc. Leoc. 147).100 
Given this, the ephebes, whose patriotism “was to be grounded upon piety to the city’s 
gods,”101 would have been made well-aware that if they broke the oath they would 
endanger the very places they had visited.102 
But what did the ephebes do at these sanctuaries? Jackson suggests that they 
gazed at the spoils of Athens’ victories – captured arms, shields, helmets, and corselets – 
which had been dedicated by their ancestors during the previous two centuries.103 For the 
ephebes, these conspicuously displayed spoils would have been not only impressive to 
behold,104 but also indisputable proof of the Athenians’ martial prowess at a time when 
they could boast of no military success against Macedon: collectively the spoils 
supported Lycurgus’ claim that the polis was “an example of noble deeds for the Greeks 
… our ancestors surpassed other men in courage” (Leoc. 83).105 They could have 
admired, for example, the sword of Mardonius captured at Plataea in 479 and hung up in 
the Parthenon or the panoplies Demosthenes had brought back from Olpae in 426/5 and 
                                                
99 For patriotism in ancient Greece from Homer to the end of the Classical period, see Cuchet 2006, esp. 7-
28, 111-74, 223-317 (294-7 on Lycurgus; cf. Parker 1996, 252-3, on Lyc. Leoc. 1, 15, 25).  
100 ἀσεβείας δ’ ὅτι τοῦ τὰ τεμένη τέμνεσθαι καὶ τοὺς νεὼς κατασκάπτεσθαι τὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν 
γέγονεν αἴτιος, τοκέων δὲ κακώσεως {ὅτι} τὰ μνημεῖα αὐτῶν ἀφανίζων καὶ τῶν νομίμων 
ἀποστερῶν.  
101 Parker 1996, 255.  
102 If the ephebes first came to the Aglaurion, as Reinmuth suggests, did they also visit the temenos of the 
Attic Charities – Thallo, Auxo, and Hegemone – who had their cult on the Acropolis (Habicht 1982, 89)? If 
so, it is possible that the shrines of those deities and heroes invoked as witnesses in the ephebic oath 
constituted the core of the tour’s itinerary, as Bock 1941, 47, suggests.   
103 Jackson 1991, 235. For the dedication of armor from Homer to the Hellenistic period, see Rouse 1902; 
Pritchett 1974, 240-295. 
104 Captured arms and armor were displayed in a variety of ways, such as being hung from walls or nailed 
to posts and doors (Eur. Tro. 571-6; Paus. 2.21.4; 10.14.3; D.S. 12.70.5). Perhaps Alcaeus’ vivid and 
wondrous description of martial equipment hanging in a great hall provides an indication of how the 
ephebes may have perceived the spoils in the temples they visited (fr. 167 Page). See also Lippman, 
Scahill, and Schultz 2006, 551-64. 
105 τοῦτο γὰρ ἔχει μέγιστον ἡ πόλις ὑμῶν ἀγαθόν, ὅτι τῶν καλῶν ἔργων παράδειγμα τοῖς 
Ἕλλησι γέγονεν· ὅσον γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ πασῶν ἐστιν ἀρχαιοτάτη, τοσοῦτον οἱ πρόγονοι ἡμῶν 
τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἀρετῇ διενηνόχασιν. 
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dedicated in various temples (Dio.Chrys. Or. 2.36; Paus. 1.27; Thuc. 3.114.1). Given that 
the Athenians would have publicly vowed to the gods before setting off on campaign that 
they would dedicate a dekate of the captured arms and armor in their temples should they 
be victorious in battle (Aesch. Sept. 265-78a), these spoils may have strengthened the 
ephebes’ belief that Athens had already received divine help in war and such assistance 
could be expected in the future (Lyc. Leoc. 82; Dem. 18.153).106 Furthermore, the demos, 
by glorifying the excellence of Athens in war, may have hoped that the ephebes, desiring 
to win such honors for themselves, would also strive to emulate their predecessors on the 
battlefield.107  
Did the ephebes tour the tribal sanctuaries, located mainly around the Acropolis 
and Agora,108 as Pélékidis suggests?109 A case could be made for their inclusion if we 
take into account that Lycurgus both argued that mythical (i.e. not necessarily true) tales 
should be used to teach the young (Leoc. 95: εἰ γὰρ καὶ μυθωδέστερόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ 
ἁρμόσει καὶ νῦν ἅπασι τοῖς νεωτέροις ἀκοῦσαι) and that he used the myths of 
Codrus and the daughters of Erechtheus as examples of self-sacrifice that Athenians 
should emulate (Leoc. 84-7, 98-100; cf. the daughters of Hyacinthus Fr. 10.8).110 His 
contemporaries seem to have had a similar approach: (1) Demosthenes’ epitaphios for the 
dead at Chaeronea stresses how the citizens of each tribe had found inspiration in the 
self-sacrifice of the ten eponymous heroes and their descendents (60.27-31). (2) Phocion 
urges the Athenians who had been demanded by Alexander after Thebes’ destruction to 
                                                
106 For military vows and the dekate in Greek warfare, see Pritchett 1971, 93-100; 1979, 230-9. Jackson 
1991, 237-9, argues that vows generally included the promise to dedicate spoils to the gods in the event of 
victory. 
107 Jackson 1991, 236: “the spectacle of temples decorated within and outside with fine arms and armour 
could have been, for good or ill, a strong encouragement to fight when the city required them to do so.” 
Both Lycurgus and Demosthenes urge the young to exert itself to reach the lofty standards, especially their 
military successes, established by their famous ancestors (Lyc. Leoc. 108-10; Dem. 15.35). Were the 
ephebes also required to gaze at Alexander’s spoils on the Acropolis, discussed above (see p. 150, n. 20)? If 
so, the sight of 300 captured Persian panoplies could have served as a reminder to the ephebes that Athens’ 
hopes for independence would depend upon their ability to defeat the Macedonians militarily (i.e. they too 
would have to capture the latter’s armor in battle). 
108 Jones’ 1999, 156-61, thorough study of the epigraphic evidence has shown that shrines of the 
epoynmous heroes were all situated in Athens except for Hippothoon at Eleusis. 
109 Pélékidis 1962, 111. 
110 For Lycurgus’ utilization of myth, see Vielberg 1991, 49-68. 
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sacrifice themselves voluntarily just as the daughters of Leos and Hyacinthus did to save 
the polis from ruin (D.S. 17.15.2; Plut. Phoc. 17.2-3).111 It is possible, then, that the 
sophronistai were required to bring their charges to the shrines of the epoynmous heroes 
where they heard inspiring tales of self-sacrifice and other heroic deeds undertaken by 
their mythical ancestors on behalf of Athens. 
The ephebes may have also visited the Demosion Sema, Athens’ national 
cemetery, where the Athenians had buried those citizens who had fought and died on 
behalf of the polis throughout the Classical period, as part of their civic education.112 The 
reason, I suggest, for visiting these tombs, each with an epigram and a stele inscribed 
with the names of the war-dead arranged by tribe,113 was to demonstrate that previous 
generations of Athenians had stayed faithful to the ephebic oath and had patriotically 
sacrificed their lives in battle. It would have been impressed upon the ephebes that should 
they die for the fatherland their courage would be commemorated with an epitaphios 
delivered before the assembled demos and with an imposing and magnificent monument 
(Thuc. 2.34; Plat. Menex. 234C).114 As Lycurgus puts it, “you, O Athenians, alone know 
how to honor brave men (τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας)” (Leoc. 51). Furthermore, the 
ephebes, by seeing the tomb of the 1,000 citizens killed at Chaeronea (Lyc. Leoc. 142; 
Paus. 1.29.13),115 the very men whom Lycurgus called “the crown of the fatherland 
                                                
111 These examples are discussed in Parker 1995, 251-2. 
112 The main literary source for the tombs (dated 491-ca. 200) in the Demosion Sema is Paus. 1.29.1-16. For 
an analysis of his observations, see Pritchett 1985, 145-51. Clairmont 1983, 29-45, has reconstructed the 
public burial ground and shows that it not only included the war-dead but also other honored Athenians and 
foreigners. See also Patterson 2006, 48-56. Should we include the Demosion Sema in the tour, given that 
the Athenaion Politeia says τὰ ἱερὰ περιῆλθον (42.3)? We do have later evidence that the ephebes 
competed in funeral games held at Marathon and before the city polyandreion, the cenotaph erected in 
honor of the war-dead of Marathon, and that this tomb was located in the Demosion Sema (see Matthaiou 
2003, 190-202, on Agora I 7529 [unpublished], lines 15-7, dated to 176/5). Moreover, if E25 is an ephebic 
inscription, this suggests that the ephebes may have competed in torch races nearby the burial-mound at 
Marathon. Perhaps they also visted the city polyandreion during the tour. They may have even given heroic 
honors to the marathonomachoi, just as their descendents did in the Hellenistic period  (e.g. IG II2 1006 
[122/1], line 26). For the possibility that the Marathon war dead were the recipients of cult from the fifth 
century, see Loraux 1986, 29-30, 39-41; Whitely 1994, 213-3, esp. 230, on the Demosion Sema.  
113 For a discussion of the thirty extant casualty lists, see Smith 1919, 351-364; Bradeen 1964, 16-62; 1969, 
145-59.  
114 For the public funeral and epitaphios, see Loraux 1986, esp. 15-76. 
115 Bradeen 1964, 55-8, no. 16, has reconstructed this monument and concludes that it was of fifth-century 
type, perhaps modeled on the tomb of those slain at Coroneia in 447/6. Apart from the fragment of the 
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(στέφανον τῆς πατρίδος)” because they had died heroically in the defense of Greek 
liberty (Leoc. 46-50),116 would have understood that they too, like their older compatriots, 
would be expected to sacrifice themselves should Athens revolt and attempt to cast off 
the Macedonian yoke.  
 Let us now discuss the participation of the ephebes in the cults and festivals of 
Attica during the Lycurgan period. 
 
4.4: The Ephebes as Pious Citizens 
Forbes observes that “Athens knew the value of a religious spirit in her sons, and 
found the period of ephebic service useful for inculcating an attitude of reverence toward 
the gods.”117 This is certainly true for the ephebes of Lycurgan Athens, although they are 
not praised “for the sake of their piety towards the gods (εὐσεβείας ἕνεκεν τῆς πρὸς 
θεούς)” like their descendents in the Hellenistic period (e.g. IG II2 900 [185/4], line 7). 
The literary and epigraphic evidence suggest that Lycurgus, as the current holder of the 
venerable priesthood of Poseidon Erechtheus ([Plut]. Mor. 843E-F), was deeply 
concerned about encouraging piety among the citizen body, especially the young. Not 
only “did he speak on many occasions about sacred matters [to the demos]” ([Plut]. Mor. 
843D: εἶπε δὲ καὶ περὶ ἱερῶν πολλάκις),118 but in the Against Leocrates he also 
stresses that the cultivation of divine favor was indispensable for the continuing 
prosperity of Athens (e.g. 15, 25-6, 146).119 Given his belief that the gods oversee all 
human affairs and punish wicked behavior (e.g. the pious young man saving his elderly 
father in Lyc. Leoc. 94-7), it is understandable that the Athenians under his 
                                                                                                                                            
casualty lists (Agora I 6953), an epigram is partially preserved on the base (IG II2 5226). See also Pritchett 
1985, 222-6. 
116 Cf. Whitehead 2006, 143: “For Lycurgus the battle of Chaeronea and its aftermath had been the ultimate 
testing-ground of the caliber of all patriotic Athenians.” 
117 Forbes 1929, 146. 
118 The titles and content of his fragmentary speeches (esp. On the Priestess = Fr. 6.1-22 Conomis; On the 
Priesthood = Fr. 7.1-6 Conomis; Against Menesaichmus = Fr. 14.1-11 Conomis) do suggest that “Lycurgus 
discussed in some detail matters of ritual and regularly offered the jury lessons in Athenian cult and myth 
history” (Mikalson 1998, 25). For a commentary on these fragments, see Conomis 1961, 107-25, 140-8. 
119 Mikalson 1998, 11-20, 32, argues that Lycurgus’ beliefs about the gods, sacrifices, and (im)piety, were 
“common and familiar to Athenian audiences.” Whitehead 2006, 142-7, shows how religion (alongside 
patriotism) permeates the Against Leocrates. 
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administration devoted substantial resources to the revitalization of the city’s traditional 
cults with the objective of increasing citizen participation in them.120 
The prevailing scholarly opinion is that the ephebes’ involvement in the religious 
life of the polis would have been less extensive than in the Hellenistic period because the 
Lycurgan ephebeia “was, in this period, primarily and fundamentally military, not 
religious.”121 That scholars should hold this view is understandable if we consider that the 
fourth-century corpus, unlike Hellenistic inscriptions (especially those dating from the 
late third century onwards), do not provide an itinerary of the ephebes’ religious activities 
– sacrifices, processions, athletic competitions, and numerous other responsibilities – 
during their stint of military service.122 Furthermore, while the Athenaion Politeia 
emphasizes the military aspects of the ephebeia, such as their training under specialized 
instructors and garrisoning the fortified points of Attica (42.3-5), third- and second-
century inscriptions strongly suggest that the military importance of the institution 
declined at the very time when the prominence of religious activity on the honorary 
decrees increases.123  
Scholars, however, have failed to understand that geographical considerations, 
namely the difficulty involved in gathering together more than 1,000 ephebes stationed at 
                                                
120 For a detailed discussion of Lycurgus’ activities, see Mitchel 1970, 34-47; Parker 1996, 242-253; 
Mikalson 1998, 11-45; Humphreys 2004, 83-120. Parker 1996, 243, observes that “it is hard to define his 
religious policy more precisely than as one of encouraging the worship of the gods to flourish as the centre 
of a flourishing state.” If we can trust the Vitae decem oratorum, Lycurgus reacted to Alexander’s desire to 
be given divine honors by remarking that “what kind of god would he be when those coming out of his 
sanctuary will have to purify themselves” (Mor. 842D)? 
121 Mikalson 1998, 42. Cf. Marcellus 1994, 19: “Because the ephebic decrees of the fourth century do not 
record ephebic participation in festivals, scholars have supposed that the organization became decreasingly 
military as time passed, and that, by comparison, ephebic festival activity in the fourth century was 
minimal.” See also, Faraguna 1992, 278-80; Parker 1996, 254-5; Humphreys 2004, 89-92. 
122 For the Hellenistic ephebeia, see Dumont 1876, Vol. I, 249-305; Pélékidis 1962, 211-56; Launey 1987, 
890-7; Mikalson 1998, 172-85, 243-9, 253-5. The most substantial and informative inscriptions are as 
follows: SEG 29.116 (214/3); SEG 26.98 (205/4); SEG 15.104 (127/6); IG II2 1006 (122/1); IG II2 1008 
(118/7); IG II2 1009 (116/5); IG II2 1011 (106/5).  
123 Though military and physical training was still part of the curriculum during the Hellenistic period, the 
ephebeia ceased to be a significant fighting force on account of the small citizen enrollment, varying 
between 20 and 50 for the third century, and eventually rising to an average of 100-150 by the late second-
century (Pélékidis 1962, 165, 182; Tracy 1979, 177-8; 1982, 158-9). This is compared to 450-650 ephebes 
enrolled annually in Lycurgan Athens (pp. 99-101). Whereas the ephebes were praised for their guard duty 
on Munychia in IG II2 665 (266/5), line 12, by the end of the century it is clear, as Tracy 1979, 176-7, 
points out, that the “corps of ephebes acted in the main … as a small, select honor guard at the most 
important religious festivals and public meetings.” 
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Piraeus and along the Attic-Boeotian frontier ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.3-5), would have also 
played a crucial role in limiting the number of festivals that the ephebes could collectively 
take part in. Certainly the ephebes of Pandionis, for example, who were stationed at 
Rhamnous, Eleusis, and Phyle during their second year of military service (E15 [331/0 or 
330/29], lines 9-10; cf. Rhamnous and Eleusis in E5 [333/2]), could not have carried out 
their assigned garrison duties effectively if they were also required to attend a long and 
detailed program of cults and festivals spread throughout Attica. Consequently, the 
demos may have encouraged the ephebes, wherever they were deployed, to frequent the 
local sanctuaries and to involve themselves as far as possible in the numerous events of 
the deme’s sacred calendar.124 If we accept this, the ephebes of Pandionis may well have 
participated in the cult of Zeus Soter in the Piraeus and the cult of Artemis at Phyle, as 
scholars have suggested,125 but no evidence for such activity has survived.  
Contemporary evidence, however, suggests that the ephebes celebrated the 
Panatheneia, the most important event on Athens’ religious calendar.126 In 324 or earlier 
Dinarchus prosecuted the metic Agasicles for bribing the Halimousians to allow him to 
be registered illegally as a citizen (Harp. s.v. Ἀγασικλῆς).127 In a fragment of the Against 
                                                
124 Mikalson’s 1977, 424-35, analysis of the sacred calendar of Erchia (SEG 21.151) suggests that fourth-
century demes had a varied and extensive annual program of cults and sacrifices. For a brief study of the 
five deme fasti to have survived, four of which are incomplete, and deme religion generally, see Whitehead 
1986, 176-222. One suspects that demesmen of Piraeus, Rhamnous, Eleusis, and Phyle would have been 
receptive to including the ephebes in their religious activities, especially if we take into account that two of 
these demes seem to have followed at a local level Lycurgus’ enthusiasm for revitalization of the state cults 
(Eleusis in Schwenk 1985, no. 43 [334/3]; Piraeus in Schwenk 1985, no. 76 [324/3]). Perhaps the 
“participation of the ephebes in cult … developed spontaneously out of the initiatives of the ephebes’ 
kosmêtai and sôphronistai, of deme officials and priests, and of those who drafted new regulations of new 
festivals” (Humphreys 2004, 92).  
125 Pouilloux 1954, 110, n. 1; Reinmuth 1971, 35; Humphreys 2004, 91. 
126 For the Panatheneia, see Parke 1977, 33-50. The decree of Stratocles says that Lycurgus “prepared 
adornment for the goddess [i.e. Athena] – solid gold Victories, processional vessels made out of silver and 
gold, and golden adornment for 100 basket carriers” ([Plut]. Mor. 852B: καὶ παρασκευάσας τῇ θεῷ 
κόσμον, Νίκας τε ὁλοχρύσους πομπεῖά τε χρυσᾶ καὶ ἀργυρᾶ καὶ κόσμον χρυσοῦν εἰς ἑκατὸν 
κανηφόρους). He is also credited with the completion of the Panathenaic stadium in time for the Great 
Panatheneia held in 330 ([Plut]. Mor. 852B): he persuaded a certain Deinias to donate the land for it ([Plut]. 
Mor. 841D) and then built the stadium with the help of 1,000 draft animals provided by Eudemus of 
Plataea, who was honored for his contribution (IG II2 351 = Schwenk 1985, no. 48, [330/29]). 
127 The terminus ante quem for Dinarchus’ prosecution of Agasicles is 324 because Hyperides’ For 
Euxenippus, which mentions an “Agasicles from Piraeus” who bribed the demesmen from Halimous (3.3), 
should be dated 330-324. For the date and Agasicles’ offense, see Whitehead 2000, 155-7, 179-80. 
 
 174 
Agasicles, preserved in Harpocration, Dinarchus alleges that “… [Agasicles’ sons] who 
will ascend to the Acropolis as ephebes instead of skaphephoroi, beholden not to you for 
their citizenship but to this man’s money.”128 As Clerc points out, Agasicles was 
apparently trying to pass off his sons as citizens by including them among the ephebes 
marching in the Panathenaic procession rather than among the skaphephoroi, metics who 
carried offerings of cakes and honeycombs.129 We are not told what role the ephebes 
played, but perhaps they marched in arms alongside other citizens of military age (Thuc. 
6.56; Dem. 4.26; 21.17).130 They may have also competed in the torch-race, since we 
cannot dismiss the possibility that the Panatheneia was the festival where the 
lampadephoroi of Aiantis defeated their rivals in either 333/2 or 332/1 (E6).  
The ephebes also took part in the cult of Nemesis at Rhamnous.131 In E17 (= IG 
II2 4594a),132 dated to 330/29 or later, a certain “Theophanes, son of Hierophon, of the 
deme Rhamnous, made a dedication to Hermes, having been crowned by the ephebes and 
the sophronistai and kosmetai” (lines 1-2).133 The most convincing explanation for why 
the ephebes and their officers of three successive enrollment years (333/2 to 331/0) 
honored Theophanes is that the latter had made some unspecified but substantial 
contribution towards the expenses of the Nemesia.134 Evidence that they competed in the 
                                                
128 Harp. s. v. σκαφηφόροι: Δείναρχος ἐν τῷ Κατὰ Ἀγασικλέους (= Fr. 16.5 Conomis) φησίν· οἳ ἀντὶ 
σκαφηφόρων ἔφηβοι εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἀναβήσονται, οὐχ ὑμῖν ἔχοντες χάριν τῆς πολιτείας, 
ἀλλὰ τῷ τούτου ἀργυρίῳ, ἀντὶ τοῦ μέτοικοι· 
129 Clerc 1892, pp. 162-3; See also Whitehead 1977, 50, 87. 
130 The literary and epigraphic evidence for the ephebes’ participation in the Panatheneia in the Hellenistic 
period is discussed in Pélékidis 1962, 254-5. Cf. Heliod. Aeth. 1.10: Παναθηναίων τῶν μεγάλων 
ἀγομένων, ὅτε τὴν ναῦν Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ γῆς τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ πέμπουσιν, ἐτύγχανον μὲν ἐφηβεύων, ᾄσας 
δὲ τὸν εἰωθότα παιᾶνα τῇ θεῷ καὶ τὰ νενομισμένα προπομπεύσας, ὡς εἶχον στολῆς αὐτῇ 
χλαμύδι καὶ αὐτοῖς στεφάνοις ἔρχομαι οἴκαδε ὡς ἐμαυτόν. 
131 For a reconstruction of the temple of Nemesis and the history of the cult, see Miles 1989, 133-249.  
132 See Pouilloux 1954, 106-7; Pélékidis 1962, 123; Reinmuth 1971, 39-41, for a discussion of this 
inscription.  
133 [Θε]οφάνης Ἱεροφῶν̣τιδτος Ῥαμνούσιος Ἑρμεῖ [ἀν]έθηκεν στεφανωθε[ὶς] ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφήβων καὶ 
τῶν σοφρονιστῶν καὶ τῶν κοσμητῶν. 
134 Pouilloux 1954, 107, 110, claims that Theophanes was honored because he supplied oil to the ephebes 
as they exercised in the gymnasium and arranged athletic contests for them during their garrison duty at 
Rhamnous. See also Pélékidis 1962, 123; Reinmuth 1971, 39-41. But this would mean that all ten phylae 
would have been permanently stationed at Rhamnous. This assumption is contradicted by E2 (333/2), 
which explicitly states that the ephebes of Cecropis undertook garrison duty at Eleusis (lines 36-7, 45-7), 
with no mention of Rhamnous. The implication is that these ephebes had come temporarily to Rhamnous 
for some other important event, most likely the Nemesia. If so, Theophanes may have defrayed some of the 
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games held during the goddess’ annual festival comes from E10, a dedication of the 
sophronistes and the gymnasiarchoi of Erechtheis in 333/2 or 332/1 to commemorate the 
ephebes’ victory in the torch-race.135 The ephebes celebrated the Nemesia, I suggest, 
because Nemesis was associated with Athens’ victory at Marathon, the goddess who was 
considered by the Athenians to have brought retribution upon the Persians for their hubris 
against the city (Paus. 1.33.2-3; Aristid. 13.13).136 The demos may have hoped that the 
ephebes, by gaining her favor, would also obtain her help in defeating the Macedonians 
should conflict break out.  
Furthermore, the ephebes may have participated in festivals held in honor of 
Amphiaraus at Oropus, whom the demos honored with a golden crown because “the god 
takes fine care of the Athenians and other persons who visit the shrine for the sake of the 
health and safety of all those in the country” (IG VII 4252 [332/1], lines 11-15). Certainly 
the dedication of three inscriptions (E19, E20, and E26) at the Amphiaraeum suggests 
that the ephebes routinely came to Oropus at the very time when the epigraphic evidence 
attests to considerable Athenian activity at the sanctuary, including the establishment of a 
new and magnificent quadrennial Amphiaraea.137 While no inscription can be securely 
dated to a year in which this penteteric festival was held (i.e. 329/8 and 325/4) before 
Athens lost Oropus again after the Lamian War,138 the ephebes’ involvement in it is 
                                                                                                                                            
expenses for the festival (such as oil), or even donated sacrificial victims, as a certain Elpinikos did in 
236/5 (SEG 24.155, lines 27-31).  
135 For the Nemesia as the occasion for E10, see pp. 116-7. 
136 Miles 1989, 137-8; Stafford 2000, 88-9. 
137 In 333/2 Pytheas of Alopeke was honored for repairing the fountain and water supply at the sanctuary 
(IG II2 338 = Schwenk 1985, no. 28). In the following year the demos crowned the Atthidographer 
Phanodemus of Thymitadae, who had drafted regulations for the new quadrennial Amphiaraea, made a 
contribution towards the festival, and carried out various improvements to the Amphiaraeum (IG VII 4253 
= Schwenk 1985, no. 41). Finally, in 329/8, the demos awarded golden crowns to the ten epimetelai, among 
their number Lycurgus, Demades, and Phanodemus, who had supervised the first celebration of the festival 
(IG VII 4254 = Schwenk 1985, no. 50). 
138 For some scholars, E20 (= Reinmuth 1971, no. 15), a dedication of Leontis set up at the Amphiaraeum, 
is decisive proof that the ephebes attended this penteteric festival in 329/8 or 325/4 (e.g. Reinmuth 1971, 
69-72; Lewis 1973, 255; Faraguna 1992, 278; Tracy 1995, 25-6; Parker 1996, 254, n. 126). The date of this 
inscription is extremely controversial, however, and cannot be determined with any certainty given the 
prosopographical information. A detailed discussion of the date occurs in the appendix and concludes that 
it should be assigned 331/0-325/4 (pp. 219-21). Though Petrakos 1997, 270, no. 352, dates the enrollment 
year of E19 to the archonship of Εὐθυκρίτης (328/7), only ρι is preserved of the archon’s name. 
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nevertheless likely if we consider that (1) the eutaxia, an exclusively ephebic 
competition, may have been an event during the Amphiaric games (IG VII 4254, lines 
16-8, 45) and (2) IG VII 444 (= Petrakos 1997, 267-8, no. 348), dated to c. 335-322, 
show that they competed in the games of an unknown festival at Oropus, perhaps the 
quadrennial Amphiaraea. 
Did the ephebes celebrate the Eleusinian Mysteries?139 Despite the lack of 
contemporary evidence,140 scholars assume that they would have played a role similar to 
the Hellenistic period, when they are honored in second- and first-century inscriptions for 
escorting the sacred objects from Eleusis to the City Eleusinion and back again, lifting up 
bulls at the sacrifice, and dedicating a phiale to Demeter and Kore in the sanctuary at 
Eleusis.141 But it is difficult to know how much we should extrapolate from these decrees 
for the Lycurgan ephebeia, especially if the Hellenistic festival program as attested in 
third century and later inscriptions may have been established only after 229, when 
Athens had regained her independence from Macedon.142 Certainly we should not 
                                                                                                                                            
Consequently we cannot rule out that the archon was Ἀριστοφάνης (331/0) or Ἀριστοφῶν (330/29) 
instead. E26 is highly fragmentary and can only be dated to 333/2-322/1. 
139 Lycurgus’ administration is credited with initiating or completing several building projects at Eleusis, 
the most prominent of which was the ongoing work on the portico of Philon to the west of the Telesterion 
(IG II2 1670-71 and 1675). Lycurgus himself was closely involved in the financing of the projects, such as 
payments to an architect and a teamster at Eleusis (IG II2 1672, line 11; IG II2 1673, lines 64-5). He also 
appears to have taken great interest in the Mysteries, including the completion of the Plutonium and repairs 
to the city Eleusinion in the Agora (IG II2 1672, lines 162-9, 182-3). He apparently passed a law to forbid 
women from riding wagons on the procession to Eleusis and bought off sycophants who aimed to prosecute 
him when his wife violated it ([Plut]. Mor. 842A-B; cf. Dem. 21.158 for similar behavior). A horse-race 
was also added to the Eleusinia (IG II2 1672, line 261). For IG II2 1670-3, 1675, see Clinton 1972, 83-113. 
Lycurgus’ activities are discussed in Parker 1996, 245-6, 248; Hintzen-Bohlen 1997, 18-21, 52-4. 
140 The earliest inscription to mention the ephebes’ involvement in the Mysteries occurs around the middle 
of the third century, if the restoration of οἱ τῶν Μυστηρί]ων ἐπιμεληταί in IG II2 700 + Agora I 2054 
(259/8?), line 13, can be trusted. The first certain instance is found in SEG 29.116 (214/3), line 13.  
141 For these practices, see Dumont 1876, 260-7; Pélékidis 1962, 220-3. Examples: IG II2 1006, lines 9-10, 
74; IG II2 1008, lines 7-9; IG II2 1009, lines 7, 13-4; IG II2 1028, lines 6-7, 10, 29-30. Cf. Humphreys 2004, 
90-1: “it is natural to suppose that those stationed at Eleusis took part from the beginning in the procession 
which escorted the holy objects of the Mysteries on their way to Athens and back again, as they certainly 
did in later centuries.” See also van Straten 1995, 110-2, for the lifting of the bull as an ephebic activity in 
the fifth century as in the second. 
142 Mikalson 1998, 183-4, 292. It is dangerous to assume, for example, that the ephebes in the Lycurgan 
period led the armed procession at the festival of Artemis Agrotera at Agrai, which commemorated the 
goddess’ role in Athens’ victory over the Persians at Marathon (Parke 1977, 54-5; Jameson 1991, 210-1), 
because this activity is attested in several late Hellenistic inscriptions (Pélékidis 1962, 219-20). 
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assume, as Dillon does,143 that the reference to “ancestral practices” in IG II2 1078, lines 
10-1, an ephebic decree dating to c. 220 A.D., is proof that the ephebes took part in the 
Mysteries during the 330’s and 320’s.144 Even so, it is possible that they did indeed attend 
this festival, given their involvement in the Panatheneia, Nemesia, and the Amphiaraea. 
This is the limit of our knowledge concerning the ephebes’ fourth-century religious 
activities. 
 
4.5: The Abolition of the Ephebeia  
The evidence taken together suggests that the objective of this educational 
program was two-fold. First, it was intended to produce moderate, law-abiding, and pious 
citizens who were devoted to the preservation of the democracy. Second, it aimed to 
increase their patriotic fervor so that they would be eager for glory and be willing to 
sacrifice themselves for Athens should war break out again with Macedon.  
The ephebes’ commitment to these goals was perhaps symbolized by their 
distinctive uniform: the chlamys or short-cloak and the petasos or broad-rimmed hat 
([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.4; Poll. 10.164).145 Circumstantial evidence suggests that this garb 
was adopted because the demos considered Theseus, Athens’ national hero, whom 
scholars have called the “Athenian ephebe par excellence” or the “ephebe of ephebes,”146 
an appropriate role model for the ephebeia. Not only is Theseus often depicted as a young 
man wearing the chlamys and petasos on Classical vase paintings,147 but the color of the 
ephebes’ cloak – apparently black – was also associated with him at some point during 
the ephebeia’s existence, perhaps beginning in the Lycurgan period.148 For the ephebes, 
                                                
143 Dillon 1997, 240, n. 7 & 8. 
144 Contra Mylonas 1961, 246. 
145 For the chlamys and petasos in the ephebeia, see Pélékidis 1962, 115-6. 
146 Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 112; Sourvinou-Inwood 1987, 135. For Theseus as the archetype of the ephebe, 
see Strauss 1993, 105-6; Walker 1995, 94-6.  
147 Brommer 1982, 144; Sourvinou-Inwood 1987, 132-4.  
148 The chlamys was colored black for an unknown period until it was changed to white at Herodes Atticus’ 
expense in the second-century A.D. (Philostrat. 2.550; IG II2 2090 [165/6 A.D.], lines 5-11; cf. the black, 
white, and crimson cloaks in Artemid. 1.54). As Roussel 1941, 163-5, has shown, an etiology is provided 
for the black chlamys by IG II2 3606 (c. 176 A.D.), which honors Herodes for his generosity, namely that it 
was worn to commemorate Theseus’ failure to change his sails from black to white (thus leading to the 
death of his father Aegeus) when he returned from Crete (lines 18-22). Scholars assume that the ephebes 
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who lived in “the land of Theseus” and were the “sons of Theseus” (Soph. Oed.Tyr. 
1066; Aesch. Eum. 1026), the hero embodied the vigor of adolescence in service of the 
community, because he unified Attica, founded the democracy, liberated Athens by 
slaying the Minotaur, and defended the chora against other invaders (Thuc. 2.15; Soph. 
Oed.Tyr. 422-9; Isoc. 10.18-37).149 Given the lack of evidence, however, we cannot 
determine how large a role, if any, the cult of Theseus played in the ephebeia.150  
In the fall of 323 the patriotism of the ephebes and their older compatriots was put 
to the test when Hyperides and Leosthenes persuaded the demos, despite the opposition 
of Phocion, to break the Common Peace and fight against Antipater for their freedom. 
The situation seemed favorable because Alexander’s death in midsummer had created the 
impression of Macedonian disunity and the Athenians had every expectation of 
assembling a strong coalition of Greek states to supplement their own formidable military 
strength.151 For a while the coalition had some success against Antipater, but when 
                                                                                                                                            
wore the black chlamys in the Lycurgan period (e.g. Garland 1990, 183; Lambert 1996, 151), but the 
Athenaion Politeia does not mention the color and it could have been adopted at a later date. Despite this, 
Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 106-28, claims that the ephebes wore black in recognition of the Athenian Melanthus’ 
trick (apate) in defeating the Theban King Xanthus, thus linking the ephebeia to the Apatouria, the festival 
held in honor of Theseus (contra Maxwell-Smart 1970, 113-6; Vidal-Naquet’s response to his critics is 
found in 1986b, 126-44). Lambert 1993, 144-52, however, argues convincingly against the Melanthus-
Xanthus story as a foundation myth for the ephebeia. Burckhardt  1996, 53-7, also shows that the institution 
cannot have served as a rite of passage from boyhood to adulthood, as Vidal-Naquet supposes, because the 
ephebes first become citizens and then perform their military service. For an analysis of the weaknesses in 
Vidal-Naquet’s structuralist approach, see Ma 1994, 49-80.  
149 For Theseus as democrat and warrior, see White 1995, 83-111, 143-169. The ephebes may have been 
shown Euphranor’s painting (c. 350) of Theseus standing between Demos and Demokratia in the Stoa of 
Zeus Eleutherios (Paus. 1.3.3-4; Pliny. Nat.Hist. 35.129), which may be the inspiration for the relief on 
Eucrates’ anti-tyranny law (Oliver 1960, 164-6; contra Blanshard 2004, 6). They may have also visited the 
Stoa Poikile at some point during their military service, which had a painting that depicted the victory of 
the Athenians with Theseus over the Amazons (Paus. 1.15.4). Given that the Stoa Poikile, with its patriotic 
paintings and the prominent display of Spartan shields captured at Sphacteria in 425/4, seems to have 
functioned as a victory monument (Harrison 1972, 353-78; Francis 1990, 91-5), the presence of Theseus 
would have served to emphasize his martial prowess to the ephebes. 
150 According to Philochorus, Theseus had at least four sanctuaries situated around Athens (FGrHist 328 
F18). The main shrine, which was (re)built by Cimon to house the hero’s bones (Plut. Cim. 8.5-7; Thes. 
36.1-4; Paus. 1.17.2-6, 3.3.7), was located somewhere in the center of Athens but has not been positively 
identified (White 1995, 22). Mitchel 1970, 38, suggests that this Theseum may have functioned as the 
headquarters of the ephebeia, but we do not know whether the ephebes frequented the shrine or celebrated 
the Theseia at this time, although later evidence attests that the festival was annually attended by their 
descendents in the Hellenistic period (Pélékidis 1962, 229-35; Kennell 1999, 249-62).  
151 For the debate over whether Athens should go to war, see Tritle 1988, 124-7, on Plut. Phoc. 22.1-4, who 
shows that Phocion’s opposition was based upon his assessment that the city’s resources were insufficient 
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reinforcements arrived from the east in the following year, the combined forces of 
Antipater and Craterus destroyed Athens’ naval power at Amorgus and decisively 
defeated the Greeks at the battle of Crannon in Thessaly, forcing the Athenians and their 
allies to sue for peace.152 As we would expect, the ephebes’ role in the Lamian War was 
limited to carrying out their assigned garrison duties within the borders of Attica ([Arist.] 
Ath.Pol. 42.3-5).153 Apart from facing Micion’s invasion of Rhamnous in the summer of 
322 (Plut. Phoc. 25.1-2), they do not appear to have fought against the Macedonians 
during the conflict. 
With Athens defenseless and Antipater’s army encamped at Thebes (Plut. Phoc. 
25.3), the demos sent Demades and Phocion, probably in late August 322, to ask for 
terms.154 Antipater demanded the Athenians’ unconditional surrender and imposed a 
harsh settlement so that the city would no longer have the power to contest Macedonian 
hegemony. The patrios politeia of Solon was to be restored, in which only those 
Athenians who possessed property worth at least 2,000 drachmas had full citizen rights 
(D.S. 18.18.5).155 Demosthenes, Hyperides, and other anti-Macedonian leaders were to be 
delivered to him (Plut. Dem. 28.2; Phoc. 27.3). A garrison was to be installed on 
Munychia at Piraeus (D.S. 18.18.5). The demos had little choice but to comply with these 
                                                                                                                                            
to bring victory against Macedon, which had more money, ships, and soldiers. But, as Sealey 1993, 215, 
points out, the demos may have counted upon exploiting (1) the lack of an unquestioned center of authority 
at Babylon in the wake of Alexander’s death and (2) the widespread resentment in Greece at Macedonian 
rule on account of the exiles’ decree promulgated in 324.  
152 The main literary sources for the Lamian war (June 323-August 322) are D.S. 18.8-18; Plut. Phoc. 23-9; 
Dem. 27-31; Hyp. Epit. 6. See also Hammond and Walbank 1988, 107-17; Tritle 1988, 123-9; Tracy 1995, 
23-9; Habicht 1997, 36-42. 
153 For the youngest citizens (and oldest) being ineligible for strateia, except under extraordinary 
circumstances, in the Classical period, see pp. 35-8. 
154 According to Plutarch, Crannon was fought on the seventh of Metageitnion, or on the second of August 
322/1 (Cam. 19.5). After the battle Antipater captured several cities in Thessaly by storm and negotiated 
settlements with others, so that when he reached Boeotia, he had concluded peace treaties with all the 
Greek states that had opposed him except for Athens and Aetolia (D.S. 18.6-8). It is unclear how long this 
march southwards took, but it does perhaps suggest a date for the Athenian embassy at the end rather than 
the middle of Metageitnion. 
155 This regime was characterized as an oligarchy when Polyperchon proclaimed a restoration of the short-
lived democracy in 318/7 (IG II2 448, line 61). Tritle 1988, 136, asserts that it “was a moderate democracy, 
not an oligarchy,” but Williams 1982, 98, is probably right to call it a “moderate oligarchy.” 
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demands (Plut. Phoc. 27.1).156 The details of the altered constitution remain obscure, 
although the disenfranchisement of c. 22,000 citizens would have necessitated changes to 
the day-to-day running of the state.157 The appearance of the anagrapheus, an important 
official with wide-ranging administrative responsibilities, however, does suggest that the 
oligarchy took power at the start of 321/0.158 
Did the ephebeia survive the aftermath of Athens’ defeat?159 While no member of 
the corpus of Lycurgan inscriptions can be dated to 321/0-319/8, some scholars have 
nevertheless supposed that the institution would have continued to function in the same 
manner as described in the Athenaion Politeia except for a substantial decline in the 
number of ephebes required to serve, in proportion to the reduction in the citizen body.160 
But Mitchel’s analysis of IG II2 1187, dated to 319/8, in which the strategos Dercylus of 
Hagnous was honored for educating the boys in Eleusis (lines 4-5), strongly suggests that 
the Eleusinians had improvised an informal “ephebe-style [military] training” for their 
sons because the ephebeia had been suspended for the duration of the oligarchy.161 
Marcellus, accepting Mitchel’s interpretation, further claims that Antipater was 
responsible for the institution’s suppression because he “would have remembered the 
                                                
156 The Athenians were also required to relinquish Oropus (D.S. 18.56). Antipater, however, referred the 
issue of Samos to Philip Arrhidaeus and his regent Perdiccas (Errington 1975, 51-71). 
157 Diodorus Siculus says that 9,000 retained their full citizenship rights, while 22,000 citizens were 
disenfranchised (18.18.4-5; cf. 12,000 in Plut. Phoc. 28.4). For the citizen population of fourth-century 
Athens as c. 31,000 rather than c. 21,000, see p. 155. Various reconstructions of the reformed constitution 
are discussed in Ferguson 1911, 22-7; Gerke 1976, 90-7; Tritle 1988, 131-7; Wallace 1989, 201-4.  
158 The epigraphic evidence for the anagrapheus and his duties is discussed in Dow 1963, 37-54; Williams 
1982, 117-8, 121-9. 
159 For a discussion of this topic, see Pélékidis 1962, 155-7; Marcellus 1994, 171-6. 
160 E.g. Ferguson 1911, 22 (ephebes cut by four-sevenths); Pélékidis 1962, 157 (enrollment declines from 
600-700 to around 300 ephebes).  
161 Mitchel 1964, 346-8. He is inconsistent, however, because he also leaves open the possibility that the 
ephebeia was curtailed. Kirchner dates IG II2 1187 to the middle of the fourth century, but Mitchel has 
shown that it should be assigned to 319/8 because Dercylus was the strategos of the countryside in that 
year (Plut. Phoc. 32.5). He explains the substitution of paides on the stone for epheboi as follows: “in 
voting their thanks, the fathers perhaps thought it unsafe to put up an ephebic inscription of the familiar 
type or even to refer to their sons as ephebes, and so they merely thank Derkylos for seeing that the boys 
got their training” (348). Marcellus 1994, 174, has also drawn attention to IG II2 1199, dated to 320/19 
(Whitehead 1982, 37-8), in which the deme of Aixone honored an unknown number of sophronistai for 
their involvement in the festival of Hebe (lines 17-20). He suggests this festival had previously been part of 
the ephebes’ program (see also Humphreys 2004, 91) and that the demesmen had appointed their own 
sophronistai to oversee the youths who attended it after the ephebeia’s suspension. But there is no evidence 
that the ephebes in fact celebrated the festival in the Lycurgan period. 
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new programme which trained those citizens who had besieged him at Lamia, and who 
had at one point demanded his unconditional surrender.”162 Williams points out, however, 
that if “Antipater was so concerned about the effectiveness of Athens’ hoplites that he 
abolished the ephebic program, we should not expect him to make a hoplite franchise the 
essential governing element in Athens.”163 
A more convincing explanation, I suggest, is that the ephebeia was discontinued 
at some point in 322/1 because the oligarchs regarded a standing army of more than one 
thousand ephebes as a threat to the new regime on account of their steadfast loyalty to the 
democracy and unwavering hostility to Macedon.164 Certainly the ephebes would have 
had little enthusiasm, if not open disdain, for the oligarchy, since most were to be 
disenfranchised and Demades had condemned the leading anti-Macedonian hawks to 
death in accordance with the treaty (Plut. Dem. 28.2; Arr. Succ.Al. 1.13).165 The ephebes, 
like their older compatriots, would have also resented the presence of foreign soldiers on 
Attic soil – the Macedonians under Menyllus had occupied Munychia hill on 20 
                                                
162 Marcellus 1994, 173. See also Mitchel 1964, 347. 
163 Williams 1982, 119, n. 316. A further flaw in Marcellus’ argument is that it is difficult to determine to 
what extent the ex-ephebes’ fighting skills contributed to the initial successes of the Greeks on land against 
the Macedonians and their allies because the Athenians fought as part of a coalition and depended heavily 
on the Thessalian cavalry and Leosthenes’ generalship (D.S. 18.11.3-5; 18.12.2-4; Hyp. 6.11-13; cf. D.S. 
18.16.4-17.5). Tritle 1988, 126, argues that “the ephebic corps trained since Chaeronea was inexperienced 
and Phocion perhaps feared that they were little match for Macedonian and Greek veterans who had 
conquered the East. It is probably to these youths that Phocion referred in his reply to Hypereides [i.e. Plut. 
Phoc. 23.2].” In this passage Phocion, however, is quite specific that he is concerned about the Athenians’ 
ataxia (see Pritchett 1974, 244). If we consider that the Athenians defeated Micion by themselves (Plut. 
Phoc. 25.1-2), it is likely that the ex-ephebes in Phocion’s force retained enough of their military training, 
though few of them would have attended military reviews after leaving the ephebeia (Isoc. 7.82), to 
compensate for their lack of combat experience. 
164 Was the ephebeia abolished in 322/1 or 321/0? Marcellus 1996, 69-76 = 1994, 225-31, convincingly 
argues that Menander was born in the archonship of Sosigenes (342/1), began his military service along 
with Epicurus in 323/2 (Strabo 14.1.18), and produced his first play at the City Dionysia in March 321. He 
also claims that “Menander and Epicurus were among the final year group to complete the two-year 
Lycurgan programme” (1996, 74). His evidence is ἐδίδαξε δὲ πρῶτον ἔφηβος ὢν ἐπὶ Διοκλέους 
ἄρχοντος (Anon. Kaibel, CFG I, no. 9, line 71; cf. Ameinias the ephebe in IG II2 2323a [312/1], lines 46-
7). As we have seen, however, ἔφηβος never meant “a young man who undertakes his ephebic service,” 
but a youth who has attained civic maturity and hence is capable of military service (see pp. 23-8). If so, the 
anonymous source is suggestive but not conclusive evidence that the ephebeia was only abolished at the 
beginning of the archonship of Archippus (i.e. 321/0). 
165 Antipater vigorously hunted down and killed the condemned men, including Demosthenes and 
Hyperides (Plut. Dem. 28.3-30.5; Phoc. 29.1; [Plut.] Mor. 846E, 849B; Arr. Succ.Al. 1.13-4). Williams 
1982, 110: “The extremes to which his subordinates went to catch and destroy Athens’ leaders aroused a 
great deal of sympathy for his victims and dislike for the cruel and vindictive spirit of his purge.” 
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September 322 – whose task was to ensure that the demos complied with Antipater’s 
demands.166 It is understandable, then, that the oligarchs would have hesitated to allow 
hundreds of ephebes to be deployed on the Acte ([Arist.] Ath.Pol. 42.3), situated a short 
distance from Munychia, lest they make an attempt to expel the garrison by force and try 
to restore the democracy.167 Nor could they have ignored the danger posed by those 
ephebes stationed on the Attic-Boeotian frontier, because Thraybulus’ successful 
resistance movement by disaffected democrats had begun in Phyle against the Thirty in 
404/3 (Xen. Hell. 2.4.2-10). 
 
4.6: Conclusion 
The educational aspects of the ephebeia had their origins in the demos’ concern 
for the Macedonian threat to the constitution, Lycurgus’ desire to teach the younger 
generation about the importance of patriotism, piety, and right moral conduct, and the 
latter’s realization that the ephebes, whom Demades calls “the spring of the demos” (fr. 
68 de Falco: ἔαρ … τοῦ δήμου τοὺς ἐφήβους),168 were at their age unable to take part 
in those public institutions (i.e. the Assembly, law-courts, and theater of Dionysus) which 
were considered to be so vital in shaping the behavior of all citizens, especially the 
younger generation. The ephebes’ paideia, as far as we can tell from the limited and often 
ambiguous evidence, consisted of instruction in sophrosyne under the guidance of the 
sophronistes, a tour of Athens’ temples at the beginning of the ephebeia, and 
participation in an indeterminate number of cults and festivals in both years of their 
                                                
166 Plut. Phoc. 28.1: ἐφάνη δ’ὑπερήφανον τὸ πρόσταγμα καὶ μᾶλλον ἐξουσίας ὕβρει χρωμένης 
ἐπίδειξις ἢ πραγμάτων ἕνεκα γιγνομένη κατάληψις. Phocion, anticipating this reaction, had entreated 
Antipater not to install the garrison, but the latter refused and would only rescind the order if the former 
would guarantee that Athens would not stir up any trouble (Plut. Phoc. 27.4-5). Although Menyllus, a 
friend of Phocion’s, had avoided a heavy-handed approach in his dealings with the Athenians, the demos 
had found the Macedonian soldiers, who were a constant reminder of the city’s subservience to Antipater, 
so distasteful that they voted to send Demades in late 320/19 to negotiate its removal (Plut. Phoc. 28.1-4, 
30.4-6; Dem. 31.3-4; Arr. Succ.Al. 1.14-5). A year later Dercylus of Hagnous unsuccessfully tried to 
capture Nicanor, Menyllus’ successor (Plut. Phoc. 32.3). 
167 The oligarchs may have been concerned that the ephebes would try to emulate the heroism of 
Thrasybulus, who had seized the Munychia from the Thirty, a feat which played a crucial role in the 
downfall of the oligarchy (Xen. Hell. 2.4.10ff.).  
168 For this fragment, see Loraux 1975, 11-2. 
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military service. The goal of this “educational system,” as we have seen, was to cultivate 
the ephebes’ devotion to the state, to make them virtuous and upright citizens dedicated 
to the defense and continuation of the democracy. If so, this commitment may help to 
explain why the ephebeia was abolished by the pro-Macedonian oligarchy (321/0-319/8) 





 The ephebeia was probably created in the aftermath of Alexander’s destruction of 
Thebes in September 335. The Athenians, alarmed at the border raiding by his Boeotian 
allies and seeking to avoid a military confrontation with the Macedonians at all costs, 
were compelled to raise a standing army whose primary military function was to protect 
the chora of Attica. The demos chose to use ephebes, newly enrolled citizens, of all 
census classes for this new infantry corps because the latter had traditionally acted as a 
homeguard whenever Athens was threatened with invasion and were ineligible for 
strateia except under extraordinary circumstances. Epicrates’ legislation, perhaps passed 
soon after Thebes’ destruction, may have been responsible for the ephebeia’s foundation. 
Though the ephebeia as a state-funded organization was an innovation of the Lycurgan 
period, several aspects of the institution were a formalization of practices dating back at 
least to the second-quarter of the fourth century. Aeschines’ peripoleia shows that 
ephebos and peripolos antedated the ephebeia. An analysis of these terms shows that they 
had the same technical meanings as in the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia. Moreover, it is 
cleat that the youngest citizens also swore the oath of citizenship (known as the ephebic 
oath after the fifth century), performed garrison duty, and competed as lampadephoroi 
throughout the Classical period.  
The decision to entrust the defense of the countryside to the youngest citizens 
with no combat experience and a reputation for socially disruptive behavior, however, 
marked a decisive break with long-standing Athenian military practices in the Classical 
period. The demos, concerned about these issues, established for the first time a publicly 
funded mass training system, where specialized instructors taught the art of war to the 
ephebes. They also sought to impose strict discipline on the ephebes, granting the 
sophronistes the right to use physical punishment to chastise disorderly individuals. This 
official, who also served as a quartermaster, played a key role in ensuring that the 
ephebes would carry out their assigned duties, although the kosmetes was in overall 
charge of the institution. For the thousands of citizens who passed through the ephebeia 
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during the Lycurgan period (334/3-322/1), however, two years of garrison duty 
demanded that they had to put their public obligations before their private interests. Some 
ephebes, however, were unwilling to make this sacrifice and consequently avoided 
military service. The demos, realizing this, solved this problem by appealing to their 
philotimia, so that ambitious ephebes could distinguish themselves as lochagoi, win torch 
races, or be awarded with various honors at the end of their stint of service.  
The demos was also concerned that the ephebes could not gain the educational 
benefits of the city’s democratic institutions because they were forbidden, with few 
exceptions, from participating in the public life of Athens. Fearful for the survival of the 
democracy and frustrated by their continued subservience to Macedon, the Athenians 
under Lycurgus’ administration incorporated educational features into the ephebeia so 
that the ephebes, under the supervision of the sophronistes, would learn the importance of 
patriotism, piety, and self-control. From 334/3 onwards, then, the ephebeia ensured that 
Attica would be well defended against raiders and sought to make the ephebes virtuous 
citizens. Indeed, the objective of their paideia was to cultivate their devotion to the 
democracy and to ensure that they would fight vigorously against the Macedonians 
should the long hoped-for opportunity to rebel present itself. This came in 323, after 
Alexander’s death, when the Athenians revolted against Antipater in the Lamian war. 
Following Athens’ defeat, a pro-Macedonian oligarchy was installed, which abolished the 
ephebeia for the duration of the oligarchy (321/0-319/8) because the institution was 
perceived as a threat to the new regime on account of the ephebes’ unwavering loyalty to 
the democracy and their unyielding hatred of Macedon.  
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Appendix: The Corpus of Lycurgan Ephebic Inscriptions 
 
In a peculiar sense the study of the Athenian ephebia, not only in the 
fourth century B.C., but in every period must be the study primarily of the 
ephebic inscriptions. Apart from Aristotle’s brief description, our 
knowledge of the institution rests not on statements about it, but largely on 
inferences and deductions from the inscriptions themselves.1 
 
This is a register of twenty-eight ephebic inscriptions, published and unpublished, 
which date from the inception of the institution to the outbreak of the Lamian War (i.e. 
334/3-323/2). The inscriptions are arranged in chronological order. Though many of 
these documents cannot be assigned to a specific year because they lack an archon date, 
they are nevertheless included in the corpus if they satisfy the following criteria: (1) The 
format of a typical ephebic inscription in the Lycurgan period consists of a heading, a 
number of general decrees by honoring corporations or (more commonly) no decree, and 
a roster of the ephebes’ names followed by a patronymic arranged under deme captions.2 
While Hellenistic and Roman examples of the ephebic corpus have a similar format, 
Lycurgan inscriptions are distinctive in that they honor the ephebes of a single tribe, 
whereas the former commemorate all the ephebes who had served in the ephebeia on the 
same inscription.3 (2) To the best of my knowledge no ephebic inscription dating after the 
Lamian War has been found outside of the Athens-Piraeus enceinte. Consequently those 
inscriptions with findspots in frontier areas such as Rhamnous, Oropus, Eleusis, 
Panactum, and Marathon, must date prior to the abolition of the ephebeia by the end of 
322/1. 
                                                
1 Reinmuth 1971, ix. 
2 For this format, see Reinmuth 1955, 226, classifications 1a and 1b. Two inscriptions (E10 and E21), 
however, have rosters which omit the patronymic but include the demotic after each ephebe’s name, with 
the result that the ephebes lack deme captions. E18, on the other hand, organizes the ephebes by demes but 
lists only the names of the ephebes, not their patronymics. 
3 Reinmuth 1948, 213, suggests that there was insufficient space available on the stones to fit every ephebe 
on the same roster because citizen enrollment in the Lycurgan period was far greater – c. 450-500 in 334/3-
333/2 and 600-650 thereafter – than in subsequent periods This is supported by the fact that the earliest 
inscription to list all ten phylae is IG II2 478, dated to 305/4, when service in the ephebeia was reduced to 
one year and the enrollment of c. 372 ephebes was much reduced in comparison to the preceeding period 
(see Reinmuth 1971, 86-117).  
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 I have drawn extensively upon two scholarly studies for the compilation of this 
register. The first is Reinmuth, whose The Ephebic Inscriptions of the Fourth Century 
B.C. (Leiden 1971) contains fifteen Lycurgan ephebic inscriptions, superseeding the nine 
Pélékidis had available in his Histoire de l'éphébie attique: des origines à 31 avant Jésus-
Christ (Paris 1962). The second is Petrakos, who has recently published two epigraphic 
collections, namely his Οἱ Ἐπιγραφές τοῦ Ωρωποῦ (Athens 1997) and Ὁ Δῆμος τοῦ 
Ῥαμνοῦντος. Vol. II. (Athens 1999). These have several ephebic inscriptions, some of 
which were the fruit of Petrakos’ lengthy excavations at Rhamnous and Oropus. I have 
not attempted to provide an extensive bibliography for each inscription; the reader is 
therefore encouraged to consult Reinmuth and Petrakos whenever possible, along with 
the SEG references if cited. In addition to these authors, I have also drawn upon those 
works that have either suggested a different restoration for Reinmuth’s texts (e.g. Mitchel 
1984) or have added a new member to the corpus (e.g. Traill 1986). Lastly, I must thank 
Mark Munn, who has found three new unpublished inscriptions at Panactum and has 
made them available for me to study.  
 Information concerning the corpus is presented in the following manner. Each 
document is given a number (in bold type) and a title representative of its content, 
followed by its date.4 After this the find spot (with the inscription’s catalogue number in 
parentheses), a select bibliography, and a brief description of the stone are provided. The 
                                                
4 Unlike previous collections, I provide two dates, whenever possible, for the inscriptions in the corpus. 
The first is the date of the ephebes’ enrollment in the ephebeia, the second is the date of the inscriptions’ 
erection. The reason for this is that scholars have sometimes not drawn this distinction. The confusion is 
clearly demonstrated by the belief among some scholars that the first enrollment class for the ephebeia 
occurred in 335/4 because they reckon that the earliest attested inscriptions (E1-E4) were erected in 334/3, 
not 333/2 (e.g. Wilamowitz 1893, 194; Sekunda 1992, 331; Habicht 1997, 16; cf. Bertosa 2003, 374). 
When the Athenians created the ephebeia, they had to keep track of two distinct groups of ephebes from the 
same tribe who were serving at the same time. To avoid confusion they designated each year group by the 
archonship in which they were enrolled (Girard 1892, 624; Reinmuth 1970, 77; Clinton 1988, 29). The full 
formulae is shown in E1, a dedication of Cecropis, lines 52-3: οἱ [ἔφηβοι] οἱ ἐπὶ Κτησικλέος ἄρχοντος 
ἐνγραφέντες, “the ephebes enrolled in the archonship of Ctesilcles.” It follows, then, that the inscription 
was erected in the next year, in the archonship of Nicocrates (333/2: Pélékidis 1962, 122), since the 
ephebes are honored for their garrison duty at Eleusis (lines 37, 46 cf. [Arist]. Ath.Pol. 42.4). Reinmuth 
1970, 102, maintains that all ephebic inscriptions were erected in their second year. But those inscriptions 
that honored the ephebes for their success in the torch races (E10, E12, E24) were perhaps erected in the 
same year as their victory. Clinton 1988, 29, suggests that they were erected at the end of the ephebes’ first 
year, but there is reason to think that ephebes competed in the torch races and other events throughout their 
term of service (see pp. 116-8, 173-7). 
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text of the document, if published, is then given, though I have not included a critical 
apparatus. Lastly, I discuss certain aspects of the inscription in the notes. The topics for 
discussion are limited to the date, the number of ephebes in the roster (if there is 
uncertainty), and aspects of the text which affect the inscription’s interpretation and have 
proved controversial among scholars. It should be stressed, however, that I have not 
examined any of the corpus in person, but have instead relied upon photographs provided 
by Reinmuth, Petrakos, and others. Given this limitation, the substantial restorations 





E1: Dedication to the Kosmetes of Acamantis. 
Date:    Enrollment Year: 334/3 (Archon restored). Inscription: 333/2.  
Find Spot:   No. 79, K.Lbake Street in Athens (EM 13354a). 
Bibliography:   Reinmuth 1971 no. 1 = Mitsos 1965 (1967), 131-2. 
Description:  White marble stele with smooth finish on right preserved side. 
Rough picked back. H. 0.35 m.; W. 0.23 m. L.H. 0.004 m. 
Text:    Stoichedon 35 (lines 14-26). 
 
 [ἐπὶ Νικοφήμο] ἄρχοντος 
 [— — — — — — — — — —]ο Εἰρεσίδης εἶπε- 
15 [ν· ἐπειδὴ ὁ κοσμητὴς τῶν ἐφ]ήβων Αὐτόλυκος κ- 
 [αλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως ἐπεμε]λήθη τῶν νεανίσκ- 
 [ων, δεδόχθαι τῆι Ἀκαμαντίδ]ι φυλῆι ἐπαινέσ- 
 [αι Αὐτόλυκον ....9.....Θο]ρίκιον φιλοτιμ- 
 [ίας ἕνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας τῆ]ς περὶ τοὺς ἐφή- 
20 [βους καὶ στεφανῶσαι θαλλοῦ σ]τεφάνωι ἐπε[ι]- 
 [δὰν τὰς εὐθύνας δῶι ὧν ἐπεμελή]θη, ἀρετῆς κ[α]- 
 [ὶ ἀνδραγαθίας ἕνεκα· τὸ δὲ ψήφισ]μα τόδε ἀνα- 
 [γράψαι τὸν γραμματέα τῆς φυλῆς ἐ]στήλην ἐν 
 [τῶι ἱερῶι τοῦ Ἀκάμαντος ἐφ’ ἧς γέγρα]πται τὸ 
25 [ψήφισμα περὶ τὸς ἐφήβους ἐπὶ Μόλωνο(?)]ς ἄρχο- 
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 [ντος — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
 
Notes: I have not included the text for EM 13354 because it is not an ephebic inscription. 
For the rejection of Mitsos’ restoration of Νικοφήμο in line 13 in favor of Mitchell’s 
Κτησικλέους, see pgs. 9-10. 
 
E2: The ephebes of Cecropis 
Date:    Enrollment Year: 334/3 (Archon). Inscription: 333/2.   
Find Spot:   Acropolis (EM 7743). 
Bibliography:   Reinmuth 1971 no. 2 = IG II2 1156. 
Description:  Stele of Pentelic marble, broken upper left hand side. Originally on 
a base. H. 1.02 m.; W. 0.51 m.; Th. 0.12 m. L.H. 0.005 m. 
Text:    Stoichedon 47-54 (lines 26-63). 
 
       — — — —ου 
       — — — — — — —ους 
       — — — — — — —νίππου 
       — — — — — — —άδ[ο]υ 
5       — — — — Μνησιθέου 
       — — — Ἡ̣γησιφάνους 
       [....μα]χος Γλαυκέτου 
       [....]ανόδωρος Λυσιστράτου 
       [Κα]λλίας Καλλιάδους 
10       Ἀντιφῶν Ἐπιτρόπου 
       Χρέμης Σμικύθου 
       Αἰξωνῆς· 
       Εὐκλῆς Εὐκλείδου 
       Μελάνθιος [Ἀ]ριστείδου 
15 — — — — — — —    Θεότιμος Θεοπόμπου 
 [— — — —]μοκρίτου   Ἀμφίστρατος Φιλημονίδου 
 [— — — — — — κ]ράτους   Δημοκλείδης Δημέου 
 [demoticum]     Θεόδοτος Αἴσχρωνος. 
 [....8….]νος Φυρομάχου   Ἐπικράτης Εὐκράτους 
20 [Χαιρέστ]ρατος Χαιρίωνος  Ξυπεταιόνες· 
 [....]οτος Δημητρίου   Νικίας Εὐκταίου 
 [...]γένης Σάβωνος    Ξενοφῶν Μνησιάδου 
 [Ἀ]ντισθένης Ἀντιφάτους   Πιθῆς· 
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 Δαιδαλίδαι·     Τεισαμενὸς Κίρου 
25 Φιλόξενος Φιλονόμου   Αὐτοκλῆς Χαρίππου 
 Καλλικράτης Αἰξωνεὺς εἶπεν· ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἔφηβοι οἱ τῆς Κεκρ[οπί]- 
 δος οἱ ἐπ[ὶ Κτη]σ[ι]κλέους ἄρχοντος εὐτακτοῦσιν καὶ π[ο]ιοῦσ[ιν] 
 πάντα ὅ[σα αὐτ]οῖς οἱ νόμοι προστάττουσιν καὶ τ[ῶι σωφρ]ονι[στ]- 
 εῖ πειθ[αρχο]ῦσιν τῶι χειροτονηθέντι ὑπὸ τοῦ δ[ήμου, ἐπ]αιν[έσ]- 
30 αι αὐτ[οὺς κα]ὶ στεφανῶσαι χρυσῶι στεφάνωι ἀπ[ὸ ¯  δραχ]μῶν  
 κοσμι[ότητ]ος ἕνεκα καὶ εὐταξίας· ἐπαινέσαι δὲ καὶ τὸν σω[φρο]- 
 νιστὴν, Ἄδειστον Ἀντιμάχου Ἀθμονέα καὶ στεφανῶσαι χρυ[σῶι] 
 στεφάνωι ἀπὸ ¯  δραχμῶν, ὅτι καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως ἐπεμελή[θη]  
 τῶν ἐφήβων τῆς Κεκροπίδος φυλῆς. ἀναγράψαι δὲ τόδε τὸ ψή[φι]- 
35 σμα ἐν στήληι λιθίνι καὶ στῆσαι ἐν τῶι τοῦ Κέκροπος ἱερ[ῶι]. 
 Ἡγέμαχος Χαιρήμονος Περιθοίδης εἶπεν· ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἔφηβο[ι οἱ] 
 τῆς Κεκροπίδος ταχθέντες Ἐλευσῖνι καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμω[ς ἐπ]- 
 ιμελοῦνται ὧν αὐτοῖς ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δῆμος προστάττει κα[ὶ εὐτ]- 
 άκτους αὐτοὺς παρέχουσιν, ἐπαινέσαι αὐτοὺς κοσμιότη[τος] 
40 ἕνεκα καὶ εὐταξίας καὶ στεφανῶσαι θαλλοῦ στεφάνωι ἕ[καστον] 
 αὐτῶν· ἐπαινέσαι δὲ καὶ τὸν σωφρονιστὴν αὐτῶν Ἄδειστ[ον Ἀντι]- 
 μάχου Ἀθμονέα καὶ στεφανῶσαι θαλλοῦ στεφάνωι ἐπε[ιδὰν τὰ]- 
 ς εὐθύνας δῶι· ἐπιγράψαι δὲ τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπὶ τὸ ἀ[νάθημα] 
 ὃ ἀνατιθέασιν οἱ ἔφηβοι τῆς Κεκροπίδος· vacat 
45 Πρωτίας εἶπεν· ἐψηφίσθαι τοῖς δημόταις, ἐπειδὴ καλ[ῶς καὶ φι]- 
 λοτίμως ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς φυλακῆς Ἐλευσῖνος ο[ἱ] τῆ[ς Κεκροπί]- 
 [δ]ο[ς ἔφηβ]οι καὶ ὁ σωφρονιστὴς αὐτῶν· Ἄδειστος [Ἀν]τι[μ]ά[χου Ἀθμο]- 
 [νεύς, ἐπαι]νέσα[ι] αὐτοὺς καὶ στεφανῶσαι ἕκαστον αὐτῶ[ν θαλλοῦ] 
 [στεφάνωι]. ἀναγ[ρ]άψαι δὲ τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα εἰς τὸ ἀνάθημα, [ὃ ἀνα]- 
50 [τι]θέασιν οἱ ἔφηβοι οἱ τῆς Κεκροπίδος οἱ ἐπὶ Κτησικλέ[ους] 
 [ἄ]ρχοντος. vacat 
 Εὐφρόνιος εἶπεν· ἐψηφίσθαι τοῖς δημόταις, ἐπειδὴ οἱ [ἔφηβοι] 
 οἱ ἐπὶ Κτησικλέος ἄρχοντος ἐνγραφέντες εὐτακτοῦσιν [καὶ] 
 ποιοῦσιν πάντα ὅσα οἱ νόμοι αὐτοῖς προστάττουσιν, καὶ ὁ [σω]- 
55 φρονιστὴς ὁ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου χειροτονηθεὶς ἀποφαίνει αὐτο[υς] 
 πειθάρχοντας καὶ τἄλλα πάντα ποιοῦντας φιλοτίμως, ἐπ[αι]- 
 νέσαι αὐτοὺς καὶ στεφανῶσαι χρυσῶι στεφάνωι ἀπὸ ¯  δρα[χμ] - 
 ῶν κοσμιότητος εἵνεκα καὶ εὐταξίας· ἐπαινέσαι δὲ καὶ τὸ[ν] 
 σωφρονιστὴν αὐτῶν Ἄδειστον Ἀντιμάχου Ἀθμονέα, καὶ στεφ- 
60 ανῶσ(αι χρυσῶι στεφάνωι ἀπὸ) ¯  δραχμῶν, ὅτι καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως 
ἐπε- 
 μελήθη τῶν τε δημοτῶν (καὶ τῶν) ἄλλων ἁπάντων τῶν τῆς Κεκροπίδος 
 φυλῆς· ἐπιγράψαι δὲ τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνάθημα ὃ ἀνατι- 
 θέασιν οἱ ἔφηβοι τῆς Κεκροπίδος καὶ ὁ σωφρονιστής. vacat 
 vacat 




Notes: 30 ephebes are preserved on the roster, arranged in two columns. In the first, 8 
names appear, one belonging to the deme Daidalidai and 7 to two unknown demes (lines 
16-25). In the second, 22, 11 to an unknown deme, 7 to Aixone, 2 to Xypete, and 2 to 
Pithos (lines 1-25). Following Clinton’s 1988, 27, tentative suggestion that the 11 
ephebes in column two are from Halai Aixonides (hence adding a line for the deme 
caption), this leaves room for a minimum of 20 ephebes in column one if the six 
remaining demes of Cecropis are also represented. If we consider that Melite, Athmonon, 
and Phlya had 4(?), 5, and 7 ephebes respectively in E5, an inscription of Cecropis dating 
to the next enrollment year (i.e. Nicocrates), it is likely that these demes were also present 
(in similar numbers?) in E2. Did Sypalettos, Trinemeia, and Epieikidai send contingents? 
In E5 Sypalettos and Epieikidai had no ephebes and Trinemeia had one. We cannot be 
certain, however, whether one, two, or three of these demes were present in E2. Given 
this, probably 42-44 ephebes served in the phyle of Cecropis for 334/3-333/2. Other 
estimates: Gomme 1933, 67, (43-45 ephebes) – accepted by Pélékidis 1962, 121; 
Reinmuth 1971, 7, 107. Hansen 1988a, 3, n. 4, and Sekunda 1992, 331-2, suggest c. 42 
ephebes. 
 
E3: The ephebes of Hippothontis. 
Date:    Enrollment: 334/3 (Archon). Inscription: 333/2.  
Find Spot:   Eleusis (Eleusis Inv.No. 84). 
Bibliography:  Mitchel 1984, 115-8, reedits Reinmuth 1971 no. 3 = IG II2 1189. 
SEG 34.106. 
Description:   White Pentelic marble fragment of the top front of a base(?).  
H. 0.16 m.; W. 0.23 m.; Th. 0.15 m. L.H. 0.01 (lines 1-3), 0.005 m. 
(lines 4-13). 
Text:    Stoichedon 57 (lines 1-3), 62 (lines 4-13).  
 
 [οἱ ἔφηβοι τῆς Ἱπποθωντίδος φυ]λῆς οἱ ἐπὶ Κτησικλ[έους ἄρχοντος καὶ ὁ 
σ]- 




 [ων Δήμητρι καὶ Κόρει ἀνέθηκα]ν. 
 [ἔδοξεν Ἐλευσινίοις ….8…. ε]ἶπεν. ἐπειδὴ οἱ τῆς Ἱπποθ̣[ωντίδος ἔφηβοι 
καλ]- 
5 [ῶς τῆς φυλακῆς Ἐλευσῖνος ἐπε]μ̣ελοῦντο καὶ ἐκόσ̣[μο]υν καὶ [πάντων ὧν 
οἱ νόμοι π]- 
 [ροσέταττον αὐτοῖς ταχθέντες] Ἐλευσῖνι ἐπεμελοῦντο καὶ [τῶι 
σωφρονιστῆι π]- 
 [ειθαρχο̑ντες, ἐψηφίσθαι τοῖς δ]ημόταις ἐπαινέσαι αὐτοὺς κα̣[ὶ στεφανῶσαι 
αὐ]- 
 [τοὺς φιλοτιμίας ἕνεκα τῆς εἰς] τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἐλευσινίων, ἐπ[αινέσαι δὲ 
καὶ τὸ]- 
 [ν σωφρονιστὴν αὐτῶν ….8.…] ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας [τῆς εἰς τὸν 
δῆμον] 
 10 [καὶ στεφανῶσαι χρυσῶι στεφά]νωι καὶ ἀνειπεῖν αὐτὸν τῶι ἀγ[ῶνι ὅτι 
στεφανωῖ] 
 [ὁ δῆμος ….8… τραγωιδῶν τ]ῶν [Δ]ιονυσίων καὶ καλείτω αὐ[τὸν ὁ 
δήμαρχος κα]- 
 [θάπερ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἷς ὁ δῆμ]ος ἔδωκεν τὴν προεδρία̣[ν …..…17….....] 
[…..…….25….….....]ιτο[…7…οισουσι.[ ..…….19….…..] 
 
Notes: Reinmuth 1971, 11, restores the heading as follows: [τοῖν θεοῖν οἱ ἔφηβοι καὶ ὁ 
σωφρονιστὴς τῆς]|[Ἱπποθωντίδος φυ]λῆς οἱ ἐπὶ Κτησικλ[έους ἄρχοντος]|[ 
στεφανωθέντες ὑ]πὸ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δ[ήμου τοῦ Ἐλε]|[υσινίων ἀνέθηκα]ν. 
But Mitchel points out that the stone has a flat top (cf. Lewis 1973, 255), and suggests 
that the first line of the prescript should be discarded (Reinmuth assumed another line of 
text above …]λῆς οἱ ἐπὶ Κτησικλ[…). Tracy 1995, 115, notes that an erasure occurs 
after the first καὶ in line 5 and “continues as far as the stone is preserved.” He also doubts 
the reading of the imperfect ἐκόσ̣[μο]υν, which is unparalleled in Attic inscriptions. No-
one, however, has proposed an alternative. Marcellus 1994, 236, plausibly suggests 
[ἄλλα πάντα ποιοῦντας φιλοτίμως] instead of [τῶι σωφρονιστῆι πειθαρχο̑ντες] 
in lines 6-7 because Mitchel reports a “lower tip of a slanting stroke which might indicate 
a lambda or alpha.” 
 
E4: The ephebes of Antiochis or Erectheis. 
Date:    Enrollment: 334/3 (Archon restored). Inscription: 333/2.  
Find Spot:   Unknown (EM 2802a). 
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Bibliography:  Reinmuth 1971 no. 4 = Mitchel’s 1964, 349-50 re-edition of IG II2 
2970. SEG 22.148 = 39.234 = 41.138. 
Description:  Left side of a Pentelic stele ornamented with a relief of an armed 
Athena. H. 0.57 m.; W. 0.24 m.; Th. 0.12 m. L.H. 0.01 (lines 1-2), 
0.005 m. (lines 3-10). 
Text:    Non-Stoichedon (lines 1-2), Stoichedon 46 (lines 3-11). 
 
 [….9…..]ς ἔφηβοι οἱ ἐπὶ Κ̣[τη]σι[κλέους ἄρχοντος ἀνέθε]- 
 [σαν τῶι ἥρω?]ι σ[τεφανωθέν]τες [ὑπὸ τ]ῆς [βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου.] 
 infra cymatium 
 [σωφρο]νιστὴ[ς] Ἀφρ[……………..32….………..] 
 [..5…]σαρ[…]κλ[.]ο[…..10….. στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῶι Πειραι]- 
5 [εῖ Κόν]ων Τιμοθέ[ο]υ [Ἀναφλύστιος στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῆι χώραι] 
 [Σώφιλ]ος Ἀ[ριστο]τέ[λους Φυλάσιος ……….19………] 
 [..5…]ην[……………….39………………..] 
 [..5…] κο[σμ]η̣̣[τὴς …………….33……………..] 
 […]νευς [..]δε̣[……………..35………………] 
10 [..5…]ιο[..]στ[̣[……………..35………………] 
 — — — 
 
Notes: There is space for nine letters before the sigma on line one, clearly the genitive of 
a tribal name. Antiochis (Mitchel) or Erectheis (Reinmuth) are possibilities. It cannot be 
Cecropis, because a different sophronistes is attested on E2, lines 31-2, 41-2, 45-6, 58-9. 
The inscription is in poor condition. Lines 3-10 list a group of officials, but only the 
sophronistes Ἀφρ[…, the strategos of the Piraeus Κόν]ων Τιμοθέ[ο]υ [Ἀναφλύστιος, 
the strategos of the chora Σώφιλ]ος Ἀ[ριστο]τέ[λους Φυλάσιος, and an unnamed 
kosmetes can be made out from the fragmentary text. Since E1 also dates to the 
archonship of Ctesicles, line 8 should be restored as κο[σμ]η̣[τὴς Αὐτόλυκον ....9.... 
Θορίκιον. It is possible that …]σαρ[…]κλ[.]ο[….. (lines 3-4) and …]ην[… (lines 7-8) 
may have been didaskaloi. A roster of ephebes probably followed from line 9 onwards. 
 
E5: The ephebes of Cecropis. 
Date:    Enrollment: 333/2 (Archon). Inscription: 332/1.  
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Find Spot:   Eleusis (Eleusis Inv.No. 1103). 
Bibliography: Clinton 1988, 20-21, publishes the text of Reinmuth 1971 no. 5 = 
Travlos 1954 (1957), 70-71. SEG 41.107. 
Description:  Base (H. 0.29 m.; W. 0.663 m.; Th. 0.54 m.) of blue-gray 
Hymettian marble preserved all on all sides (smooth except for 
rough-picked bottom) with rectangular cutting (W. 0.355 m.; B: 
0.275 m.; D. 0.07 m.). L.H 0.005-0.008 m. (lines 1-11), 0.005 m. 
(lines 13-73). 
Text:    Stoichedon 52 (lines 1-11), Non-Stoichedon (lines 12-74).  
 
[ο]ἱ̣ ἔφ̣[ηβ]ο̣ι ο̣[ἱ τῆς Κεκ]ρ[ο]π̣[ίδος οἱ ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους ἄρ]χο̣ν̣[τος καὶ ὁ 
σ]- 
 ωφ̣ρ̣ο̣νιστὴς̣ α̣ὐ̣τ̣ῶ̣ν Περικ[λῆς] Περ̣ικλε̣ί̣[δου] Π̣ιθ̣ε̣ὺ̣ς ἀ̣ν̣έ̣θ̣ε̣σα̣[ν στεφ]- 
 ανώσαντες χρυσῶι στεφάνωι ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἐπιμε̣λ̣είας τῆς εἰ̣- 
 ς ἑαυτοὺς στρατηγὸν τοῦ Πειρ̣α̣ιῶς Κόνω̣ν̣α Τιμο̣θ̣έου Ἀναφλύστιο<ν> 
5 κα̣ὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τῆι χώ̣ρ̣α̣ι Σώφιλον Ἀ̣ρ̣ιστοτέλο̣υς Φυλά̣σιον καὶ τὸν σω- 
 φροντισὴ̣ν Πε̣ρ̣ι̣κλέα Περικλεί̣δου Π̣ιθ̣έα καὶ τὸν τ̣αξ̣ία̣ρ̣χ̣ον Σύνβ̣- 
 ο̣υλ̣ο̣ν Εὐβ̣ούλου Φλυέα καὶ τ̣ο̣ὺ̣ς λ̣οχα̣γο̣ὺς Θ̣ρά̣σιππον Φρυ̣να̣ίου Ἀθ̣- 
 μο̣νέα̣, Εὔβουλον Εὐβ̣ούλου Φλ̣υέ̣α̣, Ἐπι̣κρ̣ά̣την Ἀρχεδή̣μου Π̣ι̣[θ]έ̣α̣, Ἀ̣τα̣- 
 ρβ̣ίωνα Τυννίου Α̣ἰξ̣ων̣έ̣α̣, Στέφα̣νον Α̣ἰ̣σι̣μ̣ί̣δου Ἁ̣λ̣α̣ιέα, Ἀρισ̣τ[όμ]α̣χ̣ο̣ν̣ 
10 Δημοχ̣ά̣ρ̣ους Με̣λ̣ι̣τ̣έα̣, Σίμ̣ω̣να Θ̣εο̣κλέους Ἀθ̣μονέ̣α καὶ τοὺς δ̣ιδα̣σκ- 
 ά̣λους Χαιρέστρατον Πα̣λ̣ληνέα, Ἀ̣γαθά̣νορα Συρακ̣ό̣σιο̣ν. vacat 
Col. I: vacat      Φλυῆς     
 [Π]ιθ̣ῆς      Σύνβουλος Εὐβούλου 
 Ἐ̣πικράτης Ἀρχεδήμ̣ου   Εὔβουλος Εὐβούλου 
 Ἀ̣ρχίας Θρασύλλου    Φ̣α̣ι̣[δρίας] Ῥ̣[ό]δ̣ων̣ο̣ς̣ 
15 Ἀ̣πολλοφῶν Ἀπολλοφά̣νους 45 Φ̣ι̣λ̣ό[δ]ημος Νικομάχου 
 Εὐφράνωρ Εὐθυδίκου   Φειδόσ̣τ̣ρατος Ἀμεινοκλέους 
 [Ἀ]ρχῖνος Παντακλέους   Τιμω̣ν̣ίδης Ἀθ̣η̣ν̣οκλέους 
 [..]α̣ρχος Βιόττου    Ἀ̣ρ̣χ̣έ̣δ̣ι̣κος Ἀρχε̣δίκου 
 [Ἀθμ]ο̣νῆς     Μ̣ελ̣ιτῆς 
20 [Θράσ]ιππος Φρυναίου  50 Ἀρ̣ι̣στόμα[χ]ο̣ς̣ Δημ̣ο̣χάρους 
 [Σίμ]ω̣ν Θε̣οκλέους    Ε̣ὐ̣θ̣ύδομος Ἐπικράτους 
 […6…]τρ̣α̣τος Μνησιμάχου  [….]..ΝΕ..[— — —] 
 [….ca.9…..] Λ̣υκ̣ίσκου   [— — — —?— — — —] 
[……ca.13…….]…Υ   
Col. IV: Ἁλ̣αιεῆς 
Col. II: vacat     55 Σ̣τ̣έφανος Αἰσι̣μ̣ίδου 
25 Αἰξωνῆς     Σ̣ω̣κράτης Σθ̣ενοκράτους 
 Ἀταρβίων Τυννίου    Σ̣τήσαρ̣χος Νικομάχου 
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 Κα̣λ̣λία̣ς̣ Δε̣ι̣νοκράτους   Ἡδύλος Δρύωνος 
 Πολυκράτης Φαν̣ί̣ου   Βρύων Δρύωνος 
 Δημήτριος Εὐκ̣λ̣έ̣ο̣υ̣ς   60 Ἀρεσ[ί]ας Ἀ̣τα̣ρ̣β̣ίδου 
30 Κλεόστρατος Κλε̣<ο>φ̣άντου  Σωσ̣ικράτης Σωσίππου 
 Δίφιλος Να̣υ̣σιχάρ̣ου[ς]   Ἐπίγονος Διο̣δώρου 
 Φιλή̣ρατος Πα̣ν<α>ρί̣σ̣του   Εὔβο̣υ̣[λο]ς Φιλοκ̣λέους 
 Ξυπεταιόνες     Ἐπικράτης Σ̣η̣μ̣ιάδου 
 Τ̣ιμόστρατος Μ̣έ̣ν̣ω̣ν̣ο̣ς̣  65 Ν̣[.]α̣ι̣[.]ος Ἱεροφῶντος 
35 Ἡ̣γ̣ίας Ἀγαπαίου    Καλλιάδης Καλλίου 
 Χ̣[ι]ωνίδης Ἐριώτου    Φιλόστρατος Νικοβούλου 
 [— — — — — — — — —]   Σωκράτης Εὐκράτους 
Col. III: vacat      Εὐθ̣ή̣μων Ε̣ὐ̣κ̣λ̣έους 
 Μενεκλῆς Μένωνος   70 Λ̣ύσις Τ̣ιμ̣[— — — — — —] 
 Τρινεμῆς     Κ̣αλλ[ίσ]τ̣ρ[ατος — — —] 
40 Θ̣ουγ̣έ̣νης Φιλοκλέου   [— — — — — — — — — —] 
        [— — — —?— — — — —] 
Right Face: 
 ὁ δῆμος                ἡ βουλή               ἡ φυλή 
75    Ἐλε[υσίν]ιοι           Ῥαμνούσιοι 
 
Notes: 52 names are arranged in four columns. Clinton 1988, 27, suggests that Columns 
III and IV each had one more name under the demes of Melite and Halai Aixonides 
respectively, for a potential total of 54 ephebes. Reinmuth 1971, 16, 107, for some reason 
gives two totals – 52 and 48. Hansen 1988a, 3, prefers the former figure. 
 
E6: The ephebes of Aiantis. 
Date:    Enrollment: 333/2 (Archon). Inscription: 333/2 or 332/1.  
Find Spot:  South of the propylon to the Pompeion in Kerameikos 
(Kerameikos Inv.No. I 64). 
Bibliography: Reinmuth 1971 no. 6 = Habicht 1961 (1962), 143, no. 2. SEG 
21.680. 
Description:  Marble fragment (H. 0.17 m.; W. 0.325 m.; Th 0.232 m.), 
smoothed top and sides (rough picked back) but broken below, 
with a rectangular cutting for a dedication (H. 0.15 m.; W. 0.16 m.; 
D. 0.08 m.). L.H. 0.01 m. (lines 1-6), 0.007 m. (lines 7-9). 




 [Αἰ]αντίδος ἔφηβ[οι οἱ] 
 ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους ἄρχοντ[ος] 
 [κ]αὶ σωφρονιστὴς Ἐπιχάρης 
 Ἐπιγένους Οἰναῖος λαμπάδι 
5 νικήσαντες ἥρωι Μουνίχωι 
 vacat ἀνέθεσαν vacat 
 Οἰναῖοι vacat 
 [Π]ολυμήδης Πολυφίλου ///// 
 [κα]ὶ Πυθόδωρ[ος Ἀπ]ολλοδώρου 
10 — — — 
 
Notes: The names of two ephebes are preserved, uniquely conjoined by kai, of the deme 
Oinoe (lines 7-9). The Oinaioi were probably placed first in the roster because the 
sophronistes Ἐπιχάρης Ἐπιγένους was from that deme (lines 3-4). 
 
E7: The ephebes of Pandionis. 
Date:    Enrollment: 333/2 (Archon restored). Inscription: 332/1.  
Find Spot:   Unknown (EM 3590). 
Bibliography: Reinmuth 1971 no. 8 = Merritt 1945, 234-9, a re-edition of IG II2 
2976. SEG 21.682. 
Description:  Fragment of Pentelic marble stele, broken on all sides except for 
bottom (H. 0.22 m.; W. 0.19 m.; Th. 0.07 m.). L.H. 0.005 m. 
Text:    Non-Stoichedon.  
        — — — 
        [— — — — — —]ου 
        [— — — — — —]δου 
        [— — — — — — — —]ίδου 
        [— — — — — — —]οφῶντος 
5        [— — — — — —] Λυσίου 
two lines uninscribed 
 [ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους ἄρχοντος οἱ ἔφηβοι τῆς Πανδι]ονίδος καὶ ὁ σωφ[ρο]- 
 [νιστὴς ἀνέθησαν στεφανωθέντες χρυσῶι στ]εφ[άν]ωι [ὑπὸ τῆ]ς φυ[λῆς] 
 [ἀρετῆς εἰς τὴν φυλὴν καὶ σωφροσύν]ης ἕνεκα vacat 
 [στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ τῆι χώραι Σώφιλον Ἀριστ]οτέλους [Φυλάσ]ιον vacat 
10 [στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ τῶι Πειραιεῖ Κόνωνα] Τ̣ιμοθέου [Ἀναφλ]ύστιον vacat 
 [κοσμητὴν ….8…. Αἰνησιστρά]του Ἀχαρνέαv [Μν]ῆσον Ἀρίστω[νος] 
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 [demotic ca. 9, name ca. 9, patronymic ca. 9 Π]αιανιέα, [Χ]α[ρί]αν Ἀρκέωνος 
 [demotic ca. 10, name ca. 10, patronymic ca. 8]ους Μυρρινούσιον vacat 
 [λοχαγὸν name ca. 9, patronymic ca. 10 Παι]ανιέα, λοχαγὸν Εὐκλεία vacat  
15 [patronymic ca. 12, demotic ca. 12 λοχαγ]ὸν Αἰσχύλον Πυθέου Παιαν[ιέα], 
 [λοχαγὸν name ca. 11 patronymic ca. 11] Ὢαθεν, λοχαγὸν Ἐτεοκλέαv [vvv] 
 [patronymic ca. 12, demotic ca 12, λοχαγ]ὸν Φανόστρατον Φανίου vv [vvv] 
 [demotic ca. 8, λοχαγὸν name ca. 9, ..ca. 5...]γίτου Παιανιέα. vacat 
 vacat 
 
Notes: Merritt restored Nicocrates in line 6 because line 11 probably should be taken as 
κοσμητὴν ….8…. Αἰνησιστρά]του Ἀχαρνέα, who is attested as kosmetes in that year 
(E8, Col. II, lines 12-3). Reinmuth rightly rejected Merrit’s restoration of line 6 (ἐπὶ 
Νικοκράτους ἄρχοντος ὁ ταξίαρχος ἔφηβοι τῆς Πανδι]ονίδος καὶ ὁ σωφ[ρονισ), 
because the latter did not know that the taxiarchos was an ephebe (Mitchel 1961, 347-
57). The former, however, should have placed οἱ first in line 6 rather than in its present 
position, because the archonship formula is always in the attributive position (Mitchel 
1961, 351, n. 9; Clinton 1988, 30, n. 13). Lewis 1973, 256, has examined the photo of the 
inscription (Reinmuth 1971, Plate VIII) and offers an alternative reading for lines 7-8: 
σ]τεφαν̣ώ̣[σαντε]ς χρ[υσ]ῶι σ[τ]εφ[άνωι ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας τῆς εἰ]ς 
ἑαυτ[οὺς] (cf. E5, lines 2-4). I concur with Lewis upon my own scrutiny of the photo.  
The bottom part of the roster is preserved, which consists of five incomplete 
names from column II (lines 1-5). Reinmuth 1971, 22-3, estimates that there would be 
room for 30-32 names if the profile of a human head sketched on the stone at a later date 
was in fact a bust. Since it is unclear whether the 7 lochagoi were also included in the 
roster, this would mean that the contingent numbered at least 36 ephebes. Traill 1975, 32, 
n. 20, however, has disputed Reinmuth’s assumption concerning the drawing and has 
shown that we cannot determine the size of the stele from the sketch, because we do not 
know whether the latter was a face, a bust, or even an entire body. Given that the ephebes 
were separated into two columns, presumably of equal length, the roster as it stands had 
at least 10 ephebes but there is no way of determining the overall size of the contingent. 




E8: The ephebes of Leontis. 
Date:    Enrollment: 333/2 (Archon). Inscription: 332/1.  
Find Spot:   Agora Section S (Agora Inv.No. I 3068a, 3068b, 3068c). 
Bibliography:  Reinmuth 1971 no. 9 = Merritt 1940, 59-66, No. 8.  
Description:  Base of Hymmetian marble with a cutting for a dedication. 
Inscription consists of fragments which form a composite group (a: 
H. 0.63 m.; W. 0.57 m.; Th. 0.345 m.) and two more fragments 
which form the upper right half (b: H. 0.13 m.; W. 0.18 m.; Th. 
0.082 m. and c: H. 0.25 m.; W. 0.13 m.; Th. 0.11 m.). L.H. 0.01 m. 
(lines 1-2), 0.006 m. (col. I, lines 3-38; col. II, lines 3-38, col. III, 
lines 3-19.  
Text:  Stoichedon 72 (lines 1-2), 26 (col. I-II), 34 (col. III, lines 3-9), 42 
(col. III, lines 15-8).  
 
 [τῶι ἥ]ρωι ὁ σ[ω]φρονιστ[ὴς τῆς Λεωντίδος ἐπὶ] 
 Ν[ι]κ[οκράτους καὶ οἱ ἔφηβοι] σ[τεφανωθέντ]ε[ς vv] 
 ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δ[ήμου καὶ τῆς φυλ]ῆς 
 ἀρετῆς ἕνε[κα καὶ σωφρο]σύνης. vacat 
Col. I: Θεόδωρος Θεοδώρου Λευκονο[εὺς] 
 εἶπεν· ἐπειδὴ Φιλόθεος ὁ σωφ[ρον]- 
5 ιστὴς τῆς Λεωντίδος φυλῆς τ[ῶν ἐ]- 
 φήβων ἀπαγγέλλει περὶ τῶν ν[εαν]- 
 ίσκων καί φησιν εἶναι εὐτα[κτο̑ν]- 
 τας καὶ πειθομένος τοῖς τ[ε νόμο]- 
 ις καὶ ἑαυτῶι, δεδόχθαι τ[ῆι Λεω]ν- 
10 τίδι ἐπαινέσαι τὴν Λεωντίδα φυ- 
 λὴν τῶν ἐφήβων τῶν ἐπὶ Νικοκράτ- 
 ους ἄρχοντος καὶ στεφανῶσαι χρ- 
 υσῶι στεφάνωι ἕκα[στ]ον αὐτῶν ἀρ- 
 ετῆς ἕνεκα, ἐπαιν[έσ]αι δὲ καὶ τὸν 
15 σωφρονιστὴν Φι[λόθ]εον Φιλοκλέ- 
 ους Σουνιᾶ καὶ σ[τε]φανῶσαι χρυσ- 
 ῶι στεφάνωι ἀπ̣[ὸ χι]λίων δραχμῶν 
 ἐπειδὰν τὰς ε̣[ὐθύ]νας δῶι ἀρετῆς 
 ἕνεκα τῆς ε[ἰς τὴν] φυλὴν καὶ τοὺς 
20 ἐφήβους, [ἐπαιν]έ̣σαι δὲ καὶ τον τα- 
 ξίαρχον̣ [τῆς φ]υλῆς Φιλοκλέα Φ[ιλ]- 
 οθέου Σ[ουνι]ᾶ καὶ τοὺς λοχαγο[ὺς] 
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 Πανδαί[την Π]ασικλέος Ποτάμ[ιον] 
 Ἐπικρά[την] Πεισιάνακτος Σ[ουνι]- 
25 ᾶ Καλλ[ιχάρ]ην Καλλιφάνος [Σουνι]- 
 ᾶ Νικό[ξεν]ον Νικοκλέος Χ[ολληίδ]- 
 ην Τι[μοκρ]άτην Τιμοκλέος Π̣[οτάμ]- 
 ιον κ[αὶ στ]εφανῶσαι χρυσῶι [στεφ]- 
 άν[ωι ἕκα]στον αὐτῶν ἀπο πεν[τακο]- 
30 [σίων δρα]χμῶν ἀρετῆς καὶ σω[φροσ]- 
 [ύνης ἕνε]κα, δοῦναι δὲ αὐτοῖς [κα]ὶ 
 [ἀνάθημα] ἀναθεῖναι [ἐν] τῶι ἰε[ρ]ῶι 
 [τοῦ ἥρω, ἐ]παινέσαι [δὲ καὶ] τὸς [δ]ιδ- 
 [ασκάλου]ς τῆς φυλῆ[ς …6…]την Α- 
35 […7….]υ Παλλην[έα …7….]ν Ἀρ- 
 [..]αινέ[ο] Μεθων[αῖον καὶ στεφ]ανῶ- 
 [σαι] θ̣α̣λ[λο]ῦ στ[εφάνωι ὅτι καλ]ῶς [ἐ]- 
 [π]εμεληθ̣η̣σαν τ[ῶν ἐφ]ή[βων] vacat 
Col. II: [ἀναγράψαι δὲ] τόδε τὸ ψήφισμ̣[α τῆ]- 
 [ς φυλῆς τὸν γρ]αμματέα τῆς φ̣υ̣[λῆς] 
5 [καὶ στῆσαι ἐν] τῶι ἱερῶι, τὸ [δ’ ἀνάλ]- 
 [ωμα εἰς τὴν γρα]φὴν δοῦνα[ι τοὺς ἐ]- 
 [πιμελητὰς τῆς φ]υλῆς, ἀ[ναγράψαι] 
 [δὲ τὸ ψήφισμα εἰς τ]ὸ̣ [ἀν]άθ[ημα vvv] 
 [στ]ρα[τ]η[γὸς ἐπὶ] τῶι Περαι[εῖ Κόνω]- 
10 ν Τιμοθέο Ἀναφλύστιος [στρατηγ]- 
 ὸς ἐπὶ τῆι χώραι Σώφιλ[ος Ἀριστο]- 
 τέλος Φυλάσιος κοσμη[τής ..5…] 
 […] Αἰνησιστράτου Ἀχ̣[αρνεὺς σω]- 
 [φρονι]στὴς [Φιλόθ]εο[ς Φιλοκλέου] 
15 [ς Σουνι]εὺ[ς ταξίαρχος Φιλοκλέη]- 
 [ς Φιλ]οθέου [Σουνιεὺς λοχαγοὶ Πα]- 
 [ν]δαίτης Πα[σικλέος Ποτάμιος Ἐπ]- 
 [ι]κ̣ράτης Πε̣[ισιάνακτος Σουνιεὺ]- 
 ς Καλλιχάρ[ης Καλλιφάνους Σουν]- 
20 [ι]εὺς Νι[κ]ό[ξενος Νικοκλέους Χολ]- 
 [λ]ηίδης Τι[μοκράτης Τιμοκλέος Π]- 
 [ο]τάμιος [ἔφηβοι· ……13…….] 
 [..]ης Σω— — — — — — — — — —] 
 [..]υγε — — — — — — — — — — —] 
25 [.]\Ι— — — — — — — — — — — —] 
 [.]ΙΗ— — — — — — — — — — — —] 
 [..]Ρ— — — — — — — — — — — —] 
 έης Κι ̣— — — — — — — — — — — — —] 
 οδώρου Πρε[σ]βυ[χάρης ….9…..] 
30 υς Σαννείδης […7….Ποτάμιοι] 
 καθύπερθεν [……..16….….]] 
 
 200 
 Ποτάμιοι ὑπέ[νε]ρθ[εν ….9…..] 
 ν̣ Φιλίνου   Λευκονο[εῖς Κηδείδης] 
 Θρασυμήδος χαιρε[…..11……] 
35 δο Θαρσύνων Σατύρο[υ ….9…..] 
 Εὐτελίδης Μενεστρά[του …6…] 
 Νικήρατος Νικοδήμο[υ ….8….] 
 Εὐαίων Πείθω[ν]ος Θεάγ̣[γελος ...] 
 vacat 
 [ἡ βο]υλή ὁ δῆμος ἡ φυλή 
Col. III:[ …..11……]ροθεο[….9…..] Ἀθηνο[….] 
 […..11…….]εσίδη̣[ς ….8….]δοτος [….] 
5 [……12……]ς Νι̣[…7…. Παι]ονίδαι ·[…] 
 [— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]έας Μνησι[.] 
 [— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — Σμι]κύθου Αἰς[.] 
 [— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]ος Ἀμειψία(ς) 
 [— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]κησίας Νι[.] 
10 […7…. ἔδοξεν τοῖς λοχαγοῖς τῆς Λεω]ντίδος, Παν[δα]- 
 [ίτης Πασικλέος Ποτάμιος εἶπεν· ἐπειδ]ὴ Φιλόθεος [ὁ σ]- 
 [ωφρονιστὴς τῆς Λεωντίδος φυλῆς δικα]ίως ἐπιμεμέ[λ]- 
 [ηται τῶν τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ χρήσιμον ἑαυτὸ]ν παρέσχηκε[ν] 
 [τῶι τε ταξιάρχωι καὶ τοῖς λοχαγοῖς, ἐπ]αινέσαι Φιλ[ό]- 
15 [θεον Φιλοκλέους Σουνιᾶ καὶ στεφανῶσ]α̣ι αὐτὸν χρ[υσ]- 
 [ῶι στεφάνωι ἀπὸ χιλίων δραχμῶν ἀρετῆς] ἕνεκα κ̣αὶ [σω]- 
 [φροσύνης τῆς εἰς τὴν φυλήν, ἀναγράψαι δ]ὲ τόδε τὸ ψ[ήφ]- 
 [ισμα εἰς τὸ ἀνάθημα ὃ οἱ ἔ]φηβοι τῶ̣ι̣ ἥ[ρωι ἀνατιθέασι.] 
 vacat 
 [οἱ ἔφηβοι]                            [οἱ λοχαγοί] 
 
Notes: Who passed the decree honoring the sophronistes in Col. III, lines 10-19? They 
clearly belonged to Leontis: ..]ντίδος, Παν[.. (line 10). Reinmuth 1955, 226, restores 
[….7… ἔδοξεν τοῖς φυλεταῖς τῆς Λεω]ντίδος, but, as Pélékidis 1962, 125, n. 4, 
points out, it would duplicate the decree in Col. I, line 3 – Col. II, line 9. Pélékidis instead 
suggests that they were epheboi. While the ephebic corpus does attest that ephebes were 
both crowned for their military service and could crown others in the honorary 
ceremonies at the end of their stint of service (e.g. E20, left and right side, line 1: τούσδε 
ἐστεφάνωσαν οἱ ἔφηβοι), there is no evidence that ephebes as a body could pass 
decrees on these occasions. This also applies to Merritt’s 1940, 66, conjecture that they 
were ephebic lochagoi, along with the additional objection that the restoration of 
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Παν[δαίτης Πασικλέος Ποτάμιος] is by no means certain (Pélékidis 1962, 125, n. 4). 
My suggestion is that the fathers of the ephebes passed the decree. Certainly they played 
an important role not only in selecting the candidates for sophronistes ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 
42.2) but also in assessing the sophronistes’ performance at the end of his term of office 
in the ephebeia (IG II2 1159, lines 11-14, dated to 303/2). For these matters, see pgs. 130-
1. The proposed text for Col. III, lines 10-4, is as follows:  
[ἐψηφίσθαι δὲ τοῖς πατράσι τῶν τῆς Λεω]ντίδος, Παν[..]-  
 [name ca. 4, patronymic ca. 8, demotic ca. 9, εἶπεν· ἐπειδ]ὴ Φιλόθεος [ὁ σ]- 
 [ωφρονιστὴς τῆς Λεωντίδος φυλῆς δικα]ίως ἐπιμεμέ[λ]- 
[ηται  τῶν νεανίσκων καὶ χρήσιμον αὑτὸ]ν παρέσχηκε[ν] 
 [τοῖς ἐφήβοις τοῖς ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους, ἐπ]αινέσαι Φιλ[ό]- 
This restoration avoids Merrit’s problematic τῶν τῆς ἀρχῆς, which only occurs here, 
and replaces it with τῶν νεανίσκων, which is used as an alternative to ἔφηβοι in Col. I, 
lines 3-5. For αὑτὸ]ν instead of ἑαυτὸ]ν with χρήσιμον … παρέσχηκε[ν] + dative, see 
IG II2 428 (p. 336/5), lines 4-5; Agora 16.104[1] (318/7), lines 17-8; SEG 37.86 (303/2), 
lines 12-3.  
 The roster is partially preserved. The ephebic taxiarchos and lochagoi are 
honored first (Col. II, lines 15-22), followed by the remaining ephebes (Col. II, lines 22-
38, Col. III, lines 3-9), which is unfortunately fragmentary. Reinmuth 1971, 31-2, 
estimates that there is sufficient space in columns II and III for perhaps 38 ephebes. To 
this the ephebic taxiarchos and lochagoi must be added, because their names do not 
appear to have been repeated in the roster (cf. E15), in contrast to some ephebic 
inscriptions (e.g. E5). Reinmuth thus estimates c. 44 ephebes, a number accepted by most 
scholars (e.g. Hansen 1988a, 4). See, however, E9 below. 
 
E9: The ephebes of Leontis. 
Date:    Enrollment Year: 333/2 (Archon). Inscription: 333/2? 
Find Spot:   Rhamnous. 
Bibliography:  Petrakos 1996 (1997), 19. Petrakos 2004, 167-176. SEG 46.237. 
Description:   Tetragonal “Hermiac” marble(?) base. No further details.  
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Text: Petrakos provides some details of the stone’s layout but no transcript. This is a 
summary of his description. The text is stoichedon. There are no decrees. Under the 
heading, on the front face of the base, there are painted wreaths that honor the 
στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῶι Περαιῶς Κόνων Τιμοθέου Ἀναφλύστιον, κοσμητὴς 
Θουγείτων Ἀριστοκράτου Ἀρχαρνεύς, σωφρονιστὴς Φιλόθεος Φιλοκλέου 
Σουνιεύς, and ταξίαρχος Φιλοκλῆς Φιλοκλέου Σουνιεύς. Three lochagoi (unnamed 
but appear on E8, Col. I, lines 22-8) and two didaskaloi follow (unnamed). Beneath these 
officials is a roster of ephebes with patronymics and arranged under deme captions. It is 
complete and numbers 38 ephebes (according to Petrakos) who have the same names as 
the preserved portion of E8’s roster. On the left and right sides of the base there were 7 
more didaskaloi inscribed, 4 (all foreigners) and 3 (all Athenians) respectively. If so, E9 
corrects Reinmuth’s estimate of forty-four ephebes for E8. 
Notes: Petrakos dates the inscription to 333/2 because the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῆι χώραι 
Σώφιλος Ἀριστοτέλους Φυλάσιος is not honored on the stone. This would mean that 
E9 was erected before E8. He also suggests that Θουγείτων Ἀριστοκράτου 
Ἀρχαρνεύς had died in that year and was then replaced as kosmetes by ….8…. 
Αἰνησιστράτου Ἀχαρνέυς, who is attested on no other inscription for the ephebes 
enrolled in the archonship of Nicocrates (Petrakos misspells his patronymic as 
Μνησιστράτου).  
 
E10: The ephebes of Erectheis. 
Date:    Enrollment: 333/2 (Archon). Inscription: 333/2 or 332/1.  
Find Spot:  Below the east retaining wall of the temenos of Nemesis at 
Rhamnous (EAM 313 N). 
Bibliography: Reinmuth 1971 no. 13 = Pouilloux 1954, 111, no. 2. Petrakos 1979 
(1981), 68-9, no. 21, joined two fragments to IG II2 3105, showing 
that the stone, despite the doubts of Pélékidis 1962, 119, n. 1, and 
Lewis 1973, 256, was an ephebic inscription. Petrakos 1999, 84-5, 
no. 98. SEG 31.162 = 34.208 = 37.233 = 39.185. 
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Description:  Rectangular cutting on a rounded base (diam. 42 cm.; H: 27 cm.) 
with moldings top and bottom. Palagia and Lewis 1988, 337-344, 
suggest that one (NM 313) of the four hip herms (NM 314, 315, 
316) found alongside the base fitted into the cutting. L.H. 0.009 m.  
Text: 
 
 [ὁ σωφ]ρονιστὴς Περικ[— — — — — — — — —]άσιος 
 [καὶ οἱ τῆς Ἐρε]χθεῖδος ἐφήβων γ[υμ]νασίαρχοι ἀνέθεσαν, 
3 [οἱ ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους ἄρχοντος λαμπάδι νικήσαντες 
 [— —]ανδρος Τιμ[— — —] Εὐωνυμεύς, Χαρικλῆς Ἀλεξιμένου Περγασῆθεν. 
 
 ΛΑΜ[Π]ΑΔΗΦΟΡΟΙ 
Col. I:      Col. II: 
6 Ἀγακλῆς Περγασῆ    [— — — — — — — ] 
 [— — — — — — — ]  18 φανόμα[χος — — — ] 
 Ἀρχάγαθος Λανπτρ    Ἀλκιμαχίδης Περ 
9 Σόλων Ἀγρυλῆθεν    Κίμων Περγασῆ 
 Πυθοκλῆς Λανπτρε   21 Τιμοκράτης Κηφι 
 Δημοκρίνης Περγα    Σωσίβ<ι>ος Εὐωνυμ 
12 Δικαιοκράτης Περ     Διοκλῆς Λανπτρε 
 Χαριναύτης Λαν   24 Ἱέρων Λαμπτρε 
 Φιλήμων Ἀγρυλῆ    Πολυκράτης Εὐων 
15 Ἀριστοκλῆς Λανπ    Ξενοφῶν Λαμπτ 
 Φιλοχάρης Ἀναγυ   27 ἐπικράτης Εὐων 
 vacat      [---π]είθης Λαμ 
 vacat      vacat 
Col. III:      Col. IV: 
 Ὑπέρβολος Παμ    ἐπικράτης Ἀναγ   
30 Φιλοκλῆς Ἀνα    42 Θηραμένης Κηφισι 
 Ἀριστίων Περγας    Φίλων Λαμπτρ 
 Τελένικος Περγας    Θεόφιλος Ἀ<να>γυρά 
33 Εἴδων Ἀγρυλῆθεν   45 Ἀγνωνίδης Κηφισι 
 Φίλιππος Ἀναγυρά    Φιλόστρατος Λαμ 
 Φιλόδημος Λανπτ    Κάλλιπ<π>ος Λαμπτ 
36 Ἀντίφημος Περγας   48 Γλαῦκος Εὐωνυ 
 Ἀντιφάνης Κηφισι     Νικόφημος Εὐω 
 Φιλόνεως Περγασῆθ    Φιλωνίδης Εὐων 
39 Νικίας Κηφισιεύς    51 Κηφισογένης Κηφ 
 Φανοτέλης Εὐων     Πολυμήδης Λαμπτ 
 vacat     Col. V: 
        Λεωχίδης Εὐων 




Notes: 46 names arranged in five columns (left to right) are attested on the victory stele, 
plus two erasures in lines 7 and 17. Palagia and Lewis 1988, 333-4, argue that the 
gymnasiarch Χαρικλῆς Ἀλεξιμένου Περγασῆθεν in line 4 is the same person as the 
ephebe in E11, line 9. For a discussion of this gymnasiarchy, see pg. 116, n. 88. If both 
gymnasiarchs were in fact ephebes, they should then be added to the stele’s roster, 
bringing the total to 48. Petrakos 1999, 84-5, no. 98, has Χαιρέφιλος Περγ in line 7 
instead of the erasure. 
 
E11: The ephebes of Erectheis. 
Date:    Enrollment: 333/2 (= E10). Inscription: 332/1.  
Find Spot:  Unknown (EM 4112). 
Bibliography: Palagia and Lewis 1989, 334-5, associated IG II2 2401 with IG II2 
3105, proving that it belongs to the ephebic corpus. SEG 39.184. 
Description:  Fragment of Hymettian marble stele (H. 0.25 m.; W. 0.11 m.; Th. 
0.09 m.). L.H. 0.005-0.006 m. 
Text:    Non-Stoichedon. Names restored through comparison with E10. 
 
Col. I:      Col. II: 
 [— — — —ο]υ    [— — — — — — — —] 
         Περγασε[ῖς καθύπε(ρθε)] 
        Ἀλκιμαχίδης Α[— — — —] 
        Χαιρέφιλος Ν[— — — —] 
5        Φιλόνεως Φιλοσ̣[— — — —] 
        Κίμων Κίμωνος 
        Τελένικος Τελε̣[— — — —] 
        Περγασεῖς ὑ̣πέ(νερθε) 
        Χαρικλῆς Ἀλεξ[ιμένου] 
10        Ἀ̣ριστίων Ἀριστονί[κου] 
        Δ̣ικαιοκράτης Εὐμ[— — — —] 
        [Δ]η̣μοκρίνης Δημοκρ[— — — ] 
        Ἀντίφημος Θερσίου 
        Ἀγα̣κλῆς Πασικλεί(δου) 
15        Λαμ̣πτρε̣ῖ̣ς̣ [καθ]ύπε(ρθε) 
        Ἱ̣έ̣ρων Λυσίου 
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        Ξ̣ε̣ν̣ο̣φῶ̣ν Θεοδ̣ότου 
        [Φί]λων Θεοδώρου 
        [Φ]ιλόδ[ημος] Φρύνωνο[ς?] 
20        [Διοπεί]θης Διοπείθου 
        [Διοκλ]ῆς Δ̣ι̣ο̣κλείδου 
        [Χα]ριναύτης Χαριξένο[υ] 
        [Κάλλ]ιππος [Δ]ιοπε̣[— — — —] 
       [— — — — — — — —]ο[— — ] 
 
Notes: 20 ephebes are listed under three demes (Lower Pergase, Upper Pergase, and 
Upper Lamptrai). Palagia and Lewis 1989 conjecture that the extant text was column two 
of the roster and the document originally contained about 50 names under ten deme 
captions, although E10 would have had a maximum of 48 ephebes.  
 
E12: The ephebes of Acamantis? 
Date:  Enrollment Year: 334/3-333/2 (Prosopography). Inscription: 
333/2-332/1.  
Find Spot:  South of Propylaea of Pompey in Kerameikos (Kerameikos 
Inv.No. I 64).  
Bibliography:  Reinmuth 1971 no. 7 = Habicht 1961 (1962), 147, no. 3. SEG 
21.680. 
Description:  Fragment of Pentelic marble stele with margin on right but 
otherwise broken. H. 0.08 m.; W. 0.195 m.; Th. 0.127 m. L.H. 
0.006 m. 
Text:    Non-Stoichedon. 
 
 — — — 
 [— — — — — — χρυσῶι στε]- 
 [φάνωι ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα τ]- 
 ῆς εἰς ἑαυτοὺ[ς στρα]- 
 τηγὸν ἐπὶ τῶι Π[ειραι]- 
 εῖ Κόνωνα Τιμοθ[έου] 
 Ἀν[α]φλύστιον, στρ[α]- 
5 [τηγὸν ἐ]πὶ τῆι χώραι 
 [Σώφιλον Ἀρισ]τ̣οτέλ- 
 [ους Φυλάσιον — — — — —] 
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 — — — 
 
Notes: Habicht dates the stele to the enrollment year of 333/2 since Konon and Sophilos 
appear on other ephebic inscriptions in the archonship of Nicocrates (e.g. E5, lines 4-5; 
E7, lines 9-10; E8, Col. II, lines 9-12). But, as Reinmuth points out, these strategoi also 
held the same offices in the previous year (E4, lines 4-6). Habicht also plausibly suggests 
Acamantis because the tribe had an altar nearby dedeciated to its epoymnous hero at the 
Dipylon gate (IG II2 4983). Given the likelihood that the stone had several columns of 
text to the left (cf. E8), this inscription should perhaps be regarded as an anathema 
erected at the end of the ephebes’ service rather than a victory-dedication in the torch 
race, as scholars have supposed (e.g. Humphreys 2004, 115). 
 
E13: The ephebes of Oineis. 
Date:    Enrollment Year: 332/1 (Archon?). Inscription 331/0. 
Findspot:   Rhamnous (Rhamnous Inv.No. 1143). 
Bibliography:  Petrakos 1993 (1994), 7; 1993 (1996), 30. SEG 43.61 = 44.177. 
Notes: Fragments of a circular base for a small bronze tripod. No text and 
no further details. 
 
E14: The ephebes of Cecropis 
Date:    Enrollment Year: 332/1? (Prosopography). Inscription: 331/0?  
Find Spot:  The vicinity of the Library of Pantinos. Base perhaps stood in the 
Agora.  
Bibliography:  Traill 1986, 3-5. SEG 36.155. 
Description:  Two-block base of seven fragments of Hymettian marble (six form 
upper block, one the lower block). Dimensions of fragments: a = 
Agora no. 990, H: 0.15 m.; W: 0.2 m.; Th: 0.09 m.; L.H. 0.006-
0.007 m.; b = Agora no. 2301, H: 0.097 m.; W: 0.185 m.; Th: 
0.323 m.; L.H. 0.006 m.; c = Agora no. 2259, H: 0.13 m.; W: 0.16 
m.; Th: 0.281 m.; L.H. 0.006 m.; d = Agora no. 7459, H: 0.157 m.; 
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W: 0.205 m.; Th: 0.152 m.; L.H. 0.005-0.007 m.; e = Agora no. 
929, H: 0.13 m.; W: 0.135 m.; Th: 0.10 m.; L.H. 0.006 m.; f = 
Agora no. 431, H: 0.14 m.; W: 0.21 m.; Th: 0.15 m.; L.H. 0.006 
m.; g = Agora no. 6954, H: 0.41 m.; W (top): 1.198 m.; Th (top): 
0.578 m.; L.H. 0.006 m. 
Text:  Fragments of (multiple?) decrees shows that E12 was similar to E2 
and E8. Little of the main text, however, can be recovered. Upper 




 [— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]̣σ̣θα[ι] 
 [— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —] κυρίαν εἶναι 
 [— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — ἀνάλ(?)]ωμα τ[ὸ] παρὰ […] 
 [— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — οἱ φυλ]έτ̣α̣ι̣ ἐψήφ[ισαν v] 
5 [— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
— — — — — — — — — — — — πειθαρχοῦσιν(?)] αὐ̣τ̣ῶι· ἐπ̣[αινέσ]αι v 
 [δὲ καὶ τοὺς λοχαγοὺς(?) τῆς Κεκροπίδος φυλῆς τοὺς ἐπὶ — — — — — — 
ἄρχοντος καὶ στεφανῶσαι ἕκαστον αὐ]τῶν [χρ]υ̣σῶι στε- 
 [φάνωι ἀπὸ πεντακοσίων(?) δραχμῶν ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας εἰς τὴν 
φυλὴν ἵνα ἅπαντες εἰδῶσιν] ὅ̣τι̣ [ἐ]πίσταται 
 [ἡ φυλὴ χάριτας ἀποδιδόναι κατ’ ἀξίαν — — — — — — — — — — — — 
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — τ]ῆς χώρας. vv 





Right Side = Roster 
Upper Block:  
   Col. I:      Col. II: 
10   [Ἁλαιεῖς]     [Ἀθμονεῖς] 
   lacuna?     lacuna?   
 [— — — — — — — — — —]  Τει[— — — — —] 
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 [— — — — — — — — —ο]υ  Μνη[— — — — —] 
 [— — — — — — — — — —]ου  Εὐφ[ρό]νιος [— — — —] 
 [— — — — — — — — — —]του 65 Ἀρι[σ]τώνυμο[ς — — —] 
 [— — — — — — — — —]νος  Αὐτ[ο]μένης [— — — — ] 
15 [— — — — — — — —]δόκου  Αἰ[σχ]ραῖος Χ[— — — —] 
 [— — — — — — — —]ιάδου  Θε[όξ]ε̣νος Μελ[— — —] 
 [— — — —] Φ<α>ιδρίου    vacat 
 [— — —]ς Φυρομάχου  70  vacat 
 [— — —]ν Ἡφαιστοκλέου    [Φ]λυε[ῖς] 
20 [— — —]σ̣ιος Εὐφραίου   [….]κλείδη[ς …]ει̣[—] 
 [— — —]ς 〚..ιος〛 Θεοφίλου   [Ἀρί]μνηστ[ο]ς Ἀριμ[νήστου] 
   [Αἰξ]ωνεῖς    […]ελος Κηφισο[δώρου(?)] 
 [— — —]ς Φ[— — — —]  75 [Νι]κήρατος Εὐβ[ούλου] 
 [— — — — — — — — —]   Ἀπήμαντος Ἀπημ[άντου] 
25 [— — — — — — — — —]   Πολύστρατος Πολυ̣[στράτου] 
 [.]ι[.]θ[..]ι̣ος [— — —]   Ἀνθεμίων Ἀντιλ[όχου] 
 Ἔ̣κφ̣[α]ν̣[τ]ος [— — — —]   Ἀρχέδικος Ἀρχε[δίκου] 
 Καλλίας [— — —]    80 Ἀ[— — — — — — —] 
 [Ἐ]ρ̣γ̣[ο— — — — — — —]    [vacat?]   
30 [— — — — — — — — —]    [vacat?]  
 Λ̣υσ̣[— — — — — — — —]   [Πιθεῖς](?) 
 [.]π̣[— — — — — — — —]   [— — — — — — — —](?) 
 [— — — — — — — — —]θου 85 [— — — — — — — —](?) 
 Κ[— — — — — — —]ράτου  [— — — — — — — —](?) 
35 Ε[— — — — Μεταλ]ήξιδος   [— — — — — — — —](?) 
 Ν[— — — — — —]οκλέους    [vacat?] 
 〚Σ[— —〛 — —] Σ̣ωσ̣[…]μο[υ]   [vacat?] 
   vacat      90  [Ἐπιεικίδαι] (?) 
   vacat     [— — — — — — — —](?) 
40   vacat      [vacat?] 
Lower Block: 
   [Τρινεμεεῖς]     [vacat] 
 [— — — — — — — —]ου    vacat 
 [— — — —]ο̣[δ]ώρο(υ)  95  vacat 
         vacat 
         Μελιτεῖς 
        Κηφισοφῶν Πυθοδώρου 
        Παυσανίας Χαριδήμου 
  vacat of ten lines   100 Ἱερώνυμος Ἱερωνύμου 
        Ἀριστόμαχος Δημοχάρου 
        Δημοχάρης Δημοχάρου 
        Θεόδωρος Θεοδώρο[υ] 
        Πυθόδωρος Ἀγωνίππου 
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       105 Εὔφημος Θάλλου 
55   Συπαλήττιοι    Ἡγήσιππος Θάλλου 
  [Ε]ὐθύβουλος Διογένους    vacat   
   vacat        vacat   
   vacat        vacat   
   vacat       110  vacat   
   Δαιδαλίδαι      Ξυπεταιόνες 
   vacat c. 0.13 m. to bottom   Ἀσωπόδωρος [Ἰ]σχομάχου 
         Ἰσχόμαχος Ἀριστομάχου 
        Λυσικράτης Χιωνίδου 
       115 Μεναῖος Θουδ<ό>του ἐκ Κοίλης 
 
         vacat ca. 0.085m. to bottom 
Line 115: lapis ΘΟΥΔΩΤΟΥ 
 
Notes: Traill 1986, 12-3, suggests a date of “332/1 B.C. or shortly after” because he 
supposes that two ephebes – Ἀρχέδικος Ἀρχε[δίκου] Φλυεύς (line 79) and 
Ἀριστόμαχος Δημοχάρου Μελιτεύς (line 101) – also appeared in the Cecropis 
inscription of the previous year (E5, lines 48, 50). But this is probably incorrect (see pg. 
103, n. 20). Nevertheless, if [Νι]κήρατος Εὐβ[ούλου] Φλυεύς (line 75) is the brother of 
Euboulos and Suneboulos in E5 (lines 42-3), it is likely that the ephebes enrolled in one 
year during the period 332/1-330/29, possibly in 332/1. Traill’s careful reconstruction of 
the stone has found physical evidence of 58 ephebes arranged in two columns on the right 
side of the upper block under eight deme headings, of which Halai Aixonides, Athmonon, 
and Trinemeia have been fully restored. The editor has also conjectured that there is 
sufficient space for two more deme contingents – Pithos and Epieikidai (Col. II, lines 83-
87, 90-1) – which total 5 ephebes and that one more should be added to the lists of Halai 
Aixonides and Athmonon. If so, the size of the contingent was 58-65 ephebes. 
 
E15: The ephebes of Pandionis. 
Date:  Enrollment Year: 332/1 or 331/0 (Prosopographical). Inscription: 
331/0 or 330/29.  
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Find Spot:  Petrakos 1982 (1984), 161, no. 6, confirms that the stone came 
from Rhamnous. Pouilluox had wrongly suggested Sounion (EM 
4211). 
Bibliography: Reinmuth 1971 no. 10 = Pouilloux 1954, 107, no. 2. SEG 34.150. 
Petrakos 1999, 88-9, no. 101. 
Description:  Base (H: 0.535 m.; W: 0.42 m.; Th: 0.24 m.) of local marble 
broken on all sides with a cutting (W: 0.165 m.; B: 0.115 m.; D: 
0.04 m.) on the top for a herm. L.H. 0.007 m. 
Text:    Stoichedon 43 (lines 1-8), Non-Stoichedon (lines 9-22). 
   
 […ΙΛΛ. ΡΟ……….20……….ΦΗΜ…..11……] 
 [..]ΚΛΓΛΙΟΓΛΙ…..10….. Ἀν]τικλείδη[ν] Ἀντικλέο[υς] 
 [λο]χαγὸν Κλεαίνε[τον..5…]δ̣ρ̣ου Κυδ̣αθ[η]να̣ιέα λοχ[αγὸ]- 
 [ν….8….]ν̣ην Διοφῶν[τος Π]ρασ̣ιέα̣ λοχαγὸν Ἡ̣γ̣ε̣[..5…] 
5 [….9…..]τ̣ωνος Κυ[δ]α[θ]ην[αι]έα λο[χ]αγ[ὸ]ν Σάτυρον Ἐ[…] 
 […6…Παι]ανιέα λοχαγὸν […]φιλον̣ [Σω]κ̣ρά̣τους Κυ̣[δαθ]- 
 [ηναιέα δι]δασκάλο[υς Κάλ]λαισ[χρ]ον Καλλίου Παιανιέ[α] 
 [….8….]ητων Φιλοκρά[τ]η[ν Σ]ω̣στρ[ά]το[υ] Φρεάρριον […] 
 vacat 
 [ἡ βου]λὴ Ῥαμνού-  Ἐλευσί-  Φυλάσι- 
10 [ὁ δῆ]μος σιοι  νιοι  οι 
 vacat 
 Col. I:       Col.II:      
 [Πρασ]ιεις      [— — — — — —]   
 [— —]ΛΙΟ[..]ΛΗ[…]Σ   [— — — — — —]   
 [— —]Γ-Ο[— — — — — ]   [— — — — — —] 
 [— —]Φιλισ̣τ̣ι̣ων̣ο̣ς̣    ΛΗ̣Ν̣[— — —] 
15 [— —]ος̣ Ζ̣ω̣π̣ύ̣ρ̣ο̣υ̣    [— — — —]ω̣ν̣ο̣ς̣[— —] 
 [— —]ω̣ρ̣ Θ̣ε̣οφα̣ντου̣   Ἀ̣ν̣τ̣[— — —]  
 [— —]ς Δημητρίου    Ἀ̣Ν̣Τ̣Ι̣Σ ̣[— —] 
 [— — — — — —]    ΛΑΚΡ[— — — —]  
 [— — — — — —]    Α̣Ι̣Ν̣[— — — —] 
20 [— — — — — —]    [— — — — — —] 
[— — — — — —]    [— — — — — —] 






 Ἀ̣[ρ]κέδημ[ο]ς Εὐξ̣έν̣ο̣[υ] 
 Ἰσόδημος Ἰσιφίλ[ου]  
 Ἀντιχάρης Ἀντικλέο[ς] 
15 [..5…]οτης Αἰνησίου 
 [Ἡ]γησ̣[ι]κλῆς Φιλέου 
 [..]YΑ— — — — 
 Ἀντιγένη[ς…]ων̣[ος] 
 Πρώταρχ[ο]ς ΛΙΧΙΡΛ 
20 Μεγ[.]ων [Φ]ορμίωνος 
 Φανόμα[χ]ος Μ[..]ν[— —] 
 [— — ]ρ̣[ — —]τη[.]ομο[ — —] 
  
Notes: The enrollment year cannot be 333/2 as there is already a different year-class of 
ephebes – E7 – attested for that year, nor is 334/3 likely because ephebic lochagoi occur 
from 333/2 onwards. If the official of unknown title Φιλοκρά[τ]η[ν Σ]ω̣στρ[ά]το[υ] 
Φρεάρριον (line 8) is the same man who was diaitetes in 329/8 (Davies 1971, no. 
13374F: IG II2 1925, lines 5-6), then the enrollment year was c. 332/1-331/0. Reinmuth 
suggests ca. 332/1 and Pouilloux “environs de 330.” Petrakos 1999, 88, dates it to 333-
324.  
Two textual problems need to be discussed in lines 7-8.  Pouilloux’s edition of the 
text has δι]δάσκαλο[ν whereas Peek 1942, 21, no. 24, had earlier suggested 
γυμ]ν̣ασίαρχ̣ο̣[ν. Reinmuth’s examination of the inscription confirmed Pouilloux’s 
reading, but he suggests “with some hesitation” the accusative plural instead of the 
singular because if we accept the latter and the restoration Κάλ]λαισ[χρ]ον, this would 
leave a space between the two words. But this also creates a problem (as Reinmuth is 
well aware), since only one name is attested after δι]δασκάλο[υς before Reinmuth’s 
reading of [….8….]ητων in line 8. If correct, this would rule out Pélékidis’ 1962, 151, 
suggestion of ἐπὶ τῶν ἐφ]ή̣βων. Reinmuth instead restores [ἐξ ἐπιμελ]ητῶν, which 
would then mean that one of the epimeletai who maintained the fortress at Rhamnous (cf. 
E20, Left Side, lines 7-9) was also a didaskalos. Reinmuth 1971, 37, confuses these 
epimeletai with those who oversaw the Amphiareion (IG VII Addenda 4253; cf. Lewis 
1973, 255). Though it should be stressed that Reinmuth’s restorations are less than 
secure, I cannot suggest any viable alternative, unless we assume that a name has dropped 
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out of the text after Παιανιέ[α] and that the official in line 8, whatever he is, is not a 
didaskalos.  
The inscription lists at least five ephebic lochagoi at the bottom of a list of 
officials (lines 3-7) with perhaps Ἀν]τικλείδη[ν] Ἀντικλέο[υς] in line 2 being another 
ephebic officer (Reinmuth suggests a lochagos or a taxiarchos; Sekunda 1992, 337, rules 
out the former). These ephebes are not mentioned in the roster at the bottom of the 
inscription. Reinmuth 1971, 36, argues that with “three columns of names the extant 
stone would yield space for 30-33 names and demotics. If eight of the ca. ten demes of 
Pandionis were represented, 22-25 epheboi might have been listed which with the 
inclusion of the taxiarch and the five lochagoi would give a total of 28-31 epheboi for 
Pandionis in this year.” Elsewhere he gives another total – 55 ephebes – without 
explanation (23)! Reinmuth’s estimate must be regarded as a minimum, however, because 
the bottom edge of the stone is broken and consequently there is no certain way to 
determine the size of the tribal contingent. 
 
E16: The ephebes of Aigeis 
Date:    Enrollment Year: 331/0. Inscription: 330/29. 
Find Spot:   Rhamnous (EM 4218). 
Bibliography: Petrakos 1982, vol. I, 336. Schwenk 1985, no. 46. Stanton 1996, 
344-5; Petrakos 1999, 85-6, no. 99. SEG 34.151 = 35.239 = 46.248 
= 49.192. Petrakos joined fragments to IG II2 1181, showing that it 
was ephebic and from Rhamnous (Kirchner supposed a deme 
decree from Sounion).  
Description:  Front side of base of Pentelic marble with moulding on the top (H. 
0.53 m.; W. 0.29 m.; Th. 0.197 m.). L.H. 0.006 m. 
Text:    Non-Stoichedon. 
 
Front:  
 οἱ ἔφηβοι οἱ τῆς Αἰγηίδ[ο]ς οἱ ἐπὶ Ἀριστοφάνους ἄρχον- 
 [τος] καὶ ὁ σωφρονιστὴ[ς τού]των Θαρρίας Θαρριάδου 
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3 [Ἐρχιεὺς — — — — — — — — —] ἔ̣θ̣υ̣εν ἐφ’ ὑγιείαι καὶ σωτη- 
 [ρίαι — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]νιδο[….τ]οῦ δήμου. 
 [— — — — — — — — — — —]Λ[.]ΣΜ[…] 
 Right Side: 
 [— — — — — — —]ΟΛΕΟΥ[— — — — — — —] 
 [— — — — — — —]Φ[.]Ρ[.]ΟΥ[— — — — — —] 
3 [— — — — — — — — — — —]ΝΟ[— — — —] 
 
Notes: Petrakos does not include Kirchner’s reading of Ε̣Κ̣Α̣ in line 5. What is the 
singular subject of ἔ̣θ̣υ̣εν? I suggest that it was the sophronistes and consequently line 3 
could be restored as [Ἐρχιεὺς ἀνέθεσαν. Θαρρίας δὲ] ἔ̣θ̣υ̣εν. If so, for whose health 
and safety (ἐφ’ ὑγιείαι καὶ σωτη[ρίαι) Tharrias is sacrificing? It could be the 
Rhamnousians, if we assume that the ephebes of Aegeus were stationed at the fort in their 
second year of service, although Nemesis is a possibility. Much about the inscription is 
unclear: there is no ready explanation for —]νιδο[….τ]οῦ δήμου, even if we adopt the 
following reading νιδο[ς καὶ τ]οῦ δήμου.  
 
E17: A dedication to Hermes. 
Date:    Inscription: 330/29 or later (Archon). 
Find Spot:   Western side of Southern slope at Rhamnous (EM 12698). 
Bibliography: Reinmuth 1971 no. 11 = IG II2 4594a. Petrakos 1984 (1988), 208-
9; 1999, 86-7, no. 100. SEG 12.165 = 31.179 = 38.188. 
Description:  Fragment of Hymettian marble base (H: 0.2 m.; W: 0.647 m.; Th: 
0.57 m.) with cutting for a socle of a statue or column. Ornate 
lettering. L.H. 0.019 m. (lines 1-2), 0.006-0.01 m. (lines 3-5). 
Text:    Non-Stoichedon. 
 
 [Θε]οφάνης Ἱεροφῶν̣τιδτος Ῥαμνούσιος Ἑρμεῖ [ἀν]έθηκεν στεφανωθε[ὶς] 
 ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφήβων καὶ τῶν σοφρονιστῶν καὶ τῶν κοσμητῶν. 
    in coronae oleaginae 
 ἔφηβοι   ἔφηβοι   ἔφηβοι 
      οἱ ἐπὶ Νικοκράτου   οἱ ἐπὶ Νικήτου        οἱ ἐπὶ Ἀριστοφάνου 




Notes: A unique inscription in that the ephebes and ephebic officals from three 
enrollment years are collectively honoring a citizen who was not part of the ephebeia (the 
inscription alludes to no office). While is not ephebic, it should nevertheless be included 
in the corpus because of its connection with the ephebeia. Petrakos dates the dedication to 
331/0, but this is the ephebes’ enrollment year, not the end of their military service. 
Consequently the inscription must be dated to 330/29 or after.  
 
E18: The ephebes of Oineis. 
Date:    Enrollment Year: 330/29? (Proposography). Inscription: 329/8? 
Find Spot:  Bedrock at bottom of Valerian Wall in Agora (Agora Inv.No. I 
5250). 
Bibliography:  Reinmuth 1971 no. 12 = Pritchett 1949, 273-8. 
Description:  Stele of Hymettian marble (H: 1.154 m.; W: 0.3 m.; Th: 0.152 m.), 
complete except for the top front, with crowning bead molding and 
a cutting for a herm (H. 0.114 m.; W 0.06 m.). L.H. 0.007 m. 
Text:    Non-Stoichedon. 
 
 — — — — —— — — — —— — — — —— — — — —— — — — —— —  
 Col. I:        Col. II: 
 [demoticum]       [— — — — — —] 
 [— — — — — —]      [— — — — — —] 
 [— — — — — —]     40 [Ἀχαρνεῖς] 
5 [— — — — — —]        [Σώστρατος] 
   Νικομένης         Εὔθοινος 
 Βουτάδαι         Τιμοκλῆς 
   Ἅβρων         Ἱπποθέρσης 
   Θεαῖος      45   Ἀριστοφάνης 
10 Τυρμεῖδαι         Θεόφιλος 
   Δημοφάνης         Λέων 
 Φυλάσιοι         Δημόφιλος 
   Ἀριστοφῶν         Εὐθύμαχος 
   Διότιμος      50   Ἀριστοτέλης 
15   Λεπτίνης         Κηφισογένης 
   Σωκράτης         Ναυκύδης 
   Αὐτοκλῆς         Ἀντιφάνης 
   Ἐπικράτης         Δ̣ιόδωρος 
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 Περιθοῖδαι      55   Ἐχέμυθος 
20   Φιλέας         Φίλιππος 
 Ὀῆθεν          Μνησίας 
   Ἀριστόδημος        Δημοκήδης 
   Νέων          Δεισίθεος 
   Δήμων      60   Λυσικράτης 
25   Καλλιφῶν         Ἡγήτωρ 
   Ἀγαθοκλῆς         Εὐθυκλῆς 
 Λακιάδαι         Πυθοκλῆς 
   Κτησίας         Ὀλυμπιόδωρος 
   Θεόπομπος      65 Κοθωκίδαι 
30 Θριάσιοι         Δορκεύς 
   Εὔβουλος         Ἀριστόνικος 
   Τελεσίβουλος        Ἅβριππος 
   Εὔβουλος         Μνησικλῆς 
   Χιωνίδης 
35 Πτελεάσιοι 
   Εὐπόλεμος 
   Σωσίπολις 
 vacat        vacat 
70 Κηφισογένην        Χιωνίδην 
   Ἀχαρνέα       75   Θριάσιον 
 vacat        vacat 
 Ἅβρωνα       Σώστρατον 
 Βουτάδην       Ἀχαρνέα 
      Φίλιππον 
     79 Ἀχαρνέα 
 
 Right Side:       Left Side: 
 Χειμέα        Ναυκύδην 
 σωφρονιστήν       Διογένους 
 vacat         vacat 
3 Φίλιππον      6 Φιλημονίδην 
          στρατηγόν 
          vacat 
          Κηφίσιππον 
        9 ἀκοντιστήν 
 
Notes: The prosopographical details of the inscription on the ephebes Habron, probably 
Lycurgus’ son, of the deme Boutidai (Col. I, lines 8, 72-3), Pythocles Arcarneus (Col. II, 
line 63), and the sophronistes Chemeus, suggest a date c. 330/29 (Pritchett 1949, 273, 
275; Reinmuth 1971, 44-5; Merker 1986, 42). The identification of Φίλιππον, without 
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patronymic, on Right Side, line 3, is unclear. He cannot be an ephebe because Φίλιππον 
Ἀχαρνέα is attested on Left Side, lines 78-9. Hence he must be the kosmetes, a strategos, 
or a didaskalos, but it is impossible to determine this (Reinmuth 1971, 48). The extant 
roster lists 52 ephebes, organized into two columns with 25 under two unknown demes 
(one of which must be Acharnae on account of its huge contingent of twenty-four 
ephebes), and the remainder under nine demes. Pritchett 1949, 273, suggests that there is 
enough space for up to six more ephebes or demotics between the molding and the top of 
the roster. Reinmuth 1971, 49-50, suggests that two of the three unrepresented small 
demes (Louisa, Hippotomadai, and Epikephisia) supplied contingents. We cannot be 
certain, however, whether all three did, so I estimate 55-56 ephebes for Oineus in this 
year.  
 
E19: The ephebes of an unknown tribe. 
Date:  Enrollment Year: 331/0 or 330/29 or 328/7. Inscription: 330/29 or 
329/8 or 327/6. 
Find Spot:   Oropos (Oropos Inv.No. A 395). 
Bibliography:  Petrakos 1980, 28, no. 5. Petrakos 1997, 270, no. 352. 
Description:  Fragmentary base of white marble (H. 0.115 m.; W. 0.16 m.; Th. 
0.145 m). L.H. 0.012 m. 
Text:  Petrakos’ photograph of the fragment (1997, plate 41) suggests that 
it was non-stoichedon. 
 
 [Οἱ ἐφηβεύσαντες ἐπὶ Εὐθυκ]ρί[του ἄρχοντος οἱ τῆς] 
 [— — — ίδος καὶ ὁ σ]ωφρονιστὴ[ς— — — — — — ] 
 [— — — — — — ἀνέθ]εσαν τῶι Ἀμ[φιαράωι στεφανω]- 
 [θέντες ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς] κ̣α̣ὶ τοῦ δή[μου]. 
 
Notes: Petrakos’ restoration of οἱ ἐφηβεύσαντες should be rejected because it is 
unattested in the ephebic corpus until the third century (IG II2 665 [266/5], line 7). Given 
that ..]ρι[.. must be part of an archon’s name rather than a tribe’s, the following are 
possible, each used in prescripts in the Lycurgan period: (1) [οἱ ἔφηβοι οἱ τῆς tribe ca. 
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8-10 οἱ ἐπὶ ..ca.1-5..]ρι[….ca.3-9… ἂρχοντος (cf. E2 and E5) or (2) [tribe ca. 8-10 
ἔφηβοι οἱ ἐπὶ ..ca.1-5..]ρι[….ca.3-9… ἂρχοντος (cf. E4 and E21). Petrakos dates the 
inscription to the archonship of Εὐθυκρίτης (328/7), though he does not explain why we 
should choose Εὐθυκρίτης over the other two candidates for archon, namely 
Ἀριστοφάνης (331/0) and Ἀριστοφῶν (330/29). All three archon-dates are possible, 
however, because only the heading is preserved and we do not have any prosopographical 
information. Nor can we determine which tribe is being honored for their military 
service. With these caveats in mind, I suggest the following restoration, having examined 
Petrakos’ photograph:  
 
[Οἱ ἔφηβοι οἱ τῆς tribe ca. 8-10 οἱ ἐπὶ Ἀ]ρί[…6-8… ἄρ]- 
[χοντος ἐνγραφέντες καὶ ὁ σ]ωφρονιστὴ[ς name ca. 9] 
[patronymic ca. 9, demotic ca. 9 ἀνέθ]εσαν τῶι Ἀμ[φιαρά]- 
[ωι στεφανωθέντες ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς] κ̣α̣ὶ τοῦ δή[μου]. 
 
E20: The ephebes of Leontis. 
Date:  Enrollment Year: 332/1-326/5 (Prosopography); Inscription: 
331/0-325/4. 
Find Spot:  East of statue base for Agrippa in the Amphiaraion at Oropus 
(Oropus Inv.No. 344). 
Bibliography: Reinmuth 1971 no. 15 = Leonardos 1918, 73-100, nos. 95-7; 
Petrakos 1997, 270-281, no. 353. SEG 37.233 = 39.186. 
Description:  Limestone base with molding top and bottom (H. 0.73 m.; W. 
0.485 m.; Th. 0.335 m.). Nine circles on the left and right sides 
honor nine officials. L.H. on Face 0.012 m. (line 1), 0.004-0.007 
m. (lines 2-84). L.H. on sides 0.008 m. 
Text:    Non-Stoichedon.  
 
 ΛΟΧΑΓΟI 
 Ἡγέστ[ρ]ατος Κλείππου, Ἁ[γ]νίας Μακαρτά[τ]ου, Πασιφῶν Παντήνορος 
 Ἀρχέπολις Παντήνορος, Παράμυθος Ἀντιγένου, Σωσίστρατος 
 Σωσιστράτου, Λυσανίας Μόλωνος, Δ[ω]σί[θ]εος Ἀντιγένου, 
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5 Φο[ρ]ύσκος Τιμοκράτου, Σωσικλῆς Σωσιστράτου, Τιμήσιος Σημωνίδου. 
 Col. I:      Col. II: 
 Φρεάριοι Εὔπολις Καλλιάδου   vacat 
   Ἀλκίμαχος Καλλιμάχου   Ποτάμιοι ὑπένερθεν 
   Διόδωρος Καλλιμάχου     Παράμυθος Ἀντιγένου 
   Πασιφῶν Παντήνορος     Ἐπικράτ[η]ς Ἀριστοκράτου 
10   Ἀρχέπολις Παντήνορος   Σκαμ[β]ωνίδαι 
   Ἕρμιππος Πυθέου      Δωσίθεος Ἀντιγένου 
   Εὔπολις Καλλιάδου      Ταυρέας Αἰσίμου 
   Ξενοκράτης Ἀντιρήτου     Ποτάμιοι καθύπερθεν 
   Σώστρατος Φιλοκήδου     Δημοφάνης Ἀρ[ι]στ[ο]φάνου 
15   Ἀρχιάδης Ἀρχίππου   Αἰθαλίδαι 
   Θρασυκλῆς Θράσωνος     Ἐξώπιος Φαιδρίου 
   Πυθόδωρος Δημ[ο]κλέους   Ποτάμιοι Δειραδιῶται 
   Σμικρίας Ἐπι[…ο]υ       Πύρρος [Π]ανγκλέους 
 [Ὑ]βά[δ]αι       [Φ]ιλόφρων Πανγκλέ[ου]ς 
20   Μενεστρατίδης Ἱπποστράτου    [….]μων Ξενο[κ]λ[έους] 
   Λύκαιος Λυκαίου      [Ε]ὔανδρος [Ε]ὐάν[δρ]ου 
   Φρύνιχος Φρυναίου     Σωσιγένης Σ̣ώ̣[σο]υ̣ 
   Ἡγίας Ἡγίου    Σουνιε[ῖς] 
   Ἀπολλόδωρ[ος] Λυσιστρ[άτ]ου    Ἡγέ[στρατος Κλείππ]ου 
25 Χολλεῖδαι       Σωσικλῆς Σωσ[ιστ]ρά[τ]ου 
   Λυσίστρατος Λυσικρ[ά]τους    Σωσίστρατος [Σωσισ]τ[ρά]του 
   φί[…]ος Αἰσχύνου      Τ[ιμ]ήσιος Σ[ημωνίδ]ου 
   Ἀμύντης Σωδάμου      Ναυσίφιλος Κίμωνος 
   Ναῦσις Γνάθωνος      Διονύσιππος Εὐαγγέλου 
30 Ἑκαλεῖς       Μειδωνίδης Περικλέους 
   Λυσιφῶν Φιλί[σ]κου     Ἀρχέδειπνος Νικοδήμου 
 Πήληκες       Θάλλιππος Εὐαγγέλου 
   Ἱεροκλῆς Φεί[δ]ωνος     Δημοφῶν Εὐξένου 
   φιλῖνος Χαιρεστράτου   Δειραδιῶται 
35 Κήττιοι       Λυσανίας [Μ]όλωνος 
   Λυσίστρατος Ε[ὐ]ξένου     Λευκονοῆς 
   Ἀπφιτελίδης Φιλοκράτου     Φο[ρ]ύσκος Τιμο[κρ]άτους 
   Σμίκυθος Ξενοκλέους     Δήμαρχος Ἀριστάνδρου 
   Σωσίστρατος Σω[σ]τράτου    Θαρρέας Σατύρου 
40   Τιμόστρατος Τιμοκράτου     Ξαιρεφῶν Καλλιστράτου 
   Ἐπικράτης Σπο[υ]δίου     Καλλίστρατος Σωτέλου 
 Col. III: 
 vacat 
 ἐξ Οἴου 
   Ἁγνίας Μακαράτου 
   Στράτων Στρατωνίδου 
10 Εὐπυρίδαι 




   Αἰσχύλος Πρωτομάχο 
   Θεόδωρος Ἀμφιμάχο[υ] 
 
 Left Side:  
 [τούσ]δε ἐστεφ[ά]νωσαν οἱ ἔφηβοι· 
 στρατηγὸν τὸν    σωφρονιστὴν 
3 ἐπὶ τεῖ χώραι 
 in a circle    in a circle 
 Λεωσ(θ)ένην     Θυμοχάρην 
 Λεωσ(θ)ένου   12 Δημοχάρου 
6 Κεφαλῆθεν    Λευκονέα 
 in a circle    in a circle  
 ἐπιμεληταὶ    διδάσκαλον 
 οἱ ἐν τοῖς   15 Πυθα[— —] 
9 [φ]ρουρίοις    [..ca.5…]οκλέου 
       Δεκελέα 
    in a cricle 
18 Λυσίστρατον 
 Εὐξένου 
    Κήττιον 
 
 Right Side: 
 τούσδε ἐστεφάνωσαν οἱ ἔφηβοι 
 in a circle    in a circle 
 στρατηγὸν     στρατηγὸν 
3 ἐπ[ὶ] τῶι Πειραεῖ   12 ἐπὶ τει Ἀκτεῖ 
 Δικαιογένην    Φερεκλείδην 
       Φερεκλέους 
6 Κυδαθηναέα   15 Περιθοίδην 
 in a circle    in a circle 
 κοσμητὴν    ἐπιμελητὴν 
 Φιλοκλέα    Νικόδωρον 
9 Φορμίωνος   18 Φιλοθήρου 
 Ἐροιάδην     Ἀχαρνέα 
 
Notes: Lewis 1973, 255, observes that “the inscription is certainly incomplete as it stands, 
with dedicatory formula.” A variety of dates have been proposed: Pélékidis 1962, 138-
143, dates it somewhere between 330-322. Other estimates fall into this range. Bosworth 
1988a, 293-4, favors a date of 329/8 (see also Tracy 1995, 25-6, 93, 119), while Gomme 
1933, 69, argues for 327/6-326/5 and Leonardos 1918, 96-7, the editio princeps, suggests 
324/3, as does Reinmuth 1971, 69-72. The inscription was first dated to 324/3 because 
Dikaiogenes of Kydathenaion is attested as strategos of the Piraeus (Right Side, Col. I, 
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lines 2-6) and there is epigraphic evidence that he held the same office in 325/4 (IG II2 
1631, lines 214-5). But Dikaiogenes was also strategos in 324/3 (IG II2 1631, lines 380-
1), although his area of responsibility, if he had one, is unspecified. Also, if Dikaiogenes 
was strategos of the Piraeus in 325/4, then Λεωσ(θ)ένης Λεωσ(θ)ένου Κεφαλῆθεν, 
who is honored as strategos of the countryside (Left Side, lines 2-6), almost certainly the 
same man who led Athenian forces in the Lamian War (see Davies 1971, 342-4, no. 
9142), must have served in this capacity in 324/3. But Leosthenes could not have been 
strategos of the countryside and have commanded the mercenaries at Taenarum at the 
same time (D.S. 17.111.3), because the former office was exclusively concerned with 
defense of Attica ([Arist]. Ath.Pol. 61.1). Nor could he have held this office in the next 
year (323/2), since he had died by the summer of 322 (IG II2 1631, lines 601-2).  
Another reason to suppose a date of 324/3 is the identification of the kosmetes 
Φιλοκλὴς Φορμίωνος Ἐροιάδης (Right Side, lines 6-10) with the Philocles 
(patronymic and deme unknown) who was strategos at the Munychia in 325/4 and who 
was prosecuted for allowing Harpalus to enter Athens against the orders of the demos, 
found guilty, and then exiled (Din. 3 Against Philocles, passim; Dem. Ep. 3.31-2). While 
Dinarchus does say that Philocles was removed from the “care of the ephebes (ἐπιμελεία 
τῶν ἐφήβων)” (3.15), this Philocles should nevertheless be regarded as a seperate 
individual from the kosmetes because (1) ἐπιμελεία can refer any official serving in the 
ephebeia (e.g. E5, lines 1-11: for ἐπιμελεία as a virtue “for those who trained or looked 
after ephebes,” see Whitehead 1993, 68-9), (2) Philocles is a common name in Athens 
(Gomme 1933, 68; Tracy 1995, 25, n. 22), and (3) any attempt to link Philocles the 
kosmetes and the strategos results in chronological difficulties which cannot be resolved 
(Reinmuth 1971, 73-6; Worthington 1986, 63-76; 1989, 80-2).  
 The above suggests that the ephebes cannot have been enrolled in 325/4 or 324/3. 
What, then, is the date of the inscription? Bosworth 1988a, 294, and Tracy 1995, 24-5, 
argue that it should instead be dated to 329/8, on the occasion of the first penteteric 
festival at the sanctuary of Amphiaraus at Oropus. But it is just as likely that the ephebes 
were enrolled in the archonship of Chremes (326/5) and had made the dedication at the 
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second pentateric festival in 325/4. This is in fact Reinmuth’s supposition, though he 
incorrectly dates the festival to 324/3 (1971, 70-1; Lewis 1973, 255, corrects Reinmuth to 
325/4). There is no compelling reason, however, to prefer one particular date over any 
other. Consequently I date the inscription to 331/0-325/4, with the ephebes’ enrollment 
year occurring between 332/1 and 326/5 (it cannot be 333/2 because E8 dates to that year 
and it must date after 333/2 because ephebic lochagoi are attested). 
 
E21: The ephebes of Hippothontis. 
Date:  Enrollment: 332/1 or 325/4 (Archon restored). Inscription: 331/0 
or 324/3. 
Find Spot:   Panactum (Panakton 1991-350). 
Bibliography:  Unpublished (courtesy of Mark Munn). SEG 38.67. 
Description:  Rectangular marble base (H. 0.39 m.; W. 0.54 m.; Th. 0.37 m.) 
smoothed (right side broken and lower left side of face eroded) 
with a rectangular cutting for a dedication (W. 0.22 m.; B. 0.18 m.; 
D: 0.047 m.). 
Text: (Description) A heading of two lines followed by four(?) wreaths which honor an 
unknown official, probably a strategos, followed by the sophronistes, the kosmetes, and 
the ephebic taxiarchos. Underneath these officials, in the center of the stone, are two 
more wreaths, each of which honors an ephebic lochagos. The roster is organized into 
two columns, one to the right of and the other below the lochagoi, in which 19 names are 
preserved. Hansen 1994, 302, n. 24, for some reason gives c. 34 names on the roster. 
Notes: Munn’s restoration for the prescript is [Ἱπποθω]ν̣τ̣ίδο̣ς [ἔφηβοι οἱ ἐπὶ 
Νι]κ̣[οκράτους ἄρχο]ντος Διὸς vv [κο]ύ̣ρ̣οις ἀ̣[νέ]θε[σαν]. The enrollment year 
cannot have been 333/2, however, because the kosmetes in the archonship of Nicocrates 
is ….8…. Αἰνησιστρά]του Ἀχαρνέα (E8, Col. II, lines 12-3), not Κτησικλῆν 
Κόπρειον honored in wreath no. 3. Through private correspondence, Munn has informed 
me that the average center-to-center distance for the first two lines is 1.29 cm. I suggest 
that this would leave a distance of about 16.5-17 cm, or 13-15 letters between the sigma 
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and the kappa in line one. If so, Nicetes (332/1) or Anticles (325/4) are possibilities. The 
prosopographical details on the ephebes (esp. Μνησίθειος Κόπ[ρειος] and his family c. 
350-260: see Traill 1995-2004, nos. 656325-656340) do not allows us to determine which 
archon-year is correct. 
 
E22: The ephebes of Acamantis. 
Date:  Enrollment Year: 333/2-323/2 (Ephebic Officers). Inscription: 
332/1-322/1. 
Find Spot:  Northwest of Theater and South of Citadel Wall at Rhamnous (EM 
13200). 
Bibliography:  Reinmuth 1971 no. 14 = McLeod 1959, 121-6. Petrakos 1999, 89-
90, no. 103.  
Description:  Upper right corner of white sugary marble pillar crowned with 
cavetto capital. Top is rough picked, sides and back smoothly 
finished. Dedication secured with dowel hole. H. 307 m.; W. 
0.155m; Th. 0.216 m. L.H. 0.007 m. (lines 1-2), 0.005 m. (lines 3-
15).  
Text:    Non-Stoichedon. 
 
 [οἱ ἔφηβοι στεφ]ανωθέντες ὑπὸ 
 [τῆς βουλῆς καὶ το]ῦ δήμου vac. 
 infra abacum 
 vacat 
 [ταξίαρχ]ος 
 [— — — — — — — — — —]κου Θορίκιος 
5 [λοχαγ]οί 
 [— — — — — — — — — —]ου Προσπάλτιο[ς] 
 [— — — — — — — Ἀ]γνούσιος 
 [— — — — — — — — —ο]υς Χολαργεύς 
 [— — — — — — — κρ]άτους Θορίκιος 
10 [— — — — — — — — —Κ]ε̣φαλῆθεν 
 [— — — — — — — — —ο]υ[ς] Χολαργεύς 
 [— — — — — — — — — Σ]φήττιος 
 [— — — — — — — — — —]ς Θορίκιος 
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 [— — — — — — ἐκ Κ]εραμείων 
15 [— — — — — — — — — Θ]ορίκιος 
 vacat  
 
Notes: Preserves the heading and a list of ephebic taxiarchoi and lochagoi. This suggests 
that the ephebes were enrolled c. 333/2-324/3 because ephebic officers are attested from 
the archonship of Nicocrates. 
 
E23: The ephebes of Leontis. 
Date:    Enrollment Year: 334/3-323/2 (Lycurgan). 
Find Spot:   Panactum (Panakton 1988-1). 
Bibliography:  Unpublished (courtesy of Mark Munn). SEG 38.67. 
Description:  Fragment of marble stele left edge preserved but other three sides 
broken (H. 0.24 m.; W. 0.12 m.; Th. 0.055-0.06 m.). L.H. 0.0055 
m. (lines 1-9, 22-29), 0.004 m. (lines 10-21).  
Text: (Description) Non-stoichedon. One column is preserved which lists 16 ephebes 
under five deme headings (Deiradiotai, Kropidai, Sophon Chenarchou, ex Oiou, and 
Potamioi). These show that the ephebes come from Leontis. If there were two columns on 
the stone, then the contingent would have numbered at least 32 ephebes and perhaps 
many(?) more. Above the roster is the fragmentary text of two decrees. This suggests that 
the dedication was similar to the more substantial ephebic inscriptions of E2, E8, and 
E14. The genitive of the name σ]τρατου appears in line 6, which could be the 
patronymic of the sophronistes, but this is uncertain.  
Notes: The date of the inscription is unclear. The ephebe Θεοτιμίδης Ἀστυνόμου ἐξ 
Οἲου (line 22) (Traill 1995-2004, no. 510143) apparently belongs to a family known 
epigraphically in the fourth- and third-centuries and whose names alternate between 
Astynomos and Lysiades (for a summary of the family tree, see SEG 32.559). 
Theotimides’ father Astynomos son of Lysiades was active c. 350-310 (IG II2 1553; 
3831) and his grandson of the same name was a proxenos honored at Thermon c. 280-260 
(IG II2 3832). The son Lysiades son of Astynomos is unattested but was perhaps born in 
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the late 350’s. If so, Theotimides may have been the younger son of this Lysiades and 
perhaps born c. 350-342.  
 
E24: The ephebes of Leontis. 
Date:    Enrollment Year: 334/3-323/2 (Lycurgan). 
Find Spot:   Panactum (Panakton 1992-400). 
Bibliography:  Unpublished (courtesy of Mark Munn).  
Description:  Fragment of Pentelic marble stele with broken top and left. Right 
side rough picked with front face worn (H. 0.315 m.; W. 0.205 m.; 
Th. 0.095 m.). L.H. 0.006 m.  
Text: (Description) Non-stoichedon? The (bottom?) of the roster lists 15 ephebes under 
seven demes (Hybadai, Paionidai, Aithalidai, Pelekes, Euripidai, Kolones, and ex Oiou) 
and one unknown deme. While the find spot and the arrangement of the roster shows that 
the inscription is Lycurgan, the prosopographical details are insufficient to date the stone 
with greater precision.  
  
E25: The ephebes of an unknown tribe. 
Date:    Inscription: 334/3-322/1? (Lycurgan). 
Find Spot:   Marathon. 
Bibliography:  Mastrokostas 1970, 19. Michaud 1970, 919. SEG 32.106. 
Description:  Rectangular stone base with top right hand side broken (H. 0.81 
m.; W. 0.43 m.; Th. 0.34 m.).  
Text:    Non-Stoichedon. 
 
 οἵδε ἀνέθεσαν Σ ̣[— — —] 
 ωνος παιδοτριβοῦν̣[τος] 
 Μοσχίων    Κλεομέδ[ων] 
 Π̣είσων  
5 Οὐλιάδη[ς — — — — — —] 




Notes: Mastrokostas suggests a fourth-century date for the inscription. A candelabra was 
found nearby with a relief of lampadephoroi on each side, suggesting that the victorious 
tribal team of the unknown tribe dedicated E25 after a torch-race. He identifies the stone 
as follows: “Στάμου λιθίνη Βάσις … φέρουσα ἀνάθεσιν ἐφήβων.” Michaud 1970 
and Marcellus 1994, 250, concur, though the latter has misgivings. There is no mention, 
however, of ἔφηβοι, unlike E6 and E10. This leaves open the possibility that it could be 
pre-Lycurgan (cf. IG II2 1250). But if it is ephebic, it must date to the Lycurgan period, 
because later ephebic inscriptions are not attested outside of Athens. After the heading a 
roster lists four ephebes(?) arranged in two columns without patronymics and demotics. 
The contingent may have come from Aiantis, given that it was found at Marathon, which 
is a deme of that tribe.  
 
E26: The ephebes of an unknown tribe. 
Date:    Enrollment Year: 334/3-323/2 (Lycurgan). 
Find Spot:   Amphiaraion at Oropos (Oropos Inv.No. 563). 
Bibliography: Petrakos 1980, 26, no. 12. Petrakos 1997, 281, no. 354. SEG 
31.435. 
Description:  Fragment of the top of a Pentelic marble base (H. 0.44 m.; W. 
0.165 m.; Th. 0.105 m.). L.H. 0.014 m. 
Text: 
  
   οἱ ἐφηβ[εύσαντες— — — ] 
 
Notes: Petrakos’ alternative reading of οἱ ἔφηβ[οι οἱ τῆς — — ιδος — — ], should be 
preferred to the above restoration (see E19 above).  
 
E27: The ephebes of an unknown tribe. 
Date:    Enrollment Year: 334/3-323/2 (Lycurgan). 
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Find Spot:  South of Tower C of the south gate at Rhamnous (Rhamnous 
Inv.No. 930). 
Bibliography: Petrakos 1990 (1993), 29, no. 12. Petrakos 1999, 90, no. 104. SEG 
41.139. 
Description:  Fragment of a “Hermiac” Pentelic marble base with incisions at the 
top and at right-hand face (H. 0.76 m.; W. 0.76 m.; Th. 0.185 m.). 
L.H. 0.012 m. 
Text:    Two lines are reserved on the left side. 
 
   οἱ ἐφη[β— — — ] 
    [— — — ]ιος 
 
E28: The ephebes of an unknown tribe. 
Date:    Enrollment Year: 334/3-323/2 (Lycurgan). 
Find Spot:   Rhamnous (Rhamnous Inv.No. 1018). 
Bibliography: Petrakos 1991, 48, no. 20. Petrakos 1999, 87-7, no. 101. SEG 
43.67 = 49.193. 
Description:  Fragment of a base, remnants of an erased ephebic dedication on 
left and right sides. L.H. 0.005 m. (left side) 0.014 m. (right side). 
Text: 
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